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COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 


COLLAPSE 


AND 


RECONSTRUCTION 

EUROPEAN  CONDITIONS  AND 
AMERICAN  PRINCIPLES 


BY 


SIR  THOMAS  BARCLAY 

AUTHOR   OF 

"PROBLEMS    OF    INTERNATIONAL   PRACTICE   AND   DIPLOMACY" 

"NEW   METHODS    OF   ADJUSTING   INTERNATIONAL 

DISPUTES   AND   THE  FUTURE,"   ETC. 


non-referT 


pqwvad  •  ais 


■   «  * »    *    » 


BOSTON 
LITTLE,  BROWN,  AND  COMPANY 

1919 


^•^ 

-> 

^-. 


Copyright,  1919, 
Bt  Little,  Brown,  and  Compant. 


All  rights  reserved 


Set  up  and  electrotyped  by  J.  S.  Gushing  Co.,  Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


PREFACE 

It  would  be  pretentious  to  offer  in  a  short  and 
single  volume  more  than  suggestions  on  so  vast  a 
subject  as  the  political  reconstruction  of  a  Europe 
which  the  continuance  of  the  War  beyond  any  prac- 
tical purpose  but  destruction  has  shattered  to  its 
foundations. 

It  is  futile  now  to  express  regrets  that  those  in 
power  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  the  warnings  of  others 
who  had  at  any  rate  some  knowledge  of  Central 
Europe,  Russia  and  the  Balkans,  —  to  warnings 
as  to  the  probable  consequences  of  the  break-up 
especially  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire,  or  of 
indifference  to  the  aspirations  of  the  Russian  prole- 
tariat, or  to  the  meaning  of  social  democracy  and  — 
as  they  are  likely  to  do  now  —  to  the  danger  of 
relying  on  superannuated  and  imperfect  sources 
of  information  and  methods  for  dealing  with  many 
unprecedented  problems. 

If  Western  Governments  had  not  had  their  eyes 
concentrated  on  Berlin,  they  might  have  under- 
stood, as  all  who  know  Central  Europe  politically 
understand,  that  if  the  overtures  of  February, 
1915,  from  Vienna  had  been  followed  up,  the  War 
might  have  come  to  an  end  just  as  it  did  with  the 
Austrian  collapse  in  1918,  without  bringing  down 
on  the  heads  of  all  the  scaffolding  of  a  state  system 
laboriously  built  up  by  generation  after  genera- 
tion of  experienced  craftsmen  and  resting  on  geo- 


428423 


vi  PREFACE 

graphical    and    historical    foundations    which    it    is 
beyond  the  power  of  any  congress  of  peace  to  alter. 

Empires  might  have  been  preserved  which,  what- 
ever their  faults,  were  in  process  of  transformation 
and  were  better  working  political  entities  than  any 
cut-and-dried  schemes  of  state  formation  now  on 
the  horizon  are  likely  to  become  except  by  a  process 
of  evolution  which  will  probably  bring  us  back 
eventually  to  something  very  like  what  has  been 
destroyed. 

A  historian  and  thinker  like  President  Wilson,  a 
careful  observer  like  M.  Jules  Cambon,  a  political 
sceptic  —  in  spite  of  his  apparent  optimism  —  like 
Mr.  Lloyd  George,  may  exercise  a  restraining  influ- 
ence on  the  impetuosity  of  those  who  think  the 
problems  of  constructive  politics  can  be  solved  by 
efforts  of  imagination  or  the  paper  schemes  of  in- 
genious draftsmen. 

I  have  followed  in  the  distribution  of  the  subject- 
matter  a  system  I  have  adopted  in  other  books  to 
the  satisfaction  of  my  readers,  —  that  of  confining 
the  text  of  the  chapter  to  controversial  matter  and 
shunting  digression,  historical  and  other,  into  special 
notes  which  are  consequently  sometimes  longer 
than  the  text  of  the  chapter  itself. 

The  principles  laid  down  by  President  Wilson 
have  been  accepted  by  both  sides  to  the  conflict  as 
peace  preliminaries.  They  are  mutually  binding  and 
constitute  for  the  time  being  the  basis  of  reconstruc- 
tion. Anybody  writing  at  present  on  the  subject 
has  no  option  but  to  treat  them  as  such. 

T.  B. 


CONTENTS 

PAQB 

PREFACE        V 

CHAPTER 

INTRODUCTION 1 

Note:  On  Imperial  Violation   of  German 

Constitution 15 

I.    PAST  AND  PRESENT 18 

Note  :  President   Wilson's   Proposition  as 

Accepted  by  the  Allies  .        .      26 

n.    FOREIGN  POLICY 32 

Note  :  On    Public    Opinion    and    Foreign 

Policy  in  England  ....      42 

Note  :  On   Interest   of   British   Press   on 

Foreign  Policy         ....      42 

Note  :  On  Germany's  and  Russia's  Geograph- 
ical Situation 43 

m.    DIPLOMACY,     SECRET    TREATIES     AND 

NEGOTIATIONS       ....      45 

Note:  Inviolability  of  Treaties;  Sugges- 
tions FOR  Addition  to  the  Agree- 
ment of  1871 54 

Note:  Suggested    Agreement    as    Regards 

Secret  Treaties  and  Clauses        .      55 

IV.    EVOLUTION   OF   UNITED   STATES'     FOR- 
EIGN POLICY         ....      58 

Note:  On  Panama  Canal       .        ...      77 

Note:  On  the  Mexican  Policy     ...      85 


viii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

V.  EQUALITY  OF  TRADE  CONDITIONS    .   88 

Note:  On  "Open-Door"  Policy    ...      93 

Note  :  European  Resources  of  Iron  Ore     .      97 

Note  :  On  the  State  of  British  Trade  Im- 
mediately before  the  War    .         ,      99 

Note:  On  Effect  of  "Most-Favoured-Na- 
tion" Clause  in  Commercial 
Treaties 100 

Note:  On  Russia  and  Poland        .        .        .    108 

Note:  On  Rumania,  Serbia  and  Monte- 
negro   112 

Note:  Treaty  and  Military  Convention 
BETWEEN  Rumania  and  the  Entente 
Powers 118 

VI.    COLONIAL  EXPANSION 126 

Note:  On  Consequences;  England's  Posi- 
tion as  a  Mother  of  Nations       .     134 

VII.    CONQUEST  AND  ANNEXATION  .        .        .135 

Note:  On  Language  as  a  Political  Ques- 
tion     140 

Note:  On  Alsace-Lorraine    ....    142 

Note  :  On  "Readjustment  of  the  Frontiers 

of  Italy" 152 

Vin.    FREEDOM  OF  NAVIGATION         .        .        .158 

Note:  On  Immunity  from  Capture  of  Pri- 
vate Property  in  Naval  War        .     166 

IX.    ARMAMENTS 178 

Note:  Suggested  Clauses  Respecting  Na- 
tionalisation of  Production  of 
Material  of  War    ....     185 


CONTENTS  ix 

CHAPTER  PAQB 

X.    LAW  OF  NATIONS 186 

Note:  On  Preambles  to  Different  Inter- 
national Conventions  Relating 
TO  War  and  Peace  .        .        .        .190 

Note:  Memorandum  of  a  Scheme  for  the 
Promotion  of  Law  and  Justice 
AMONG  Nations  by  Education        .     195 

XI.    NEUTRALISx\TION 202 

Note:  Suggested  Form  of  Agreement  as  to 

Proclamations  of  Neutralisation    210 

Note  :  On  Some  of  the  German  Theories 
Respecting  Neutralisation  and  Its 
Guarantees 213 

Note:  On  Buffer  Zones         ....    222 

Xn.    THE   HAGUE    COURT    AND   ITS   POTEN- 
TIALITIES         225 

Note:  Draft  Suggestions  of  a  Convention 
FOR  Improved  Organisation  of 
Hague  Conferences         .        .        .    247 

Xm.    BALANCE  OF  POWER  AND   FEDERATION    251 

Note  :  On  the  Problem  of  Austria-Hungary    253 
Note:  On  the  Ottoman  Empire     .        .        .    256 

Note  :  Allies'  Agreement  Relating  to  Con- 
stantinople AND   the  Straits  and 
FOR  Partition  of  Asia  Minor         .    260 
Note:  On  the  Question  of  Asia  Minor      .    261 
Note:  On  Imperial  Federation  and  India  .    263 

XIV.    A  SOCIETY  (OR  LEAGUE)  OF  NATIONS  .    269 

XV.    AMERICA'S  MISSION 305 

Note:  Some  Extracts  from  President  Wil- 
son's Messages  (January  to  April, 
1917) 312 


\ 


COLLAPSE  AND  RECON- 
STRUCTION 

INTRODUCTION 

The  task  which  the  World's  War  ^  has  imposed 
upon  statesmen  is  not  only  one  of  reconstruc- 
tion, it  is  one  of  reconstruction  on  such  a  plan  that 
it  will  eliminate  as  far  as  possible  causes  of  war  in 
the  more  immediate  future.  The  pretentious  for- 
mula of  a  "War  to  end  War"  is  not  based  on  knowl- 
edge we  possess  from  experience  either  psychological, 
sociological  or  historical.  If,  however,  the  "War 
to  end  War"  is  pretentious,  the  duty  of  statesmen 
will  none  the  less  be  to  redeem  the  failure  of  their 
own  generation   and   approach  the   future   with  a 

1 1  call  the  war  World's  War  because  it  is  the  English  rendering  of 
Guerre  Mondiale,  itself  probably  derived  from  the  German  term  Welt- 
krieg:  neither  term  is  based  on  Enghsh  or  French  analogies.  If  the 
term  Seven  Years'  War  had  not  already  taken  a  place  in  history,  it 
might  have  been  applicable  to  the  present  war,  the  origin  of  which 
historians  will  probably  date  back  to  September,  1911,  the  date  of  the 
outbreak  of  the  Turco-ItaUan  War,  since  when  the  continuity  of  causa- 
tion has  been  unbroken.  It  may  come  to  be  called  the  Great  War, 
but  if  other  wars  arise  almost  immediately  out  of  it,  as  is  possible  if  any 
settlement  is  attempted  which  is  not  sincerely  democratic  or  based  on 
geographical  and  economic  necessity,  historians  may  revert  to  the  time- 
honoured  method  of  calling  it  after  the  years  of  its  duration. 


2  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

sense  of  the  responsibility  they  have  incurred  towards 
posterity. 

The  duration  of  peace,  however,  is  dependent 
rather  upon  a  simultaneous  advance  of  the  reason- 
ableness of  mankind  than  upon  any  artifices  of 
statesmen  and  diplomatists. 

I  say  simultaneous  because  just  as  the  slowest 
ship  makes  the  pace  of  a  fleet,  so  the  most  back- 
ward nation  in  the  community  of  nations  makes  the 
pace  of  civilisation. 

But  even  assuming  a  relatively  high  degree  of 
civilisation  in  any  one  State,  the  majority  may  be 
easily  swayed  by  circumstances,  oratory,  prejudice, 
their  mental  balance  disturbed  by  over-education, 
the  rectitude  of  their  vision  vitiated  by  tradition 
and  the  different  influences  which  determine  the 
character  of  groups  of  mankind  just  as  they  do  that 
of  individuals. 

Moreover,  those  who  get  possession  of  power  and 
direct  a  national  policy  may  be  ignorant  persons  who 
have  entered  political  life  owing  to  connections  with 
those  already  in  possession  or  inexperienced  persons 
who,  having  had  to  perform  absorbing  menial  func- 
tions in  politics  for  the  sake  of  a  living,  have  had  no 
experience  outside  their  own  parliament  or  its  pur- 
lieus and  whose  training  has  been  one  of  obedience 
to  the  initiative  of  others.  These  necessarily  form 
the  majority  in  an  administration  recruited  from 
any  parliament. 

The  game  of  diplomacy,  again,  is  often  practically 
one  of  irritation  and  counter-irritation  disguised  in 


INTRODUCTION  S 

courteous  language.  Foreign  OflSces  are  generally 
too  absorbed  by  immediate  and  proximate  details 
to  observe  clouds  gathering  on  the  horizon.  None, 
I  may  say  in  this  connection,  worked  harder  than 
the  British  Foreign  Office  to  avert  the  crisis  when  it 
burst  upon  them.  It  is  neither  just  nor  expedient 
to  blame  men  in  office  when  such  a  crisis  arises. 
If  subject  for  blame  there  is,  let  it  apply  to  a  system 
which  has  persisted  in  all  European  countries  in 
spite  of  the  criticism  of  able  and  experienced  men  who 
have  lacked,  however,  the  numbers  and  prestige  to 
overturn  a  superannuated  system  of  dealing  with 
foreign  affairs. 

President  Wilson's  notes  and  messages  drew 
European  attention  to  the  difference  of  the  American 
method  but  did  not  at  once  win  approval.  Some 
European  critics  treated  the  American  method  as 
mere  cabotinage  and  it  is  only  gradually  that  Euro- 
peans have  begun  to  understand  that  in  America 
foreign  policy  is  not  regarded  as  involving  quite 
a  different  set  of  democratic  considerations  from 
domestic  policy,  in  reference  to  which,  in  all  self- 
governing  countries,  a  government  must  be  and 
remains  in  constant  touch  with  the  people  it  affects. 

Then  again  wars  are  gambles  of  nations.  The 
States  which  embark  on  them  believe  they  will  be 
successful ;  otherwise  we  must  assume  they  would 
not  so  act. 

They  are  seldom  unpopular.  They  appeal  to  the 
spoliative  instincts  of  mankind  because  they  are  in 
the  nature  of  gambling,  and  if  statesmen  and  writers 


4  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

criminal  enough  to  encourage  war  are  not  always 
condemned  as  they  ought  to  be,  they  are  not  dis- 
tinguishable from  abettors  of  gambling  hells  in  a 
well-ordered  community  except  in  the  scale  of  the 
enormity  of  the  offence. 

And  war  has  the  effect  on  men's  minds  of  all 
great  emotions.  It  seems  to  paralyse  the  power  to 
reason.  The  contagion  of  belligerent  emotion,  more- 
over, is  not  confined  to  the  belligerent  States ; 
it  is  almost  as  intense  among  neutral  nations  who 
watch  the  game,  and  carry  on  a  "war  of  opinion", 
almost  as  active  as  if  they  were  parties  to  the  struggle. 

The  expectation  that  war  will  fall  into  desuetude 
with  the  growth  of  popular  wisdom  and  of  the 
consciousness  that  its  consequences  are  not  ad- 
vantageous to  the  majority  may  therefore  not  be 
realised,  and  it  is  safer  to  assume  that  it  will  not, 
and  take  precautions  accordingly. 

It  is  true  that  it  was  a  commonplace  before  the 
War  to  speak  of  a  European  conflict  as  sooner  or 
later  inevitable.  The  state  of  tension  in  Europe 
had  become  unendurable.  Industrial  life  was  being 
vitiated  by  the  prevailing  unrest :  the  margin  of 
speculation  had  grown  far  out  of  its  natural  pro- 
portion. The  air  was  charged  with  tense  and 
aggressive  currents  of  feeling,  and  when  war  broke 
out  it  came  almost  as  a  relief  —  like  a  thunder 
clap  after  a  period  of  enervating,  sultry,  storm- 
threatening  weather. 

Yet  postponement  of  what  seems  an  inevitable 
event  in  the  history  of  nations  opens  up  a  variety 


INTRODUCTION  5 

of  possibilities.  Circumstances  may  change,  other 
solutions  may  occur  to  statesmen,  diplomatists, 
publicists,  politicians ;  a  reaction  may  set  in,  the 
tide  of  public  opinion  may  turn,  new  affinities 
may  grow  up,  a  common  cause  may  arise.  And 
thus  wars  may  be  avoided  by  mere  patience  and 
steady,  untiring  effort  on  the  part  of  those  in  charge 
of  the  destiny  of  nations. 

It  will  be  for  the  future  historian  when  he  has  ac- 
cess to  all  the  available  material  still  hidden  from 
the  public  eye  to  form  a  dispassionate  opinion  as 
to  whether  statesmen,  and  which  of  them,  failed ; 
where  the  system,  if  any,  broke  down ;  what  were 
the  causes  of  the  poor  quality  currently  attributed 
to  contemporary  statesmanship.  All  the  sciences, 
even  astronomy,^  may  have  a  voice  in  the  solution 
of  its  greatest  problem,  which,  after  all,  is  why  the 
War  took  place  at  all. 

Meanwhile,  those  who  have  to  deal  not  with 
history  but  with  construction  will  have  to  build  with 
the  materials  they  possess,  insufficient  as  they  may 
be.  If  they  sincerely  wish  to  secure  a  period  of 
peace  for  posterity  they  will,  nevertheless,  have  to 
search  for  causes  beyond  the  immediate  occasion 
of  the  War,  for  the  underlying  tendencies  which 
preceded  it  and  distinguish  between  the  inflammable 
material  and  the  igniting  flame  and  endeavour  to 
counteract  the  revival  of  situations  which  have 
proved  so  disastrous  to  mankind. 

A  perusal  of  the  diplomatic  records  issued  by  the 

*  See  Professor  Raphael  Dubois'  studies. 


6  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

different  Foreign  Offices  leaves  the  reader  under 
the  impression  that  the  War  had  no  justification 
whatsoever.  We  see  in  it  England  and  Russia 
making  the  most  strenuous  efforts  to  preserve  peace, 
France  playing  the  part  of  a  resigned  associate 
of  both,  ready  to  take  consequences  of  acts  to 
which  she  was  not  a  party,  Belgium  the  victim  of 
unprovoked  aggression,  Germany  trying,  down  to 
a  point,  to  preserve  peace,  then  vaguely  quarrelling 
with  Russia,  and  Austria,  on  the  eve  of  a  settlement 
of  the  originating  grievance,  aghast  at  the  course 
being  taken  by  events  she  had  started.  In  the 
whole  tangle  of  diplomatic  despatches  and  appeals, 
there  is  nothing  which  can  be  singled  out  as  a  matter 
justifying  war  except  the  violation  of  the  neutralisa- 
tion of  Belgium,  which  came  rather  as  a  consequence 
than  as  a  cause  of  the  War.  Hence  the  bewildered 
anxiety  with  which  the  Foreign  Offices  of  the  bel- 
ligerents all  tried  to  exonerate  their  respective 
governments  from  liability  for  a  war  which  they 
alleged  with  equal  emphasis  all  round  they  had  been 
doing  their  utmost  to  avoid. 

A  number  of  unofficial  writers  have  endeavoured 
to  explain  how  and  why  the  War  came  about  and 
much  ingenuity  has  been  exercised  to  gather  from 
the  different  official  books  evidence  of  the  guilt  of 
the  different  parties  involved.  It  was  the  Russian 
mobilisation,  says  Germany,  which  brought  on 
the  calamity.  It  was  Germany,  say  England  and 
France,  who,  impatient  not  to  let  the  chance  of 
war  escape,  hurried  into  it  while  Austria-Hungary, 
Russia  and  Serbia  were  still  negotiating  a  settlement 


INTRODUCTION  7 

and  had  practically  come  to  terms.  It  was  Eng- 
land, again  say  later  German  authorities,  who 
might  have  prevented  the  war  by  exercising  influ- 
ence at  Petrograd.  By  not  doing  so,  while  at  the 
same  time  protesting  her  devotion  to  peace,  she 
played  once  more  her  old  double-faced  game  and 
is  really  the  guilty  party,  and  so  on. 

These  attempts  to  saddle  blame  on  each  other 
are  interesting  features  for  the  historian  in  them- 
selves. It  is  possible  that  diplomacy  did  fail. 
It  is  also  possible  that  more  than  one  Government 
involved  did  not  bring  the  maximum  of  effort 
to  bear  on  the  preservation  of  peace.  It  is  possible 
again  that  there  were  arriere-pensees,  considerations 
of  a  compensating  charact^er,  which  brought  con- 
solation for  failure  in  the  effort  to  preserve  peace. 

The  different  objects  which  have  been  put  for- 
ward by  responsible  persons,  such  as  the  annihila- 
tion of  militarism  in  Germany,  the  destruction  of 
British  maritime  supremacy  and  other  ideas  only 
show  that  writers  are  still  groping  for  reasons. 
Among  tendencies  antecedent  to  the  War,  it  may, 
however,  be  remembered  that  the  German  nation 
had  drifted  into  a  state  of  great  irritability  through 
constant  appeals  to  its  patriotism,  appeals  without 
which  the  necessary  taxation  for  increasingly  heavy 
expenditure  on  armaments  would  probably  have 
appeared  to  the  German  people  and  their  repre- 
sentatives unjustifiable.  The  Morocco  incidents, 
especially  the  Agadir  affair,  excited  Germans,  as 
I  know  from  personal  experience,  to  such  demon- 


8  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

strati ve  anger  that  in  1911  war  was  only  prevented 
through  the  direct  action  of  the  Kaiser  himself. 
The  Germans  felt  that  their  enormous  and  well- 
trained  army  and  their  expensive  and  eflScient  fleet 
had  not  saved  them  from  a  humiliating  diplomatic 
defeat  at  the  hands  of  a  country  they  believed  them- 
selves capable  of  crushing  in  a  six  weeks'  campaign. 
The  intervention  of  England  in  1911  had  been  a 
warning,  but  the  circumstances  in  1914  were  dif- 
ferent. It  was  currently  stated  that  England  was 
no  longer  pledged  to  support  France  after  she  had 
come  into  possession  of  her  stake  under  the  arrange- 
ment of  1904.  In  these  circumstances,  the  absten- 
tion of  England  was  expected.  Germany,  however, 
had  forgotten  that  if  she  had  her  grievances  against 
England,  England  was  in  a  state  of  similar  irrita- 
bility owing  to  the  constant  increase  of  the  German 
navy  and  the  intimations  of  German  writers  re- 
corded by  excitable  English  writers  that  the  object 
of  these  increases  was  to  dispute  British  supremacy 
at  sea.  As  regards  other  countries,  in  France  a 
certain  number  of  wild  young  patriots  and  unwise 
older  ones  thought  that  to  excite  German  hostility 
was  good  sport.  As  a  fact,  however,  France  is 
involved  in  the  War  only  through  her  alliance  with 
Russia,  and  as  regards  Russia  herself,  it  is  difficult 
to  see  what  problem,  difficulty  or  ambition  it  was 
possible  to  solve  or  realise  by  a  war,  whatever  its 
result,  unless  dynastic  objects  were  concerned,  and 
in  that  case  the  German  declaration  of  war  may 
have  been  a  prolongation  of  the  life  of  a  tottering 
dynasty. 


INTRODUCTION  9 

Still,  while  actual  facts  warranting  recourse  to 
war  are  conspicuously  absent,  the  War  has  brought 
tendencies,  feelings  and  ambitions  to  the  surface 
which  are  now  so  strongly  marked  that  they  can 
only  be  accounted  for  by  the  assumption  that  they 
have  been  accumulating  energy  while  in  a  more  or 
less  latent  condition.  This  would  explain  the  extra- 
ordinary popularity  of  the  War  not  only  in  Germany, 
but  in  England  and  even  in  France  and,  if  I  am 
rightly  informed,  at  the  beginning  also  in  Russia 
and  Italy.  I  do  not,  in  saying  this,  mean  to  suggest 
that  the  War  might  not  have  been  averted  or  that 
it  is  less  a  calamity  because  it  appealed  to  different 
national  sentiments. 

As  between  Germany  and  England  it  has  been 
waged  with  an  animosity  so  unprecedented  that 
one  must  look  for  explanation  elsewhere  than  in 
the  more  or  less  factitious  hatred  begotten  of  war 
in  general.  On  the  German  side,  it  has  made 
thinkers  whose  processes  of  thought  have  influenced 
the  mind  of  man  throughout  the  world  belie  their 
intellectual  independence  and  assume  a  hostile 
attitude  towards  a  nation  whose  whole  polity  stands 
for  those  rights  of  independence  and  justice  which 
most  of  them  have  themselves  championed.  Among 
the  Anglo-Saxons,  it  has  taken  the  form  of  "black- 
guarding" the  enemy  in  a  manner  quite  foreign  to 
their  traditions  of  chivalry  and  sport.^ 

^  In  a  country  of  voluntary  service,  allowance  must  of  course  be 
made  for  the  fact  that  appeals  for  recruiting  purposes  are  necessarily 
highly  coloured  and  that  many  newspapers  actuated  by  the  patriotic 
desire  to  increase  the  multitude  of  our  fighting  forces  may  not  have  exer- 


10  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

Fortunately  for  civilisation  and  for  the  good  name 
of  England  and  America  these  exaggerations  of 
language  were  not  translated  into  action  and  the 
tradition  and  spirit  of  their  armies  in  spite  of,  per- 
haps on  account  of,  its  mainly  civilian  character, 
remained  as  chivalrous  and  sportsmanlike  as  ever. 

The  object  of  war  being  to  bring  it  to  its  own 
conclusion,  the  shorter  it  is  the  less  inconvenience 
it  causes  to  the  community  and  the  less  ultimate 
slaughter  and  suffering  to  the  forces  engaged. 
Unless  the  sources  from  which  it  can  be  sustained 
are  paralysed  and  the  trade  and  profit-earning 
resources  of  a  nation  crippled  so  that  the  war  can 
strike  at  the  national  revenue,  money  will  flow 
into  the  treasury  and  the  fighting  can  continue. 
The  civilian,  in  general,  claims  relative  exemption 
from  the  evils  of  war  and  efforts  have  been  made  by 
humanitarians  to  attenuate  the  evils  of  war  for 
him;  but  in  every  war  he  is  indignant  at  having 
to  suffer  at  all  from  its  effects.  With  the  develop- 
ment of  the  interdependence  of  nations  and  the 
universal  adoption  of  national  military  service 
the  civilian  becomes  more  and  more  involved  in 
its  consequences,  and  the  prospects  are  that  he 
will  become  rather  more  than  less  a  victim  of  them. 

When  a  duel  is  fought  the  seconds  stand  watch- 
ing every  thrust  and  parry  to  prevent  the  antag- 
onists in  the  excitement  of  the  fight  from  violat- 
ing the  rules  of  combat.     But  for  their  vigilance, 

cised  all  the  discrimination  they  would  use  in  peace  time  in  the  selection 
of  their  news. 


INTRODUCTION  11 

the  combatants  are  exposed  to  losing  their  self- 
control  and  disregarding  the  rules.  In  war  the 
neutrals  are  the  seconds.  In  this  War  the  seconds 
have  not  been  strong  enough  to  call  the  combatants 
to  order  and  eventually  have  joined  in  it  themselves. 
Thus  we  have  had  a  melee  in  which  the  thin  voice 
of  impotent  onlookers  has  only  been  a  source  of 
further  irritation  to  combatants,  smarting  from 
wounds  and  the  more  angry  because  they  felt 
their  own  inability  to  recover  their  reason. 

International  law,  in  so  far  as  it  treats  of  war, 
is  essentially  the  work  of  neutrals.  In  time  of 
peace  all  are  potential  neutrals  and  owing  to  this 
much  of  international  law  has  been  codified  by 
agreement  and  these  agreements,  however  much 
they  have  been  violated,  are  still  acknowledged  by 
belligerents  to  be  binding  upon  the  parties  to  them. 
Subject  to  these  agreements  publicists  try  to  ascer- 
tain what  the  practice  is  and  endeavour  to  bring 
it  into  such  harmony  with  European  morals  as 
the  character  of  war  permits. 

This  was  the  method  of  Grotius  at  a  time  not 
unlike  the  present,  when  war  as  ruthless  as  that  of 
the  World's  War  was  devastating  Central  Europe. 
When  his  famous  book  appeared  in  1625,  the  war 
was  ten  years  old  and  had  still  twenty  to  run.  The 
memory  of  the  atrocities,  cruelty  and  extortions  of 
the  League  has  descended  to  posterity  and  still 
brands  with  infamy  the  names  of  Wallenstein  and 
Tilly.  They  excited  the  indignation  of  the  man- 
kind of  that  age,  and  Grotius,  subject  of  a  neutral 
State,  produced  his  famous  book  as  a  revolt  against 


12  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

the  ruthlessness  of  these  military  commanders. 
The  more  humane  and  generous  Gustavus  Adolphus 
approved  this  attempt  to  attenuate  the  horrors  of 
war.  The  sack  of  Magdeburg,  the  burning  of 
the  city,  and  the  massacre  of  twenty  thousand 
of  its  citizens  some  six  years  after  the  appearance 
of  "De  Jure  BeUi  ac  Pacis",  however,  show,  as  in 
the  recent  War,  how  little  respect  commanders  in 
the  field  have  for  the  requirements  of  law  and 
humanity. 

To  deal  effectively  with  the  problems  involved 
in  the  consideration  of  terms  of  peace  calculated 
to  avert  danger  of  war  in  the  future,  the  public 
must  constantly  bear  in  mind  that  a  distinction 
exists  between  the  causes  and  the  occasions  of 
war.  I  repeat  this,  not  because  I  claim  to  be  the 
discoverer  of  what  is  obvious  when  attention  is 
drawn  to  it,  but  because  a  whole  system  proposed 
for  insuring  the  world  against  the  repetition  of 
similar  catastrophes  is  based  upon  the  prevention 
of  occasions  of  war  instead  of  upon  removal  of  the 
causes  of  war.  The  failure  of  the  peace  movements 
of  a  generation  of  civilised  mankind,  in  fact,  is 
due  to  concentration  of  effort  on  arbitration  and 
other  methods  of  dealing  with  incidents  of  inter- 
national trouble  and  not  with  causes.  It  seems 
hardly  necessary  to  labour  a  point  on  which  all 
pathology  is  based,  and  statesmen,  in  dealing  with 
the  life  and  polity  of  mankind,  can  only  follow 
with  safety  the  analogies  of  individual  human 
life. 


INTRODUCTION  13 

In  the  endeavour  to  deal  with  causes  the  states- 
men of  the  respective  negotiating  nations  will 
do  well  to  give  their  adversaries  credit  for  equally 
sincere  desires  to  do  their  best  for  their  own  coun- 
tries. They  are  all  subject  to  suspicion  of  each 
other's  objects,  all  necessarily  more  or  less  ignorant 
of  each  other's  difficulties  and  all  in  charge  of  under- 
takings involving  knowledge,  capacity  and  a  sense 
of  responsibility  out  of  proportion  to  any  they  have 
been  able  to  attain  in  an  official  or  political  career. 
They  are  subject  to  fits  of  alarm  and  panic  like 
other  human  beings,  and  just  as  subject  to  nervous 
breakdown  and  hysteria. 

For  the  discussion  of  the  conditions  of  permanent 
peace,  even  patriotism  is  a  disqualification  if  com- 
bined with  ignorance  of  the  subtle  influences  exer- 
cised by  the  physical,  social,  historical  and  indus- 
trial circumstances  of  different  countries  on  the 
minds  of  their  peoples  and  statesmen. 

Assuming  that  the  primary  object  of  negotiations 
for  peace  is  the  attainment  of  a  peace  which  will 
have  as  permanent  a  character  as  the  foresight  of 
living  men  can  achieve,  the  following  principles 
seem  calculated  to  serve  as  a  basis  of  effort  for  its 
attainment : 

1.  The  avoidance  of  solutions  which  create  or 
which  will  or  may  be  reasonably  expected  to  create 
a  national  grievance  or  grievances  present  or  future ; 

2.  The  avoidance  of  solutions  which  may  reason- 
ably be  regarded  as  having  a  humiliating  character ; 

3.  Consideration   for   reasonable   claims    of   any 


14  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

State  which  do  not  essentially  curtail  the  reasonable 
realisation  by  another  State  of  its  geographical  and 
economic  requirements. 

On  these  principles  the  analysis  of  the  situation 
to  which  the  present  book  is  devoted  will  more  or 
less  be  based. 


NOTES  TO  INTRODUCTION 

Note  on  Imperial  Violation  of  German  Constitution 

The  apparently  cynical  effrontery  of  the  German 
Declaration  of  War  to  France  reminded  one  at  first  sight 
of  the  provocation  of  the  Capulets.     It  read : 

"The  German  administrative  and  military  authorities 
have  established  a  certain  number  of  flagrantly  hostile 
acts  committed  on  German  territory  by  French  military 
aviators.  Several  of  these  have  openly  violated  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  by  flying  over  the  territory  of  that 
country ;  one  has  attempted  to  destroy  buildings  near 
Wesel ;  others  have  been  seen  in  the  district  of  the  Eifel ; 
one  has  thrown  bombs  on  the  railways  near  Carlsruhe 
and   Niirnberg. 

"I  am  instructed  and  I  have  the  honour  to  inform 
Your  Excellency,  that  in  presence  of  these  acts  of  aggres- 
sion the  German  Empire  considers  itself  in  a  state  of  war 
with  France  in  consequence  of  the  acts  of  this  latter 
Power." 

Louis  XIV  would  have  said  :  "  C'est  mon  hon  plaisir, " 
but  there  was  a  reason  for  this  nonsense  not  very  flatter- 
ing to  the  political  intelligence  of  those  to  whom  it  was 
addressed.  The  Imperial  Constitution  (Reichs-Verf as- 
sung)  provides  (Article  11)  that  the  Emperor  "declares 
war  and  concludes  peace  in  the  name  of  the  Empire." 
"For  the  declaration  of  war,  however,  the  consent  of 


16     COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

the  Imperial  Council  (Bundesrat)  is  requisite,  except 
in  case  of  attack  on  imperial  territory  or  on  the  coast." 
Article  63  adds  that  the  whole  armed  force  of  the  Empire, 
in  time  of  war  as  in  time  of  peace,  is  under  the  orders 
of  the  Emperor. 

It  is  not  without  significance,  therefore,  that  the  denial, 
later  on,  that  any  bombs  were  thrown  near  Niirnberg 
or  elsewhere  in  Bavaria  came  from  the  country  whose 
concurrence  in  the  War  was  thus  forced. 

Note  on  Diplomacy  during  the  War 

With  the  progress  of  the  War  the  presence  in  it,  as 
regards  Germany,  of  Russia  became  as  accidental  as  the 
Austro-Hungarian  quarrel  with  Serbia.  Her  war  was 
with  Austria-Hungary.  With  the  latter  she  was  carry- 
ing on  practically  an  independent  though  parallel  war, 
in  spite  of  Germany  having  been  the  first  to  throw  down 
the  gauntlet.  It  soon  became  obvious  that  both  Russia 
and  Austria-Hungary  were  likely  to  have  enough  internal 
difficulties  to  occupy  them  at  home  to  negative  any  effec- 
tive cooperation  as  partners  of  the  Western  belligerents. 

In  the  diplomacy  of  the  War,  the  question  for  the 
Western  belligerents  thus  came  to  be  whether  the  loss 
of  Russian  cooperation  would  not  be  more  than  amply 
compensated  by  the  effect  of  the  collapse  of  Austria- 
Hungary  on  the  German  ability  to  continue  the  struggle. 
Hence,  probably,  the  persistent  refusal  of  France,  Eng- 
land, and  Italy  to  listen  to  repeated  overtures  to  enter  into 
separate  negotiations  with  Austria-Hungary  which  might 
have  brought  the  War  to  an  end  as  early  as  February, 
1915. 

Whether  the  diplomacy  of  the  Allies  was  well-consid- 
ered, judicious  or  based  on  accurate  knowledge  of  the  state 
of  Central  Europe,  it  is  premature  to  discuss.     All  that 


INTRODUCTION  17 

can  meanwhile  be  said  is  that  judging  by  impending 
possible  consequences  it  seems  probable  that  they  would 
have  been  less  fatal  in  all  the  belligerent  countries,  if 
peace  had  been  made  before  the  calamities  of  war  had 
undermined  the  foundations  of  modern  European  polity. 


CHAPTER  I 

PAST   AND   PRESENT 

"The  past  and  the  present  are  in  deadly  grapple 
and  the  peoples  of  the  world  are  being  done  to 
death  between  them, "  said  President  Wilson  in  his 
speech  delivered  at  the  tomb  of  Washington  on 
July  4,  1918. 

He  had  just  before  stated :  *'  There  must  now 
be  settled  once  for  all  what  was  settled  in  America 
in  the  great  age  upon  whose  inspiration  we  draw 
to-day."  Washington  and  his  associates  had  con- 
sciously planned  that  "men  of  every  class  should 
be  free",  and  the  President  summed  up  the  ultimate 
goal  of  American  intervention  in  the  words : 

"What  we  seek  is  the  reign  of  law  based  on  the 
consent  of  the  governed." 

In  the  view  of  America's  spokesman,  if  I  read  his 
different  utterances  aright,  the  recent  War  has  not 
been  a  war  for  social  betterment.  It  was  a  war 
for  political  betterment.  Nobody  would  deny  that 
Germany  possesses  an  elementary  education,  meth- 
ods of  promoting  research,  and  a  variety  of  inter- 
mediate stages  affording  means  for  the  develop- 
ment of  the  individual  which  other  nations  may 


PAST  AND  PRESENT  19 

envy.  Nor  would  anybody  deny  that  Germany's 
efforts  to  cope  with  pauperism  and  disease  have 
been  a  subject  of  admiration  to  the  whole  world 
of  experts  in  such  matters.  Nor  would  anybody 
even  deny  that  German  statesmen,  and  first  among 
them  Kaiser  William  II  himself,  have  strenuously 
and  unremittingly  sought  to  give  every  German 
his  share  in  the  comforts  of  life,  and,  in  short,  that 
the  German  people,  under  the  fostering  influence 
of  an  efficient  and  conscientious  government  before 
they  were  plunged  into  war,  enjoyed,  along  with 
an  extraordinary  prosperity,  social  welfare  appre- 
ciated universally. 

But  what  boots  all  this  prosperity  and  social 
welfare  if  enjoyed  under  a  system  that  by  a  stroke 
of  the  pen  can  cast  all  the  progress  of  generations 
into  a  whirlpool  of  devastation;  that,  by  merely 
turning  a  handle,  can  open  the  sluices  and  sweep 
away  in  a  flood  of  bloodshed  not  only  the  work  of 
our  own  age,  but  that  created  by  the  toil,  art  and 
wisdom  of  our  forefathers ;  that  can  jeopardise 
not  only  prosperity  and  social  welfare  at  home  but 
overwhelm  in  an  artificial  catastrophe  nation  after 
nation,  bringing  ruin,  misery  and  mourning  into 
the  homes  of  all  mankind  ! 

The  Kaiser,  in  a  speech  delivered  a  few  days 
(June  16)  before  that  of  the  President  from  which 
I  have  quoted  above,  contrasted  civilisation  based 
on  two  different  Weltanschauung  en  —  the  German 
principle  which  seeks  to  promote  the  virtue  and 
value  of  the  individual  and  the  Anglo-Saxon  which 
leaves  the  individual  at  the  mercy  of  its  capitalist 


20  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

ruler.  With  the  unconsciousness  of  the  "benefi- 
cent tyrant"  he  did  not  see  the  real  issue.  He  did 
not  seem  to  know  that  the  Anglo-Saxons  have 
borrowed,  and  gratefully  so,  much  in  the  realm  of 
social  progress  from  Germany  and  that  the  present 
struggle  is  not  against  Germany,  nor  against  his  or 
their  social  principles,  but  is  against  a  system  of  which 
he  has  the  misfortune  to  be  the  presiding  genius.^ 

That  I  take  to  be  the  President's  message  to  the 
German  people,  to  whom  America  comes  as  a 
saviour  as  much  as  to  the  rest  of  Europe.  The 
enemy  of  all  mankind,  of  universal  man,  is  the 
power  to  destroy.  That  power  to  destroy  belongs 
to  the  past.  All  arbitrary  power  to  let  loose  the 
forces  of  destruction  left  to  rulers  and  governments 
is  a  survival  of  periods  when  wars  were  waged  in 
the  interest  of  dynasties  and  peoples  were  slaughtered 
for  causes  in  which  they  had  no  concern ;  of  an 
age  when  might  was  the  only  right  respected  as 
between  sovereign  and  sovereign.  Populations  then, 
as  pieces  on  a  chessboard,  were  moved  about  as 
suited  the  fancy  of  the  players,  diplomacy  laid  its 
plans  with  deceit  on  its  lips,  and  governments  acted 
as  if  they  were  not  bound  in  their  relations  with 

^  Under  the  heading  "  Opposition  of  the  German  Government :  Friend- 
ship toward  the  German  People"  see  President's  message  to  Congress, 
April  2,  1917 : 

"We  are,  let  me  say  again,  the  sincere  friends  of  the  German  People, 
and  shall  desire  nothing  so  much  as  the  eariy  reestablishment  of  intimate 
relations  of  mutual  advantage  between  us  —  however  hard  it  may  be 
for  them,  for  the  time  being,  to  believe  that  this  is  spoken  from  our 
hearts.  We  have  borne  with  their  present  Government  through  all 
these  bitter  months  because  of  that  friendship  —  exercising  a  patience 
and  forbearance  which  would  otherwise  have  been  impossible." 


PAST  AND  PRESENT  21 

each  other  to  respect  their  engagements  and  act 
honourably,  but  as  if  they  were  Hcensed  to  prostitute 
the  noblest  names  and  qualities  in  the  service  of 
objects  long  since  banished  from  intercourse  among 
civilised  individuals.  These  are  the  things  America 
had  entered  the  "death-grapple"  to  exterminate. 

A  close  examination  of  the  fourteen  points  laid 
down  by  President  Wilson  in  his  address  of  January 
8,  1918,  reaffirmed  in  the  four  of  that  of  July  4, 
1918,  and  the  five  of  that  of  September  27,  1918,^ 
reveals  several  underlying  principles  which  may 
be  considered  as  constituting  the  foundation  of 
the  President's  programme.  This  programme  the 
Allies  have  adopted  with  one  reservation  in  its 
entirety.  That  reservation  referred  to  in  Mr. 
Lansing's  reply  to  Germany  of  November  5, 
1918,  relates  to  the  second  of  the  President's  four- 
teen points.  In  the  same  letter  a  principle  has 
been  added,  viz. :  that  of  compensation  for  damage 
done  to  civilian  property. 

A  synthesis  of  the  points  is  therefore  indispensable 
to  the  proper  understanding  of  the  matters,  ques- 
tions and  problems  of  peace. 

As  enunciated  in  the  fourteen  and  completed 
in  the  others  they  may  be  summed  up  as  follows : 

1.  No  secret  international  agreements  (1  —  also 
one  of  the  five) ; 

2.  Freedom  of  the  sea  and  its  channels  (2,  12  — 
subject  to  reservations  referred  to  in  Mr.  Lansing's 
letter  of  November  5th) ; 

1  See  Notes  to  the  present  chapter.  President  Wilson's  principles  and 
Mr.  Lansing's  letter  confirming  their  adoption  by  the  Allies. 


22  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

3.  Most  favoured  nation  treatment  to  be  general- 
ised (3  —  also  one  of  the  five) ; 

4.  Restriction  of  armaments  (4) ; 

5.  Acquiescence  of  populations  in  all  matters 
affecting  sovereignty  over  them  (5,  6  —  also  one 
of  the  four) ; 

6.  Abolition  of  the  "right  of  conquest"  (7,  8, 
11  —  also  among  both  the  four  and  the  five) ; 

7.  Access  to  the  sea  a  right  of  all  States  (11,  13) ; 

8.  All  States  as  settled  by  the  Treaty  of  Peace 
to  be  guaranteed  an  equal  right  to  their  independence 
and  integrity  (14  —  also  among  the  four) ; 

9.  Racial  homogeneity  of  population  to  be  a 
ground  of  adjustment  of  frontiers  (9,  12).^ 

These  I  take  to  be  the  principles  which  have  been 
agreed  to  as  such  by  the  Allies.  Details  are  matters 
for  negotiation,  and  by  details  I  mean  the  appli- 
cation to  each  individual  case  of  such  of  the  prin- 
ciples as  expediency  warrants  or  dictates.  Thus, 
principle  Number  5  may  in  some  instances  conflict 
with  principle  Number  9 ;  Number  3  may  not  always 
tally  with  Number  8,  some  of  them  may  not  be 
capable  of  universal  application.     Nevertheless  they 

*  The  President  distinguishes  between  "must"  and  "should",  and 
the  first  six  points,  those  of  general  application,  he  gives  as  "heads" 
only. 

Belgium  "must"  be  evacuated,  but  of  "French  territories"  he  says 
the  invaded  portions  "should"  be  restored  and  the  wrong  done  to  France 
in  1871  in  the  matter  of  Alsace-Lorraine  "should"  be  righted.  Of 
Italian,  Slav,  Rumanian,  Serbian,  Montenegrin,  Polish  and  other 
claims  he  uses  the  same  conditional  "  should-"  Even  of  the  permanent 
opening  of  the  Dardanelles  to  the  ships  and  trade  of  all  nations  he  uses 
it.     Of  the  Society  of  Nations  he  states  it  "  must "  be  formed. 


PAST  AND  PRESENT  23 

constitute  the  main  lines  on  which  it  has  been 
promised  to  Em-opean  democracy  a  resettlement 
of  Em'ope  shall  be  based. 

Alongside  these  pledges  of  the  governments  of 
the  Allies  to  the  democracies  of  the  world  there  are 
necessarily  generalisations  or  principles  ^  to  which 
all  political  effort  is  as  subject  as  surgery  is  to  nature. 

I  have  picked  out  some  such  generalisations  or 
principles  which  seem  to  apply  to  present  circum- 
stances and  submit  them  for  consideration.  They 
are  as  follows : 

1.  The  movable  or  changeable  yields  to  the 
immutable ;  therefore,  in  a  conflict  between  racial 
and  geographical  considerations,  the  latter  neces- 
sarily prevail ; 

2.  Natural  boundaries  are  such  as  offer  the  mini- 
mum of  obstacles  to  their  preservation  as  such ;  there- 
fore navigable  rivers,  being  highways  of  commerce, 
do  not  afford  the  requisites  of  natural  boundaries ; 

3.  An    independent    State    is    entitled   to    enjoy 

*  If  of  any  practical  value  at  all  principles  are  at  best  general- 
isations, but  the  use  to  which  they  are  generally  put  in  politics  is  that 
which  appears,  for  the  time  being,  to  be  in  the  interest  of  those  whose 
action  they  seem  to  justify. 

Louis  Blanc,  a  man  of  sincere  devotion  to  principles,  writing  of  the 
intervention  of  France  in  Spain  in  1823,  in  spite  of  its  cruelty  and  reac- 
tionary character,  said,  "lorsque  un  gouvemement  croit  representer 
ime  cause  juste,  qu'il  la  fasse  triompher  partout  oil  le  triomphe  est 
possible;  c'est  plus  que  son  droit,  c'est  son  devoir."  ("Histoire  de  dix 
Ans,"  edition  de  1846,  t.  I,  p.  112.) 

He  was  in  the  middle  of  a  period  when  cosmopolitanism  and  inter- 
nationalism were  forces  of  reaction  against  three  powerful  autocracies 
which  sought  to  determine  the  destinies  of  Europe.  His  principle  was 
just  as  handy  a  weapon  for  the  one  side  as  for  the  other. 


24  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

the  consequences  of  its  independence,  such  as 
territorial  inviolability,  its  right  to  determine  its 
own  form  of  government,  its  right  of  diplomatic 
and  consular  representation,  and  its  right  generally 
to  share  in  the  international  intercourse  of  the 
world,  subject  only  to  qualifications  dictated  by 
other  principles  (All  independent  States  are  in- 
ternational persons  and  entitled  to  exercise  their 
rights  on  terms  of  equality  with  other  States) ; 

4.  A  State  which  is  dependent  on  other  States 
for  revenue  lacks  an  element  of  independence; 

5.  A  State  without  free  access  to  the  sea  is 
dependent  on  its  neighbors  and  lacks  an  element 
of  independence ; 

6.  A  State  enjoys  its  right  of  participation  in 
pacific  international  intercourse  subject  to  its  ob- 
servance of  its  contractual  obligations  and  of  the 
principles  of  humanity,  honour  and  social  and 
commercial  integrity  regarded  as  essential  in  the 
conduct  of  individuals. 

All  these  principles  are  necessarily  subject  to  an 
axiom  which  is  self-evident.  It  constitutes  an  ele- 
ment of  permanency. 

I  venture  to  state  it  and  its  corollaries  in  the 
following   propositions : 

Evolution  of  States  is  subject  to  the  general 
processes  of  evolution  and  implies  adjustment  of 
organisms  to  environment  and  a  coalescing  of 
apposite  tissues. 

Checking  evolution  in  progress  may  bring  about 
unforeseen,  undesirable  and  possibly  disastrous 
consequences. 


PAST  AND  PRESENT  25 

Racial,  industrial,  traditional  and  political  im- 
pulses within  any  State  in  course  of  time  have  always 
yielded  to  each  other.  Compromise  is  a  conscious 
acceptance  of  such  natural  adjustment  of  tendencies. 

Preference  should  therefore  be  given,  ceteris  pari- 
bus and  where  it  works  without  violent  resistance, 
to  the  status  quo. 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  I 

President  Wilson's  Proposition  as  Accepted  by 

THE  Allies 

The  fourteen  points  of  January  8,  1918,  were  : 

1.  Open  covenants  of  peace,  openly  arrived  at,  after 
which  there  shall  be  no  private  international  understand- 
ings of  any  kind  but  diplomacy  shall  proceed  always 
frankly  and  in  the  public  view. 

2.  Absolute  freedom  of  navigation  upon  the  seas,  out- 
side territorial  waters,  alike  in  peace  and  in  war,  except 
as  the  seas  may  be  closed  in  whole  or  in  part  by  inter- 
national action  for  the  enforcement  of  international 
covenants. 

3.  The  removal,  so  far  as  possible,  of  all  economic 
barriers  and  the  establishment  of  an  equality  of  trade 
conditions  among  all  the  nations  consenting  to  the  peace 
and  associating  themselves  for  its  maintenance. 

4.  Adequate  guarantees  given  and  taken  that  national 
armaments  will  be  reduced  to  the  lowest  point  consistent 
with  domestic  safety. 

5.  A  free,  open-minded,  and  absolutely  impartial  adjust- 
ment of  all  colonial  claims,  based  upon  a  strict  observance 
of  the  principle  that  in  determining  all  such  questions 
of  sovereignty  the  interests  of  the  populations  concerned 
must  have  equal  weight  with  the  equitable  claims  of  the 
government  whose  title  is  to  be  determined. 

6.  The  evacuation  of  all  Russian  territory  and  such 
a  settlement  of  all    questions  affecting  Russia  as  will 


PAST   AND   PRESENT  27 

secure  the  best  and  freest  cooperation  of  the  other  nations 
of  the  world  in  obtaining  for  her  an  unhampered  and  un- 
embarrassed opportunity  for  the  independent  determina- 
tion of  her  own  poUtical  development  and  national 
policy  and  assure  her  of  a  sincere  welcome  into  the  society 
of  free  nations  under  institutions  of  her  own  choosing; 
and,  more  than  a  welcome,  assistance  also  of  every  kind 
that  she  may  need  and  may  herself  desire.  The  treat- 
ment accorded  Russia  by  her  sister  nations  in  the  months 
to  come  will  be  the  acid  test  of  their  good  will,  of  their 
comprehension  of  her  needs  as  distinguished  from  their 
own  interests,  and  of  their  intelligent  and  unselfish 
sympathy. 

7.  Belgium,  the  whole  world  will  agree,  must  be  evacu- 
ated and  restored,  without  any  attempt  to  limit  the  sover- 
eignty which  she  enjoys  in  common  with  all  other  free 
nations.  No  other  single  act  will  serve  as  this  will  serve 
to  restore  confidence  among  the  nations  in  the  laws  which 
they  have  themselves  set  and  determined  for  the  govern- 
ment of  their  relations  with  one  another.  Without  this 
healing  act  the  whole  structure  and  validity  of  interna- 
tional law  is  forever  impaired. 

8.  All  French  territory  should  be  freed  and  the  invaded 
portions  restored,  and  the  wrong  done  to  France  by  Prussia 
in  1871  in  the  matter  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  which  has 
unsettled  the  peace  of  the  world  for  nearly  fifty  years, 
should  be  righted,  in  order  that  peace  may  once  more  be 
made  secure  in  the  interest  of  all. 

9.  A  readjustment  of  the  frontiers  of  Italy  should  be 
effected  along  clearly  recognizable  lines  of  nationality. 

10.  The  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary,  whose  place 
among  the  nations  we  wish  to  see  safeguarded  and  assured, 
should  be  accorded  the  freest  opportunity  of  autonomous 
development. 


28  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

11.  Roumania,  Serbia,  and  Montenegro  should  be 
evacuated ;  occupied  territories  restored  ;  Serbia  accorded 
free  and  secure  access  to  the  sea  ;  and  the  relations  of  the 
several  Balkan  states  to  one  another  determined  by 
friendly  counsel  along  historically  established  lines  of 
allegiance  and  nationality ;  and  international  guarantees 
of  the  political  and  economic  independence  and  territorial 
integrity  of  the  several  Balkan  states  should  be  entered 
into. 

12.  The  Turkish  portions  of  the  present  Ottoman 
Empire  should  be  assured  a  secure  sovereignty,  but  the 
other  nationalities  which  are  now  under  Turkish  rule 
should  be  assured  an  undoubted  security  of  life  and  an 
absolutely  unmolested  opportunity  of  autonomous  devel- 
opment, and  the  Dardanelles  should  be  permanently 
opened  as  a  free  passage  to  the  ships  and  commerce  of  all 
nations  under  international  guarantees. 

13.  An  independent  Polish  State  should  be  erected 
which  should  include  the  territories  inhabited  by  indis- 
putably Polish  populations,  which  should  be  assured  a 
free  and  secure  access  to  the  sea,  and  whose  political  and 
economic  independence  and  territorial  integrity  should 
be  guaranteed  by  international  covenant. 

14.  A  general  association  of  nations  must  be  formed 
under  specific  covenants  for  the  purpose  of  affording 
mutual  guarantees  of  political  independence  and  terri- 
torial integrity  to  great  and  small  states  alike. 

The  four  points  of  July  4  were : 

1.  The  destruction  of  every  arbitrary  power  anywhere 
that  can  separately,  secretly,  and  of  its  single  choice 
disturb  the  peace  of  the  world ;  or,  if  it  cannot  be  presently 
destroyed,  at  least  its  reduction  to  virtual  impotence. 

2.  The  settlement  of  every  question,  whether  of  terri- 
tory  or   sovereignty,    of   economic    arrangement   or   of 


PAST   AND    PRESENT  29 

political  relationship,  upon  the  basis  of  the  free  accept- 
ance of  that  settlement  by  the  people  immediately  con- 
cerned, and  not  upon  the  basis  of  the  material  interest 
or  advantage  of  any  other  nation  or  people  which  may 
desire  a  different  settlement  for  the  sake  of  its  own  exterior 
influence  or  mastery. 

3.  The  consent  of  all  nations  to  be  governed  in  their 
conduct  towards  each  other  by  the  same  principles  of 
honour  and  of  respect  for  the  common  law  of  civilised 
society  that  govern  the  individual  citizens  of  all  modern 
States,  and  in  their  relations  with  one  another,  to  the  end 
that  all  promises  and  covenants  may  be  sacredly  observed, 
no  private  plots  or  conspiracies  hatched,  no  selfish  injuries 
wrought  with  impunity,  and  a  mutual  trust  established 
upon  the  handsome  foundation  of  a  mutual  respect  for 
right. 

4.  The  establishment  of  an  organisation  of  peace  which 
shall  make  it  certain  that  the  combined  power  of  free 
nations  will  check  every  invasion  of  right,  and  serve  to 
make  peace  and  justice  the  more  secure  by  affording  a 
definite  tribunal  of  opinion  to  which  all  must  submit 
and  by  which  every  international  readjustment  that 
cannot  be  amicably  agreed  upon  by  the  peoples  directly 
concerned  shall  be  sanctioned. 

The  five  points  of  September  27  were : 

1.  The  impartial  justice  meted  out  must  involve  no 
discrimination  between  those  to  whom  we  wish  to  be  just 
and  those  to  whom  we  do  not  wish  to  be  just.  It  must 
be  a  justice  that  has  no  favorites  and  knows  no  standard 
but  the  equal  rights  of  the  several  peoples  concerned. 

2.  No  special  or  separate  interest  of  any  single  nation 
or  group  of  nations  can  be  made  the  basis  of  any  part  of 
the  settlement  which  is  not  consistent  with  the  common 
interest  of  all. 


30  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

3.  There  can  be  no  leagues  or  alliances  or  special  cov- 
enants and  understandings  within  the  general  and  com- 
mon family  of  the  league  of  nations. 

4.  And  more  specifically,  there  can  be  no  special, 
selfish  economic  combinations  within  the  league  and  no 
employment  of  any  form  of  economic  boycott  or  exclusion 
except  as  the  power  of  economic  penalty  by  exclusion 
from  the  markets  of  the  world  may  be  vested  in  the  league 
of  nations  itself  as  a  means  of  discipline  and  control. 

5.  All  international  agreements  and  treaties  of  every 
kind  must  be  made  known  in  their  entirety  to  the  rest  of 
the  world. 

Mr.  Lansing's  letter  was  as  follows : 

Washington,  November  5,  1918 

f        *****        * 

In  my  Note  of  October  23,  1918, 1  advised  you  that  the 
President  had  transmitted  his  correspondence  with  the 
German  authorities  to  the  Governments  with  which 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  is  associated  as  a 
belligerent,  with  the  suggestion  that,  if  those  Govern- 
ments were  disposed  to  effect  peace  upon  the  terms  and 
principles  indicated,  their  military  advisers  and  the 
military  advisers  of  the  United  States  be  asked  to  submit 
to  the  Governments  associated  against  Germany  the 
necessary  terms  of  such  an  armistice  as  would  fully  pro- 
tect the  interests  of  the  peoples  involved  and  insure  to 
the  Associated  Governments  the  unrestricted  power  to 
safeguard  and  enforce  the  details  of  the  peace  to  which  the 
German  Government  had  agreed,  provided  they  deemed 
such  an  armistice  possible  from  the  military  point  of  view. 

The  President  is  now  in  receipt  of  a  memorandum  of 
observations  by  the  Allied  Governments  on  this  corre- 
spondence, which  is  as  follows : 


PAST   AND   PRESENT  31 

"  The  Allied  Governments  have  given  careful  considera- 
tion to  the  correspondence  which  has  passed  between 
the  President  of  the  United  States  and  the  German  Govern- 
ment. Subject  to  the  qualifications  which  follow,  they 
declare  their  willingness  to  make  peace  with  the  Govern- 
ment of  Germany  on  the  terms  of  peace  laid  down  in  the 
President's  address  to  Congress  of  January  8,  1918,  and 
the  principles  of  settlement  enunciated  in  his  subse- 
quent addresses.  They  must  point  out,  however,  that 
clause  2,  relating  to  what  is  usually  described  as  the  free- 
dom of  the  seas,  is  open  to  various  interpretations,  some 
of  which  they  could  not  accept.  They  must,  therefore, 
reserve  to  themselves  complete  freedom  on  this  subject 
when  they  enter  the  peace  conference. 

"Further,  in  the  conditions  of  peace  laid  down  in  his 
address  to  Congress  of  January  8,  1918,  the  President 
declared  that  invaded  territories  must  be  restored  as 
well  as  evacuated  and  freed.  The  Allied  Governments 
feel  that  no  doubt  ought  to  be  allowed  to  exist  as  to  what 
this  provision  implies.  By  it,  they  understand  that 
compensations  will  be  made  by  Germany  for  all  damages 
done  to  the  civilian  population  of  the  Allies  and  their 
property  by  the  aggression  of  Germany  by  land,  by  sea 
and  from  the  air." 

I  am  instructed  by  the  President  to  say  that  he  is  in 
agreement  with  the  interpretation  set  forth  in  the  last 
paragraph  of  the  memorandum  above  quoted. 

I  am  further  instructed  by  the  President  to  request 
you  to  notify  the  German  Government  that  Marshal 
Foch  has  been  authorized  by  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  and  the  Allied  Governments  to  receive 
properly  accredited  representatives  of  the  German  Gov- 
ernment, and  to  communicate  to  them  the  terms  of  an 
armistice.  .  .  . 


CHAPTER  n 


FOREIGN   POLICY 


The  policy  of  a  nation  necessarily  reflects  more 
or  less  the  national  character  behind  it.  Those 
who  direct  it  are  merely  average  citizens  who  have 
been  selected  without  reference  to  any  special 
ability  from  a  number  of  men  who  had  originally  ob- 
tained entrance  into  the  diplomatic  service  by  an 
examination  test  in  average  general  knowledge. 
After  this  intellectual  test  come  the  influences  begot- 
ten of  school  and  family  connections  on  the  one 
hand  and  an  average  intelligent  obedience  to  higher 
oflScials  who  have  gone  through  the  same  or  simi- 
lar tests  and  training  on  the  other.  The  traditions 
of  any  office  thus  necessarily  tend  to  become  stereo- 
typed and  the  mode  of  giving  effect  to  them  may 
be  predicated  with  relative  accuracy  by  any  observer 
who  is  familiar  with  the  average  national  intellect 
and  more  particularly  that  of  the  class  concerned. 

In  England  the  average  intellect  is  dull  but 
honest.  School  life  is  based  on  the  development 
of  character  and  a  robust  sort  of  honour  which 
easily  takes  the  external  form  of  arrogance.  The 
reputation  abroad  of  British  diplomacy  is,  however. 


FOREIGN  POLICY  33 

and  therefore,  that  though  arrogant,  it  is  straight- 
forward, well-meaning  and  trustworthy.  In  Ger- 
many diplomacy  has  endeavoured  to  follow  the 
English  example  but  the  basis  is  different.  Early 
training  in  that  country  is  occupied  with  the  acqui- 
sition of  exact  knowledge  and  habits  of  intellectual 
accuracy  and  the  average  German  has  a  much  more 
effective  culture  than  the  Englishman.  The  devel- 
opment of  character  is  neglected  and  boys  do  not 
acquire  in  school  that  individual  sense  of  honour 
which  distinguishes  English  training.  In  many 
cases  they  are  encouraged  to  play  the  part  of  traitor 
to  each  other.  The  master  does  not  respect  the 
privacy  of  the  child  nor  are  children  expected  to 
respect  it  among  themselves.  A  child  who  reports 
the  evil  doings  of  a  companion  is  not  reproached,  the 
principle  being  that  the  teacher  ought  to  know 
everything  about  every  child  to  be  able  to  correct 
shortcomings  before  they  grow  into  habits. 

This  method  has  spread  into  the  whole  life  of 
Germany.  Clerks  spy  upon  each  other  in  offices; 
soldiers,  even  officers,  spy  upon  each  other  in  their 
daily  life,  and  a  faculty  for  spying  has  factitiously 
become  characteristic  of  a  whole  people.  Even 
in  the  exalted  entourage  of  the  Kaiser  himself, 
there  is  none  of  that  discreet  respect  for  private 
conversation  which  is  part  of  the  training  of  the 
upper  and  higher  middle-class  Englishman.  Yet 
in  Germany  to  be  like  an  Englishman  is  or  was  the 
aim  of  every  well-born  German. 

Among  delusions  nursed  with  admiration  in 
Germany    and    fortified    with    historical    examples 


34  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

is  the  idea  that  a  ruthless  pursuit  of  self-interest 
is  the  source  of  England's  success  among  nations. 
This  had  developed  into  the  worship  of  force  and 
necessity.  Necessity  is  merely  a  way  of  expressing 
that  something  is  highly  desirable  and  the  use  of 
force  is  justified  to  secure  what  is  highly  desirable. 
If  physical  force  is  not  available  or  applicable,  then 
superior  cunning  takes  its  place. ^ 

German  diplomacy  bears  the  marks  of  these 
initial  shortcomings  and  w^hile  it  brings  a  much 
more  exhaustive  and  more  accurate  knowledge 
to  bear  in  the  treatment  of  international  questions 
than  the  English,  it  falls  far  short  of  it  in  the  faculty 

1  A  German  manufacturer  once  showed  me  a  card-box  of  handker- 
chiefs he  had  manufactured.  Inside  the  box  was  a  card  bearing  the 
words  "Made  in  England"  with  initials.  This  had  been  inserted  by 
the  middleman.  My  friend  did  not  condemn  him  as  a  rogue  but  ex- 
plained to  me  that  the  only  way  to  get  Germans  to  buy  certain  goods 
was  to  pass  them  off  as  English.  Necessity  justified  the  roguery  or, 
as  my  friend  said  to  call  it,  the  stratagem,  for  the  goods,  he  said,  were 
certainly  of  better  quality  than  could  be  had  for  the  price  had  they  been 
really  "made  in  England." 

Another  case  of  similar  roguery  was  practised  by  one  of  the  largest 
firms  of  electrical  apparatus  manufacturers.  They  formed  a  small 
English  company  with  an  English  name  and  paid  a  couple  of  EngUsh- 
men  salaries  to  act  as  directors.  They  then  issued  their  machines  with 
the  name  of  this  English  firm.  The  disk  which  bore  its  name  was  so 
formed  that  the  words  "Made  in  Germany"  could  be  clipped  off  while 
leaving  the  disk  intact.  The  obvious  object  of  this  was  to  cheat  the 
ultimate  purchaser  into  thinlcing  he  bought  a  machine  of  English  manu- 
facture. "Necessity",  said  the  manager.  The  English  purchaser 
wanted  a  good  quality  of  machine.  He  had  the  mistaken  notion  that 
he  could  get  this  only  from  an  English  house.  They  created  an  English 
house  to  satisfy  him  and  they  merely  used  the  addition  to  the  disk  to 
pass  the  Customs.  The  purchaser  obtained  a  better  article  than  he 
could  have  bought  for  the  money  if  it  had  been  made  in  England.  He 
was  not  robbed.    Far  from  it.    He  was  merely  humoured ! 


FOREIGN  POLICY  35 

of  inspiring  a  sense  of  its  honesty,  or  respect  and 
consideration  on  the  part  of  others. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  general  culture  the 
French  diplomatist  is  superior  to  both  the  English 
and  German  and  he  has  the  intellectual  and  social 
gifts  of  most  Frenchmen  which  make  him  a  favourite 
in  every  milieu  into  which  he  tumbles.  As  a  diplo- 
matist he  is  *'to  the  manor  born"  and  if  the  pursuit 
of  diplomacy  were  exclusively  one  of  making  friends 
for  one's  country,  which  it  largely  is,  the  French 
diplomatist  would  be  easily  first.  In  dealing  with 
difficulties  when  they  arise,  however,  French  diplo- 
matists are  not  equal  to  the  cool-headed  and  obstinate 
Englishmen  or  to  the  accurate  but  more  or  less 
unscrupulous  diplomatists  of  Germany. 

The  diplomacy  of  the  United  States  is  based  on  a 
different  principle  from  that  of  England,  France 
or  Germany,  viz. :  that  of  more  or  less  permanency 
of  the  staff  and  subjection  of  the  diplomatic  chiefs 
to  the  party  system."  An  American  ambassador 
or  minister  plenipotentiary,  like  a  member  of  the 
Cabinet,  is  regarded  as  having  a  close  connection 
with  the  presidential  policy  and  as  such  he  is  cho- 
sen from  among  his  trusted  political  supporters. 
Though  they  have  not  always  been  successes,  the 
same  may  be  said  of  carriere  diplomatists,  while 
many  of  the  American  diplomatists  have  shown  a 
greater  ability  for  the  understanding  of  their  coun- 
try's material  interests.  The  system  of  permanent 
counsellors,  moreover,  has  proved  its  value  and  is 
worthy  of  accentuation  as  regards  both  prestige  and 
rewards. 


36  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

While  diplomacy  is  affected  by  training  and 
class  environment,  national  characteristics  have 
their  share  in  foreign  policy  generally.  Thus  na- 
tional sentiment  plays  a  great  part  in  the  decisions 
of  statesmen,  who  not  only  use  it  against  one  another 
as  an  excuse  or  disguise  for  pretensions  not  based 
on  right  or  reason,  but  also  in  just  cases  of  claim. 

National  sentiment  is  the  reason  of  the  multitude 
and  while  statesmen  have  responsibilities  which 
forbid  their  sacrificing  permanent  interests  to  pass- 
ing waves  of  sentiment  and  pledging  the  future 
to  the  fluctuating  feelings  of  contemporary  crowds, 
they  cannot  neglect  them  without  danger  of  being 
carried  off  their  feet.  It  is,  therefore,  a  part  of 
the  business  of  a  statesman  to  utilise  public  senti- 
ment for  the  national  interest  or  draw  it  into  chan- 
nels in  which  it  can  flow  off  without  jeopardising 
any  permanent  national  interest. 

National  ideals  begotten  of  national  sentiment 
like  all  other  manifestations  of  national  mentality 
are  subject  to  the  processes  of  evolution.  Their 
seeds  are  planted  by  some  contagious  emotion, 
they  grow  in  intensity  to  their  full  bloom  and  then 
their  vitality  declines,  while  more  robust  ideals 
of  like  origin,  struggling  into  fruition,  take  their 
place. 

National  ideals,  be  it  said  to  the  honour  of  mod- 
ern civilisation  however,  are  the  outcome  of  a  high 
level  of  collective  thinking.  The  American  Declara- 
tion of  Independence  was  a  splendid  vindication 
of  the  rights  of  peoples,  but  it  was  not  a  national 


FOREIGN  POLICY  37 

manifestation.  It  was  rather  a  manifestation  in 
favour  of  the  preservation  of  local  liberties  against 
encroachments  of  a  central  administration.  To 
ascribe  the  French  Revolution  to  any  ideal,  either 
specific  or  general,  is  to  confuse  cause  and  effect. 
Nothing  we  know  of  the  French  Revolution  justifies 
the  conclusion  that  it  was  anything  but  a  revolt 
like  the  many  revolts  which  have  produced  organic 
changes  in  national  polity.  Collective  thinking 
was  a  reaction  which  succeeded  the  French  Revo- 
lution as  a  part  of  the  political  revival  of  which  it 
was  the  starting  point.  Successive  reactions  in 
France,  Germany,  England  and  the  Netherlands 
during  a  period  of  peace  after  the  upheaval  produced 
a  sort  of  racial  crystallisation.  Men  speaking  the 
same  language  began  to  be  conscious  that  they 
had  something  in  common ;  the  migration  of  agri- 
cultural populations  into  industrial  centres  and 
the  growth  of  the  newspaper  made  them  articulate. 
With  the  building  of  railways  the  processes  were 
accentuated;  nations  as  such  began  to  exist  and 
nationalism  as  a  political  idea  forced  itself  on  the 
attention  of  political  thinkers. 

For  half  a  century  writers  competed  with  each 
other  in  the  interpretation  of  what  was  now  appealed 
to   as   public   opinion. 

Since  then  we  have  passed  through  stages  of 
State  unification  according  to  race  and  language. 
Dynasties  gradually  became  mere  adjuncts  of 
this  national  development  and  now  a  new  conscious- 
ness of  the  incompatibility  of  hereditary  sovereignty 
with  the  freedom  of  self-government  has  suddenly 


38  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

led  to  the  capsizing  of  the  whole  monarchical 
system  in  three  empires  without  an  attempt  to 
save  it. 

With  the  weakening  of  authority  grew  up  the 
theory  of  the  continuity  of  foreign  policy  —  a 
continuity  expounded  by  Lord  Rosebery  and  ma- 
terialised by  Sir  Edward  Grey  but  practised  in 
France  long  before  either.  It  seems  destined  to 
undergo  the  transformation  which  the  undertaking 
of  governments  to  abandon  secret  diplomacy  implies. 

Foreign  oflBces  have  always  had  traditional  poli- 
cies, simply  because  they  "descend"  from  official 
to  official  and  involve  the  least  individual  initiative. 
No  doubt  if  an  incoming  Ministry  considers  that 
the  policy  of  its  predecessors  exposed  the  country 
to  dangerous  or  costly  difficulties,  it  is  not  likely 
to  be  guided  by  any  theory  of  continuity  or  to 
refrain  from  a  critical  examination  and  balancing 
of  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  any  previous 
line  of  conduct;  and  a  strong  Foreign  Minister 
can  shake  off  superannuated  traditions  and  stereo- 
typed attitudes  towards  other  countries.  But 
after  a  Foreign  Minister  has  been  inhaling  a  Foreign 
Office  atmosphere  for  a  certain  time,  he  seems,  in 
spite  of  himself,  to  become  sooner  or  later  inoculated 
by  it.  Thus,  even  a  far-seeing  statesman  like  the 
late  Lord  Salisbury,  when  he  was  approached,  in 
1901,  by  a  very  distinguished  Frenchman  as  to 
placing  the  relations  of  his  country  and  France 
on  a  permanent  footing  of  amity,  curtly  replied : 
"C'est   de   I'utopie."     It    was    the   superannuated 


FOREIGN  POLICY  39 

tradition  of  the  British  Foreign  Office  to  regard 
France  as  an  uncertain  quantity,  "one  thing  one 
day,  another  thing  another ",  with  a  pohcy  as 
fluctuating  as  her  governments,  and  a  poHtical 
pendulum  swinging  wildly  and  sending  the  world 
round  at  far  too  great  a  speed  for  its  good. 

The  Foreign  Office  official  is  necessarily  more  or 
less  bound  by  knowledge  collected  from  the  diplo- 
matic missions  abroad.  The  chiefs  of  such  mis- 
sions, however,  seldom  have  any  opportunity,  even  if 
they  remain  long  enough  in  any  post,  of  obtaining  an 
intimate  acquaintance  with  the  country  to  which 
they  are  accredited.  As  a  rule  they  are  the  last 
to  know  what  is  happening  of  importance  to  them 
because  they  are  conspicuous.^ 

Exceptions,  of  course,  there  have  always  been. 
Lord  Lyons  was  one,  another  was  Lord  Lytton, 
who  had  a  keen  understanding  of  French  character. 
Nevertheless  he  did  not  succeed  in  breaking  the 
continuity  of  British  policy  towards  France  or  in 
reacting  against  the  obvious  Franco-Russian  policy 
which  a  recent  French  "yellow  book"  has  shown 
to  have  been  in  process  of  secret  formation  unsus- 
pected by  him  and  the  continuity  of  which,  by  the 
way,  might  have  exposed  France  to  disaster  but  for 
the  accession  to  it  of  England,  against  whom  the 
policy  was  more  or  less  calculated  to  operate. 

It  is  barely  twenty  years  since  the  relations  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  France  underwent  this 
change.     Popular  feeling,  which  had  been  whirling 

^  A  French  diplomatist  once  described  his  position  to  me  as  that  of 
a  man  going  about  with  a  danger  warning  on  his  top  hat. 


40  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

round  a  vortex  of  indignation  and  hatred,  as  if 
the  two  nations  were  moved  by  subterranean  forces 
as  uncontrollable  as  those  of  unconscious  Nature 
itself,  exhausted  itself  and  on  the  wave  of  reaction 
a  new  feeling  was  fostered  by  an  active  agitation 
which  brought  about  a  break  in  the  continuity 
of  the  policies  of  both  France  and  England  and  saved 
both  from  the  horror  of  a  war  as  terrible  as  the  one 
which  has  just  been  brought  to  a  close. 

The  rise  of  Germany  was  a  new  and  inconvenient 
factor  in  the  official  scheme  of  British  policy.  That 
she  had  a  foreign  policy  at  all,  not  to  speak  of  a 
"Welt-politik",  which  had  to  be  reckoned  with, 
aroused  a  sort  of  unconscious  indignation  at  dis- 
turbance of  time-honoured  habits  of  political  thought 
and  the  older  foreign  offices  tried  to  deal  with  old 
problems  which  had  existed  before  Germany  as  a 
*'Welt-staat"  came  upon  the  scene,  without  taking 
her  into  consideration. 

More  suppleness,  more  accurate  knowledge,  more 
publicity,  a  wider-spread  public  interest  in  foreign 
affairs,  a  greater  influence  of  the  back  benches  of 
parliaments  in  external  relations  would  possibly 
save  nations  from  repetition  of  some  errors,  but 
the  insistence  by  democracy  on  parliamentary 
control  is  the  most  promising  reform  on  the  horizon, 
because  it  may  counteract  the  danger  of  drifting 
into  those  "spirited"  foreign  policies  which  ingen- 
ious, ambitious  but  irresponsible  heads  of  depart- 
ments are  prone  to  cultivate  in  the  privacy  of  their 
offices  and  in  which  often  a  political  chief  finds 


FOREIGN  POLICY  41 

himself  entangled  before  he  has  mastered  the  details, 
complications  and  reactions  of  the  national  interests. 

One  of  the  most  dangerous  consequences  of 
detachment  of  diplomacy  from  parliamentary  con- 
trol is  the  discretion  left  to  Foreign  Offices  to  enter 
into  secret  engagements  binding  States  to  coopera- 
tion and  pledging  their  future  often  even  without 
reference  to  the  Cabinet  itself,  as  we  have  seen  re- 
vealed in  the  above-mentioned  French  "yellow 
book"  on  the  Franco-Russian  alliance. 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  II 

Note  on  Public  Opinion  and  Foreign  Policy  in 

England 

The  influences  which  affect  British  pubhc  opinion  in 
international  poHcy  at  present  seem  to  be : 

(1)  The  Foreign  OflSce  itself,  which  has  a  sort  of 
traditional  line  of  conduct  in  regard  to  each  country  and 
question,  and  of  which  the  Foreign  Minister  is  the  spokes- 
man; 

(2)  The  responsible  Press  which  looks  for  guidance 
to  the  Foreign  Office  clerks  to  whom  its  writers  have 
access ; 

(3)  The  more  or  less  competent  critics  who  examine 
questions  freely  in  the  reviews  and  a  few  members  of 
the  House  of  Parliament  who  take  an  interest  in  such 
subjects  and  some  of  whom,  though  possessing  more  than 
usual  competency,  are  heard,  occasionally  at  any  rate, 
within  the  Houses  themselves. 

Note  on  Interest  of  British  Press  in  Foreign 

Policy 

In  his  valuable  volume  entitled  "Common  Sense  in 
Foreign  Policy",  page  4,  Sir  Harry  Johnston  observes: 

"The  new  press  has  concerned  itself  more  and  more 
with  questions  of  Foreign  Policy.  Leading  articles  and 
communiques,  inspired  by  the  highest  authorities  in 
England  and  potentates  abroad,  have  begun,  with  the 


FOREIGN  POLICY  43 

new  century,  to  appear  in  other  journals  as  well  as  in 
the  Times:  In  the  Daily  Telegraph,  Daily  Chronicle, 
Morning  Post,  Daily  Mail,  Daily  Graphic,  Standard, 
Westminster  Gazette,  Pall  Mall  and  Star;  In  the  Man- 
chester Guardian,  Yorkshire  Post,  Scotsman,  Northern 
Whig  of  Belfast,  Birmingham  Post,  Western  Morning 
News  and  Liverpool  Courier." 

Note  on  Germany's  and  Russia's  Geographical 

Situation 

Germany  was  sandwiched  in  between  England  and  the 
Russian  Empire.  Both  held  positions'  which  the  War 
is  not  likely  to  change  essentially,  because  of  their  situa- 
tion both  demographically  and  geographically.  The  one 
has  an  overflowing  population  in  an  overcrowded  area 
and  the  other  an  immense  area,  thinly  peopled.  Ger- 
many was  becoming  overpeopled  but  her  overflow  tended 
rather  westwards  than  eastwards,  because  German  indus- 
trial education  turned  out  artisans  more  in  demand  in 
highly  civilized  than  among  under-civilized  peoples, 
not  to  speak  of  their  own  preference  for  countries  not 
subject  to  either  political  or  religious  persecution. 

As  regards  Russia,  it  may  be  useful  to  consider  her 
geographical  position  in  connection  with  her  foreign  policy. 
Russia  is  ice-bound  for  several  months  of  the  year.  Arch- 
angel is  closed  to  traffic  from  September  to  April,  Kron- 
stadt  from  December  to  April  and  Vladivostock  sees  its 
shores  covered  with  a  thin  crust  of  ice  from  December  till 
April,  though  the  Peter  the  Great  Gulf  on  which  it  stands 
does  not  freeze. 

Russia's  attempt  to  get  into  the  Pacific  at  Port  Arthur 
was  frustrated  by  Japan,  her  attempts  to  reach  Con- 
stantinople were  frustrated  by  the  Western  Powers,  and 
to  reach  the  Persian  Gulf  by  England. 


44  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

Russian  statesmen,  obliged  to  keep  foreign  war  in 
reserve  for  the  maintenance  of  autocracy,  have  made 
it  a  principle  of  their  foreign  policy  to  seek  an  outlet 
to  ports  accessible  to  navigation  throughout  the  year, 
and  owing  to  lack  of  opposition  to  expansion  eastwards 
across  Northern  Asia,  Russia  has  extended  her  dominion 
across  the  vast  continent  to  the  ocean. 

Russia  is  now  confronted  on  the  eastern  as  well  as 
on  western  sides  by  Powers  which  are  in  greater  need 
than  she  of  colonisable  areas  for  their  growing  popula- 
tions. On  the  east  as  on  the  west,  she  is  being  driven 
from  the  sea.  This  lateral  pressure  may  bring  Russia 
to  concentrate  her  policy  on  the  historic  effort  south- 
wards. The  dangers  to  the  future  of  closing  the  valves 
of  expanding  population  or  trade  are  too  obvious  to 
require  emphasis  and  are  still  too  vague  to  be  dealt  with 
in  detail.  It  is  to  the  interest  of  the  future  that  they 
shall  not  be  overlooked. 


CHAPTER  m 

DIPLOMACY,   SECRET    TREATIES   AND   NEGOTIATIONS 

President  Wilson  has  evidently  concluded  after 
careful  examination  of  numerous  historic  cases 
that  secret  clauses  hidden  from  the  public  view 
and  entered  into  for  the  purpose  of  disguise  of  some 
kind  are  a  danger  to  peace  and  has  therefore  pre- 
scribed among  his  conditions  of  peace : 

"Open  covenants  of  peace,  openly  arrived  at,  after 
which  there  shall  be  no  private  international  under- 
standings of  any  kind  but  diplomacy  shall  proceed 
always  frankly  and  in  the  public  view." 

The  President  no  doubt  had  more  especially 
in  view  the  different  agreements  between  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary,  the  more  or  less  secret  na- 
ture of  which  excited  distrust  throughout  Europe 
at  the  time  and  led  to  the  dividing  of  Europe  into 
two  hostile  camps  under  the  guise  of  a  "balance  of 
power",  which  less  acute  historians  had  not  per- 
ceived had  never  led,  either  in  Greek  times,  or  in 
Italy  when  the  idea  was  revived,  or  in  the  eighteenth 
century  in  northern  Europe,  or,  as  has  now  been 
shown,  in  our  own  times,  to  the  assurance  of  peace 
but  always  ultimately  to  war. 


46  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

And  with  that  independence  which  characterises 
him,  the  President  has  no  doubt  had  misgivings 
as  to  what  may  have  been  the  effect  of  the  secret 
clauses  annexed  to  the  Anglo-French  agreement 
of  1904,  which  potentially  negatived  the  effect 
of  the  agreement  published  to  the  world.  As  it  is 
possible  that  the  President  had  these  clauses,  which 
affected  the  trade  of  the  United  States,  as  they  did 
all  other  trades,  also  in  view,  I  may  remind  the 
reader  that  they  related  to  Egypt  and  Morocco 
and  that  the  two  contracting  powers  agreed  that 
any  alteration  of  status  of  the  one  Power,  viz. : 
Great  Britain  in  Egypt ;  or  of  the  other,  viz. ;  France 
in  Morocco,  would  release  them  from  their  reciprocal 
self-denying  engagements.  In  other  words  they 
foreshadowed  the  protectorates  and  practical  annexa- 
tions which  have  now  been  effected. 

He  has  now  further  material  for  reflection  in  the 
revelations  made  in  the  new  French  "yellow  book" 
as  to  secret  engagements  between  the  French  and 
Russian  governments  which  were  hidden  for  several 
years  entirely  from  the  public  view,  and  the  exact 
nature  of  which  has  only  just  been  made  known. 

Apart  from  the  fact  that  to  conceal  any  inter- 
national engagements  binding  a  nation  is  an  insult 
to  its  intelligence,  concealment  is  a  violation  of  a 
first  principle  of  democratic  government,  viz. :  that 
national  consent,  direct  or  indirect,  can  alone 
pledge  it  to  action.  No  doubt  the  advocates  of  a 
different  view  maintain  that  in  the  process  of  evolu- 
tion  democracy  necessarily   inherits   the   practices 


SECRET  TREATIES  AND  NEGOTIATIONS       47 

of  foreign  offices  and  diplomacy  and  thus  also  gives 
tacit  consent  to  that  practice  till  deliberately  can- 
celled. Mr.  Wilson  would,  no  doubt,  reply :  It 
is  time  to  cancel  it  deliberately.  But,  before 
finally  making  up  our  minds  to  pole-axe  the  abom- 
ination, let  us  look  a  little  more  closely  into  the 
subject  and  try,  at  any  rate,  to  avoid  regretful 
precipitation. 

It  must,  I  think,  be  conceded  that  the  object 
of  secrecy  is  necessarily  to  conceal  an  ultimate 
purpose,  object  or  contingency  from  the  knowledge 
of  others  whose  interests  might  lead  them  to  raise 
objections,  or  take  up  some  antagonistic  attitude. 
Merely  to  suspect  or  have  good  reason  to  suspect 
the  existence  of  secret  clauses,  though  their  precise 
character  be  unknown,  may  therefore  lead,  even 
oblige  other  governments  to  take  action  or  prepare 
to  take  action  to  protect  their  interests  and  defeat 
the  suspected  purpose. 

Who,  for  instance,  knows  whether  possible  secret 
understandings  between  the  German  and  other 
governments  with  a  view  to  appeasing  the  former 
after  discovery  of  the  secret  clauses  of  1904,  sus- 
pected understandings  which  at  the  time  excited 
the  Portuguese  Government  and  shortly  afterwards 
startled  the  Italian  Government,  were  not  at  the 
bottom  of  Italy's  anxiety  to  set  up  a  fait  accompli 
against  any  attempt  to  frustrate  another  secret 
understanding  which  had  recognised  her  priority 
in  the  Tripolitaine  whenever  it  should  be  available, 
and  did  not  lead  her,  with  such  unseemly  and  unjust 
precipitation,  into  the  war  with  Turkey? 


48  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

Without  mucli  casuistry  it  would  be  possible 
to  connect  these  secret  agreements,  luiderstandings 
and  eventuahties  with  one  another  and  evolve  out 
of  them  a  sequence  of  cause  and  effect  culminating 
in  the  complete  breakdown  and  present  discredit 
of  European  diplomacy  which  instead  of  averting 
bungled  into  mere  bludgeonry. 

One  more  word  about  secret  clauses  before  we 
pass  to  another  aspect  of  secrecy :  It  is  diflBcult 
to  keep  them  secret  for  long.  Any  one  who,  like 
myself,  has  made  a  lifelong  study  of  diplomacy 
and  its  methods,  especially  as  an  outsider  unbound 
by  Foreign  Office  restrictions,  will  testify  that 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  absolute  secrecy.  The 
fact  that  several  persons  are  necessarily  "in  the 
know"  or  more  or  less  "in  the  know"  soon  begets 
a  rumour.  The  rumour  spreads,  the  suspected 
clauses  grow  in  magnitude  with  the  effect  to  justify 
apprehension,  and  eventually  they  lead  to  that 
vague  unrest  to  which  international  trouble  can 
nearly  always  be  traced.  President  Wilson  is 
right  to  place  them  at  the  top  of  the  scale  in  his 
attempt  to  summarise  the  matters  affecting  the 
future  peace  of  the  world. 

When  President  Wilson  says  "diplomacy  shall 
proceed  always  frankly  and  in  the  public  view", 
he  has  no  doubt  in  mind  the  American  system  of 
addressing  Congress  and  the  nation  at  every  step 
in  the  progress  of  any  matter  of  foreign  policy,  a 
system  of  which  he  himself  is  not  only  a  consistent  ex- 
ponent but  has  shown  himself  a  consistent  practiser. 


SECRET  TREATIES  AND  NEGOTIATIONS       49 

Interpretations  may  have  warranted  the  idea 
that  President  Wilson  aimed  at  the  suppression 
of  diplomatic  action  and  that,  in  connection  with 
negotiations  for  peace  there  must  be  no  privacy. 
This  is  certainly  a  misconstruction.  The  Presi- 
dent cannot  but  know  that  in  the  course  of  a  war 
or  even  in  the  midst  of  any  ordinary  heated  inter- 
national controversy,  argument  in  public  is  neces- 
sarily tinged  with  its  glow  and  it  is  in  the  detached 
coolness  of  privacy  and  even  secrecy  alone  that  pre- 
liminaries and  details  can  be  effectively  discussed. 

I  have  been  so  often  behind  the  scene  of  such 
diplomatic  preliminaries  that  I  can  bear  witness 
to  a  practice  which  we  might  call  a  method,  were 
it  not  simply  the  necessary  consequence  of  cir- 
cumstances beyond  need  of  an  act  of  volition. 

The  first  step  to  peace  in  the  course  of  a  war  is 
the  prise  de  contact.  -This  may  be  through  a  common 
neutral  friend  or  through  two  friends  technically 
enemies.  Several  efforts  of  this  kind  had  been 
made  during  the  recent  conflict.  If  they  have 
failed,  it  has  been  through  faulty  selection  of  men, 
error  in  the  choice  of  the  moment,  or  through  at- 
tempting to  start  negotiations  before  the  prise  de 
contact  was  firm.  To  make  a  prise  de  contact  effect- 
ual, it  is  essential  that  it  shall  be  absolutely  secret, 
covered  by  some  different  object  which  conclusively 
explains  it,  such  as  meeting  to  arrange  exchange  of 
prisoners  or  their  treatment,  or  to  deal  with  Red 
Cross  understandings,  or  for  any  other  purpose, 
oflScial  or  private,  which  can  serve  to  disguise  the 
object.     Any    open    proceeding    would    obviously 


50  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

create  false  hope  and  might  seriously  interfere 
with  the  national  morale,  which  as  every  one  knows 
counts  for  much  in  the  prosecution  of  war. 

The  prise  de  contact  satisfactorily  established, 
the  belligerents  can  talk  with  one  another  and  seek 
jointly  the  bases  of  negotiation.  If  these  secret 
non-binding  agents  are  two  old  friends,  as  may 
be  —  as  ought  to  be  —  the  case,  they  vdll  know 
one  another  well  enough  to  venture  on  frankness. 
The  secret  history  of  wars  of  the  past  has  shown 
the  difficulty  of  reaching  even  elementary  bases 
of  negotiation.  It  took  ten  years  of  such  efforts 
to  bring  the  Powers  engaged  in  the  Thirty  Years' 
War  down  to  the  point  of  signing  preliminaries. 
For  before  preliminaries  are  signed  by  accredited 
agents  of  their  governments,  the  prise  de  contact 
must  have  eventuated  in  pourparlers  of  an  unbinding 
character  leaving  negotiators  and  governments  alike 
perfectly  free,  and  this  may  involve  many  secret 
meetings  before  the  propitious  moment  arrives 
when  suitable  draft  preliminaries  can  be  submitted 
and  agreed  to.  Thereafter  only  can  the  official 
diplomacy  safely  step  on  to  the  stage. 

It  is  not  likely  that  President  Wilson  was  opposed 
to  a  procedure  which  is  also  that  of  any  important 
business  operation  in  private  life.  All  he  probably 
had  in  mind  was  that  no  secret  agreements  be  made 
finally  binding  upon  nations  without  their  knowledge 
and  consent.  The  experience  of  late  years  and 
modern  notions  of  democratic  government  cannot 
but  encourage  the  President  to  insist  on  this  public- 
ity in  the  interest  of  civilised  mankind. 


SECRET  TREATIES  AND  NEGOTIATIONS      51 

Between  secrecy  and  publicity  there  are  many 
stages  of  privacy  and  discretion  of  a  relative  character 
and  responsible  Ministers  take  opportunities  of  lift- 
ing the  veil  in  answers  to  questions  in  Parliament, 
communications  through  newspapers  and  speeches 
on  the  platform  or  at  banquets.  By  a  strange  sur- 
vival and  anomaly,  however,  the  British  Parliament 
is  practically  the  only  parliament  of  any  nation  hav- 
ing pretensions  to  be  regarded  as  "free"  in  President 
Wilson's  sense  that  exercises  no  parliamentary  con- 
trol over  the  most  momentous  issues  which  can  en- 
gage the  lives,  treasure  and  honour  of  a  people. 

It  is  true  that  there  has  been  a  revolt  among 
younger  and  more  progressive  members  of  Parlia- 
ment against  leaving  momentous  international  issues 
to  the  uncontrolled  discretion  of  their  respective 
Foreign  Offices. 

The  only  consequence  down  to  now  of  this  revolt 
has  been  to  induce  politicians  to  pay  more  attention 
than  they  have  hitherto  done  to  foreign  affairs. 

In  France,  in  1902,  for  the  purpose  of  enabling 
private  members  to  take  an  active  part  alongside 
the  Ministers  in  the  preparatory  part  of  legislation 
and  the  examination  of  suggestions  and  amend- 
ments, sixteen  grand  committees  were  appointed, 
among  which  practically  all  the  special  work  of 
Parliament  was  divided  up.  One  of  these  deals 
exclusively  with  foreign  affairs,  protectorates  and 
colonies.  Members  of  it,  it  is  true,  complain 
that  they  are  not  consulted  more  frequently  or 
more  consecutively,  but  they,  nevertheless,  keep 
a  close  watch  on  the  work  which  is  in  train  at  the 


52  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

Quai  D'Orsay,  and  all  proposed  treaty  engage- 
ments are  necessarily  referred  to  tlie  committee 
under  French,  parliamentary  procedm*e.  Though 
this  is  done  generally  only  after  the  country  is 
practically  pledged,  the  members  of  the  committee, 
all  the  same,  obtain  post  hoc  experience  of  the  special 
work  allotted  to  them,  and  can  receive  ministerial 
explanations,  when  there  may  be  doubt  or  hesita- 
tion, which  it  would  be  difficult  to  furnish  in  public. 
This  in  turn  covers  to  some  extent  the  foreign  minis- 
ter's responsibility.  Nothing  prevents  him,  more- 
over, from  anticipating  criticism  even  in  the  course 
of  negotiations  by  conference  with  the  committee. 

In  the  United  States  Senate,  the  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  is  in  still  closer  contact  with  the  State 
Department,  and  by  no  means  confines  itself  to 
registering  the  acts  of  the  Secretary  of  State.  So 
strongly  do  American  statesmen  and  politicians 
view  the  need  of  parliamentary  control  over  foreign 
affairs  that  no  clause  in  the  American  Constitution 
is  more  jealously  enforced  than  that  which  requires 
Senatorial  approval  for  all  international  engage- 
ments of  the  United  States.  Senatorial  debates 
on  such  matters  are  usually  conducted  with  closed 
doors,  and  nothing  is  more  interesting  to  the  British 
visitor  to  the  Capitol  than  the  frequency  of  these 
secret  executive  sittings. 

Recent  events  seem  to  show  the  desirability  of  the 
institution  of  a  special  committee  of  the  House 
of  Commons  for  foreign  relations,  which,  recruited 
without  party  preference,  should  be  able  to  com- 
municate its  views  as  a  whole,  as  well  as  the  views 


SECRET  TREATIES  AND  NEGOTIATIONS       53 

of  individual  members  of  it,  to  the  Foreign  Secretary 
as  a  matter  of  right  and  not  as  one  of  mere  suffer- 
ance. There  are  many  members  of  Parliament 
who  have  business  interests  in  different  countries 
which  bring  them  into  close  contact  with  these 
countries,  and  enable  them  to  obtain  a  greater 
personal  experience  of  British  interests  in  connection 
with  them  than  public  officials,  however  efficient, 
ever  have  a  chance  of  obtaining.  The  fact  that  a 
certain  number  of  competent  representatives  of 
the  country  in  the  House  of  Commons  were  paying 
special  and  effective  attention  to  the  national 
interests  abroad  would  have  a  reassuring  effect 
among  the  electorate.  Such  a  committee,  moreover, 
would  serve  as  a  nursery  for  the  training  of  a  cer- 
tain number  of  members  of  Parliament  in  foreign 
affairs,  and  this  again  would  enable  these  mem- 
bers to  create  throughout  the  country  a  greater 
and  more  intelligent  interest  in  our  foreign  relations. 
The  public  has  undoubtedly  begun  to  feel,  especially 
in  the  north  of  England,  that  foreign  affairs  are 
conducted  in  a  manner  not  suited  to  the  repre- 
sentative character  of  the  institutions  of  a  self- 
governing  country.  The  cooperation  of  an  advi- 
sory committee  of  Parliament  would  certainly  help 
the  Foreign  Office  to  bring  British  foreign  policy 
into  closer  harmony  with  the  national  feeling  and 
interests,  and  it  would  meet  to  a  great  extent  charges 
of  the  inadequacy  of  diplomacy,  when,  as  often,  it  is 
bound  to  fail,  not  through  its  incompetency,  but 
through  the  ignorance  of  those  who  have  the  dicta- 
tion of  the  policy  to  be  pursued. 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  III 

Inviolability  of  Treaties 
Suggestions  for  Addition  to  the  Agreement  of  1871 

Whereas  allegations  of  violation  of  treaty  engagements 
are  subject  to  so  many  qualifications  and  counter  allega- 
tions that  all  the  H.  C.  P.  may  confess  to  some  measure 
of  guilt  in  the  past,  and  whereas  for  the  future  they  all 
solemnly  once  more  pledge  themselves  to  strict  observance 
of  all  Treaty  engagements  and  agree  to  revive  and  uphold 
the  protocol  signed  in  London  on  January  17,  1871, 
which  is  as  follows  : 

The  Plenipotentiaries  of  North  Germany,  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  of  Great  Britain,  of  Italy,  of  Russia,  and  of 
Turkey,  assembled  today  in  conference,  recognize  that  it 
is  an  essential  principle  of  the  law  of  nations  that  no  power 
can  liberate  itself  from  the  engagements  of  a  Treaty 
nor  modify  the  stipulations  thereof,  unless  with  the  con- 
sent of  the  Contracting  Powers  by  means  of  an  amicable 
arrangement. 

In  faith  whereof  the  said  Plenipotentiaries  have  signed 
the  present  Protocol. 

Whereas,  however,  it  is  not  reasonable  to  bind  States, 
under  the  more  or  less  rapidly  changing  circumstances 
of  the  modern  world  to  perpetual  observance  of  all  the 
engagements  they  may  enter  into  with  other  States ; 

Whereas  it  is  one  of  the  commonplaces  of  diplomacy 
to  allege  the  absence  of  any  moral  cogency  binding  a 
Party  to  a  Treaty  obtained  under  duress ; 


SECRET  TREATIES  AND  NEGOTIATIONS       55 

Whereas  among  the  sanctions  which  have  been  proposed 
or  suggested  for  enforcing  observance  of  international 
agreements,  none  can  have  the  weight  of  a  solemn  under- 
taking made  freely  before  the  whole  world  present  and 
future  to  honestly  and  conscientiously  observe  such 
agreements  and  in  case  of  unworkability  or  obsolescence, 
or  desirability  of  release,  to  resort  to  some  procedure  for 
the  revision  of  such  agreements  ; 

Whereas,  therefore,  to  enable  States  to  revise  inter- 
national agreements  or  any  clauses  thereof,  not  on  juridical 
grounds  but  on  grounds  of  expediency,  alteration  of  cir- 
cumstances, ethnical,  demographic,  commercial,  social, 
hygienic  or  other ; 

It  is  agreed  to  make  the  following  addition  to  the 
Protocol  of  1871,  viz.  : 

If  any  of  the  H.  C.  P.  shall  desire  on  any  ground  what- 
soever to  so  liberate  itself  from  any  Treaty  engagement 
or  to  obtain  a  modification  thereof,  it  shall  give  notice 
accordingly  to  the  other  or  all  other  Contracting  Parties 
with  a  full  statement  of  the  grounds  upon  which  such 
release  or  modification  is  demanded  and  the  Contracting 
Parties  shall  within  reasonable  time  reply  thereto. 

In  case  of  any  difference  of  opinion  the  respective 
statements  shall  be  submitted  for  advice  and  recommenda- 
tion to  some  authority  to  be  created  under  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  Society  of  Nations. 


Suggested  Agreement  as  Regards  Secret  Treaties 

AND  Clauses 

Whereas  the  object  of  secret  treaties  or  clauses  is 
to  conceal  from  parties  other  than  those  immediately 
concerned  objects  likely  to  excite  the  opposition  of  such 
others  or  be  prejudicial  to  their  interests ; 

And  whereas  when  they  come  to  light  they  necessarily 


56  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

cause  resentment  and  are  a  cause  of  international  em- 
bitterment ; 

And  whereas  the  possibiUty  of  entering  into  such 
secret  clauses  or  treaties  is  a  cause  of  international  dis- 
trust and  the  bare  suspicion  thereof  may  be  a  cause  of 
taking  precautions  against  them  and  this  reciprocal  action 
accentuates  bad  feeling  wherever  it  may  exist ; 

Whereas,  nevertheless,  the  affairs  of  nations  can  only 
be  conducted  in  accordance  with  the  practice  of  negotia- 
tions between  individuals,  but  whereas,  a  reputation  for 
honesty  in  business  averts  distrust,  suspicion  and  bad 
feeling  and  induces  a  frank  and  friendly  attitude  even 
where  the  solution  of  differences  may  be  difficult,  there 
is  equal  reason  to  believe  the  effect  of  such  conduct 
in  the  transaction  of  business  between  States  would  be 
similar ; 

Whereas,  however,  there  may  be  secret  agreements 
which  are  merely  secret  in  the  sense  that  they  are  of  no 
concern  to  others  but  those  immediately  interested  and 
these  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  agreements  deliberately 
concealed  from  other  States  and  are  beyond  the  scope 
of  this  present  undertaking  and  pledge; 

Whereas  it  is  a  principle  of  the  sovereignty  of  the 
people  that  its  future  action  shall  never  be  pledged 
without  its  knowledge ; 

Whereas  even  merely  informal  moral  or  ad  referendum 
engagements  pledge  a  nation's  honour; 

It  is  agreed  as  follows : 

The  H.  C.  P.  solemnly  pledge  themselves  not  to  enter 
into  any  secret  agreements  which  shall  be  contrary  in 
effect  or  sense  to  agreements  made  with  other  States  or 
to  agreements  communicated  to  or  made  known  directly 
or  indirectly  to  other  States ; 

And  they  further  solemnly  pledge  themselves  to  regard 


SECRET  TREATIES  AND  NEGOTIATIONS      57 

honesty,  truth  and  sincerity  in  international  concerns 
and  in  the  observance  of  international  undertakings,  even 
verbal  promises,  as  a  principle  of  conduct  sacred  to  the 
maintenance  of  national  honour  and  they  agree,  in  case 
of  any  alleged  violation  of  such  principle,  to  the  submission 
of  the  question  to  a  Court  of  Honour  or  some  other  author- 
ity to  be  instituted  in  connection  with  the  Society  of 
Nations. 


CHAPTER  IV 

EVOLUTION  OF  THE  UNITED   STATEs'  FOREIGN   POLICY 

Washington's  famous  Farewell  Address  is  a 
much  used  and  much  abused  document.  Frag- 
ments of  it  are  often  quoted  and  from  time  to  time 
the  text  is  twisted  into  arguments  more  or  less 
foreign  to  its  nature.  For  more  than  a  century  it 
has  served,  in  fact,  as  a  guiding  line  for  all  the 
Presidents.  As  the  basis  of  American  foreign 
policy,  it  is  necessarily  the  starting  point  of  any 
study  of  this  policy.  Its  language  is  so  simple, 
clear  and  dignified  and  its  counsels  are  so  apposite 
to  the  present  scheme  that  it  would  be  mere  super- 
erogation to  attempt  to  present  it  in  any  paraphrased 
abridgment  or  any  but  its  own  form.  I  therefore 
quote  the  whole  of  that  part  of  it  which  is  essential 
to  this  work : 

"Here,"  said  Washington,  "perhaps,  I  ought  to 
stop.  But  a  solicitude  for  your  welfare,  which  cannot 
end  but  with  my  life,  and  the  apprehension  of  danger, 
natural  to  that  solicitude,  urge  me,  on  an  occasion 
like  the  present,  to  offer  to  your  solemn  contempla- 
tion, and  to  recommend  to  your  frequent  review, 
some  sentiments,  which  are  the  result  of  much 
reflection,    of   no   inconsiderable   observation,    and 


UNITED  STATES'  FOREIGN  POLICY  59 

which  appear  to  me  all-important  to  the  permanency 
of  yom*  felicity  as  a  People.  These  will  be  ojBfered 
to  you  with  the  more  freedom,  as  you  can  only  see 
in  them  the  disinterested  warnings  of  a  parting 
friend,  who  can  possibly  have  no  personal  motive 
to  bias  his  counsel.  Nor  can  I  forget,  as  an  encour- 
agement to  it,  your  indulgent  reception  of  my  senti- 
ments on  a  former  and  not  dissimilar  occasion. 

"Interwoven  as  is  the  love  of  liberty  with  every 
ligament  of  your  hearts,  no  recommendation  of 
mine  is  necessary  to  fortify  or  confirm  the  attach- 
ment. 

"The  unity  of  Government,  which  constitutes 
you  one  people,  is  also  now  dear  to  you.  It  is 
justly  so;  for  it  is  a  main  pillar  in  the  edifice  of 
your  real  independence,  the  support  of  your  tran- 
quillity at  home,  your  peace  abroad ;  of  your  safety ; 
of  yom-  prosperity ;  of  that  very  Liberty,  which  you 
so  highly  prize.  But  as  it  is  easy  to  foresee,  that, 
from  different  causes  and  from  different  quarters, 
much  pains  will  be  taken,  many  artifices  employed, 
to  weaken  in  your  minds  the  conviction  of  this 
truth ;  as  this  is  the  point  in  your  political  fortress 
against  which  the  batteries  of  internal  and  external 
enemies  will  be  most  constantly  and  actively  (though 
often  covertly  and  insidiously)  directed,  it  is  of 
infinite  moment,  that  you  should  properly  estimate 
the  immense  value  of  your  national  Union  to  your 
collective  and  individual  happiness  ;  that  you  should 
cherish  a  cordial,  habitual,  and  immovable  attach- 
ment to  it ;  accustoming  yourselves  to  think  and 
speak  of  it  as  of  the  Palladium  of  your  political 


60  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

safety  and  prosperity ;  watching  for  its  preservation 
with  jealous  anxiety;  discountenancing  whatever 
may  suggest  even  a  suspicion,  that  it  can  in  any 
event  be  abandoned ;  and  indignantly  frowning 
upon  the  first  dawning  of  every  attempt  to  alienate 
any  portion  of  our  country  from  the  rest,  or  to 
enfeeble  the  sacred  ties  which  now  link  together  the 
various  parts. 

"For  this  you  have  every  inducement  of  sympathy 
and  interest.  Citizens,  by  birth  or  choice,  of  a 
common  country,  that  country  has  a  right  to  con- 
centrate your  affections.  The  name  of  American, 
which  belongs  to  you,  in  your  national  capacity, 
must  always  exalt  the  just  pride  of  Patriotism, 
more  than  any  appellation  derived  from  local 
discriminations.  With  slight  shades  of  difference, 
you  have  the  same  religion,  manners,  habits,  and 
political  principles.  You  have  in  a  common  cause, 
fought  and  triumphed  together;  the  Independence 
and  Liberty  you  possess  are  the  work  of  joint  coun- 
sels, and  joint  efforts,  of  common  dangers,  suffer- 
ings, and  successes.  .  .  . 

"It  is  important,  likewise,  that  the  habits  of 
thinking  in  a  free  country  should  inspire  caution, 
in  those  intrusted  with  its  administration,  to  confine 
themselves  within  their  respective  constitutional 
spheres,  avoiding  in  the  exercise  of  the  powers  of 
one  department,  to  encroach  upon  another.  The 
spirit  of  encroachment  tends  to  consolidate  the 
powers  of  all  the  departments  in  one,  and  thus  to 
create,  whatever  the  form  of  government,  a  real 
despotism.     A  just  estimate  of  that  love  of  power. 


UNITED  STATES'  FOREIGN  POLICY  61 

and  proneness  to  abuse  it,  which  predominates  in 
the  human  heart,  is  suflficient  to  satisfy  us  of  the 
truth  of  this  position.  The  necessity  of  reciprocal 
checks  in  the  exercise  of  political  power,  by  dividing 
and  distributing  it  into  different  depositories,  and 
constituting  each  the  Guardian  of  Public  Weal 
against  invasions  by  the  others,  has  been  evinced 
by  experiments  ancient  and  modern ;  some  of  them 
in  our  own  country  and  under  our  own  eyes.  To 
preserve  them  must  be  as  necessary  as  to  institute 
them.  If,  in  the  opinion  of  the  people,  the  dis- 
tribution or  modification  of  the  constitutional 
powers  be  in  any  particular  wrong,  let  it  be  cor- 
rected by  an  amendment  in  the  way,  which  the 
constitution  designates.  But  let  there  be  no  change 
by  usurpation;  for,  though  this,  in  one  instance, 
may  be  the  instrument  of  good,  it  is  the  customary 
weapon  by  which  free  governments  are  destroyed. 
The  precedent  must  always  greatly  overbalance 
in  permanent  evil  any  partial  or  transient  benefit, 
which  the  use  can  at  any  time  yield.  .  .  . 

"Observe  good  faith  and  justice  towards  all 
Nations ;  cultivate  peace  and  harmony  with  all. 
Religion  and  Morality  enjoin  this  conduct;  and 
can  it  be,  that  good  policy  does  not  equally  enjoin 
it?  It  will  be  worthy  of  a  free,  enlightened,  and, 
at  no  distant  period,  a  great  Nation,  to  give  to  man- 
kind the  magnanimous  and  too  novel  example  of  a 
people  always  guided  by  an  exalted  justice  and 
benevolence.  Who  can  doubt,  that,  in  the  course  of 
time  and  things,  the  fruits  of  such  a  plan  would 
richly    repay    any   temporary    advantages,    which 


62  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

might  be  lost  by  a  steady  adherence  to  it  ?  Can  it 
be,  that  Providence  has  not  connected  the  perma- 
nent felicity  of  a  Nation  with  its  Virtue?  The 
experiment,  at  least,  is  recommended  by  every 
sentiment  which  ennobles  human  nature.  Alas ! 
is  it  rendered  impossible  by  its  vices  ?  .  .  . 

"Against  the  insidious  wiles  of  foreign  influence 
(I  conjure  you  to  believe  me,  fellow  citizens,)  the 
jealousy  of  a  free  people  ought  to  be  constantly 
awake ;  since  history  and  experience  prove,  that 
foreign  influence  is  one  of  the  most  baneful  foes 
of  Republican  Government.  But  that  jealousy,  to 
be,  useful,  must  be  impartial ;  else  it  becomes  the 
instrument  of  the  very  influence  to  be  avoided, 
instead  of  a  defence  against  it.  Excessive  partiality 
for  one  foreign  nation,  and  excessive  dislike  of 
another,  cause  those  whom  they  actuate  to  see  danger 
only  on  one  side,  and  serve  to  veil  and  even  second 
the  arts  of  influence  on  the  other.  Real  patriots, 
who  may  resist  the  intrigues  of  the  favorite,  are 
liable  to  become  suspected  and  odious ;  while  its 
tools  and  dupes  usurp  the  applause  and  confidence 
of  the  people,  to  surrender  their  interest. 

"The  great  rule  of  conduct  for  us,  in  regard  to 
foreign  nations,  is,  in  extending  our  commercial 
relations,  to  have  with  them  as  little  political 
connection  as  possible.  So  far  as  we  have  already 
formed  engagements,  let  them  be  fulfilled  with 
perfect  good  faith.     Here  let  us  stop. 

"Europe  has  a  set  of  primary  interests,  which 
to  us  have  none,  or  a  very  remote  relation.  Hence 
she  must  be  engaged  in  frequent  controversies,  the 


UNITED  STATES'  FOREIGN  POLICY  63 

causes  of  which  are  essentially  foreign  to  our  con- 
cerns. Hence,  therefore,  it  must  be  unwise  in  us  to 
implicate  ourselves,  by  artificial  ties,  in  the  ordinary 
vicissitudes  of  her  politics,  or  the  ordinary  combina- 
tions and  collisions  of  her  friendships  or  enmities. 

"Our  detached  and  distant  situation  invites 
and  enables  us  to  pursue  a  different  course.  If  we 
remain  one  people,  under  an  efficient  government, 
the  period  is  not  far  off,  when  we  may  defy  material 
injury  from  external  annoyance ;  when  we  may 
take  such  an  attitude  as  will  cause  the  neutrality, 
we  may  at  any  time  resolve  upon,  to  be  scrupulously 
respected;  when  belligerent  nations,  under  the 
impossibility  of  making  acquisitions  upon  us,  will 
not  lightly  hazard  the  giving  us  provocation ;  when 
we  may  choose  peace  or  war,  as  our  interest,  guided 
by  justice,  shall  counsel.  .  .  . 

"In  offering  to  you,  my  countrymen,  these 
counsels  of  an  old  and  affectionate  friend,  I  dare 
not  hope  that  they  will  make  the  strong  and  lasting 
impression  I  could  wish ;  that  they  will  control 
the  usual  current  of  the  passions,  or  prevent  our 
nation  from  running  the  course  which  has  hitherto 
marked  the  destiny  of  nations.  But,  if  I  may  even 
flatter  myself,  that  they  may  be  productive  of 
some  partial  benefit,  some  occasional  good ;  that 
they  may  now  and  then  recur  to  moderate  the  fury 
of  party  spirit,  to  warn  against  the  mischiefs  of 
foreign  intrigue,  to  guard  against  the  impostures 
of  pretended  patriotism ;  this  hope  will  be  a  full 
recompense  for  the  solicitude  for  your  welfare,  by 
which  they  have  been  dictated." 


64  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

Whoever  has  carefully  read  this  political  "testa- 
ment" of  the  first  President  of  the  State  which  had 
just  been  created  will  know  more  of  the  United 
States'  policy  than  may  be  gathered  from  any  other 
source.  Washington's  successors  have  drawn  as 
much  inspiration  from  it  as  from  the  Constitution 
itself.  When  the  Cuban  War  brought  the  annexa- 
tion of  the  Philippines,  authors  and  politicians  on 
both  sides  appealed  to  it,  but  never  at  any  time 
was  the  morally  binding  nature  of  the  Farewell 
Address  called  into  question.  In  the  case  of  the 
Philippines  the  issue  was  whether  the  United  States 
should  abandon  for  transient  advantages  the  perma- 
nent advantage  of  their  geographical  situation  on 
a  continent  completely  detached  from  the  other 
large  continent  which  extends  from  the  western 
extremity  of  Europe  through  Asia  to  Japan. 

Mr.  Wilson,  like  all  his  predecessors,  has  sought 
in  the  Farewell  Address  directions  for  guidance, 
in  circumstances  as  critical  as  they  may  be  deceptive. 
Washington  had  advised  avoidance  of  any  inter- 
ference or  partiality  in  European  wars  as  a  funda- 
mental principle  from  which  it  would  be  dangerous 
to  depart,  of  any  partiality  which  might  cause  men 
to  see  danger  on  one  side  while  seconding  artifice 
or  influence  on  the  other.  He  had  foreseen  the  time 
when  the  United  States  might  have  to  adopt  the  atti- 
tude necessary  to  enforce  respect  for  the  neutrality 
they  might  have  to  declare,  when  belligerent  nations 
would  not  lightly  hazard  the  giving  of  provocation, 
when  the  United  States  might  have  to  choose  peace 
or  war  as  their  interest  guided  by  justice  might  entail. 


UNITED  STATES'  FOREIGN  POLICY  65 

These  counsels  of  wisdom  are  at  the  back  of  all 
President  Wilson's  pronouncements,  behind  all  his 
actions  and  hesitations,  and  Press  commentaries 
or  criticisms  have  been  rather  commentaries  on  or 
criticisms  of  general  principles  of  American  policy 
than  of  the  particular  policy  of  the  man  who  for 
the  time  being  is  the  Chief  of  the  Executive  Power. 

This  policy  of  detachment  and  noninterference 
in  European  affairs  necessarily  implied  the  corollary 
that  it  was  not  expedient  to  allow  European  Powers 
to  import  into  America  their  ambitions  and  quarrels. 
It  became  the  privilege  of  President  Monroe  to 
give  expression  to  this  principle  in  the  course  of  a 
message  to  Congress  on  December  2,  1823.  It 
seemed  opportune,  he  said,  clearly  to  assert  as  a 
principle  of  the  United  States'  foreign  poHcy  the 
proposition  that  "the  ^American  continents  by  the 
free  and  independent  condition  which  they  have 
assumed  and  maintain  are  henceforth  not  to  be 
.considered  as  subjects  for  future  colonization  by 
any  European  power.  We  owe  it  therefore  to 
candor  and  to  the  amicable  relations  existing  between 
the  United  States  and  these  powers  to  declare  that 
we  should  consider  any  attempt  on  their  part  to 
extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere 
as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety.  With  the 
existing  colonies  or  dependencies  of  any  Em*opean 
power  we  have  not  interfered  and  shall  not  inter- 
fere. But  with  the  Governments  who  have  declared 
their  independence  and  maintain  it,  and  whose 
independence  we  have  on  great  consideration  and 


66  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

on  just  principles,  acknowledged,  we  could  not  view 
any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of  oppressing 
them  or  controlling  in  any  other  manner  their  des- 
tiny by  any  European  power  in  any  other  light  than 
as  the  manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  disposition 
toward  the  United  States." 

This  declaration  of  President  Monroe,  known  as 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  was  made  at  a  time  when  the 
French  Government  was  preparing  an  expedition 
to  Spain.  Mr.  Canning,  then  British  Secretary  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  signified  his  country's  intention  to 
remain  neutral  on  certain  conditions,  among  which 
was  the  one  that  France  should  not  attempt  to 
annex  any  of  the  Spanish  Colonies.  The  French 
expedition  resulted  in  the  reinstatement  of  the 
legitimist  dynasty  in  Spain.  Fearing  a  possible 
union  between  the  two  related  dynasties,  Great 
Britain  declared  that,  though  she  would  not  inter- 
vene between  Spain  and  her  American  colonies, 
she  nevertheless  considered  that  help  given  by 
any  foreign  Power  to  Spain's  expedition  against 
these  colonies  would  constitute  a  new  question  in 
reference  to  which  His  Majesty's  Government 
would  take  such  decision  as  Great  Britain's  interest 
required. 

Mr.  Canning  had  already  informed  the  United 
States'  Minister  in  London,  then  Mr.  Rush,  of  a 
proposal  he  had  in  contemplation  to  make  after 
the  French  expedition  to  Spain,  with  a  view  to  the 
holding  of  some  congress,  meeting  or  conference  for 
the  settlement  of  matters  affecting  South  America. 
In  his  conversations  on  the  subject  with  Mr.  Rush, 


UNITED  STATES'  FOREIGN  POLICY  67 

Mr.  Canning  proposed  that  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment should  agree  with  the  Government  of  Great 
Britain  to  protest  against  any  action  which  might 
endanger  the  new  South  American  repubHcs.  Mr. 
Rush,  while  admitting  that  any  attempt  on  the  part 
of  France  and  the  Continental  Alliance  to  reassert 
European  supremacy  over  the  new  republics  would 
be  "an  act  of  national  injustice  disclosing  a  very 
alarming  progressive  ambition",  was  nevertheless 
of  the  opinion  that  to  join  Great  Britain  in  the 
proposed  protest  would  seem  contrary  to  the  tradi- 
tional policy  of  the  United  States  of  standing  aloof 
from  European  political  affairs.  Mr.  Canning  was 
insistent.  The  United  States  were  the  master 
power  on  the  American  continent.  They  were 
in  close  relation  with  Spanish  America  by  their 
geographical  position  as  well  as  with  Europe  by 
their  intercourse;  and  they  were  also  bound  to 
the  new  States  of  South  America  by  political  ties. 
Was  it  possible  that  they  could  stand  aloof  while 
the  fate  of  these  new  States  was  being  settled  by 
Europe?  Had  not  a  modification  taken  place 
in  the  United  States'  position  towards  Europe, 
which  Europe  itself  was  bound  to  recognise  ?  Were 
the  great  political  and  commercial  interests  hang- 
ing on  the  fate  of  the  new  continent  to  be  debated 
and  directed  in  this  hemisphere  without  the  co- 
operation or  even  the  knowledge  of  the  United 
States  ?  Were  they  to  be  debated  and  directed 
without  some  prior  agreement  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain,  the  two  leading  commercial 
and  maritime  powers  of  the  two  worlds  ? 


68     COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

On  receipt  of  Mr.  Rush's  despatches,  President 
Monroe  sent  Mr.  Canning's  correspondence  to  Mr. 
Jefferson  and  Mr.  Madison,  the  most  eminent 
American  statesmen  of  the  day,  to  ask  their  advice. 

Mr.  Jefferson's  reply  throws  a  certain  light  on 
the  present  policy  to  which,  without  laying  too 
much  stress  on  it,  I  nevertheless  call  the  reader's 
attention. 

The  question  was  the  most  important  that  had 
been  submitted  for  his  consideration  since  the 
question  of  independence.  "This  one,"  said  he, 
"made  us  a  nation  and  the  other  will  set  our  com- 
pass and  point  to  the  course  we  are  to  follow  across 
the  seas  of  time  lying  before  us  and  never  could 
we  have  sailed  towards  our  goal  in  more  propitious 
circumstances.  Our  first  fundamental  maxim  must 
be  never  to  obtrude  upon  European  disputes ;  our 
second,  never  to  suffer  Europe  to  meddle  with 
cisatlantic  affairs.  North  and  South  America 
have  a  series  of  interests  distinct  from  those  of 
Europe  and  which  are  proper  to  itself.  For  that 
reason,  Europe  and  America  must  have  separate 
and  distinct  systems ;  while  the  former  labours 
to  become  the  seat  of  despotism,  our  efforts  should 
certainly  tend  to  make  our  hemisphere  the  home  of 
liberty. 

"One  nation,  especially,  could  disturb  us  in  the 
prosecution  of  this  goal  and  she  now  offers  to  guide, 
to  help  and  accompany  us.  By  acceding  to  her 
request  we  should  detach  her  from  European  com- 
binations, we  should  throw  that  nation's  weight 
in  the  scales  of  free  government  and,  at  one  stroke, 


UNITED  STATES'  FOREIGN  POLICY  69 

we  should  emancipate  a  continent  which  otherwise 
might  languish  for  a  long  time  in  uncertainty  and 
difficulties.  Great  Britain  is  the  nation  which  can 
do  us  most  harm  among  the  nations  of  the  world, 
whereas,  if  she  is  with  us,  we  need  not  fear  the  whole 
world.  It  is  important,  therefore,  for  us  to  enter- 
tain with  Great  Britain  relations  of  cordial  friend- 
ship and  nothing  would  help  to  tighten  the  ties  of 
affection  so  much  as  to  fight  once  more  in  the  same 
cause.  Not  that  I  would  purchase  its  friendship 
by  taking  part  in  its  wars.  But  the  war  in  which  the 
present  proposal  could  involve  us,  if  war  were  to 
come  of  it,  would  not  be  England's  war  but  ours. 
The  object  is  to  introduce  and  to  establish  the 
American  system  of  keeping  away  from  our  con- 
tinent all  foreign  Powers,  of  never  allowing  European 
Powers  to  meddle  with  our  peoples'  affairs.  It  is 
a  question  of  vindicating  our  own  principle  not  of 
departing  from  it,  and  if,  in  order  to  facilitate  the 
realization  of  this  scheme,  we  can  create  a  division 
in  the  European  camp  and  bring  on  our  side  its 
most  powerful  member,  we  must  surely  do  so.  But, 
I  am  entirely  of  Mr.  Canning's  opinion  that  this 
step  will  prevent  war  rather  than  provoke  it.  The 
moment  Great  Britain  would  be  taken  away  from 
their  side  and  thrown  on  this  one,  the  whole  of 
Europe  combined  would  not  dare  to  undertake  such 
a  war,  for  how  indeed  could  these  Powers  attack 
either  of  these  two  enemies,  without  some  superior 
fleet.  And  we  must  also  not  neglect  this  oppor- 
tunity to  enter  our  protest  against  the  other  vio- 
lations of  the  rights  of  all  nations  perpetrated  as  a 


70  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

result  of  the  interference  of  any  one  whatsoever 
in  his  neighbour's  home  affairs,  these  violations  so 
shamelessly  begun  by  Buonaparte  and  now  con- 
tinued by  the  Alliance  which  dubs  itself  'Holy' 
and  which  is  as  little  respectful  as  he  was  of  justice." 
Mr.  Madison  shared  Mr.  Jefferson's  views  in 
another  letter  which  is  not  so  important. 

For  the  purpose  of  this  article  it  is  unnecessary 
to  retrace  the  vicissitudes  through  which  the  prin- 
ciples in  question  have  passed,  nor  need  I  recall 
the  United  States'  attitude  in  the  crisis  created  by 
the  French  intervention  in  Mexico.  The  Monroe 
Doctrine  could  only  become  a  hard  and  fast  rule  of 
American  policy  after  the  consolidation  of  central 
government  after  the  close  of  the  Civil  War. 

It  is  suflBcient  to  say  that  the  policy  of  noninter- 
vention in  European  affairs  and  its  corollary,  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  have  been  the  keystone  of  the 
foreign  policy  of  the  United  States  for  a  century 
devoted  to  the  internal  development  of  unparalleled 
material  resources. 

"Up  to  the  present,"  said  Mr.  Olney  in  his  famous 
despatch  of  August  7,  1895,  on  the  Venezuela 
question,  "  we  have  been  spared  in  our  history  the 
evils  and  burdens  attendant  upon  immense  armies 
and  all  the  other  accessories  of  large  war  establish- 
ments, and  this  exemption  has  contributed  in  no 
small  measure  to  our  national  greatness  and  pros- 
perity as  well  as  to  every  citizen's  interest." 

This  is  no  exaggeration  of  the  advantages  the 
United  States  have  drawn  from  a  situation  which 


> 


UNITED  STATES'  FOREIGN  POLICY  71 

enables  their  Government  to  keep  aloof  from  the 
rivalries  and  dilQSculties  of  Europe. 

Mr.  Olney  further  says:  "The  United  States 
are  practically  sovereign  on  their  continent,  their 
word  is  law  for  those  subjects  on  whom  they  impose 
their  intervention.  And  why  is  it  so  ?  It  is  not 
merely  an  effect  of  their  friendship  or  of  their 
good  will;  it  is  not  by  reason  of  their  standing  as 
a  highly  civilized  power,  nor  because  wisdom, 
justice  and  equity  are  the  invariable  characteristics 
of  the  United  States'  actions.  It  is  because,  in 
addition  to  all  other  motives,  their  inexhaustible 
resources,  combined  with  their  isolated  position, 
make  them  masters  of  the  situation  and  invulner- 
able towards  every  one  of  the  other  Powers  either 
singly  or  in  coalition." 

To  be  supreme  on  the  American  continent  amidst 
weak  though  turbulent  neighbours  while  preserving 
its  immunity  from  burdens  similar  to  those  under 
which  European  States  are  groaning  is  quite  a  natural 
wish  on  the  part  of  the  chief  American  Power. 

Thence  springs  the  foreign  policy  of  the  United 
States,  —  that  is,  noninterference  in  extra-Ameri- 
can affairs  and  intervention  in  American  affairs 
wherever  a  European  interest  is  asserted. 

It  is  easy  to  foresee  further  consequences  of  a 
policy  which  is  passing  at  the  present  moment 
through  a  period  of  active  evolution  without  going 
to  the  length  which  JVIr.  Olney  foreshadowed  for  it 
in  his  despatch  of  August  7,  1895. 

"Three  thousand  miles  of  ocean,"  said  he,  "which 
separate    these    continents    make    any    permanent 


72  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

political  union  between  an  American  and  an  Euro- 
pean State  unnatural  and  inopportune." 

The  question  was  asked  in  England  at  the  time 
whether  the  emancipation  of  the  European  colonies 
in  America  could  ever  become  part  of  the  foreign 
policy  of  the  United  States. 

The  Hispano-American  War  brought  about  a 
situation  which  did  not  seem  entirely  to  agree 
with  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Nevertheless  President 
Roosevelt  in  a  speech  delivered  in  1912  on  the 
results  of  the  Hispano-American  War  declared : 

"The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  simply  a  statement 
of  our  very  firm  belief  that  the  nations  now  existing 
on  this  continent  must  be  left  to  work  out  their 
own  destinies  among  themselves  and  that  this 
continent  is  no  longer  to  be  regarded  as  the  coloniz- 
ing ground  of  any  European  Power.  The  one 
Power  on  this  continent  that  can  make  the  power 
effective  is,  of  course,  ourselves,  for  in  the  world 
as  it  is,  a  nation  which  advances  a  given  doctrine, 
likely  to  interfere  in  any  way  with  other  nations, 
must  possess  the  power  to  back  it  up,  if  it  wishes 
the  doctrine  to  be  respected." 

We  now  come  to  our  own  times,  the  eve  of  the 
opening  of  the  Panama  Canal. 

On  August  2,  1912,  the  United  States  Senate 
adopted  the  following  resolution  proposed  by  Sena- 
tor Lodge  by  a  majority  of  fifty-one  votes  to  four. 

"Resolved  that  when  any  harbor  or  other  place 
in  the  American  continent  is  so  situated  that  the 
occupation  thereof  for  naval  or  military  purposes 


UNITED  STATES'  FOREIGN  POLICY  73 

might  threaten  the  communications  or  the  safety  of 
the  United  States,  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  could  not  see  without  grave  concern  the 
possession  of  such  harbor  or  other  place  by  any  cor- 
poration or  association  which  has  such  a  relation 
to  another  Government  not  American  as  to  give 
that  Government  practical  power  of  control  for 
national  purposes." 

This  action  of  the  Senate  grew  out  of  the  report 
that  a  stretch  of  territory  bordering  on  Magdalena 
Bay,  Mexico,  might  be  acquired  by  the  subjects 
of  a  foreign  country  and  thus  through  control  by 
their  own  national  Government  become  the  base 
of  permanent  naval  or  military  occupation.  In 
support  of  the  resolution  Senator  Lodge  said : 

"The  declaration  rests  on  a  much  broader  and 
older  ground  than  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  This 
resolution  rests  on  the  generally  accepted  prin- 
ciple that  every  nation  has  a  right  to  protect  its 
own  safety.  It  is  its  duty  and  right  to  intervene." 
The  Senator  added  that  the  opening  of  the  Panama 
Canal  gave  to  Magdalena  Bay  an  importance  that 
it  had  never  before  possessed,  the  Panama  routes 
passing  in  front  of  it. 

The  political  situation  of  the  United  States  had 
undergone  an  important  alteration  by  the  annexa- 
tion of  the  Philippine  Islands  which  was  already 
a  departure  from  the  principles  enunciated  by 
Washington.  The  opening  of  the  Panama  Canal 
was  an  event  of  still  greater  importance  in  the 
evolution    of    the    United    States'    foreign    policy. 


74  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

This  canal  was  bound  to  have  upon  the  United 
States'  policy  an  effect  analogous  to  that  of  the 
opening  of  the  Suez  Canal  upon  British  foreign 
policy.  The  utilisation  by  overseas  trade  of 
the  Suez  Canal  resulted  in  organic  changes  in  the 
construction  of  ships  which  no  longer  had  to  cross 
vast  stretches  of  ocean  without  putting  in  at  any 
port  on  the  way.  But  especially  the  new  route  to 
India  brought  about  an  alteration  in  a  commercial 
system  which  adapted  itself  to  new  markets.  The 
closing  of  the  Canal  for  a  few  days,  nay,  for  a  few 
hours,  might  entail  loss  not  only  material  but  also  a 
dislocation  of  methods  and  schemes  on  which  the 
regular  exercise  of  Imperial  control  in  India  and 
elsewhere  is  built  up.  The  result  was  the  Egyptian 
question,  the  main-mise  on  Egypt  and  finally  its 
annexation. 

The  Panama  Canal  cannot  but  produce  a  similar 
transformation  of  a  commercial  system  hitherto 
based  on  totally  different  traffic  conditions  between 
the  two  shores  of  the  Atlantic  continent,  and  new 
interests  which  the  closing  of  the  canal  would 
threaten  with  disaster.  Now,  between  the  United 
States  territory  and  the  Panama  Canal  there  is  a 
large  State  which  for  several  years  has  been  unable 
to  restore  itself  to  a  condition  of  internal  peace. 
One  need  only  study  the  history  of  the  Suez  Canal 
to  perceive  what  may  be  the  possible  development 
of  American  collateral  policy  interests  in  connec- 
tion with  the  Panama  Canal.  It  will  necessarily 
affect  the  relations  of  the  United  States  with  their 
nearer  neighbours. 


UNITED  STATES'  FOREIGN  POLICY  75 

The  reader  has  seen  in  this  brief  analysis  of  the 
evolution  of  the  United  States'  foreign  policy  a 
relationship  between  the  notion  of  detachment  from 
European  affairs  and  that  of  de  facto  hegemony 
on  the  American  continent.  He  has  seen  that  the 
desire  to  keep  the  American  continent  free  from  the 
necessity  of  creating  permanent  armies  and  to  avoid 
the  European  evil  of  militarism  had  given  birth  to 
both  the  Washington  and  Monroe  declarations.  He 
has  seen  principles,  new  circumstances,  shake  the 
foundations  of  these.  The  Great  War  was  a  new 
circumstance  of  still  greater  cogency. 

On  the  one  hand,  the  United  States  had  to  con- 
sider the  possibility  of  a  defeat  of  Great  Britain 
which  would  not  only  have  completely  upset  the 
political  and  economic  condition  of  their  overseas 
trade  but  would  have  threatened  their  hegemony 
on  the  American  continent  and  their  control  of  the 
Panama  Canal.  Successes  on  land  of  either  of 
the  European  belligerents  had,  it  is  true,  a  senti- 
mental, even  warm  sentimental  interest  for  the 
United  States  but  so  long  as  the  maritime  supremacy 
of  Great  Britain  remained  intact,  the  American 
people  confined  their  interest  to  helping  the  Allied 
Powers  keep  up  a  defensive  war  capable  of  pre- 
venting the  Central  Powers  from  extending  their 
conquests.  By  their  financial  resources  and  their 
industries,  the  United  States  did  this  to  the  extent 
of  their  private  means.  When  the  maritime  su- 
premacy of  Great  Britain  seemed  threatened  by 
submarine  warfare,  a  large  number  of  new  poten- 
tialities had  to  be  considered. 


76  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

This  was  one  of  the  situations  President  Wilson 
had  now  to  examine.  There  was  also  a  nearer 
contingency  which  he  had  to  consider :  the  possible 
alliance  between  Germany  and  Mexico,  an  alliance 
which,  as  is  now  known  from  the  correspondence 
which  has  been  captured,  had  been  contemplated 
and  which  might  always  materialise.  I  lay  no 
stress  on  consequences  too  obvious  to  require  ex- 
planations. 

By  the  declaration  of  war.  President  Wilson  at 
one  and  the  same  time  made  the  United  States' 
hegemony  on  the  American  continent  effective, 
upheld  in  its  entirety  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and 
insured  the  protection  of  the  Panama  Canal.  As 
regards  Mexico,  the  existence  of  an  adequate  Ameri- 
can army  reduced  it,  in  fact,  to  a  condition  of  practi- 
cal vassalage  which  brought  to  an  end  a  perilous 
state  of  things  of  which  some  short-sighted  politicians 
did  not  realize  the  gravity. 

The  declaration  of  war  was  therefore  but  the 
last  step  in  the  policy  of  a  century,  and  those  who 
think  that  it  throws  over  that  policy  and  constitutes 
a  "new  departure"  will  do  well  to  shake  off  that 
illusion.  The  only  unaccountable  and  disconcert- 
ing "departure"  from  the  safe  and  well-considered 
policy  of  the  founders  was  the  annexation  of  the 
Philippines,  which  we  may  some  day  learn  was  due 
more  to  sentimental  reasons  than  to  more  trust- 
worthy considerations  based  on  permanent  interests 
and  the  established  principles  of  American  general 
policy. 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  IV 

Note  on  Panama  Canal  ^ 

One  need  only  notice  on  the  map  the  shape  of  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  and  compare  it  with  the  shape  of  the 
Caribbean  Sea  in  order  to  be  convinced  that,  whereas 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico  as  a  consequence  of  American  domina- 
tion over  Cuba  has  become  a  lake  which  the  United 
States  have  the  means  of  closing,  the  Caribbean  Sea 
could  only  be  closed  by  acquiring  some  form  of  domina- 
tion over  a  number  of  islands  at  present  belonging  to 
different  Powers.  It  follows  that,  as  regards  the  sending 
of  forces,  in  all  possible  hostile  combinations,  for  the 
defence  of  the  Panama  Canal,  it  would  be  necessary 
either  to  go  through  Mexico  or  to  cross  the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 
Moreover,  in  case  of  war,  it  would  be  impossible  to  con- 
template an  effective  barrage  of  the  Caribbean  Sea  in 
spite  of  the  possession  of  the  island  of  Porto  Rico.  There 
are,  it  is  true,  railways  across  Mexico  but  only  some  sec- 
tions of  railway  systems  in  the  other  States  of  Central 
America.  The  problem  of  providing  means  of  defence 
for  the  canal,  in  fact,  has  become  by  reason  of  events  in 
Mexico  more  acute,  but  it  is  not  confined  to  Mexico. 

That  the  creation  of  this  new  waterway  would  bring 
about  changes  in  the  relations  between  Spanish  America 

1  Translated  by  Mr.  A.  Wright,  from  Sir  T.  Barclay's  "Le  President 
Wilson  et  revolution  de  la  politique  6trangere  des  Etats-Unis." 
Armand  Colin,  Paris,  1918. 


78  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

and  the  active  and  somewhat  restive  States  of  the  east 
of  the  Union,  was  too  obvious  not  to  occasion  anxiety 
on  different  sides.  This  anxiety  seems  to  express  itself 
rather  in  respect  to  pohtical  than  material  interests. 
In  this  connection,  the  following  observations  by  a 
writer  (P.  A.  Monjas)  in  "Espana  y  America"  (1911) 
are  interesting : 

"That  the  United  States,  in  constructing  the  canal, 
have  no  purely  commercial  object  in  view,  is  evident 
from  the  considerable  disproportion  between  the  enormous 
cost  of  the  work  and  the  small  importance  of  their  mer- 
chant service,  as  also  from  the  fact  that  they  have  con- 
nected the  two  shores  of  the  canal  by  railways,  some  of 
which,  for  instance  the  Tehuantepec  Railway,  constitute 
a  great  danger,  and  lastly  from  the  further  fact  of  the 
rapid  completion  of  the  Panamerican. 

"What  is  then  the  end  which  is  being  pursued  by  the 
White  House  Government  in  protecting  the  emancipa- 
tion of  Panama  and  in  expending  without  reckoning 
such  considerable  amounts  in  order  to  realise  the  colossal 
scheme  first  evolved  by  Ferdinand  de  Lesseps?  Simply 
to  convert  this  strategical  point  into  a  veritable  arsenal 
for  war,  a  permanent  threat  for  the  peoples  of  Latin 
America,  more  particularly  for  those  of  South  America, 
and  to  show  in  the  world's  face  that  it  has  laid  the  founda- 
tions for  further  conquests. 

"It  has  been  shown,  hundreds  of  times,  that  the  com- 
mercial exchanges  between  the  Northern  Colossus  and 
the  Southern  nations  are  unequal ;  stress  has  been  laid, 
ad  nauseam,  on  the  advantages  of  all  kinds  for  the  Euro- 
pean traders  in  Brazil,  Argentine,  Chile,  Uruguay  and 
other  producing  countries,  and  on  the  fact  that  in  spite 
of  the  opening  of  the  canal,  distances  will  continue  more 
favourable  for  the  old  continent.     How  then  can  one 


UNITED  STATES'  FOREIGN  POLICY  79 

explain  the  enthusiasm  of  the  United  States?  Did  the 
Washington  Government  then,  as  some  persons  have 
alleged,  undertake  this  work  with  so  much  energy  in  the 
interests  of  the  Republics  of  Latin  America,  out  of  purely 
commercial  altruism?  If  so,  why  these  fortifications 
and  these  excessive  duties  which  affect  equally  Europeans 
and  South  Americans  ? 

"The  commercial  waterway  so  patronised  at  the  outset, 
let  us  be  allowed  to  say  it  without  hesitation,  has  lost  its 
character  and  has  been  transmuted  into  a  strategical 
and  military  measure. 

"South  American  statesmen  must  not  close  their 
eyes  to  the  danger  arising  out  of  the  opening  of  this 
new  waterway  in  the  hands  of  an  imperialist  govern- 
ment. .  .  . 

"Once  the  Panama  Canal  is  open,  who  will  be  able 
to  prevent  the  United  States  from  exercising  their  power- 
ful influence  over  the  Southern  Pacific,  just  as  they  exer- 
cise it  now  over  the  West  Indies  Sea  ?  .  .  , 

"The  fortifying  of  the  Panama  Canal,  in  violation 
of  all  usage  and  customs  recognized  in  International  Law 
is  a  danger  and  a  threat  to  the  Republics  of  Spanish 
America.  It  is  not  sufficient  to  say  that  preponderance 
in  these  seas  is  necessary  to  check  the  voracity  of  other 
nations  and  more  particularly  of  Japan.  Those  are  pre- 
texts invented  by  the  Government  and  Press  of  the  United 
States,  in  order  to  mislead  credulous  souls.  Such  acts 
of  sovereignty  constitute  an  infraction  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  and  the  modern  tendency  of  the  United  States 
is  Imperialist.  From  defenders,  they  have  become  cum- 
bersome protectors. 

"The  peoples  of  South  America  must  prepare  for  the 
future  and  compose  their  quarrels  in  order  to  form  one 
block  in  the  interest  of  their  race  and  of  their  dignity. 


80  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

for  that  is  the  only  way  for  them  to  make  themselves 
invincible  and  miassailable. 

"The  South  American  family  united  in  a  supreme  desire 
for  freedom  in  the  defence  of  a  race  shall  not  be  van- 
quished by  the  Yankee's  formidable  squadrons  nor  by 
the  dollars  of  their  multi-millionaires ;  whereas  if  divided, 
it  will  drift  further  and  further  from  the  ideal  of  its  destiny 
and  the  Northern  octopus  shall  slowly  and  surely  crush 
it  in  its  frightful  tentacles.  It  will  thus  work  at  the  dig- 
ging of  its  own  grave. 

"Let  us  say  what  we  think.  The  Panama  Canal  will 
for  a  long  time  be  the  source  of  sensational  rumours. 
The  fortifications  theme  was  scarcely  exhausted  before 
the  problem  of  the  acquisition  of  the  Galapagos  Islands 
arose ;  then  came  the  attempt  by  President  Arosemena 
to  enter  into  pourparlers  with  Colombia,  and  on  all 
sides  one  sees  dangers,  some  real,  some  imaginary,  as 
soon  as  the  presence  of  the  star-spangled  flag  is  signalled 
in  the  Pacific. 

"  Time  will  confirm  once  more  the  radical  transformation 
which  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  undergone  and  the  naivete 
of  certain  South  American  statesmen  and  of  a  part  of  the 
South  American  Press  who  remain  undisturbed  when 
conquerors  are  at  the  doors  of  Byzantium." 

Similar  alarm  has  been  shown  by  M.  D'Estournelles 
de  Constant  in  his  interesting  work  on  "Les  Etats  Unis 
d'Amerique",  Paris,  1913  (new  edition,  1917).  It 
seems  however  to  me  to  overlook  a  situation  which  I 
have  pointed  out  in  the  text.^ 

M.  D'Estournelles  de  Constant  says:  "In  Panama, 
in  the  Philippines,  the  Americans  could  have  restricted 
themselves  to  a  useful  and  magnificent  mission;    they 

1  "Le  President  Wilson  et  revolution  de  ^la  politique  etrangere  des 
Etats-Unis."     Armand  Colin,  Paris,  1918. 


UNITED  STATES'  FOREIGN  POLICY  81 

went  beyond ;  in  Panama  they  have  assumed  Habihties 
without  Umit  and  fraught  with  peril  for  every  one ;  they 
have  assumed  the  responsibihty  of  a  route  where  every 
accident  of  a  purely  administrative  order  will  be  fatally 
enlarged  owing  to  their  political  domination  and  will 
assume  a  political  character.  What  a  blow  to  the  civiliza- 
tion and  to  the  higher  interests  of  the  United  States ! 
What  bravado  and  senseless  quest  for  impopularity ! 
Can  one  imagine  the  ships  of  all  countries  which  for  forty 
years  have  been  freely  sailing  through  the  Suez  Canal, 
henceforward  filing  past  the  guns  of  the  American  forts  ! 
What  a  startling  difference  of  treatment !  What  a 
shock  to  every  one's  mind !  It  is  by  pretensions  of  that 
kind,  by  blows  of  Might  superseding  Right,  that  Germany 
did  so  much  harm  to  herself  in  universal  opinion;  and 
now  we  see  the  American  democracy  falling  into  this 
imperial  mistake  even  before  it  has  an  army  and  the 
necessary  maritime  squadrons  to  support  such  an  attitude. 

"These  precautions,  alleged  to  have  been  taken  in 
the  interest  of  American  commerce,  will  do  it  harm.  The 
Panama  Canal  should  be  an  improvement  on  the  Suez 
Canal :  it  should  have  been  not  in  the  hands  of  one  Power, 
that  is  to  say  in  the  hands  of  one  Government  and  one 
day  perhaps  in  the  hands  of  a  coterie,  but  rather  under 
the  safeguard  of  all, 

"An  unfortified  Panama  Canal  would  have  been  still 
more  neutral,  still  less  threatened,  and  hence,  better  de- 
fended by  general  interest  than  the  Suez  Canal. 

"Let  us  suffer  this  belittling  of  a  great  scheme;  let 
us  submit  to  these  fortifications  more  humiliating  still 
for  those  who  impose  them  than  for  those  who  accept 
them.  But  let  us  follow  the  consequences  of  this  Ameri- 
can mistake.  Under  the  pretext  of  protecting  a  neutrality 
which  had  nothing  to  fear  from  anybody,  the   United 


82  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

States  are  going  to  inflict  upon  themselves  garrisons, 
squadrons  which  will  call  for  other  squadrons  and  so 
forth.  That  is  not  all.  Provision  had  to  be  made  for 
the  bill  to  be  paid;  and,  in  order  to  find  the  enormous 
sums  which  all  these  precautions  will  cost  the  United 
States,  they  had  to  go  further  along  the  road  of  violation 
of  every  one's  rights ;  under  the  pretext  of  giving  prefer- 
ential treatment  to  a  few  national  navigation  companies 
yet  unborn,  they  had  to  get  ready  to  extort  from  foreign 
ships  differential  taxes  which  in  some  cases  will  be  pro- 
hibitive, and  from  which  the  United  States  alone  will 
derive  any  profit ;  this  is  the  boycotting  of  international 
commerce  on  its  way  through :  taxes,  guns,  nothing  will 
be  wanting  to  greet  it  in  this  canal  soi-disant  universal" 
(p.  497). 

As  regards  the  relations  between  England  and  the 
United  States  in  the  western  hemisphere  and  the  Panama 
Canal,  Mr.  Coolidge  (A.  C.  Coolidge,  "Les  Etats-Unis 
Puissance  Mondiale",  Paris,  1908,  pp.  300  et  seq.)  points 
out  that  these  relations  are  not  confined  solely  to  the 
questions  concerning  Canada;  apart  even  from  the 
Great  Dominion,  Great  Britain  occupies  in  the  New 
World  a  position  which  the  Americans  constantly  have 
to  take  into  account.  "In  the  coralliferous  Bermuda 
Islands  fortified  and  almost  impregnable,  she  possesses 
an  excellent  base  for  operations  whence  a  hostile  fleet 
could  threaten  the  whole  American  coast  from  Maine 
to  Florida.  More  to  the  south  the  Bahama  Islands  group 
commands  the  entrance  to  the  Florida  Canal ;  Jamaica 
stands  as  a  sentinel  in  front  of  any  canal  which  might 
go  through  Nicaragua  or  Panama ;  the  British  possessions 
in  Guyana  and  the  Lesser  Antilles  command  the  exit  from 
the  Caribbean  Sea.  In  short,  all  these  posts  make  a 
formidable   chain.     The   Bermuda   Islands   are    isolated 


UNITED  STATES'  FOREIGN  POLICY  83 

and  have  given  rise  to  no  quarrel.  The  United  States 
may  be  annoyed  at  their  being  in  possession  of  the  Eng- 
lish but  there  is  nothing  to  be  done.  They  have  rather 
turned  their  attention  towards  the  Caribbean  Sea  and 
the  neighbouring  waters  where  during  nearly  the  whole 
of  the  nineteenth  century  they  have  had  keen  rivalry  with 
the  English  —  a  rivalry  which  has  only  just  come  to 
an  end. 

"When  the  Panama  Canal  is  at  last  completed,  New 
York  as  well  as  the  ports  of  the  Mexican  Gulf  will  be 
much  nearer  the  western  shores  of  South  America ;  they 
will  also  be  able  to  communicate  with  Australia  and  the 
Far  East  in  much  more  advantageous  conditions  than 
to-day.  What  will  these  advantages  exactly  be?  It 
is  difficult  to  say ;  distance  does  not  prevent  Bremen 
from  competing  with  Marseilles  in  the  same  regions,  but 
this  is  a  factor  nevertheless  which  must  be  reckoned 
for  something.  It  is  easier  to  see  what  the  American 
fleet  will  gain  :  the  canal  will  enable  it  to  concentrate 
its  forces  rapidly  in  either  of  the  great  oceans,  and  as  a 
neutral  line  of  water  communication,  it  would  be  invalu- 
able if  one  was  at  war  on  both  sides  at  the  same  time. 
Even  now  American  supremacy  is  solidly  established 
in  the  Mexican  Gulf  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  It  might 
take  umbrage  at  the  arrival  of  the  Canadians  in  these 
waters,  but  they  need  not  make  it  a  serious  case.  If 
Great  Britain  again  wished  to  become  a  rival  of  the 
United  States  in  that  part  of  the  world,  she  no  longer 
has  the  means.  Although  their  present  situation  is 
satisfactory,  certain  signs  warrant  the  belief  that  the 
United  States  will  not  be  satisfied  with  it.  Led  by  the 
impulse  of  natural  forces  and  hereditary  traditions  rather 
than  by  deliberate  purpose,  they  must,  it  seems,  fortify 
their  position  in  these  waters." 


84  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

President  Roosevelt,  on  his  side,  recalls  that  in  the 
past  most  of  the  members  of  the  different  Congresses 
have  been  opposed  always  to  the  reconstruction  of  the 
fleet  and  to  the  fortification  of  the  Panama  Canal.  "  They 
thought  they  were  acting  well,  but,"  he  adds  with  his 
usual  verve,  "they  shamefully  betrayed  the  national 
duty,  they  showed  themselves  the  most  dangerous  enemies 
of  the  Republic.  If  the  American  people  wish  to  support 
such  politicians,  let  them  give  up  the  canal,  give  it  back 
to  Panama,  or  present  it  to  Japan,  to  Germany,  to  Eng- 
land or  to  any  nation  who  is  governed  by  men,  not  by 
eunuchs !  Let  them  give  up  also  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
and  no  longer  pretend  that  they  protect  life  and  property 
in  Mexico !  In  short,  let  us  become  a  Western  China, 
and  in  weakness  and  impotence  wait  for  the  day  when 
our  territory  shall  be  split  up  between  more  energetic 
races  !  But  if  we  intend  to  play  our  part  as  a  great  nation, 
to  be  ready  to  defend  our  own  interests  and  to  be  useful 
to  others,  let  us  make  up  our  minds  what  we  ought  to  do 
and  get  ready  to  do  it !  South  of  the  equator,  on  a  line 
nearing  on  both  sides  the  Panama  Canal,  we  no  longer 
need  concern  ourselves  about  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Brazil,  Chile  and  the  Argentine  are  capable  of  upholding 
this  doctrine  for  the  whole  of  South  America,  except 
in  the  extreme  northern  parts.  Consider  for  instance 
the  case  of  the  Argentine.  As  in  Switzerland,  military 
service  there  is  compulsory,  which  socially  and  indus- 
trially has  been  of  much  benefit.  It  has  also  given  the 
State  an  army  of  almost  half  a  million  men ;  although 
the  population  is  not  one  ninth  that  of  the  United  States. 
The  Argentine  is  much  more  ready  to  defend  its  territory 
in  case  of  sudden  attack  by  a  powerful  enemy.  We  should 
do  well  to  join  its  school  and  to  learn  the  lesson  it  gives 
us. 


UNITED  STATES'  FOREIGN  POLICY  85 

"Hence  we  need  only  feel  anxiety  as  to  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  when  it  concerns  the  approaches  to  the  Panama 
Canal ;  that  is  to  say  the  territories  between  our  southern 
frontier  and  the  equator.  We  need  not  worry  as  to 
this  doctrine  as  regards  Canada,  for,  last  year,  Canada 
showed  itself  infinitely  stronger  than  us."  (Theodore 
Roosevelt.  "Le  Devoir  de  I'Amerique  en  Face  de  la 
Guerre",  pp.  193  et  seq.)     Paris,  1917. 

Note  on  the  Mexican  Policy 

The  Mexican  question,  in  contradistinction  from  the 
Panama  Canal  question,  is  a  question  of  foreign  policy 
for  the  United  States.  In  spite  of  the  President's  declara- 
tions as  to  the  noninterventionist  character  of  his  Gov- 
ernment, it  involves  problems  of  adjacency  of  exceptional 
gravity. 

For  those  who  may  know  nothing  of  the  matter,  a  few 
observations  on  this  subject  may  possibly  be  useful. 
They  will  form  a  complement  to  what  I  have  already  said 
on  the  Panama  question. 

The  Mexican  revolution  was  a  constitutional  and 
liberal  reaction  against  the  dictatorship  of  Porfirio  Diaz, 
who  had  been  in  power  from  1876  to  1911.  Under  his 
Government,  which  had  been  preserved  by  force  and 
intrigue,  the  country  as  a  whole  had  enjoyed  consider- 
able prosperity.  Popular  will,  however,  had  been  sup- 
pressed by  the  classic  methods  of  military  despotisms. 

After  thirty-five  years  of  dictatorship,  Diaz  was  over- 
thrown by  Francisco  Madero,  the  leader  of  a  secessionist 
group  of  the  liberal  and  progressist  parties  who  had  him 
elected  in  the  place  of  Diaz. 

Huerta  had  been  a  general  under  the  orders  of  Madero. 
After  a  ten-days*  battle  in  the  city  of  Mexico  against 


86  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

Madero's  adversaries,  he  suddenly  seized  power  and 
caused  the  arrest  of  Madero,  who  was  killed  in  the 
National  Palace. 

Huerta  then  assumed  oflSce,  which  he  retained  from 
February,  1913,  to  July,  1914.  Public  rumour  accused 
him  of  being  favourable  to  foreign  interests  supported  by 
a  section  of  European  diplomacy. 

In  the  north,  Huerta  met  with  resistance  on  the  part 
of  Venustiano  Carranza  who  had  been  a  Senator  and  who 
at  that  moment  was  Governor  of  the  state  (province)  of 
Coahuila.  Carranza,  after  a  confused  struggle  in  which 
various  interests  endeavoured  to  amalgamate,  became 
President.  President  Huerta  then  took  refuge  in  the 
United  States,  where  he  died. 

As  in  the  case  of  Huerta  and  Madero,  Carranza*s 
general,  Villa,  took  advantage  of  his  chief's  confidence 
to  oppose  him.  Zapata,  another  general,  also  separated 
from  him  and  these  two  leaders  of  bands,  assisted  by  Felix 
Diaz,  who  had  fought  against  Madero,  are  still  chiefs  of 
armed  factions. 

Carranza,  who  alone  enjoys  some  civil  authority  as  a 
parliamentarian  and  administrator  among  those  who  led 
the  revolution,  was  recognized  as  soon  as  possible  (Octo- 
ber 19,  1915)  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States. 
It  is  a  de  facto  government,  the  legitimacy  of  which  has 
not  yet  been  ratified  by  an  election,  but  as  such  it  has 
been  recognized  by  all  or  nearly  all  the  governments  of 
South  America,  by  Japan  and  by  all  the  great  European 
Powers. 

In  the  course  of  the  struggle,  numerous  Americans 
were  killed,  wounded  or  ill-treated  and  material  interests 
of  American  citizens  suffered.  Even  the  flag  of  the 
United  States  was  insulted.  Hot-headed  patriots  in  the 
United  States  wished  to  embark  on  a  war  with  Mexico, 


UNITED  STATES'  FOREIGN  POLICY  87 

to  visit  on  the  innocent  the  crimes  of  the  guilty.  The 
Government,  having  a  greater  responsibiUty  than  opposi- 
tion leaders,  was  wise  enough  not  to  do  anything  which 
might  have  resulted  in  the  creation  of  a  coalition  of  the 
various  Mexican  parties  for  national  defence,  and  have 
inevitably  brought  back  a  military  dictatorship.  Presi- 
dent Wilson's  electors  were  thankful  to  him  for  not  hav- 
ing launched  the  country  into  an  adventure  the  object 
of  which  would  have  been  the  support  of  a  cause  contrary 
to  all  the  traditions  of  the  great  American  republic  and 
which  could  only  have  created  grievances  in  a  neighbour- 
ing State.  (See  T.  Barclay's  "Le  President  Wilson 
et  revolution  de  la  politique  etrangere  des  Etats-Unis." 
Armand  Colin,  Paris,  1918.) 


CHAPTER  V 

EQUALITY   OF   TRADE   CONDITIONS 

I  AM  not  concerned  with  any  meanings  of  a 
domestic  character  which  may  be  hidden  behind 
the  third  of  President  Wilson's  theses.  It  was 
addressed  to  the  world  generally  and  the  plain 
meaning  of  the  verbal  statement  is  what  binds 
the  responsible  political  chiefs  who  have  accepted 
its  terms  as  those  to  which  the  Allies  are  committed. 

The  third  of  the  President's  theses  contains  two 
propositions.  The  first  is  "the  removal,  so  far  as 
possible,  of  all  economic  barriers."  The  words  "so 
far  as  possible"  reduce  it  to  a  mere  pious  wish, 
an  expression  of  the  President's  personal  leaning  to 
"free  trade"  and  disapproval  of  monopolies  whether 
deliberate  or  practical  of  all  kinds,  as  he  has,  in 
fact,  more  or  less  explained. 

The  second  part  is  affirmative,  viz. :  "the  establish- 
ment of  an  equality  of  trade  conditions."  Free 
trade  is  equality  of  trade  conditions,  but  equality 
of  trade  conditions  is  also  consistent  with  a  protec- 
tive tariff,  provided  no  preference  under  it  is  given 
to  one  importer  as  against  another.  It  means 
most-favoured-nation  treatment  and  as  a  definition  of 


EQUALITY  OF  TRADE  CONDITIONS  89 

that  treatment  the  President's  words  ought  to 
mean  nothing  else.  In  the  view  of  every  authority 
judicial  or  political,  except  the  United  States  Su- 
preme Court,  it  does  mean  nothing  else. 

To  give  effect  to  it  in  the  Treaty  of  Peace  "among 
all  the  nations  consenting  to  peace",  to  use  the 
President's  phrasing,  the  nations  "associating  them- 
selves for  its  maintenance"  will  have  to  agree  to 
a  "most-favoured-nation  clause"  without  arriere- 
pensee,  or  a  clause  so  precise  that  there  will  be  no 
possibility  of  going  behind  it  and  alleging  that  such 
a  clause  "does  not  prevent  special  concessions."  ^ 
The  clause  to  carry  out  the  President's  proposal 
as  endorsed  by  the  Allies  will  have  to  state  that  it 
does  prevent  special  concessions. 

"Equality  of  trade  conditions,"  as  propounded  by 
the  President  without  any  specific  qualification 
would  exclude  "boycotting"  as  a  sanction  against 
any  nation  guilty  of  backsliding,  and  it  is  a  barrier 
against  the  adoption  of  several  of  the  resolutions 
of  the  Economic  Conference  of  Allied  Governments 
of  June,  1916,  especially  of  clause  B  II.  These 
resolutions  were  adopted  before  the  United  States 
had  become  a  belligerent  and  President  Wilson 
is  free  to  regard  them  as  obsolete,  if  it  so  pleases 
him.     The  obnoxious  clause  reads  as  follows : 

"Whereas  the  war  has  put  an  end  to  all  treaties 
of  commerce  between  the  Allies  and  Enemy  Powers, 
and  it  is  of  essential  importance  that  during  the 
period  of  economic  reconstruction  the  liberty  of 
none  of  the  Allies  should  be  hampered  by  any  claim 

1  See  Whitney  Robertson,  S.  C,  decisions. 


90  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

put  forward  by  Enemy  Powers  to  most-favoured- 
nation treatment,  the  Allies  agree  that  the  benefit 
of  this  treatment  will  not  be  granted  to  those  Powers 
during  a  number  of  years,  to  be  fixed  by  mutual 
agreement  among  themselves. 

"During  this  number  of  years  the  Allies  undertake 
to  assure  each  other,  so  far  as  possible,  compensatory 
outlets  for  trade  in  case  consequences  detrimental 
to  their  commerce  should  result  from  the  applica- 
tion of  the  undertaking  referred  to  in  the  preceding 
clause." 

The  French  Government  apparently  sees  no 
antinomy  between  this  strangely  unpractical  clause 
and  President  Wilson's  third  point,  seeing  that  as 
recently  as  September,  1918,  it  "denounced"  (i.e. 
gave  notice  of  cancellation  of)  the  Franco-Swiss 
treaty  of  commerce  of  October  20,  1906,  with  a 
semi-ofl5cial  explanation  which  says:  "In  June, 
1916,  the  Economic  Conference  in  Paris  put  on 
record  the  wish  of  the  Entente  Powers  to  refuse 
the  enemy  the  benefits  of  the  most-favoured-nation 
treatment  for  the  years  following  the  conclusion 
of  peace.  The  Government  had  to  be  prepared 
for  the  economic  war  after  the  war  of  arms  has 
ceased.  Following  the  principle  and  to  facilitate 
its  application,  the  French  Government  in  a  cir- 
cular of  April,  1918,  proposed  to  denounce  all  exist- 
ing treaties  of  commerce  containing  the  most-fa- 
voured-nation clause.  Hence  the  denunciation  of 
the  Franco-Swiss  treaty."  This  is  out-Heroding 
Herod,  for  as  the  Temps  (September  16,  1918)  ob- 
serves, the  Economic  Conference  did  not  propose 


EQUALITY  OF  TRADE  CONDITIONS  91 

to  begin  operations  by  penalising  neutral  countries. 
Merely  denouncing  the  treaty,  however  irritating 
it  may  be  to  the  Swiss,  does  not  however  neces- 
sarily mean  that  the  denunciation  will  be  acted 
upon  and,  as  in  the  case  of  England's  imports  into 
France  under  a  special  most-favoured-nation  re- 
gime which  has  existed  since  1892,  Switzerland  may 
be  granted  most-favoured-nation  treatment  by  act 
of  Parliament  without  a  treaty. 

But  the  point  remains  that  the  French  Govern- 
ment does  not  consider  itself  bound  by  President 
Wilson's  third  proposition,  although  it  has  joined 
in  the  chorus  of  acceptance  of  the  whole  of  his  four- 
teen and  other  propositions,  with  the  single  reser- 
vation dealt  with  in  the  analyses  of  point  number  2.^ 

I  am  not  aware  that  the  decisions  of  the  Economic 
Conference  were  preceded  by  any  inquiry  into  the 
needs  or  opinions  of  business  men  among  any  of 
the  Allied  nations.  The  signatories  of  the  docu- 
ment are  all  politicians  or  diplomatists  and  it  is 
still  open  to  governments  to  ascertain  what  the 
English,  French  or  Italian  manufacturing  interests 
think  of  the  resolutions  before  giving  the  remotest 
efifect  to  suggestions  not  only  untested  but  in  abso- 
lute contradition  to  the  American  attitude,  an 
attitude  I  believe  to  be  in  accordance  with  the  feel- 
ing of  the  bulk  of  the  business  interests  of  the  coun- 
tries concerned. 

In  dealing  with  other  questions  of  after-war 
trade  the  resolutions  of  the  Economic  Conference 

1  See  p.  31. 


92  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

are  still  more  antagonistic  to  President  Wilson's. 
If  I  understand  the  different  utterances  aright  and 
read  correctly  the  motives  of  the  American  people 
for  being  in  the  War  at  all,  it  is  that  they  wish 
to  put  an  end  to  the  causes  of  war  and  not  to  create 
new  ones  or  continue  the  struggle  under  the  mantle 
of  a  factitious  peace.  The  President  expressed 
this  view  most  emphatically  in  his  speech  launch- 
ing the  fourth  Liberty  Loan  at  the  end  of  September 
last.  The  response  to  the  Loan  is  the  answer  of 
America. 

"There  can  be,"  he  said,  "no  leagues  or  alliances 
or  special  covenants  and  understandings  within 
the  general  and  common  family  of  the  league  of 
nations";  and  more  specifically,  "there  can  be  no 
special,  selfish  economic  combinations  within  the 
league  and  no  employment  of  any  form  of  economic 
boycott  or  exclusion  except  as  the  power  of  economic 
penalty  by  exclusion  from  the  markets  of  the  world 
may  be  vested  in  the  league  of  nations  itself  as  a 
means  of  discipline  and  control." 

"Economic  rivalries  and  hostilities,"  says  the 
President  truly  indeed,  "have  been  the  prolific 
source  in  the  modern  world  of  the  plans  and  passions 
that  produce  war.  It  would  be  an  insincere  as 
well  as  an  insecure  peace  that  did  not  exclude  them 
in  definite  and  binding  terms."  And  as  if  to  em- 
phasize this  coup  de  grace  he  adds  that  the  common 
purpose  of  enlightened  mankind  has  taken  the  place 
of  national  purposes  and  the  counsels  of  plain  men 
those  of  statesmen  who  "must  follow  the  clarified 
common  thought  or  be  broken." 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  V 

Note  on  "Open-Door"  Policy 

The  habitable  parts  of  the  world  are  a  limited  area, 
exclusion  from  any  of  which  is  a  diminution  of  the  avail- 
able markets  of  the  nations  excluded.  Every  Power 
is,  therefore,  rightfully  interested  in  the  prevention  of 
such  exclusion. 

The  United  States  Government  in  1899  called  attention 
to  the  subject  as  regards  China,  without,  be  it  said  how- 
ever, going  into  any  question  of  principle. 

In  a  communication  to  the  Foreign  Office,  dated  Sep- 
tember 11,  1899,  Mr.  Choate  reminded  Lord  Salisbury 
that  the  British  Government,  while  conceding  to  Ger- 
many and  Russia  the  possession  of  "spheres  of  influence 
or  interest"  in  China,  in  which  they  were  to  enjoy  special 
rights  and  privileges,  particularly  in  respect  of  railroads 
and  mining  enterprises,  had  at  the  same  time  sought 
to  maintain  the  "open-door"  policy,  that  is,  to  secure 
to  the  trade  and  navigation  of  all  nations  equality  of 
treatment  within  such  "spheres."  The  maintenance 
of  this  policy,  Mr.  Choate  said,  was  equally  desired  by 
the  United  States  Government.  Though  the  latter 
would  not  commit  itself  to  the  recognition  of  any  exclusive 
rights  of  any  Power  within,  or  control  over,  any  portion 
of  the  Chinese  Empire  under  such  agreements  as  had 
been  made,  it  could  not  conceal  its  apprehension  that 
difficulties    might    arise    between    the    Treaty    Powers, 


94  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

imperilling  the  rights  secured  to  the  United  States  by 
its  Treaties  with  China.  His  Government  thought  that 
danger  of  international  irritation  might  be  removed  by 
declarations  being  made  by  each  Power  claiming  a  "sphere 
of  interest"  in  China,  in  some  form  to  this  effect : 

"1.  That  it  will  in  no  wise  interfere  with  any  Treaty 
port  or  any  vested  interest  within  any  so-called  'sphere 
of  interest'  or  leased  territory  it  may  have  in  China. 

"2.  That  the  Chinese  Treaty  Tariff  for  the  time  being 
shall  apply  to  all  merchandise  landed  or  shipped  to  all 
such  ports  as  are  within  such  'sphere  of  interest'  (unless 
they  be  free  ports),  no  matter  to  what  nationality  it 
may  belong,  and  that  duties  so  leviable  shall  be  collected 
by  the  Chinese  Government. 

"3.  That  it  will  levy  no  higher  harbour  dues  from 
another  nationality,  frequenting  any  port  in  such  'sphere', 
than  shall  be  levied  on  vessels  of  its  own  nationality  — 
and  no  higher  railroad  charges  over  lines  built,  controlled, 
or  operated  within  its  'sphere'  on  merchandise,  belong- 
ing to  citizens  or  subjects  of  other  nationalities,  trans- 
ported tlirough  such  spheres,  than  shall  be  levied  on 
similar  merchandise  belonging  to  its  own  nationals 
transported  over  equal  distances." 

There  was  strong  reason,  Mr.  Choate  continued,  to 
believe  that  the  Governments  of  Russia  and  Germany 
would  cooperate  in  such  an  understanding.  Under  a 
recent  Ukase  the  Emperor  of  Russia  had  declared  the 
port  of  Talienwan  open  to  the  merchant  ships  of  all 
nations  during  the  whole  term  of  the  lease  under  which 
it  was  to  be  held  by  Russia,  and  Germany  had  declared 
Kiao-Chao  a  "free  port." 

On  September  29,  1899,  Lord  Salisbury  replied  that 
the  policy  consistently  advocated  by  Great  Britain  was 
one  of  securing  equal  opportunity  for  the  subjects  or 


EQUALITY  OF  TRADE  CONDITIONS  95 

citizens  of  all  nations  in  regard  to  commercial  enterprise 
in  China,  and  that  from  this  policy  H.  M.  Government 
had  no  intention  or  desire  to  depart. 

On  November  30,  1899,  Lord  Salisbury  informed  Mr. 
Choate  that  H.  M.  Government  were  prepared  to  make 
a  declaration  in  the  sense  desired  by  the  United  States 
Government  "in  regard  to  the  leased  territory  at  Wei- 
hai-Wei  and  all  territory  in  China  which  may  hereafter 
be  acquired  by  Great  Britain  by  lease  or  otherwise,  and 
all  spheres  of  interest  now  held  or  which  may  hereafter 
be  held  by  her  in  China,  provided  that  a  similar  declara- 
tion be  made  by  the  other  Powers  concerned." 

Before  January  5,  1900,  all  the  powers  concerned  had 
subscribed  to  the  declaration  in  question,  which  thus 
became  binding  among  them. 

In  further  confirmation,  and  no  doubt  with  a  view  to 
giving  still  greater  precision  to  the  above  principles,  the 
British  and  German  Governments  on  October  16,  1900, 
signed  the  following  agreement : 

"Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  and  the  Im- 
perial German  Government,  being  desirous  to  maintain 
their  interests  in  China  and  their  rights  under  existing 
Treaties,  have  agreed  to  observe  the  following  principles 
in  regard  to  their  mutual  policy  in  China : 

"1.  It  is  a  matter  of  joint  and  permanent  international 
interest  that  the  ports  on  the  rivers  and  littoral  of  China 
should  remain  free  and  open  to  trade  and  to  every  other 
legitimate  form  of  economic  activity  for  the  nationals  of  all 
countries  without  distinction ;  and  the  two  Governments 
agree  on  their  part  to  uphold  the  same  for  all  Chinese 
territory  as  far  as  they  can  exercise  influence. 

"2.  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  and  the 
Imperial  German  Government  will  not,  on  their  part, 
make  use  of  the  present  complication  to  obtain  for  them- 


96  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

selves  any  territorial  advantages  in  Chinese  dominions, 
and  will  direct  their  policy  towards  maintaining  undi- 
minished the  territorial  condition  of  the  Chinese  Empire. 

"3.  In  case  of  another  Power  making  use  of  the  com- 
plications in  China  in  order  to  obtain  under  any  form 
whatever  such  territorial  advantages,  the  two  Contracting 
Parties  reserve  to  themselves  to  come  to  a  preliminary 
understanding  as  to  the  eventual  steps  to  be  taken  for 
the  protection  of  their  own  interests  in  China. 

"4.  The  two  Governments  will  communicate  this 
agreement  to  the  other  Powers  interested,  and  especially 
to  Austria-Hungary,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  Russia,  and 
the  United  States  of  America,  and  will  invite  them  to 
accept  the  principles  recorded  in  it." 

This  agreement  was  simultaneously  communicated 
by  the  British  and  German  Governments  to  the  Powers 
mentioned  in  Clause  4.  The  principles  "recorded  in  it" 
were  duly  accepted  by  them  all. 

The  "open-door"  question  was  brought  up  again  in 
connection  with  Morocco.  Under  Article  IV.  of  the 
joint  declaration  of  April  8, 1904,  signed  on  behalf  of  Great 
Britain  and  France,  it  was  agreed  that  "the  two  Govern- 
ments, being  equally  attached  to  the  principle  of  com- 
mercial liberty  both  in  Egypt  and  Morocco,  declare 
that  they  will  not  in  those  countries  countenance  any 
inequality  either  in  the  imposition  of  customs  duties  or 
other  taxes,  or  railway  transport  charges.  .  .  .  This 
mutual  engagement  shall  be  binding  for  a  period  of  thirty 
years." 

Negotiations  between  France  and  Germany,  which 
arose  out  of  a  controversy  in  respect  of  the  same  subject 
matter,  resulted  in  the  signing,  on  September  28,  1905, 
of  a  joint  note  concerning  the  matter  to  be  submitted 
to  the  Conference  on  Morocco  affairs,  which  included  the 


EQUALITY  OF  TRADE  CONDITIONS     97 

"fixation  of  certain  principles  for  the  purpose  of  preserv- 
ing economic  freedom",  in  other  words,  the  "open  door" 
generally  without  any  restriction  as  to  time. 

At  an  earlier  date.  Article  I.  of  the  General  Act  of 
the  Berlin  Conference  of  1885  on  the  regime  to  be  applied 
in  the  Congo  basin,  declared,  "The  trade  of  all  nations 
shall  enjoy  complete  freedom." 

It  is  seen  that  the  principle  of  the  "open  door"  has 
already  been  consistently  applied  in  connection  with 
certain  non-European  areas.  As  these  areas  are  practi- 
cally the  only  areas  which  of  late  years  have  come  within 
the  scope  of  European  regulation,  the  dme  seems  to  be 
approaching  when  the  principle  might  be  declared  to  be 
of  general  application. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  diminishing  the  possible 
causes  of  conflict  among  nations,  the  adoption  of  the 
principle  as  an  international  contractual  obligation  would 
be  of  great  utility.  While  putting  an  end  to  the  injustice 
of  exclusion,  it  would  obviously  reduce  the  danger  of 
nations  seeking  colonial  aggrandisement  with  a  view 
to  imposing  exclusion,  and  thus  one  of  the  chief  tempta- 
tions to  colonial  adventure  would  be  eliminated.  (From 
Sir  T.  Barclay,  "Problems  of  International  Practice 
and  Diplomac5^"    London  and  Boston,  1907.) 

European  Resources  of  Iron  ORfc 

Germany  and  Austria  have  large  resources  of  good 
iron  ore,  but  the  rate  of  their  production  is  not  sufficient 
to  supply  the  needs  of  the  iron  smelting  works  and  Ger- 
many supplements  her  supplies  from  Sweden,  France, 
Spain  and  Algeria. 

Poland  has  resources  of  ore  estimated  at  about  600, 
000,000  tons.     Much  of  it  goes  to  Silesia. 


98  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

Russia  is  not  very  rich  in  iron  ores.  In  the  Ural 
Region  there  are  439  mines  but  no  single  deposit  appears 
to  be  of  any  great  magnitude.  In  Central  Russia  the 
resources  are  estimated  at  some  780,000,000  tons  but  many 
of  the  deposits  are  thin  and  cannot  be  profitably  worked. 

Sweden :  The  Lapland  region,  as  far  as  explored,  is 
estimated  to  contain  1,158,000,000  tons  of  good  iron  ore. 
Central  and  Southern  Sweden  about  134,000,000  tons  of 
ore  of  different  grades. 

In  1894  the  total  French  production  of  iron  ore  was 
3,700,000  tons  of  which  3,000,000  was  raised  in  Meurthe- 
et-Moselle,  and  the  Briey  field  contributed  only  9,000 
tons  of  the  whole.  In  1913  the  output  had  risen  to 
22,000,000  tons  of  which  the  Briey  district  contributed 
15,000,000. 

The  resources  are  estimated  by  Nicou  ^  as  follows : 

Nancy,  200,000,000  tons 

Longwy,  275,000,000  tons 

Briey,  2,000,000,000  tons 

Crusnes,  500,000,000  tons 

Down  to  1914,  650,000,000  tons  had  been  extracted 
from  the  Lorraine  mines,  or  an  amount  equal  to  one  eighth 
of  the  quantity  remaining. 

There  are  other  sources  in  Normandy,  Anjou  and 
Brittany  (see  Nicou's  report). 

The  Normandy  deposits  extend  over  the  departments 
of  Calvados,  La  Manche  and  I'Orne  and  are  second  in 
importance  among  the  iron-producing  districts  of  France. 

Of  the  importing  countries  the  returns  of  1913  showed 
that  the  United  Kingdom  imported  8,000,000  tons  of  iron 
ore,  Belgium  4,400,000  tons,  France  1,400,000  tons, 
Austria  942,000  tons,  the  United  States  2,600,000  tons 
and  Germany  14,000,000  tons. 

*  Journal  of  the  Iron  and  Steel  Institute,  1914. 


EQUALITY  OF  TRADE  CONDITIONS  99 

Of  exporting  countries  France  sent  out  10,000,000 
tons  (plus  Algeria  1,350,000),  Spain  9,000,000,  Sweden 
6,400,000  tons. 


Note  on  the  State  of  British  Trade  Immediately 

Before  the  War 

There  is  a  widespread  and  rather  mischievous  impres- 
sion, not  only  among  certain  ignorant  German  patriotic 
writers  but  also  in  France  and  America  and  even  among 
some  Englishmen,  that  England  joined  the  Allies  against 
Germany  on  the  economic  ground  that  her  manufacturers 
were  ousting  us  from  our  greatest  markets,  that  if  the 
War  had  not  stopped  her,  the  trade  of  the  whole  world 
would  soon  have  been  in  her  hands  and  we  should  have 
had  to  take  a  second  and  diminishing  place  in  the  markets 
of  the  world. 

The  facts  of  British  trade  do  not  in  the  least  bear 
out  this  apprehension. 

Taking  the  totals  of  British  trade  during  the  ten  years 
from  1904  to  1913,  the  exports  from  the  United  Kmgdom 
to  foreign  countries  rose  from  £188,000,000  to  £330, 
000,000  and  to  our  own  colonies  and  protectorates  from 
£112,000,000  to  £195,000,000  through  a  steady  gradua- 
tion culminating  in  these  figures.  The  figures  of  the 
three  years  preceding  the  War,  so  far  from  showing  any 
relaxation  of  the  progression,  show  the  contrary,  as  the 
following  oflScial  table  of  exports  (Consignments  of  the 
Produce  and  Manufactures  of  the  United  Kingdom  to 
Foreign  Countries),  demonstrates: 

To  Foreign  Countries     To  British  Possessiona  To  Protectorates 

1911  £295,000,000    £159,000,000    £454,000,000 

1912  £310,000,000    £177,000,000    £487,000,000 

1913  £329,000,000    £195,000,000    £525,000,000 


100  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

In  the  same  period  our  exports  to  Germany  of  produce 
and  manufactures  of  the  United  Kingdom  increased 
from  £25,000,000  to  £40,000,000.  Of  these  £40,000,000 
the  analysis  shows  that  £27,000,000  consisted  of  articles 
wholly  or  mainly  manufactured  in  the  United  Kingdom. 

That  our  imports  from  Germany  increased  in  a  larger 
proportion  does  not  prove  that  we  were  losing,  seeing 
that  our  total  export  trade  was  increasing,  as  we  have 
seen,  all  the  while  enormously  and  our  trade  had  never 
during  the  ten  years  immediately  preceding  the  War 
been  so  prosperous  as  in  1913. 

Note  on  Effect  of  "Most-Favoured-Nation" 
Clause  in  Commercial  Treaties  ^ 

The  most-favoured-nation  clause  is  one  which  it  has 
become  customary  to  insert  in  treaties  of  commerce, 
providing  that  if  any  reductions  of  tariff  or  other  advan- 
tages are  granted  by  either  co-contracting  State  to  any 
third  State,  the  other  shall  have  the  benefit  of  them. 
In  Europe  this  clause  has  been  uniformly  treated  as 
applying  to  all  reductions  of  tariff  without  distinction. 
The  United  States  interpretation,  on  the  other  hand, 
distinguishes  between  reductions  of  a  general  character 
and  reductions  made  specifically  in  return  for  reductions 
by  some  other  State.  The  latter  do  not  come  within 
the  operation  of  the  clause,  and  a  co-contracting  State 
is  only  entitled  to  obtain  extension  of  them  to  itself  by 
granting  similar  concessions.  In  other  words,  special 
concessions  to  any  co-contracting  State  are  only  allowed 
gratuitously  to  a  third  co-contracting  State,  when  nothing 
is  given  for  them,  the  clause  not  covering  advantages 
granted  in  return  for  advantages. 

^  From  Sir  Thomas  Barclay's  "  Problems  of  International  Practice  and 
Diplomacy."     London  and  Boston,  1907. 


EQUALITY  OF  TRADE  CONDITIONS         101 

In  a  despatch  of  July  17, 1886,  to  the  American  Minister 
in  China,  Mr.  Bayard  explained  the  American  view  in 
the  following  terms:  "In  its  commercial  aspects  the  ex- 
pediency of  an  unqualified  favoured-nation  clause  is 
questionable.  The  tendency  is  towards  its  formal  qual- 
ification, by  recognising  in  terms  what  most  nations  hold 
in  fact  and  in  practice,  whether  the  condition  be  expressed 
in  the  clause  or  not,  that  propinquity  and  neighbourliness 
may  create  special  and  peculiar  terms  of  intercourse  not 
equally  open  to  all  the  world ;  or  by  providing  that  the 
most-favoured  treatment,  when  based  on  special  or 
reciprocal  concessions,  is  only  to  be  extended  to  other 
Powers  on  like  conditions." 

This  is  still  the  United  States  view,  as  is  set  out  in  a 
luminous  article  in  the  November  (1905)  number  of  the 
North  American  Review,  on  "The  Alternative  of  Reciproc- 
ity Treaties,  or  a  Double  Tariff",  by  Mr.  John  Osborne, 
chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Trade  Relations,  State  Department, 
and  late  Secretary  of  the  Reciprocity  Commission,  a 
gentleman  eminently  competent  to  describe  the  con- 
temporary American  standpoint.  Mr.  Osborne  main- 
tains that  "it  is  evident  that  the  gratuitous  extension  to 
third  Powers  of  commercial  advantages  exchanged  in 
reciprocity  between  two  countries  is  absolutely  incon- 
sistent with  the  true  principles  of  reciprocity  as  under- 
stood in  the  United  States ;  it  would  not  only  seriously 
impair  and  even  tend  to  destroy  the  value  of  the  original 
grant,  but  it  would  also  involve  duty  reductions  upon 
the  entirety,  or,  at  least,  the  bulk  of  importations  from 
the  world,  of  the  articles  of  merchandise  affected,  thus 
constituting  a  serious  sacrifice  in  national  revenues." 

This  is  an  argument  of  policy,  and  not  one,  properly 
speaking,  of  interpretation  or  construction.  No  strictly 
judicial  argument  can  be  urged  in  support  of  the  Ameri- 


102  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

can  view.  WTiether  a  reduction  "bought",  as  it  were, 
by  a  counter-reduction  is  affected  by  a  "most-favoured- 
nation" clause  depends,  from  a  judicial  point  of  view, 
solely  on  the  wording  of  the  clause. 

There  seemed  to  be  a  possibility  that  this  would  become 
the  judicial  construction  in  America  under  a  decision  of 
the  United  States  Supreme  Court  (Bartram  v.  Robertson), 
but  the  question  a  few  months  later  came  up  again  in 
Whitney  v.  Robertson  (Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States,  1887,  124  United  States,  190),  when  the  official 
view,  on  the  contrary,  was  strongly  endorsed.  The 
plaintiffs  in  the  action  were  merchants  doing  business 
in  the  city  of  New  York.  They  imported  a  large  quantity 
of  sugars,  produce  of  the  island  of  San  Domingo,  similar 
in  kind  to  sugars  produced  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands, 
which  were  admitted  free  of  duty  under  a  treaty  with 
the  government  of  those  islands.  The  treaty  provided 
for  the  importation  into  the  United  States,  free  of  duty, 
of  various  articles,  "the  produce  and  manufacture  of 
those  islands,  in  consideration,  among  other  things,  of 
like  exemption  from  duty,  on  the  importation  into  that 
country,  of  sundry  specified  articles  which  are  the  produce 
and  manufacture  of  the  United  States."  The  first  two 
articles  of  the  treaty,  which  recited  the  reciprocal  engage- 
ments of  the  two  countries,  declared  that  they  were 
made  in  consideration  "of  the  rights  and  privileges"  and 
"as  an  equivalent  therefor",  which  the  one  conceded 
to  the  other.  The  plaintiffs  relied  for  a  like  exemption 
of  the  sugars  imported  by  them  from  San  Domingo  upon 
Article  IX.  of  the  treaty  with  the  Dominican  Republic, 
which  is  as  follows:  "No  higher  or  other  duty  shall  he 
imposed  in  the  importation  into  the  United  States  of 
any  article  of  growth,  produce,  or  manufacture  of  the 
Dominican  Republic,  or  of  her  fisheries;    and  no  higher 


EQUALITY  OF  TRADE  CONDITIONS  103 

or  other  duty  shall  be  imposed  on  the  importation  into 
the  Dominican  Republic  of  any  article  the  growth,  produce, 
or  manufacture  of  the  United  States  or  their  fisheries, 
than  are  or  shall  be  'payable  on  the  like  articles,  the  growth, 
produce,  or  manujacture  of  any  other  foreign  country, 
or  its  fisheries."  In  Bartram  v.  Robertson,  the  Supreme 
Court  had  held  that  brown  and  unrefined  sugars,  the 
produce  and  manufacture  of  the  island  of  St.  Croix, 
a  Danish  possession,  were  not  exempt  from  duty  by 
force  of  the  treaty  with  Denmark,  though  similar  goods 
from  the  Hawaiian  Islands  were  thus  exempt.  The  first 
article  of  the  treaty  with  Denmark  provided  that  the 
contracting  parties  should  not  grant  "any  particular 
favour"  to  other  nations,  in  respect  to  commerce  and 
navigation,  which  should  not  immediately  become  com- 
mon to  the  other  party,  who  should  enjoy  the  same  freely 
if  the  concession  were  freely  made,  and  upon  allowing  the 
same  compensation  if  the  concession  were  conditional. 
Article  IV.  provided  that  no  higher  or  other  duties  should 
be  imposed  by  either  party  on  the  importation  of  any 
article  of  its  produce  or  manufacture,  into  the  country 
of  the  other  party,  than  were  payable  on  like  articles,  being 
the  produce  or  manufacture  of  any  other  foreign  country. 
The  Supreme  Court  had  held  that  — 

"Those  stipulations,  even  if  conceded  to  be  self -execut- 
ing by  the  way  of  a  proviso  or  exception  to  the  general 
law  imposing  the  duties,  do  not  cover  concessions  like 
those  made  to  the  Hawaiian  Islands  for  valuable  considera- 
tion. They  were  pledges  of  the  two  contracting  parties, 
the  United  States  and  the  King  of  Denmark,  to  each 
other,  that  in  the  imposition  of  duties  on  goods  imported 
into  one  of  the  countries  which  were  the  produce  or  manu- 
facture of  the  other,  there  should  be  no  discrimination 
against  them  in  favour  of  goods  of  like  character  imported 


104  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

from  any  other  country.  They  imposed  an  obhgation 
upon  both  countries  to  avoid  hostile  legislation  in  that 
respect.  But  they  were  not  intended  to  interfere  with 
special  arrangements  with  other  countries  founded  upon 
a  concession  of  special  privileges." 

In  Whitney  v.  Robertson,  counsel  for  the  plaintiffs  con- 
tended that  the  omission  from  the  treaty  with  the  Republic 
of  San  Domingo  of  the  Danish-American  provision  as  to 
free  concessions,  and  concessions  upon  compensation, 
precluded  any  concession  in  respect  of  commerce  and 
navigation  by  the  U.  S.  Government  to  another  country 
without  that  concession  being  at  once  extended  to  San 
Domingo.  The  Supreme  Court,  however,  held  that 
the  absence  of  this  provision  did  not  change  the  obliga- 
tions of  the  United  States ;  that  Article  IX.  of  the  treaty 
with  San  Domingo  was  "substantially  like  Article  IV. 
in  the  treaty  with  the  King  of  Denmark."  It  was  a 
pledge  of  the  contracting  parties  that  there  should  be  no 
discriminating  legislation  against  the  importation  of 
articles  which  were  the  growth,  produce,  or  manufacture 
of  their  respective  countries,  in  favour  of  articles  of  like 
character  imported  from  any  other  country,  but  "  it  had 
no  greater  extent."  "It  was  never  designed  to  pre- 
vent special  concessions,  upon  sufficient  considerations, 
touching  the  importation  of  specific  articles  into  the 
country  of  .the  other."  "It  would  require  the  clearest  lan- 
guage to  justify  a  conclusion  that  the  U.  S.  Government 
intended  to  preclude  itself  from  such  engagements  with 
other  countries,  which  might  in  the  future  be  of  the  high- 
est importance  to  its  interests." 

With  all  respect  to  the  great  authority  of  the  decisions 
of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court,  the  language  of  the 
Treaty  in  question  seems  of  the  clearest,  and  diametrically 
opposed  to  its  ruling. 


EQUALITY  OF  TRADE  CONDITIONS  105 

The  treaty  regulating  the  trade  relations  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States  (July  3,  1815),  continued 
in  force  and  reported  in  an  official  return  to  the  British 
Parliament,  Commercial  No.  4,  1907,  to  be  in  operation 
between  the  two  countries  down  to  January  1,  1907, 
is  practically  in  the  same  terms,  providing  that  — 

"No  higher  or  other  duties  shall  be  imposed  on  the 
importation  into  the  territories  of  His  Britannic  Majesty 
in  Europe  of  any  articles  of  growth,  produce,  or  manu- 
facture of  the  United  States,  and  no  higher  or  other  duties 
shall  be  imposed  in  the  importation  into  the  United  States 
of  any  articles  the  growth,  produce,  or  manufacture  of 
His  Britannic  Majesty's  territories  in  Europe,  than  are 
or  shall  be  payable  on  the  like  articles,  being  the  growth, 
produce,  or  manufacture  of  any  foreign  country"  (Art. 

n.). 

The  form  adopted  in  the  treaty  between  Great  Britain 
and  Uruguay  of  July  15,  1899,  leaves  nothing  to  con- 
struction; it  specifically  restricts  the  application  of  the 
clause : 

"It  was  also  agreed  that  the  stipulations  contained 
in  the  Treaty  which  is  to  be  renewed  do  not  include  cases 
in  which  the  Government  of  the  Oriental  Republic  of  Uruguay 
may  accord  special  favours,  exemptions,  and  privileges 
to  the  citizens  or  products  of  the  United  States  of  Brazil,  of 
the  Argentine  Republic,  or  of  Paraguay  in  matters  of  com- 
merce. Such  favours  cannot  be  claimed  on  behalf  of 
Great  Britain  on  the  ground  of  most-favoured-nation  rights 
as  long  as  they  are  not  conceded  to  other  States.  It  is, 
nevertheless,  understood  that  the  said  special  favours, 
exemptions,  and  privileges  shall  not  be  capable  of  applica- 
tion to  products  similar  to  those  of  Great  Britain,  nor 
be  extended  to  navigation." 

The  same  may  be  said  of  the  Franco-German  Treaty 


106  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

of  Frankfort  (May  10,  1871).     Article  II.  of  that  treaty 
provided  as  follows : 

"The  treaties  of  commerce  with  the  different  States 
of  Germany  having  been  annulled  by  war,  the  French 
and  German  Governments  will  base  their  commercial 
relations  upon  the  system  of  reciprocal  treatment  on  the 
footing  of  the  most  favom'ed  nation. 

"This  rule  shall  not  apply,  however,  to  the  favours 
which  either  of  the  Contracting  Parties,  by  commercial 
Treaties,  has  granted  or  shall  grant  to  States  other  than 
the  following :  —  England,  Belgium,  Holland,  Switzer- 
land, Austria,  and  Russia.  .  .  . 

"Nevertheless,  the  French  Government  reserves  to 
itself  the  faculty  to  establish  on  German  vessels  and 
their  cargoes,  tonnage  and  flag  duties,  under  reserve 
that  these  duties  shall  not  be  higher  than  those  which 
are  imposed  upon  vessels  and  cargoes  of  the  above  men- 
tioned nations." 

The  German-Austro-Hungarian  Treaty  of  Conunerce 
of  December  6,  1891,  amended  and  completed  by  that 
of  January  25,  1905,  provides  that  no  more  favourable 
conditions  in  respect  of  ** import,  export,  or  transit"  duties 
shall  be  granted  by  either  Contracting  Party  to  a  third  Power 
than  are  accorded  to  the  other  Party,  and  that  any  con- 
cessions of  this  kind  made  to  a  third  Power  shall  at  once 
be  applied  to  the  other  (Art.  II.),  any  dispute  relating  to 
this  provision  to  be  referred  to  arbitration  (Art.  XXIII.). 
This  seems  equally  clear  in  the  contrary  sense. 

In  Europe  the  American  view  has  found  a  supporter 
(semble)  in  Professor  F.  de  Martens,  who  considers  that 
a  distinction  must  be  made  between  a  case  where  a 
commercial  advantage  is  granted  purely  and  simply, 
and  a  case  where  there  is  simply  an  exchange  of  bons 
procedes  or  a  dedommagement.     "In  the  former  case  alone 


EQUALITY  OF  TRADE  CONDITIONS  107 

have  other  States  a  right  to  claim  the  same  advantage. 
To  grant  it  in  the  second  would  be  contrary  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  reciprocity  of  commercial  obligations." 

The  same  opinion  was  also  arrived  at  much  earlier  by 
a  distinguished  French  writer,  M.  Hautefeuille,  who, 
in  answer  to  the  question  of  whether  the  condition  of 
being  treated  as  the  most  favoured  nation  only  carried 
the  advantages  existing  at  the  time  of  the  signature  of 
the  treaty,  or  comprised  those  which  should  be  subse- 
quently conceded  to  another  State,  answered  that  the 
clause  must  be  considered  as  implying  everything  that 
existed  at  the  moment  when  signed,  but  that  it  could 
not  be  considered  to  extend  to  anything  later  in  date.^ 

It  is  evident  that  it  will  be  necessary  in  future  treaties 
of  commerce  to  be  careful  to  provide  against  the  possibility 

^  The  forms  of  most-favoured-nation  clauses  vary  considerably. 
That  of  the  Treaty  of  Commerce  and  Navigation  between  Great  Britain 
and  France  of  February  28,  1882,  runs  : 

"Each  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  engages  to  give  the  other 
immediately  and  unconditionally  the  benefit  of  every  favour,  immunity, 
or  privilege  in  matters  of  commerce  or  industry,  which  viay  have  been 
or  may  be  conceded  by  one  of  the  High  Contracting  Powers  to  any  third 
nation  whatsoever,  whether  within  or  beyond  Europe." 

The  British  Treaty  of  Commerce  with  Honduras  of  January  21, 
1887,  provides : 

"The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree,  that  in  all  matters  relating 
to  commerce  and  navigation,  any  privilege,  favour,  or  immunity  what- 
ever which  either  contracting  party  has  actually  granted  or  may  hereafter 
grant  to  the  subjects  or  citizens  of  any  other  State  shall  be  extended 
immediately  and  unconditionally  to  the  subjects  or  citizens  of  the  other 
contracting  party;  it  being  their  intention  that  the  trade  and  naviga- 
tion of  each  coimtry  shall  be  placed  in  all  respects  by  the  other  on  the 
footing  of  the  most  favoured  nation"  (Article  I.). 

The  Anglo-Rumanian  Treaty  of  August  13,  1892: 

"The  subjects,  vessels,  and  goods,  produce  of  the  soil  and  industry 
of  each  of  the  two  High  Contracting  Parties  shall  enjoy  in  the  dominions 
of  the  other  all  privileges,  immunities,  or  advantages  granted  to  the  most 
favoured  nation"  (Article  I.) 


108  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

of  a  construction  which  might  frustrate  the  very  objects 
for  which  most-favoured-nation  clauses  are  resorted  to, 
namely,  to  prevent  any  third  Power  from  enjoying  special 
advantages.  Meanwhile  the  interest  of  stable  inter- 
national relations  requires  that  the  sense  of  the  existing 
terminology  of  the  clause  should  be  defined.^ 

Note  on  Russia  and  Poland 

President  Wilson  demands  the  evacuation  by  Germany 
of  all  Russian  territory.  The  rest  of  his  sixth  proposition 
is  in  the  nature  of  an  appeal  to  the  Allies  to  give  Russia 
a  chance  of  righting  herself. 

The  only  question  I  need  deal  with  is  that  of  evacua- 
tion. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  President  to-day  would  not 
take  the  same  view  as  nearly  a  year  ago,  when  there  was 
a  prospect  of  a  properly  elected  Republican  government 
being  in  a  position  to  take  over  the  territory  which  had 
been  wrested  from  Russia.  The  President's  views  may 
also  have  undergone  change  as  regards  the  right  of  Fin- 
land, the  Baltic  provinces  and  possibly  the  Ukraine 
themselves  to  determine  what  shall  be  their  form  of 
government  and  by  what  external  allegiance,  if  any, 
they  may  be  willing  to  curtail  their  autonomy.     Evacua- 

^  Droit  International  (1886),  ii.,  p.  322.  "At  the  present  day,  when 
national  interests  are  so  entangled  and  complex,"  says  M.  Lehr,  "it 
is  always  a  serious  matter  to  bind  oneself  in  advance  by  a  clause  which 
is  vague  and  general,  and  the  eventual  bearing  of  which  cannot  be  esti- 
mated. There  have  been  several  instances  in  the  course  of  the  last  few 
years  in  which  a  Power  in  the  negotiation  of  a  treaty  has  been  in  the 
necessity  of  refraining  from  granting  concessions,  because  being  ex- 
tended by  virtue  of  the  clause,  without  any  compensation  whatever  to 
a  whole  series  of  other  countries,  they  would  have  been  disastrous  to 
the  national  industry."  See  Ernest  Lehr,  Revue  de  Droit  International, 
1893,  p.  316. 


EQUALITY  OF  TRADE  CONDITIONS  109 

tion  which  might  only  mean  the  imposition  of  a  worse 
provisional  regime  than  at  present  can  hardly  be  one  of  the 
President's  present  conditions.  We  may  rely,  I  think,  on 
his  general  principles  and  analogies  as  regards  the  settle- 
ment of  all  matters  relating  to  the  ex-provinces  of  Russia. 

As  regards  Poland  there  is  nothing  more  tragic  than 
the  history  of  the  Poles,  one  of  the  most  gifted  races  of 
Europe  and  the  most  unhappy,  victims  of  rival  Powers 
which  have  never  left  them  alone  for  a  hundred  and  fifty 
years. 

In  1772  at  the  time  of  the  first  partition,  Poland  con- 
sisted of  the  Kingdom  of  Poland  properly  speaking  and 
the  Duchy  of  Lithuania.  The  Kingdom  included  in 
the  north  Posnania  or  Great  Poland,  Little  Poland  with 
Warsaw  and  Cracow,  and  Royal  Prussia  with  Danzig; 
in  the  south  Red  Russia  or  Galicia  and  in  the  southeast 
Little  Russia.  The  first  partition  gave  Galicia  to  Austria, 
Royal  Prussia,  with  the  exception  of  the  cities  of  Danzig 
and  Thorn,  to  Prussia,  and  a  part  of  Lithuania  to  Russia. 
On  the  second  partition  in  1793  Prussia  got  Great  Poland 
with  Danzig  and  Thorn,  and  Russia  the  half  of  Lithuania. 
The  third  partition  in  1795  gave  the  rest  of  Lithuania 
to  Russia. 

Napoleon  was  the  next  manipulator  of  the  unhappy 
country.  The  treaty  of  Tilsit  (1807)  created  the  Duchy 
of  Warsaw^  and  made  Danzig  a  free  city.  In  1809  Galicia 
and  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw  were  united.  Lastly  came 
the  Congress  of  Vienna  which  more  or  less  confirmed 
the  pre-Napoleonic  conditions  but  gave  Danzig  to  Prussia. 
The  three  Powers  agreed  to  grant  constitutions  suitable 
to  the  three  Polish  provinces.  Austria  alone  kept  her 
word. 

It  is  calculated  that  the  present  population  of  Russian 


110  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

Poland  is  9,400,000,  of  Austrian  Poland  (Galicia),  4,500,000 
and  of  Prussian  Poland  (in  Posnania,  Upper  Silesia  and 
scattered  through  East  Prussia  generally),  3,500,000. 
Among  these  are  perhaps  two  or  three  millions  of  Jews. 

With  Poland  President  Wilson  deals  in  a  special  prop- 
osition (Number  13).  Poland,  he  says,  (a)  should  be 
an  independent  State  politically  and  economically,  (b) 
should  include  territories  inhabited  by  indisputably 
Polish  populations  and  (c)  should  be  assured  "free  and 
secure  access  to  the  sea." 

The  second  of  President  Wilson's  Fourth  of  July  prop- 
ositions lays  down  that  matters  whether  of  sovereignty 
or  of  political  or  economic  relationship  are  subject  to  the 
principle  of  acceptance  by  those  immediately  concerned. 

Then,  the  first  condition  to  be  imposed  in  connection 
with  Poland  is  that  the  Poles  alone  shall  decide  as  to 
their  own  destiny  within  the  area  of  what  was  formerly 
Russian  Poland. 

As  regards  Prussian  Poland  the  application  of  the 
same  principle  is  less  simple.  It  has  not  in  fact  been 
detached  from  Prussia  by  conquest  or  revolt.  Nor  have 
we  conclusive  evidence  that  there  is  any  desire  on  the 
part  of  the  Prussian  Poles  to  be  detached  from  Germany 
as  a  whole.  I  say  "as  a  whole",  because  there  is  an 
obvious  difference  between  forming  part  of  a  backward 
political  entity  like  Prussia  and  having  autonomy  within 
a  progressive  empire.  Nor  do  I  perceive  any  practical 
need  of  ascertaining  the  feelings  in  regard  to  separation 
of  people  who  do  not  seem  to  have  hitherto  agitated 
for  more  than  a  reasonable  recognition  of  the  right  to 
use  their  own  language  and  be  employed  in  the  adminis- 
tration of  their  own  districts.  On  the  other  hand  Prus- 
sian  Poland   has  furnished  to   Prussia   as   Ireland   has 


EQUALITY  OF  TRADE  CONDITIONS  111 

furnished  to  England,  in  spite  of  a  widespread  spirit  of 
disaffection,  an  exceptionally  large  proportion  of  political 
and  diplomatic  genius. 

The  same  may  be  said  of  the  gifted  race  in  reference 
to  Austrian  Poland  where,  moreover,  the  Poles  enjoy 
constitutional  freedom,  have  their  own  university  and 
are  not  known  to  have  been  desirous  in  any  appreciable 
degree  of  severance  from  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire. 

President  Wilson  demands  that  Poland  shall  be  an 
independent  State  economically  as  well  as  politically. 
When  we  enter  the  domain  of  economics  we  are  no  longer 
in  that  of  ideals  and  idealists  but  in  that  of  the  interests 
of  industry  and  commercial  prosperity.  In  these  matters 
to  be  fenced  in  by  neighbouring  countries,  by  customs 
barriers,  protective  systems  and  the  treacherous  devices 
agricultural  interests  are  in  the  habit  of  concocting  to 
keep  rivals  at  bay,  may  have  material  disadvantages. 
On  the  other  hand,  to  have  free  access  to  neighbouring 
markets  and  the  protection  of  a  powerful  confederation 
in  those  beyond  seas  may  weigh  considerably  in  the 
balance  of  commercial  and  industrial  interests  against 
political  ideals. 

To  meet  the  difficulty  he  must  have  foreseen  in  this 
respect,  perhaps  to  evade  it,  the  President  demands 
"free  and  secure  access  to  the  sea." 

Between  Poland  and  the  part  of  Prussia  inhabited  by 
Poles  and  the  sea  there  is  a  wide  band  of  territory  which 
is  German.  Danzig,  in  the  time  of  Poland's  political 
glory,  it  has  been  seen,  was  part  of  Poland.  It  was  at  a 
time,  however,  when  racial  and  linguistic  questions 
played  no  part  in  the  destinies  of  nations  and  populations 
were  handed  from  State  to  State  as  if  sovereignty  and 
ownership  were  synonymous.     Danzig,  like  Konigsberg, 


112  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

has  always  in  modern  times  been  a  German  city  and  its 
Hinterland  and  all  the  Hinterland  of  the  coast  to  a  long 
way  inland  is  Germanic  not  Polish.  I  do  not  for  a  moment 
suppose  that  the  President  proposes  to  detach  either 
Danzig  or  Kbnigsberg  from  Germany.  If  so,  then  the 
only  method  of  obtaining  access  to  the  sea  would  be  by 
obtaining  the  use  of  a  free  harbour  or  dock  such  as  Ger- 
mans had  arranged  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  to  begin 
constructing  at  Rotterdam,  a  dock  more  or  less  on  the 
lines  of  that  which  Germany  possesses  in  the  free  City 
of  Hamburg.  This  is  not  "free  and  secure"  access  in 
the  full  sense  of  the  words,  but  it  might  be  a  workable 
independence.  The  same  principle  of  free  docks  might 
also  be  applied  in  a  number  of  other  cases  similar  to  that 
of  landlocked  Poland,  such  as  that  of  landlocked  Switzer- 
land which  may  some  day  obtain  from  the  French  Gov- 
ernment the  use  of  such  an  independent  dock  at  Mar- 
seilles. The  same  principle  might  be  applied  in  still 
other  familiar  cases.  Baron  Aehrenthal,  the  then  Austro- 
Hungarian  foreign  minister,  authorized  me  in  1908  to 
propose  it  as  a  solution  to  Mr.  Milovanovitch,  the  Ser- 
bian foreign  minister,  who  replied  that  Serbia  would  have 
first  to  build  a  railway  and  she  had  neither  money  to 
build  one  nor  enough  exportable  goods  to  bear  the  ex- 
pense of  its  upkeep  if  it  were  built. 

The  principle,  however,  having  once  been  admitted 
into  the  commercial  polity  of  modern  peoples,  it  may  be- 
come, as  a  compromise,  an  additional  method  of  meeting 
certain  international  difficulties. 

Note  on  Rumania,  Serbia  and  Montenegro 

President  Wilson  classes  in  his  eleventh  proposition 
Rumania,   Serbia  and  Montenegro  together,   but  their 


EQUALITY  OF  TRADE  CONDITIONS  113 

position  in  the  Balkans  and  in  their  relations  to  the  present 
War  are  not  the  same. 

Serbia  is  the  victim  of  an  aggression.  Rumania  entered 
the  War  for  purposes  set  out  in  her  official  records,  which 
were  still  more  deliberately  than  those  of  Italy  purposes 
of  conquest. 

Montenegro,  an  "outpost  of  Russian  mischief  in  the 
Balkans"  as  it  has  been  called,  seems  to  have  no  par- 
ticular desire,  according  to  competent  opinion,  to  be  de- 
tached from  Serbia  to  which  it  belongs  geographically, 
ethnographically,  historically,  linguistically  and  especially 
sympathetically. 

The  three  States  in  question  must  necessarily  be  dealt 
with  separately  and,  to  follow  out  an  examination  of 
their  respective  position  in  logical  order,  let  us  begin  with 
Montenegro  which  belongs  in  every  respect  to  the  Serbian 
sphere,  so  much  so  that  not  very  long  ago  it  was  alleged 
that  an  intrigue  was  pending  to  place  the  Montenegrin 
sovereign  on  the  throne  of  Serbia  and  thus  unite  the  two 
countries  after  the  fashion  of  Scotland  and  England  of 
old! 

The  size  of  a  State  is  no  criterion  of  the  magnitude 
of  its  sense  of  political  responsibility.  It  may  be  more 
powerful  in  proportion  to  its  political  inferiority.  This 
has  been  the  case  with  Russia.  Or  from  its  very  minute- 
ness it  may  be  a  danger  to  its  neighbours  as  a  result 
of  its  geographical  inaccessibility  and  political  irresponsi- 
bility.    This  has  been  the  case  with  Montenegro. 

The  question  of  whether  Montenegro  would  be  able 
to  meet  the  obligations  of  independence  without  the  assist- 
ance of  Russia  is  a  fair  subject  of  inquiry. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  grant  of  representative  govern- 
ment in  the  place  of  the  present  existing  absolute  mon- 


114  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

archy,  as  part  of  the  modern  system  with  which  Presi- 
dent Wilson  is  seeking  to  endow  Europe,  is  a  democratic 
advantage  which  the  people  of  Montenegro  might  not 
have  the  full  benefit  of,  without  the  economic  expansion 
which  would  be  obtained  by  broadening  its  area  of  un- 
fettered markets. 

The  Montenegrins  have  never  had  any  experience  of 
self-government  and  under  the  guidance  of  their  fellow- 
countrymen  of  Serbia  they  might  be  a  source  of  strength 
to  that  country  and  contribute  a  share  in  some  respects 
not  unlike  that  Scotland  has  contributed  to  England,  by 
their  rough  mountainous  country  and  more  adventurous 
nature,  to  the  common  benefit  of  two  countries  of  the 
same  race  and  language  at  present  merely  separated  by 
an  artificial  political   boundary. 

Serbia  is  a  country  of  great  promise.  It  has  an  able- 
bodied,  healthy  population,  mineral  resources,  a  fertile 
soil  and  all  the  elements  that  in  cooperation  bring  pros- 
perity and  social  betterment  to  a  people,  but  one :  She 
is  hemmed  in  by  rivals  who  have  a  surplus  of  the  same 
agricultural  produce  to  dispose  of  as  herself  —  pigs, 
cereals,  poultry,  eggs,  etc.,  which  on  one  pretext  or  another 
they  do  their  best  to  exclude  from  their  own  area  as  well 
as  from  the  outer  world.  Facilities  for  transport  which 
the  Hungarian  Government,  owner  of  the  Hungarian 
railways,  might  have  granted  were  never  afforded  and, 
on  the  contrary,  as  regards  the  Serbian  pigs,  their  exclu- 
sion, from  time  to  time,  was  decreed  on  the  ground  of  their 
being  tainted  with  trichinosis,  an  allegation  the  truth 
of  which  was  denied  absolutely  by  the  Serbs.  An  outlet 
southward  or  eastward  if  it  did  not  meet  with  similar 
opposition  from  rival  interests  was  checked  by  transport 
diflBculties  of  an  equally  deterrent  character. 


EQUALITY  OF  TRADE  CONDITIONS  115 

The  obvious  remedy  for  this  state  of  things  was  access 
to  the  sea,  and  such  access  could  only  be  obtained  by 
expansion  westward  to  the  Adriatic  or  southward  to 
Salonica  or  such  arrangements  by  treaty  as  would  secure 
outlets  not  dependent  on  intervening  foreign  authorities. 

Men  like  Baron  x4.ehrenthal,  who  sought  to  conciliate 
rather  than,  like  certain  Magyar  patriots,  to  exasperate 
her,  saw  the  danger  which  might  some  day  follow  from 
this  "bottling  up"  of  legitimate  Serbian  economic  aspir- 
ations. In  1908  he  authorized  me,  when  on  a  visit  to 
Belgrade,  to  suggest  to  the  Serbian  Foreign  Minister, 
Mr.  Milovanovitch,  whom  I  had  met  the  previous  year 
at  the  Hague  and  with  whom  I  was  on  terms  of  friend- 
ship, that  a  leasing  arrangement  might  be  made  for  the 
construction  of  a  Serbian  railway  to  the  Adriatic.  Mr. 
Milovanovitch,  who  was  one  of  the  ablest  of  then  living 
Balkan  statesmen,  told  me  he  wished  people  would  let 
Serbia  alone,  let  her  work  at  her  destiny  by  herself  and 
only  interfere  when  asked.  She  had  neither  the  money 
to  build  nor  the  produce  to  feed  a  railway  of  her  own  to 
the  sea.  This,  however,  did  not  prevent  the  continuance 
of  international  intrigue  at  Belgrade  behind  the  back 
of  Mr.  Milovanovitch.  Nor  did  it  prevent  the  encourage- 
ment by  Russian  emissaries,  protected  by  the  Russian 
legation,  of  violent  Serbian  patriots,  and  European  opinion 
became  a  great  deal  more  excited  over  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  decree  of  annexation  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina  than 
the  Serbs  themselves  in  whose  interest  the  agitation  was 
or  was  supposed  to  have  been  fomented. 

One  of  the  curses  of  Serbia  throughout  her  history 
has  been  that  her  capital  is  not  only  on  her  frontier,  but 
is  on  a  navigable  river.  Of  all  conceivable  frontiers 
only  a  busier  thoroughfare  than  a  navigable  river  can  be 
a  worse  one,  for  the  obvious  reason  that  unless  it  is 


116  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

closed  to  navigation  a  navigable  river  is  a  connecting 
seam,  a  bond,  a  junction,  and  the  interest  of  the  inhabi- 
tants of  its  banks  is  the  removal  not  the  creation  of  any 
restraints  to  trade  and  intercourse.  There  are,  no  doubt, 
political  fanatics  who  pursue  ideals  detached  from  the 
material  interests  of  peoples  but  history  has  no  instances 
of  a  majority  of  any  community  consciously  sacrificing 
their  obvious  interest  to  the  altruistic  ambitions  of  idea- 
logues.  The  anomaly  is  accentuated  by  the  fact  that 
Belgrade,  capital  of  Serbia,  is  connected  by  a  bridge  with 
the  Hungarian  town  of  Semlin.  Revolutionary  intrigue 
in  both  has  always  been  fostered  by  this  facility  of  escape 
from  either,  a  circumstance  which  has  begotten  much 
of  the  ill-feeling  which  for  a  generation  has  vitiated  the 
relations  between  the  neighbouring  governments.  The 
Serbian  Administration,  whenever  difficulty  arose,  emi- 
grated to  Nish,  the  ancient  Serbian  capital,  as  it  did 
on  July  27,  1914,  on  handing  even  an  acquiescent  reply 
to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government, 

All  observers  of  international  affairs  are  familiar  with 
the  battle  instinct  of  piracy  and  contraband  called  "Tes- 
prit  de  frontiere."  In  the  course  of  time  it  seems  to 
evolve  into  a  blind  hatred  that  makes  no  distinctions  and 
admits  no  palliatives.  The  Belgrade  press  has  always 
reflected  this  spirit  and  Serbia  has  been  martyrised  most 
unjustly  for  excess  of  word  and  act  due  merely  to  this 
"esprit  de  frontiere."  Whatever  arrangements  of  the 
new  frontiers  of  Serbia  are  made  this  consideration  in 
the  interests  of  permanent  peace  should  not  be  lost  sight 
of. 

Rumania,  like  Serbia,  has  a  homogeneous  population. 
She  differs  from  Serbia,  however,  in  not  belonging  to  any 
of  the  Slavonic  groups.     The  Rumanians  speak  a  Latin 


EQUALITY  OF  TRADE  CONDITIONS  117 

tongue  and  have  preserved  a  good  deal  of  the  pride  and 
reserve  of  the  Roman  conquerors  from  whom  they  claim 
descent, 

Rumania  had  grievances  against  both  Slav  and  Mag- 
yar. The  Russian  Government,  to  repay  her  for  the 
assistance  she  rendered  in  the  Turco-Russian  War  of 
1877  and  her  brilliant  and  historic  capture  of  Plevna, 
took  fertile  Bessarabia  from  her  and  gave  her  the  Do- 
brudja  swamp  in  its  place,  a  wrong  which  never  ceased 
to  rankle  in  the  Rumanian  bosom  till  Bessarabia  was 
recently  restored  to  her.  Against  the  Magyar  the  griev- 
ance is  that  a  large  Rumanian  though  somewhat  mixed 
population  lies  across  the  frontier  in  Transylvania. 
Southward,  too,  in  Macedonia,  Rumanians  have  settled, 
for  like  the  Slavs,  they  move  and  migrate  to  and  fro  in 
communities.  It  is  estimated  that  as  many  as  4,000,000 
of  Rumanians  are  under  Hungarian  rule,  that  there  are 
2,000,000  in  Bessarabia  who  from  1878  were  under  Rus- 
sian rule,  and  that  some  500,000  are  scattered  throughout 
Macedonia,  while  Rumania  as  a  State  has  a  population 
of  only  7,500,000. 

The  difficulty  throughout  Hungary  is  that  the  popula- 
tion is  not  homogeneous ;  within  thirty  miles  of  Budapest 
there  are  Slovak,  Rumanian,  and  German  settlements 
where  not  a  word  of  Magj^ar,  the  official  language,  is 
spoken.  The  Rumanian  settlements  grow  thicker  in 
population  the  nearer  they  are  to  the  frontier  till  they 
form  the  majority  in  eastern  Transylvania. 

To  bring  all  outer  Rumanians  within  the  fold  could 
only  be  effected  by  deliberate  exchanges  of  population 
and  resistance  to  the  wandering  instincts  inherited  by 
these  communities  of  Eastern  Europe  from  more  or  less 
nomad   ancestors. 

This  does  not,  however,  apply  to  a  rectification  of 


118  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

frontier  in  eastern  Transylvania  where  the  population  is 
practically  all  Rumanian  and  which  is  so  distinct  from 
Magyar  and  Slav  alike  that  there  is  no  reason  linguistic, 
ethnographic  or  sociological  against  detaching  it  from 
a  country  to  which  it  owes  not  even  the  indulgence  of 
being  governed  in  a  language  it  understands. 

To  Anglo-Saxons  questions  of  Eastern  Europe,  espe- 
cially those  connected  with  the  communal  instincts  of 
races  so  different,  seem,  more  or  less,  involved  in  mystery, 
and  in  fact  the  more  they  are  approached  and  understood, 
the  greater  seem  to  grow  the  difficulties  of  solution  and 
the  remoter  the  hopes  of  securing  any  permanent  peace 
amid  the  flux  and  reflux  of  the  instable  racial  elements 
composing  the  populations  and  political  entities  of  Austria- 
Hungary  and  the  Balkans. 

Treaty  and  Military  Convention  between 
Rumania  and  the  Entente  Powers^ 

Treaty 

Article  1,  France,  Great  Britain,  Italy  and  Russia 
guarantee  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  Kingdom  of 
Rumania  within  the  whole  extent  of  its  present  frontiers. 

Article  2.  Rumania  undertakes  to  declare  war  upon 
and  to  attack  Austria-Hungary  in  the  conditions  stipu- 
lated in  the  military  convention;  Rumania  also  under- 
takes to  break  off,  as  and  from  the  declaration  of  war, 
all  economic  and  commercial  intercourse  with  the  enemies 
of  the  Allied  Powers. 

Article  3.  France,  Great  Britain,  Italy  and  Russia 
recognize  Rumania's  right  to  annex  the  territories  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  monarchy  enumerated  in  Article  4. 

*  Translated  for  the  author  by  Mr.  A.  Wright. 


EQUALITY  OF  TRADE  CONDITIONS  119 

Article   4.     The  boundaries  of  the  territories  mentioned 
in  the  foregoing  article  are  as  follows  : 

The  boundary  line  shall  start  upon  the  Pruth  at  a 
point  of  the  present  frontier  between  Russia  and  Rumania 
near  Novoselitza  and  will  go  up  this  river  to  the  Galician 
frontier  at  the  confluence  of  the  Pruth  and  the  Ceremos, 
Then  it  will  follow  the  frontier  of  Galicia  and  Bukovina 
and  that  of  Galicia  and  Hungary  to  the  Stog  point  (Hill 
1655).  Thence  it  will  follow  the  line  of  separation  of 
the  waters  of  the  Tisza  and  of  the  Tizo  in  order  to  reach 
the  Tisza  at  the  village  of  Trebuza  above  the  point  of 
confluence  with  the  Tizo.  From  this  point,  it  will  descend 
the  thalweg  of  the  Tisza  to  a  point  four  kilometres  below 
its  confluence  with  the  Szamos,  the  village  of  Vasares- 
Nameny  to  be  included  in  Rumania.  It  will  then  pro- 
ceed in  a  south-southwesterly  direction  up  to  a  point 
six  kilometres  east  of  the  town  of  Debreczen.  From 
that  point  it  will  continue  to  the  Crisch  at  a  point  three 
kilometres  below  the  junction  of  its  two  afiluents  (the 
White  Crisch  and  the  Rapid  Crisch).  It  will  then  join 
the  Tisza  on  a  level  with  the  Algye  village,  north  of 
Sezgedin,  passing  west  of  the  villages  of  Croshaza  and 
Bekessamson,  describing  a  small  curve  three  kilometres 
east  of  the  latter  village.  From  Algye,  the  line  will 
descend  the  thalweg  of  the  Tisza  to  its  confluence  with 
the  Danube  and  lastly  will  follow  the  thalweg  of  the 
Danube  to  the  present  frontier  of  Rumania. 

Rumania  undertakes  not  to  erect  any  fortifications 
in  front  of  Belgrade  within  a  zone  to  be  subsequently 
settled  and  to  keep  within  the  said  zone  only  such  forces 
as  may  be  necessary  for  police  services.  The  royal 
Rumania  Government  undertakes  to  indemnify  Serbian 
subjects  of  the  Banat  region  who,  abandoning  their 
property,  would  wish  to  emigrate  within  two  years  of 
the  conclusion  of  peace.  . 


120  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

Article  5.  Rumania  on  the  one  part,  and  France, 
Great  Britain,  Italy  and  Russia  on  the  other  undertake 
not  to  conclude  a  separate  peace  or  the  general  peace 
except  jointly  and  simultaneously. 

France,  Great  Britain,  Italy  and  Russia  also  under- 
take that,  in  the  Peace  Treaty,  the  territories  stated  in 
Article  4  shall  be  annexed  to  the  Rumanian  Crown. 

Article  6.  Rumania  shall  enjoy  the  same  rights  as 
the  Allies  in  all  that  concerns  the  peace  preliminaries  and 
negotiations,  and  in  the  discussion  of  the  questions  which 
shall  be  submitted  for  decision  to  the  Peace  Conference. 

Article  7.  The  Contracting  Powers  undertake  to 
keep  the  present  convention  secret  until  the  conclusion 
of  the  general  peace. 

Made  in  five  parts  at  Bucharest,  August  4/17,  1916. 

Military  Convention 

Article  1.  In  pursuance  of  the  Treaty  of  Alliance 
entered  into  on  August  4/17,  1916,  between  France, 
Great  Britain,  Italy,  Russia  and  Rumania,  Rumania 
mobilising  all  her  land  and  naval  forces,  undertakes 
to  attack  Austria-Hungary  not  later  than  August  15/28, 
1916  (eight  days  after  the  Salonica  offensive).  The 
offensive  operations  of  the  Rumanian  army  shall  begin 
on  the  same  day  as  the  declaration  of  war. 

Article  2.  As  and  from  the  signature  of  the  present 
convention  and  during  the  mobilisation  and  concentra- 
tion of  the  Rumanian  army,  the  Russian  army  under- 
takes to  operate  in  a  specially  energetic  manner  on  all 
the  Austrian  front  with  the  object  of  insuring  the  carry- 
ing out  of  the  Rumanian  operations  above  mentioned. 
Such  action  shall  be  especially  offensive  and  strenuous 
in  Bukovina  where  the  Russian  troops  must  at  least 
keep  their  positions  and  their  present  effectives. 


EQUALITY  OF  TRADE  CONDITIONS  121 

As  and  from  August  12/25,  1916,  the  Russian  fleet 
must  insure  the  safety  of  the  port  of  Constantza,  prevent 
any  landing  by  enemy  troops  upon  the  Rumanian  coast 
and  any  incursion  in  the  Danube,  above  the  mouths  of 
that  river. 

Rumania,  on  the  other  hand  will  recognise  the  right 
of  the  Russian  Black  Sea  Fleet  to  use  the  port  of  Con- 
stantza and  to  take  such  steps  as  may  be  necessary  against 
the  enemy  submarine  fleet. 

The  Russian  Fleet  units  which  shall  use  the  Danube 
whether  to  protect  its  shores  or  to  lend  assistance  to  the 
Rumanian  land  and  sea  forces  shall  be  under  the  orders 
of  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Rumanian  armies  and 
will  cooperate  upon  the  river  with  the  Rumanian  monitor 
squadron.  The  details  of  such  cooperation  will  be  settled 
in  accordance  with  the  articles  of  the  present  convention. 

Article  3.  Russia  undertakes  that,  at  the  time  of 
the  mobilisation  of  the  Rumanian  army,  she  will  send 
into  the  Dobrudja,  two  infantry  and  one  cavalry  division 
in  order  to  cooperate  with  the  Rumanian  army  against 
the  Bulgarian  army. 

The  Allies  undertake  to  start  a  determined  offensive 
by  the  Salonica  armies,  at  least  eight  days  before  Ru- 
mania's entry  into  the  war,  in  order  to  facilitate  the 
mobilisation  and  concentration  of  all  the  Rumanian 
military  forces.  This  offensive  shall  start  on  August 
7/20,  1916. 

If,  in  the  course  of  military  operations,  the  Allied 
Powers,  after  agreement  between  the  respective  staffs, 
were  to  increase  their  military  contingent  cooperating 
with  the  Rumanian  army,  such  increase  of  forces  shall 
not  modify  in  any  way  the  stipulations  of  the  agreements 
entered  into. 

Article  4.     France,   Great  Britain,  Italy  and  Russia 


122  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

undertake  to  supply  Rumania  with  munitions  and  war 
material  which  shall  be  carried  in  Rumanian  or  Allied 
ships  and  conveyed  through  Russia. 
■  Such  deliveries  and  conveyance  shall  be  carried  out 
in  such  a  way  as  to  insure  the  arrival  into  Rumania 
in  as  continuous  a  manner  as  possible  of  a  minimum  of 
three  hundred  tons  per  day,  calculated  upon  one  month's 
supply. 

In  the  event  of  the  Allies  obtaining  new  means  of  access 
facilitating  the  transport  of  munitions,  Rumania  may 
have  the  benefit  thereof. 

Article  5.  The  Allies  also  undertake  as  far  as  possible 
to  supply  Rumania  with  horses,  rubber,  medicines,  articles 
of  food  and  equipment  which  she  may  ask  according  to 
quantities  and  categories  which  will  be  mutually  agreed. 

Article  6.  The  Allies  shall  place  at  Rumania's  dis- 
posal the  technical  staff  necessary  for  the  manufacture 
within  the  country  of  war  munitions  and  material. 

Article  7.  Immediately  upon  the  signing  of  the  present 
convention,  the  staffs  of  the  Russo-Rumanian  armies 
and  the  staff  of  the  Salonica  armies  shall  in  concert 
agree  upon  the  modalities  of  their  cooperation. 

Any  agreement  during  the  military  operations  of  the 
Russo-Rumanian  armies  or  any  change,  interpretation 
(eclaircissement)  or  supplement  with  a  view  to  a  per- 
manent liaison,  shall  be  settled  at  the  respective  Head- 
quarters as  stated  hereunder. 

Article  8.  The  cooperation  of  the  Allied  armies  does 
not  imply  any  subordination  of  one  of  the  contracting 
parties  to  the  other ;  it  only  operates  as  the  free  accept- 
ance of  the  provisions  or  modifications  due  to  the  general 
situation,  to  the  requirements  of  the  object  in  view  and 
to  camaraderie  in  arms. 

Article   9.     In  principle,  the  royal  Rumanian  troops 


EQUALITY  OF  TRADE  CONDITIONS  123 

and  the  Russian  Imperial  troops  will  preserve  their  own 
command,  their  distinct  zone  of  operations  and  complete 
independence  in  the  conduct  of  operations.  The  line 
of  demarcation  between  the  two  armies  will  run  from 
Dorna-Vatra  by  the  Bistritza  and  the  valleys  of  the 
Chaio  and  Samesch  rivers  to  Debreczen.  The  chief  object 
of  the  Rumanian  operations,  as  far  as  the  military  situa- 
tion south  of  the  Danube  may  allow,  will  be  through 
Transylvania  in  the  direction  of  Budapest. 

The  Russian  troops  provided  for  in  Article  3  and  in- 
tended to  cooperate  with  the  Rumanian  army  will  be 
under  the  orders  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Rumanian  army. 

In  the  event  of  the  Russian  contingent  operating 
south  of  the  Danube  being  considerably  increased  to 
such  an  extent  as  to  make  it  of  equal  or  superior  strength 
to  the  Rumanian  troops  with  which  it  will  cooperate, 
such  contingent  may  form,  upon  leaving  Rumanian 
territory,  an  independent  army  which  will  be  placed 
under  the  supreme  Russian  command.  In  that  case, 
such  army  operating  outside  Rumanian  territory  will 
have  a  distinct  zone  of  operations  and  will  be  conducted 
in  accordance  with  the  directive  lines  of  the  supreme 
Russian  command  while  nevertheless  complying  entirely 
with  the  plans  of  the  two  General  Headquarters  on  the 
bases  hereinbefore  agreed. 

If,  by  reason  of  the  object  in  view,  military  operations 
with  combined  Russo-Rumanian  forces  were  to  take 
place,  the  command  of  such  forces  would  be  settled  by 
the  respective  zone  of  operations.  All  orders  and  instruc- 
tions relating  to  the  conduct  of  these  operations  will  be 
drawn  up  in  Rumanian  and  in  Russian. 

Article  10.  In  principle,  in  national  territory  as  well 
as  in  territory  occupied  by  the  armies  of  one  of  the  con- 


124  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

trading  powers,  the  armies  of  the  other  shall  not  enter 
except  if  the  general  interest  and  the  common  object 
make  it  necessary  and  subject  to  written  and  prior  consent 
in  each  particular  case. 

Article  11.  Upon  every  occasion  when,  in  the  course 
of  operations,  the  Allied  armies  shall  find  themselves 
compelled,  for  the  carrying  of  troops,  of  provisions  or 
military  supplies,  to  use  one  or  several  railways  upon  the 
territory  of  the  Allied  Power,  such  use  shall  be  settled 
for  each  particular  case  by  delegates  of  the  Main  Allied 
General  Headquarters. 

The  administration  and  organisation  of  transport,  and 
the  provisioning  by  means  of  local  resources  shall  in 
all  cases  devolve  upon  the  territorial  authorities. 

Article  12.  Prisoners,  war  booty  and  trophies  taken 
by  one  of  the  armies  shall  belong  to  it. 

War  booty  taken  in  common  battles  and  on  the  battle- 
field shall  be  divided  proportionately  to  the  effectives 
taking  part  in  the  battle.  Nevertheless  in  order  to 
facilitate  the  provisioning  of  the  Rumanian  army,  the 
Russian  Imperial  Command  shall  give  up  to  the  Rumanian 
army  such  war  material  and  munitions  forming  of  the 
mixed  booty,  as  it  may  urgently  need. 

Article  13.  In  order  to  coordinate  the  action  of  the 
Rumanian,  Russian  and  Allied  armies  and  in  order  more 
safely  to  reach  the  military  objects  in  view,  a  representa- 
tive of  the  Rumanian  army,  assisted  if  need  be  by  a 
certain  number  of  other  officers,  must  be  at  the  Russian 
and  Allied  Headquarters  upon  the  opening  of  the  Ru- 
manian military  operations.  Likewise  representatives 
of  the  Russian  and  Allied  armies  and  their  assistants 
must  be  at  the  Headquarters  of  the  Rumanian  army. 

Headquarters  of  the  cooperating  armies  must  mutually 
inform  each  other  and  in  good  time  of  military  conject- 


EQUALITY  OF  TRADE  CONDITIONS  125 

ures,  reconstruction  of  forces  and  the  progress  of  opera- 
tions. 

Article  14.  If,  in  the  course  of  operations,  situations 
arose  necessitating  the  taking  of  new  steps  and  raising 
questions  not  provided  for  in  the  present  convention,  all 
such  questions  shall  be  dealt  with  in  each  General  Head- 
quarters with  the  delegate  of  the  Allied  army,  but  they 
shall  not  become  final  imtil  after  agreement  by  the  com- 
manders-in-chief. 

Article  15.  In  order  that  the  measures  preparatory  to 
the  commencement  of  operations  may  be  taken  in  good 
time,  the  contracting  parties  must  agree  upon  the  plan 
of  military  operation  before  the  day  of  opening  of  hostili- 
ties by  the  Rumanian  army. 

Article  16.  Questions  of  armistice  shall  be  decided 
by  mutual  agreement  by  the  supreme  commands  of  the 
cooperating  armies. 

Article  17.  The  present  convention  shall  remain  in 
force  from  the  day  of  signature  to  the  day  of  the  general 
peace. 

Made  in  five  parts  at  Bucharest,  August  4/17,  1916. 


CHAPTER  VI 


COLONIAL   EXPANSION 


There  are  two  kinds  of  policy  as  regards  colonial 
expansion.  Jules  Ferry,  in  the  eighties,  used  colonial 
policy  as  a  method  of  diverting  the  attention  of 
the  French  people  from  the  "revanche"  agitation 
which  was  exciting  a  dangerously  active  hostility 
on  the  part  of  Germany.  Germany  had  grown  in 
strength  and  had  become  considerably  more  than 
a  match  for  France  than  she  had  been  in  1870. 
He  was  successful  in  calming  the  feelings  of  German 
statesmen  but  he  excited  the  suspicions  of  the 
English.  Then  came  a  substitute  for  colonial 
expansion  in  the  Russian  alliance.  Mr.  Ribot 
tried  the  more  direct  method  of  at  one  and  the  same 
time  giving  France  a  sense  of  self-confidence  and 
putting  a  brake  on  aggressive  anti-German  tenden- 
cies. Jules  Ferry's  colonial  expansion  was  factitious. 
France  had  no  surplus  inhabitants,  no  expanding 
industries,  the  prosperity  of  which  was  necessary  for 
the  support  of  an  overwhelming  industrial  popu- 
lation.^ 

English  colonial  expansion,  on  the  other  hand, 

'See  Barclay,  "Thirty  Years  Anglo-French  Reminiscences",  chap. 
VII.     London  and  Boston,  1907. 


COLONIAL  EXPANSION  127 

had  been  a  natural  growth  in  which  government 
merely  followed  settlers  and  there  has  never  been 
a  conscious  objective  connected  with  any  general 
scheme  of  policy  among  contemporary  British 
statesmen. 

The  other  policy  is  that  which  was  pursued  by 
Germany  for  the  deliberate  purpose  at  first  of 
obtaining  outlets  for  her  surplus  population  which 
her  statesmen  tried  to  retain  within  her  allegiance 
and  afterwards  for  that  of  obtaining  markets  from 
which  her  industrial  products  could  not  be  excluded. 

Italian  colonial  policy  was  based  on  analogous 
requirements. 

These  two  forms  of  colonial  expansion  policy 
have  occupied  much  of  the  attention  of  the  Foreign 
and  Colonial  Offices  of  Europe  for  over  a  genera- 
tion.^ 

England's  colonial  policy  has  been  natural  but 
her  continental  Asiatic  expansion  has  been  more  or 
less  like  that  of  France,  one  of  imperial  conquest, 
conquest  which  the  historian  may  be  entitled  to 
regard  as  that  of  muscular,  semi-barbarous  Euro- 
peans over  refined  races  of  civilised  Asia,  far  more 
intelligent  and  thoughtful  than  the  troops  who  had 
overcome  them.  As  I  wrote  in  1914,  I  am  not 
patriot  enough  to  have  any  sympathy  with  annexa- 
tion of  territory  not  susceptible  of  European  coloni- 
sation.    I  venture  to  quote  what  I  then  said,  because 

^  Russian  expansion  was  not  colonial  but  connected  with  a  geo- 
graphical situation  which  is  likely  to  produce  the  same  rivalries  whether 
Russia  ultimately  settles  down  under  a  Republican  or  an  imperial 
regime. 


128  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

it  is  becoming  every  day  more  applicable  to  the 
place  of  Em'ope  in  Asia  and  because  President 
Wilson's  fifth  proposition  shows  his  keen  eye  has 
perceived  that  native  right,  thought  and  civilisa- 
tion will  have  to  be  respected  by  Europeans  as  a 
part  of  the  organisation,  method  and  policy  the 
preservations  of  peace  will  entail : 

"Much  as  one  must  admire  toiling  European 
civil  servants  who  give  their  lives  to  good  and  useful 
administrative  work,  one  ought  to  have  nothing 
but  loathing  for  the  frivolous  pretexts  employed 
to  justify  the  barbarous  slaughter  of  harmless 
people  who  rise  to  defend  their  homes  against  the 
invaders  and  the  hypocritical  pretences  put  forward 
as  a  reason  for  depriving  them  of  their  independence. 

"  In  the  case  of  an  overpeopled  country  there  is 
some  sort  of  excuse  of  self-preservation  for  the 
annexing  of  territory.  To  annex  merely  to  find 
employment  for  an  oversupply  of  candidates  for 
the  civil  service  is  hardly  fair  to  the  rest  of  man- 
kind. 

"  The  retribution  which  history  generally  has 
in  store  for  the  crimes  of  nations  is  already  beginning 
to  gather  on  the  horizon  of  the  Far  East.  Those 
who  have  not  the  power  to  defend  the  possessions 
they  have  wrested  from  the  weaker  hands  of  native 
Asiatic  communities  may  yet  have  to  surrender 
them  to  conquering  Powers  who  have  borrowed 
Western  methods  of  aggrandisement  and  with 
which  a  future  generation  may  have  to  reckon."  ^ 

1  Barclay's  "  Thirty  Years  Anglo-French  Reminiscences ",  p.  83. 
London  and  Boston,  1907. 


COLONIAI,  EXPANSION  129 

President  Wilson's  fifth  proposition  deals  with 
the  colonial  problem.  On  behalf  of  the  Allies  he 
has  promised  Europe,  it  is  true,  "a  free,  open-minded 
and  absolutely  impartial  adjustment  of  all  colonial 
claims",  that  is  to  say  those  of  Europeans  in  the 
non-European  and  non-American  world.  But  he 
goes  further  and  has  promised  the  world  in  general 
*'a  strict  observance  of  the  principle  that,  in  deter- 
mining such  questions  of  sovereignty,  the  interests 
of  the  populations  concerned  shall  have  equal  right 
with  the  equitable  claims  of  the  government  whose 
title  is  to  be  determined.'* 

President  Wilson  confines  his  proposition  to 
colonial  claims.  It  does  not  apply  to  settled  colo- 
nies, sovereignty  over  which  is  not  in  question,  and 
which  do  not  come  within  the  purview  of  the  peace 
negotiations.  In  using  the  word  "colonial",  does 
he,  however,  distinguish  between  dependencies  and 
colonies,  that  is,  between  non-European  countries 
under  the  "mastery"  of  another,  but  which,  owing 
either  to  climatic  unsuitability  for  colonisation  by 
Europeans  or  to  other  reasons,  are  without  per- 
manent colonists,  and  extra-European  colonial  settle- 
ments, properly  speaking.''  The  French  lump  all 
foreign  dependencies  and  colonies  together  under 
the  name  of  "colonies",  such  a  distinction  for  any 
practical  purposes  not  existing  for  France,  whose  only 
colony,  properly  speaking,  forms  part  of  a  British 
dominion.  President  Wilson  seems  not  to  make  the 
English  distinction,  no  doubt  for  the  same  reason 
as  the  French,  viz. :  that  the  United  States  have 


130  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

expanded   laterally   and   their   only   foreign   settle- 
ments are  not  colonies,  properly  speaking. 

The  President's  proposition,  we  have  seen,  involves 
two  issues.  The  one  is  impartiality  in  the  adjust- 
ment of  claims  among  the  belligerent  States,  and 
the  other,  observance  of  the  time-honoured  prin- 
ciple, hitherto,  alas,  more  honoured  in  the  breach 
than  the  observance,  that  the  interests  of  the 
populations  concerned  must  have  equal  weight 
with  the  equitable  claims  of  the  government  whose 
title  is  to  be  determined. 

To  begin  with  the  latter,  the  first  French  impres- 
sion was  that  the  President  was  claiming  a  voice 
for  the  indigenous  populations  of  the  countries  in 
question.  Though  the  original  text  does  not  neces- 
sarily bear  that  construction,  it  might  have  been 
a  reaflSrmation  of  American  polity  as  declared  at 
the  Berlin  West-African  Conference  of  1885,  when 
an  attempt  was  made  by  the  United  States  repre- 
sentative, Mr.  Kasson,  to  apply  international  law 
to  native  races  in  so  far  as  regarded  "recognition 
of  the  right  of  native  tribes  to  dispose  freely  of 
themselves  and  of  their  hereditary  territory." 
In  conformity  with  this  principle,  the  American 
Government,  Mr.  Kasson  said,  would  have  gladly 
adhered  "to  a  more  extended  rule  to  be  based  on  a 
principle  which  should  aim  at  the  voluntary  con- 
sent of  the  natives  whose  country  is  taken  possession 
of,  in  all  cases  where  they  had  not  provoked  the 
aggression."  ^     This   suggestion,   however,   was   not 

^  Protocol  of  January  31,  1886.     Parliamentary  Papers,  C4361,  p.  209. 


COLONIAL  EXPANSION  131 

acted  upon,  and  the  Conference  confined  itself 
to  establishing  rules  for  the  occupation  of  Africa 
by  European  States. 

Equality  among  Christian  States  and  those, 
such  as  Japan,  assimilated  to  them,  is  a  principle 
of  their  intercourse.  "Uncivilised"  races  and  com- 
munities are  not,  in  European  practice,  treated  as 
equals.  Their  governments  are  treated  as  local 
and  in  such  practice  they  are  annexed  to  the  domin- 
ions of  "civilised"  States  without  reference  to  their 
will  or  consent.  Where  treaties  have  been  made 
with  natives,  any  appeal  to  them  has  hitherto 
been  rather  by  way  of  evidence  of  prior  occupation 
than  as  involving  any  question  of  native  right. 

President  Wilson  says  "the  interests"  of  the 
populations  concerned  must  be  balanced  against 
the  title  of  the  claimants.  If  this  view  is  insisted 
and  acted  upon,  it  will  mean  either  that  a  special 
charter  or  mandate  containing  protective  provisions 
will  have  to  be  obtained  from  the  Peace  Conference 
or  that  some  international  authority  be  constituted 
by  it,  or  that  a  special  conference  be  held  to  complete 
and  generalise  the  work  of  the  Brussels  African 
Conference  of  1889-1890.  In  any  case,  I  think  the 
President  is  right  to  bring  the  matter  forward, 
and  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  one  of  the  sections  of  the 
Congress  of  Peace  will  deal  with  the  rights  of  natives 
by  providing  a  charter  for  their  protection. 

The  impartial  adjustment  of  colonial  "claims** 
involves  naturally  the  question  of  the  German 
colonies.     The   word    "claims"    may   also   involve 


132  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

that  of  colonies  of  a  size  disproportionate  to  the 
requirements  of  the  dominant  nation.  I  am  always 
using  the  word  "colonies"  in  the  vague,  non -British 
sense.  No  doubt  a  section  of  the  Congress  will  be 
told  off  to  deal  with  this  adjustment,  for  any  attempt 
to  repartition  Africa  would  give  rise  to  diflSculties 
almost  as  great  as  those  with  which  we  are  confronted 
in  Europe. 

With  what  territorial  areas  will  the  Congress 
be  given  by  its  constituents  the  right  to  deal? 
We  have  seen  that  the  President  himself  confines 
its  scope  to  "claims."  Does  the  word  "claims" 
include  all  areas  the  status  of  which  has  been  changed 
during  the  War.^  If  so,  the  British  Foreign  Secre- 
tary's statement  that  no  colonies  will  be  returned 
to  Germany  may  be  premature.  Is  the  phrase 
"open-minded  and  impartial  adjustment"  intended 
to  cover  such  cases  as  the  Cape  to  Cairo  railway, 
the  granting  of  reasonable  demands  for  coaling 
stations  and  exchanges  of  colonial  settlements 
with  a  view  to  enabling  different  nations  to  have 
such  stations  ?  Will  the  scope  of  the  Congress' 
powers  in  this  connection  be  defined  and  limited? 
Certain  German  colonies  will  no  doubt  be  "claimed" 
by  other  Powers  as  a  matter  of  geographical  right. 
Should  not  certain  principles  be  established  as  to 
what  constitutes  priority  among  different  claims? 

This  adjustment  of  colonial  claims  on  the  equitable 
basis  of  taking  the  reasonable  requirements  of 
claimants  into  account  and  balancing  the  industrial 
and   demographic   exigencies   of   the   one   and   the 


COLONIAL  EXPANSION  133 

other,  if  carried  out  in  a  spirit  of  impartiality,  may 
for  many  years  check  the  revival  of  the  spirit  of 
international  unrest  which  comes  from  overpopu- 
lation, overproduction,  insufficient  sources  of  raw 
materials  and  all  the  other  causes  of  overseas 
ambitions. 

Those  who  get  the  upper  hand  in  preparing  the 
deliberations  of  the  Congress  of  Peace  will  do  well 
to  insist  on  younger  men  than  those  who  are  respon- 
sible for  the  contemporary  breakdown  of  European 
statesmanship  being  taken  into  Council.  The  colo- 
nies are  the  concern  of  younger  men.  The  future 
appertains  to  them  and  not  to  those  who  have 
spent  their  lives  in  the  cramped  and  narrow  space 
of  a  Europe  which  already  begins  to  belong  to  the 
past  and  where  the  old  men  who  govern  it  are 
necessarily  too  ignorant  of  new  conditions,  too 
exanimated  by  the  fatigues  of  a  life  of  petty  political 
detail,  to  be  entrusted  with  matters  requiring  breadth 
of  treatment  by  supple  minds  in  the  prime  of  their 
elasticity  and  genius. 


NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  VI 

Note  on  Consequences 
England's  Position  as  a  Mother  of  Nations 

As  the  military  power  of  European  nations  in  the 
present  age  of  universal  conscription  is  largely  in  pro- 
portion to  the  magnitude  of  their  population,  it  is  obvious 
that  a  thickly  peopled  country  which  is  nearing  the  maxi- 
mum of  its  productivity  will  fall  automatically  into  a 
position  of  military  inferiority  as  compared  with  a  thinly 
peopled  one  which  has  a  wider  margin  of  prospective 
productivity. 

Great  Britain,  though  not  Ireland,  is  approaching 
such  a  maximum. 

A  consequence  of  the  necessarily  restricted  population 
of  Great  Britain  is  that  as  the  military  disproportion  be- 
tween her  and  other  Great  Powers  increases,  she  becomes 
more  dependent  on  her  overseas  emigrant  population. 
On  their  loyalty  to  the  motherland  she  has  to  rely  for  her 
raw  materials,  an  absolutely  diminishing  quantity  within 
the  home  area,  and  for  her  food,  a  relatively  and  condi- 
tionally diminishing  quantity. 

Her  interest,  therefore,  is  not  only  to  cultivate  the 
friendship  of  her  neighbours  but  to  maintain  and 
strengthen  social  and  racial  links  among  all  Anglo-Saxon 
communities  without  assuming  that  colonies  will  prove  an 
exception  to  the  universal  rule  of  life  that  a  healthy 
maturity  is  incompatible  with  the  preservation  of  any 
form  of  suzerainty. 


CHAPTER  VII 

CONQUEST   AND   ANNEXATION 

The  sixth,  seventh,  eighth  and  eleventh  of  Presi- 
dent Wilson's  propositions  deal  with  evacuations, 
the  ninth  with  a  territorial  adjustment,  the  tenth 
(presumably)  with  the  Slav  populations  of  Austria- 
Hungary  and  the  thirteenth  with  Poland. 

These  form  a  group  to  which  the  second  of  the 
four  points  set  out  in  President  Wilson's  July  Fourth 
speech  refers : 

"The  settlement,"  he  said,  "of  every  question, 
whether  of  territory  or  sovereignty,  of  economic 
arrangement  or  of  political  relationship"  shall 
be  "upon  the  basis  of  the  free  acceptance  of  that 
settlement  by  the  people  immediately  concerned 
and  not  upon  the  basis  of  the  material  interest  or 
advantage  of  any  other  nation  or  people  which 
may  desire  a  different  settlement  for  the  sake  of  its 
own  exterior  influence  or  mastery." 

This  declaration  of  the  rights  of  peoples,  com- 
munities and  races,  for  it  applies  to  all  pending 
questions  affecting  groups  of  mankind,  is  in  the 
nature  of  a  charter  for  the  protection  of  smaller 
and  weaker  groups  against  pretensions  and  ambi- 
tions of  existing  States  and  its  acceptance  by  them 


136  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

is  one  of  the  reciprocal  pledges  on  the  faith  of  which 
the  War  has  been  brought  to  a  conclusion.^ 

1 A  strange  parliamentary  declaration  was  made  by  the  Italian 
Prime  Minister,  Signer  Orlando,  as  reported  in  the  Temps  of  December 
17  and  18,  1918,  which  is  not  an  encouraging  symptom  as  regards  the 
spirit  in  which  the  word  of  the  Italian  Government  has  been  pledged. 
I  give  it  "in  extenso"  as  reported  without  further  comment : 

"  Au  S^nat,  le  president  du  conseil  a  profite  de  la  discussion  des  douzi- 
emes  provisoires,  pour  faire  connaitre  ofEcielement  le  point  de  vue 
de  ritalie  dans  les  questions  de  reparation  des  attentats  allemands  et 
des  garanties  necessaires  pour  une  paix  durable.  II  a  reserve,  en  quel- 
que  mesure,  la  liberte  de  son  gouvernement  dans  I'appreciation  de  ces 
garanties. 

"  'L' Italic,'  a  dit  M.  Orlando,  'nest  pas  en  Hat  de  demobiliser  en  quelque 
mesure  que  ce  soit.  On  doit  encore  garder  intact  tout  I'appareil  de 
guerre.  Les  difficultes  immediates  qu'il  s'agit  de  surmonter  ne  sont  pas 
diminuees;  elles  sont  peui-etre  accrues.  Quant  aux  questions  inter- 
nationales,  il  ne  convient  pas  d'anticiper  en  public  sur  ce  qui  fait  I'objet 
de  discussions  particulieres,  et  d'autre  part  les  droits  et  les  aspirations 
de  ritalie  sont  subordonnes  a  des  directives  d'un  caractere  general  qui 
peuvent  prevaloir  ou  ne  pas  prevaloir  a  la  conference  de  la  paix. 

"'Certes,  les  directions  qui  prevaudront  devront  etre  justement 
appliquees  en  Italic;  les  puissances  alliees  ont  adhere  a  des  principes 
qui,  par  leur  portee,  conduiront  au  reglement  des  questions  qui  interes- 
sent  notre  pays.  Ces  principes  sont  ceux  du  president  Wilson.  Nous 
les  avons  preconises;  ils  doivent  elever  la  guerre  aux  plus  purs  ideals 
d'humanite.  A  ces  principes  nous  serons  fideles;  mais  je  ne  saurais 
dire  jusqu'd  quel  point,  car,  dans  la  pratique,  des  obstacles  peuvent  surgir 
qui  nous  obligeront  a  recourir  a  des  temperaments. 

"'Quant  a  la  reparation  des  dommages,  c'est  une  question  qui  est 
en  dehors  de  toute  discussion  relative  aux  principes  a  adopter  dans  un 
sens  ou  dans  I'autre.  Un  des  postulats  de  M.  Wilson  exclut  I'indemnitfi 
prise  au  sens  traditionnel  du  mot,  mais  il  est  hors  de  doute  que  les 
directives  qui  seront  adoptees  par  les  autres  nations  pour  la  reparation 
des  dommages  seront  adoptees  aussi  pour  I'ltalie.  (Tres  vives  appro- 
bations.) ' 

"M.  Orlando  est  convaincu  qu'aucune  personne  de  bon  sens  ne 
pourra  penser  qu'un  des  Etats  ennemis  puisse  ^tre  exonere  de  payer  sa 
dette  sous  pretexte  qu'il  a  pu  s'effriter. 

"  Dans  la  suite  du  discours  dont  nous  avons  donnS  hier  la  premiere 


CONQUEST  AND  ANNEXATION  137 

There  is  only  one  form  of  "free  acceptance"  by 
a  people  known  to  democracy  and  that  is  the  decision 
by  the  majority  ascertained  by  secret  ballot.  Ac- 
ceptance   may    be    presumed    from    circumstances 

partie,  le  president  du  conseil  italien  a  expose  encore  comme  il  suit  les 
points  de  vue  du  gouvernement  dans  les  questions  litigieuses  Sventuelles 
(Yougo-Slavie,  Grece,  Asie-Mineure). 

"  M.  Orlando  a  declare : 

*"A  cette  heure  decisive  pour  I'ltalie,  nous  ne  serons  pas  animus 
d'un  esprit  d'intransigeance  qui  nous  ferait  considerer  des  problemes 
si  complexes  et  qui  doivent  etre  resolus,  seulement  d'un  cote.  Cette 
m^thode  pent  convenir  surtout  a  qui  parle  pour  son  compte  et  n'assume 
pas  de  responsabilites. 

"*Ne  voulant  pas  que  des  violences  soient  commises  a  notre  egard 
nous  n'en  userons  pas  contre  d'autres,  et  parce  que  nous  sommes  inspires 
d'un  sentiment  de  profonde  confiance  non  seulement  dans  la  loyaute  — 
cette  declaration  est  d'elle-meme  superflue  —  mais  dans  la  cordiale 
amitie  de  nos  allies,  nous  savons  pouvoir  compter  sur  une  egale  et 
reciproque  confiance  et  nous  sommes  stirs  que  toutes  les  difficultes  objec- 
tivement  existantes  seront  beureusement  surmontees.' 

"M.  Orlando  a  assure  que  le  gouvernement  tiendra,  qu'il  a  tenu  meme 
un  tres  haut  compte  des  considerations  presentees  par  M.  Tittoni  sur 
les  questions  concernant  rindemnit6  de  guerre,  la  reorganisation  de  la 
MediterranSe  orientale  et  des  colonies. 

"Apres  avoir  rappele  le  role  de  I'ltalie  dans  la  guerre  ainsi  que  I'eflFort 
et  les  victoires  de  la  France,  la  creation  d'une  considerable  armee  bri- 
tannique  et  les  inappreciables  services  de  sa  marine,  I'intervention,  enfin, 
des  Etats-Unis  et  I'apport  de  ses  ecrasantes  ressources  qui  ont  ete 
pour  I'ennemi  le  coup  de  grace,  M.  Orlando  a  revendique  pour  I'ltalie 
le  droit  de  faire  valoir  son  point  de  vue  dans  toute  grande  question 
mondiale : 

"'Maintenant  que  nous  obtiendrons,  comme  c'est  notre  droit  pri- 
mordial, de  pouvoir  fermer  les  portes  de  la  maison  (Tres  vifs  applaudisse- 
ments),  que  le  peuple  a  montre  son  pouvoir  de  defendre  sa  maison  contre 
toute  menace,  maintenant  commence  pour  I'ltalie  une  periode  de  com- 
munion internationale,  qui  aflBrme  son  interet  partout  ou  les  questions  de 
caractere  economique  et  spirituel  portent  I'ltalie  en  contact  avec  les 
autres  races.  II  n'y  a  aucun  impdrialisme  dans  ce  programme.  Les 
rapports  auxquels  je  fais  allusion,  j'entends  qu'ils  se  developpent  dans 


138  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

and  it  may  be  free  according  to  circumstances  but 
experience  has  shown  that  presumption  of  a  popular 
opinion  is  open  to  doubt. ^ 

It  may  be  diflBcult  to  proceed  with  due  respect 
to  democratic  principles  in  all  cases.  Before  a 
referendum  can  be  held  a  register  of  voters  must  be 
established  and  this  implies  an  electoral  law  fixing 
who  is  entitled  to  figure  on  the  register.  To  adopt 
an  electoral  law  the  preliminary  step  of  creating 
a  provisional  constituent  assembly  may  be  neces- 
sary. These  different  steps  take  time  and  mean- 
while events  proceed,  irrevocable  measures  are 
taken,  public  opinion  may  grow  excited  and  the 
Jait  accompli  may  become  an  obstacle  to  the  exer- 
cise of  principles  essential  to  the  vindication  of 
popular  rights.  This  seems  to  be  the  case  in  Alsace 
where  the  presumption  is  that  the  Alsatians  are 
favourable  to  a  re-transfer  to  French  allegiance,  for 

la  libre  et  feconde  concurrence  des  activites  pacifiques,  mais  il  est  essential 
que  ritalie  ne  soit  plus  absente  du  camp  politique  international,  car 
on  peut  affirmer,  en  general,  qu'il  n'y  a  pas  de  question  Internationale 
ne  touchant  pas  a  un  juste  interet  de  I'ltalie. 

" '  Nos  enfants,  qui  surent  gagner  cette  terrible  guerre,  saiu-ont  ouvrir 
le  radieux  chemin  de  la  paix.' 

"  Tous  les  ministres  et  de  nombreux  senateurs  felicitent  M.  Orlando. 

"On  approuve,  a  I'unanimite,  I'ordre  du  jour  suivant  accepte  par 
le  president  du  conseil,  M.  Orlando : 

'"Le  Senat,  sflr  d'interpreter  le  sentiment  unanime  de  I'ltalie,  a 
pleine  confiance  que  I'oeuvre  des  delegues  italiens  a  la  conference  de 
la  paix  assurera  k  la  patrie  la  realisation  de  nos  aspirations  et  de  ses 
interets  moraux  et  materiels  scelles  par  le  sang  verse  et  par  les  sacrifices 
soutenus  et  couronnes  par  la  victoire  commune.'  " 

1  The  prognostications  of  the  result  of  the  British  election  of  1906 
of  practically  the  whole  press  of  the  country  turned  out  wrong  —  so 
wrong  that  instead  of  the  victory  expected  by  the  Unionists,  the  Liberals 
obtained  one  of  the  largest  majorities  on  record. 


CONQUEST  AND  ANNEXATION  139 

though  the  Alsatian  deputies  to  the  Reichstag 
were  not  elected  specifically  to  deal  with  the  subject, 
they  may  be  supposed  to  possess  the  confidence  of 
the  electors  generally. 

Annexation  without  the  deliberate  consent  of  the 
people  immediately  concerned,  however,  implies 
different  consequences  from  those  arising  out  of 
deliberate  consent.  In  the  latter  case  the  people 
are  free  to  judge  whether  the  conditions  are  suitable 
and  decide  accordingly.  In  the  case  of  presumed 
consent,  they  exercise  no  such  option  and  in  the 
absence  of  any  presumption  as  to  conditions, 
it  is  just  that  their  existing  laws,  local  institutions 
and  privileges,  religious  convictions  and  habits 
be  respected.  This  implies  further  that  any  measure 
of  autonomy  they  possess  be  maintained  until, 
upon  all  matters  concerning  them,  the  inhabitants 
decide  otherwise.  This  has  been  the  English  prin- 
ciple of  conduct  towards  all  the  European  peoples 
within  the  British  Empire.  It  apphes  to  Scotland, 
Ireland,  the  Channel  Islands  and  to  all  the  colonies, 
to  all  its  dependencies  of  European  origin.  It  is 
an  Anglo-Saxon  principle  which  the  Allies  have 
accepted  in  accepting  President  Wilson's  formulae 
and  is  too  precious  a  guarantee  of  popular  freedom 
to  be  treated  with  indifference. 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  VII 

Note  on  Language  as  a  Political  Question 

Nobody  who  has  not  been  in  rural  Hungary  or  in 
Macedonia  can  reaUze  the  meaning  of  what  is  called 
the  "Language  Question." 

Within  twenty  miles  of  Budapest  the  traveller  meets 
villages,  —  Slav,  German  and  Magyar,  —  as  separate 
from  each  other  in  appearance,  habits  and  language  as 
the  nations  of  Europe. 

The  manager  of  the  Hungadi  enterprise  told  me  in 
1908  that  he  had  to  take  his  employees  from  one  or 
another  village  entirely,  for  they  would  not  mix.  They 
were  like  a  trade  union.  They  worked  as  villages.  The 
only  advantage  in  a  strike  was  that  he  could  get  a  village 
of  another  race  to  replace  them ! 

One  of  the  Hungarian  Ministers  told  me  that  he  had 
to  be  able  to  speak  to  his  constituents  not  only  in  Magyar 
and  German  but  also  in  some  Slav  language  and  even 
Rumanian.  On  one  occasion,  he  had  not  been  able  to 
make  himself  understood  in  a  village  of  his  constituency 
where  an  unfamiliar  language  was  spoken.  It  turned 
out  that  this  village  had  grown  recently  into  importance 
through  the  return  from  America  of  emigrants  who  had 
left  it  a  number  of  years  earlier  and  that  most  of  them 
knew  English.     He  addressed  them  in  English ! 

The  mixture  in  Macedonia  is  of  still  greater  variety, 
including  Greeks  as  well  as  Rumanians  and  even  Al- 


CONQUEST  AND  ANNEXATION  141 

banians.  The  obvious  remedy  for  this  confusion  and 
the  resulting  complication  of  government  is  to  enforce 
the  teaching  of  a  common  language  and  this  has  been  the 
policy  in  the  United  States,  which  might  otherwise  have 
become  an  exaggerated  Macedonia. 

When  other  States  have  tried  the  same  system,  there 
has  generally  been  some  rival  State  which  had  an  interest, 
or  supposed  interest,  to  stir  up  resistance.  In  German 
Poland  it  was  the  neighbouring  Poles,  in  Hungary  the 
Rumanians,  in  Austria  the  Russians,  in  Macedonia  the 
Greeks,  and  all  have  carried  on  political  intrigues  on  the 
spot  against  the  dominant  State  through  the  schoolmaster 
and  excited  sympathy  for  alleged  grievances  by  repre- 
senting the  dominant  State  as  an  oppressor. 

Yet,  there  is  no  hardship  in  adding  a  common  language 
to  the  vernacular  one.  France  became  unified  through 
this  very  process  and  not  only  patois  of  French  but  Breton 
and  Basque,  which  are  distinct  languages,  are  nevertheless 
still  spoken  as  before  the  union. 

In  ignorant  and  degenerate  cities,  among  an  illiterate 
middle  class  and  in  countries  where  elementary  education 
is  regarded  as  a  means  for  keeping  the  working  classes 
"in  their  place",  knowledge  of  two  languages  is  regarded 
as  the  privilege  only  of  the  traveller.  In  Russia,  Ger- 
many, Norway,  Holland,  Belgium,  Italy,  ability  to 
speak  one  or  even  two  foreign  languages  is  so  widespread 
that  Anglo-Saxon  and  French  monolinguists  belonging 
to  a  class  which  has  the  means  of  being  properly  educated 
are  regarded  as  intellectual  inferiors  and  justly  so,  for, 
in  fact,  those  who  are  excluded  from  the  bulk  of  their 
fellowmen's  language,  literature  and  thought  are  not 
equal  to  those  who  have  access  to  them.  This  is  observ- 
able in  the  self-sufficiency  and  aggressive  ignorance  of 
monolinguists  when  they  judge  men  and  things  of  other 


142  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

countries,  which  they  are  much  more  prone  to  do  under 
the  influence  of  little  than  great  knowledge. 

While,  on  the  one  hand,  enforcement  of  the  learning 
of  a  common  language  is  a  reasonable  method  of  cementing 
the  heterogeneous  elements  of  which  all  existing  European 
States  are  composed,  and  is  in  the  interest  of  the  indi- 
vidual members  and  posterity  of  every  community,  the 
maintenance  of  the  local  language  is  a  matter  of  senti- 
mental attachment,  a  part  of  the  local  usage  and  manners 
with  which  it  becomes  oppression  to  interfere.  Common 
language  makes  a  united  nation  to  such  an  extent  that, 
as  I  have  said,  it  has  been  a  deliberate  State  method  of 
enforcing  Americanism  in  the  United  States  as  it  was  of 
Gallicising  the  inhabitants  of  France.  Common  language 
on  the  other  hand  has  been  the  basis  of  all  the  nationality 
movements  which  have  been  agitating  Europe  for  a  cen- 
tury, movements  which  culminated  in  the  recent  war, 

A  reaction  may  now  set  in.  Knowledge  of  the  diffi- 
culties of  carrying  out  a  redistribution  of  Europe  on  the 
principle  of  homogeneous  language,  which  is  the  only 
feasible  test  of  "nationality",  and  due  perception  of  the 
political  unrest  which  arose  out  of  it  accentuate  the  reac- 
tion in  favour  of  some  form  of  internationalism  which 
can  preserve  European  peoples  from  international  irrita- 
tion due  to  nationalist-linguistic  intrigue. 

Note  on  Alsace-Lorraine^ 

1.  Alsace 

There  are  three  distinct  periods  in  the  history  of  Alsace 
since  its  annexation  to  France  under  the  Treaty  of  West- 
phalia in  1648. 

*  A  mistranslation  of  President  Wilson's  note  was  circulated  in  France 
as  regards  Alsace-Lorraine.     It  misled  the  French  not  only  as  to  his 


CONQUEST  AND  ANNEXATION  143 

The  first  is  that  from  1648  to  the  French  Revolution, 
i.e.  until  1789 ;  the  second  from  the  Revolution  to  its 
annexation  to  Germany  in  1870,  and  the  third  since  then 
to  now. 

The  character,  traditions  and  presumed  tendencies  of 
a  people  cannot  be  detached  from  the  story  of  its  evolu- 
tion, and  its  history,  as  told  in  the  abstract  by  students 
of  past  records,  is  liable  to  reflect  their  personal  bias. 
History  is  but  evidence  of  impressions  of  the  past  exist- 
ing at  the  time  in  which  it  is  written.  There  are  facts, 
it  is  true,  which  cannot  be  dissolved  in  the  prisms  of 
prejudice  and  there  are  the  contemporary  records  them- 
selves of  events. 

meaning  but  also  as  to  the  consistency  of  his  propositions  generally. 
His  words  were  that  "the  tcrong  done  to  France  by  Prussia  in  1871  in 
the  matter  of  Alsace-Lorraine  which  has  unsettled  the  peace  of  the 
world  for  nearly  fifty  years  should  be  righted  in  order  that  peace  may 
once  more  be  made  secure  in  the  interest  of  all." 

The  French  translation  of  this  in  the  approved  version  was:  "le 
pr^udice  cause  a  la  France  en  1871  en  ce  qui  concerne  V Alsace-Lorraine 
.  .  .  devra  etre  repare  afin  que  etc."  The  word  devra  means  in  French 
shall  or  must,  not  should. 

Even  so  judicious  a  critic  of  events  as  the  Temps,  as  recently  as 
October  10th,  argued  on  the  strength  of  this  mistranslation  that  a  reply 
by  Germany  accepting  the  President's  proposition  implied  that  she 
"accepte  des  maintenant  entre  autres  choses  de  restituer  1' Alsace- 
Lorraine  a  la  France." 

Now,  though  the  President's  words  did  not  exclude  such  a  solution 
and  it  is  practically  certain  that  this  will  be  the  solution,  the  President 
did  not  say  what  the  mistranslation  of  his  eighth  proposition  implies 
and  acceptance  of  it  by  Germany  did  not  have  the  unrestricted  meaning 
the  Temps  and  other  commentators  assumed.  Moreover,  as  he  has 
laid  down  in  the  second  proposition  of  July  4th  that  every  question 
of  territory  shall  be  settled  on  the  basis  of  free  acceptance  by  the  people 
immediately  concerned,  the  use  of  the  words  must  or  shall  in  his  eighth 
proposition  would  be  inconsistent  with  this  principle,  and  the  last 
criticism  the  President  is  likely  to  lay  himself  open  to  willingly  is  that 
of  inconsistency. 


188  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

Hgerency.  WTien  the  neutral  influence  is  able  once 
more  to  make  itself  felt  the  more  familiar  condi- 
tions will  be  revived,  and  just  as  there  is  no  reason 
to  suppose  the  Congress  of  Peace  will  be  able  to  do 
more  than  its  predecessors  in  the  settlement  of  the 
world  to  the  satisfaction  of  all  the  High  Contract- 
ing Parties,  some  of  such  parties  may  profit  by 
the  experience  of  recent  events  and  seek  to  avoid 
entangling  alliances  capable  of  dragging  them  out 
of  their  comparatively  safe  and  potentially  strong 
position  as  neutrals. 

Organisation  and  disintegration  in  the  history 
of  mankind  follow  each  other  with  the  fatality  of 
a  law  of  nature.  The  stages  from  the  conquest  of 
liberty  to  dictatorship  as  a  rescue  from  licence  are 
among  the  recurring  facts  of  historical  evolution. 
The  wisdom  of  the  leader  is  soon  swamped  in  the 
struggle  for  leadership  as  we  have  seen  whenever 
democracy  produces  a  political  class  among  a  free 
people. 

Law  is  the  one  stable  element  in  the  life  of  com- 
munities. Even  bad  law  is  better  than  disrespect 
for  it,  because  the  alternative  for  bad  law  is  not 
necessarily  good  law  and  the  stability  of  law  is  the 
common  basis  of  all  social  and  commercial  inter- 
course. To  labour  anything  so  obvious  is  super- 
erogation and  I  need  only  add  that  what  is  true  of 
the  domestic  intercourse  of  nations  can  only  be  true 
of  intercourse  between  nations.  To  say  that  Inter- 
national Law  is  dead  is,  therefore,  about  as  true 
as  to  say  that  an  inundation  or  an  earthquake  puts 


THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS  189 

an  end  to  engineering  and  architecture.  Far  from 
it,  the  need  of  a  law  binding  on  nations  and  which 
nations  will  respect  and  may  even  be  forced  to 
respect  is  inherent  to  the  idea  of  that  Society  of 
Nations  to  which  the  peoples  of  the  world  are  look- 
ing forward  as  a  safeguard  against  lawless  ambitions, 
whether  of  potentates,  statesmen,  bureaucracies, 
oligarchies  or  democracies. 

The  work  of  the  Hague  Peace  Conference  will 
necessarily  form  part  of  the  special  work  which  the 
creation  of  a  Society  of  Nations  will  entail. 

After  two  great  wars  in  the  last  century  there 
was  active  and  effective  agitation  In  favour  of  further 
development  of  the  Law  of  Nations.  The  Italian 
war  of  liberation  led  to  the  Geneva  Convention 
and  the  Red  Cross  movement,  that  of  1870  to  the 
foundation  of  the  Institute  of  International  Law 
and  the  Society  for  the  Reform  and  Codification  of 
the  Law  of  Nations  (now  called  the  International 
Law  Association),  and  eventually  to  the  Hague 
conferences.  The  reaction  in  the  case  of  the  recent 
War  is  towards  sanctions  for  the  enforcement  of  the 
Law  of  Nations  and  hence  to  the  conception  of  a 
Society  of  Nations  capable  of  enforcing  respect  for 
it. 

Fiat  juris  regnum  in  terris. 


146  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

"Doubtless,"  says  Professor  Seailles,  summing  up 
the  transition  over  the  centuries  of  Alsatian  history  to 
absorption  into  the  French  Republic  at  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  "for  many  hundred  years  Alsace 
had  belonged  to  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  and  had  been 
mingled  more  or  less  with  its  history.  But  the  Roman 
Empire  was  not  a  modern  State  and  still  less  a  nation. 
It  included  principalities,  bishoprics,  electorates,  free 
towns  with  their  laws,  customs  and  existence,  only 
attached  to  it  by  a  more  or  less  nominal  bond  of  suzerainty. 
In  1648  at  the  signature  of  the  treaties  of  Westphalia  the 
Empire  gave  up  Alsace  to  France,  as  a  reward  for  the 
protection  accorded  by  the  king  to  the  protestant  princes 
of  Germany.  Such  a  transmission  of  suzerainty  was 
then  in  nowise  contrary  to  the  law  of  nations.  Peoples 
were  not  their  own  masters,  and  provinces,  never  dream- 
ing of  protesting,  went  from  hand  to  hand,  by  contract, 
marriage,  inheritance,  ruse  or  violence.  The  wisdom 
of  the  royal  government  respecting  their  tongue,  tradi- 
tions and  religion  soon  made  good  and  loyal  subjects 
of  the  Alsatians.  The  French  Revolution  crowned  the 
work  begun  by  the  French  kings :  the  suppression  of 
privileges,  feudal  rights  and  all  the  complications  and 
inequalities  of  the  old  order  were  welcomed  enthusi- 
astically." 

It  is  an  amazing  instance  of  the  sympathetic  character 
of  French  culture  that  although  the  French  domination 
anterior  to  1870  had  only  been  truly  effective  from  the 
Revolution  onwards,  that  is  some  twenty  years  longer 
than  since  the  annexation  of  Germany,  it  has  not  been 
efiFaced  either  by  deliberate  effort  or  by  the  greater  ma- 
terial prosperity  Alsace  has  since  enjoyed.  It  is  esti- 
mated by  German  authorities  themselves  that  as  many 


CONQUEST  AND  ANNEXATION  147 

as  twelve  per  cent,  of  the  population  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
still  speak  French  habitually,  eighty-seven  per  cent,  speak 
the  Alsatian  dialect,  and  only  ten  per  cent,  neither,  that 
is  High  German,  habitually. 

The  difficulty  of  finding  a  solution  for  the  question  of 
Alsace  is  not  so  great  as  that  of  finding  a  solution  which 
will  assure  the  peace  of  Europe  and  not  merely  pass  the 
grievance  from  one  side  of  the  Rhine  to  the  other. 

Professor  Seailles  reminds  us  of  the  German  claim 
made  to  Alsace  from  1813  to  the  War  of  1870.  "Fichte," 
he  says,  "with  splendid  daring,  in  the  very  sound  of 
Napoleon's  drums,  delivers  his  celebrated  'Speech  to  the 
German  Nation',  in  which,  uplifting  its  courage,  he 
inflamed  its  pride.  'The  German  Nation'  is  hence- 
forward a  living  active  idea,  —  its  unity  is  not  accom- 
plished, but  it  exists  in  the  thought  of  learned  men  and 
philosophers,  the  will  of  patriots  and  the  ambition  of 
statesmen.  In  1813,  after  the  retreat  of  Russia,  Ger- 
many rises  up  for  the  War  of  Independence.  The  French 
armies  are  not  yet  driven  out,  —  they  still  occupy  Ham- 
burg, Lubeck,  Danzig,  big  German  towns,  when  already 
eager,  passionate  voices  ring  out  in  denunciation  of  the 
Treaty  of  Westphalia,  which  recognizes  and  sanctions  the 
overlordship  of  France  on  German  soil.  In  his  pamphlet : 
'Der  Rhein  Deutschlands  Strom,  nicht  Deutschlands 
Grenze'  (The  Rhine,  a  river  of  Germany,  not  a  frontier 
of  Germany),  the  poet,  Moritz  Arndt,  vehemently  re- 
claims Alsace  and  exacts  'the  frontier  should  stretch 
as  far  as  echoes  the  German  tongue.'  Pamphlets,  poetry, 
newspaper  articles  catch  up  the  refrain,  develop  and 
enlarge  it  in  a  peculiar  mixture  of  earnestness  and  ped- 
antry. Princes,  generals  and  ministers  are  all  moved  with 
the  same  passion.  All  expect  from  victory  and  diplomacy 
the  realisation  of  their  national  hopes." 


148  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

"Hardly  had  Napoleon  III,"  he  goes  on  elsewhere, 
"fallen  in  the  snare  Bismarck  stretched  for  him,  and 
long  before  any  decisive  event,  the  German  intellectuals, 
Strauss,  Mommsen  and  so  on,  like  their  fellows  of  1813, 
in  papers,  pamphlets  and  open  letters,  lay  down  the 
problem  of  Alsace  and  demonstrate  that  this  soil  of 
the  Empire  ought  to  come  back  to  Germany,  whatever 
may  be  its  will,  by  the  simple  reason  that  it  belonged  to 
Germany  in  the  past." 

The  question  of  the  reannexation  to  France  of  Alsace  is 
not  an  easy  or  simple  proposition,  especially  as  it  is  com- 
plicated by  a  religious  question,  the  greater  part  of  the 
population  being  Roman  Catholic.  At  Thann,  where 
the  French  have  been  in  possession  since  1914,  the  exist- 
ing institutions  have  been  respected  and  no  attempt 
made  to  supplant  them  by  those  of  France.  It  is  not 
consistent  with  French  constitutional  polity  that  this 
recognition  of  separate  institutions  should  be  extended 
to  the  whole  province,  but  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  any 
other  method  will  satisfy  the  Alsatians. 

If  the  polity  of  France  were  that  of  the  United  King- 
dom the  difficulty  would  be  singularly  diminished.  * 

By  granting  Alsace  independent  institutions,  religious 
as  well  as  social,  by  allowing  it  to  keep  its  own  laws,  fol- 
lowing the  example  of  the  United  Kingdom  in  respect 
of  Scotland,  or  following  the  British  example  in  Ireland 
by  even  granting  it  Home  Rule,  the  internal  problem, 
if  it  arose,  might  be  more  easily  solved. 

As  regards  external  difficulties,  even  this  relative  in- 
dependence  may  not  prevent    the  revival  of    the    old 

1  "  Alsace-Lorraine :  The  History  of  an  Annexation ",  by  Gabriel 
Seailles,  Professor  at  the  Sorbonne,  Paris,  1916. 


CONQUEST  AND  ANNEXATION  149 

patriotic  agitation  for  the  recovery  of  the  province  by 
Germany. 

Two  other  solutions,  —  annexation  to  Switzerland  on 
the  one  hand  and  neutralization  on  the  other  —  have 
been  suggested,  but  there  has  been  no  manifestation  of 
opinion  among  the  Alsatians  themselves  in  favour  of 
either. 

2.  Lorraine 

The  question  of  Lorraine  is  a  totally  different  one 
from  that  of  Alsace.  There  has  never  been  a  difference 
of  opinion  concerning  the  racial  affinity  of  the  inhabitants 
of  the  part  of  Lorraine  annexed  to  Germany  in  1870, 
They  not  only  speak  the  French  language  but  geographi- 
cally form  part  of  the  ancient  province  from  which  the 
part  in  question  was  deliberately  detached  on  grounds 
of  defence  against  repetition  of  the  French  aggression 
of  1870. 

It  has  been  stated  again  and  again  during  the  War 
that  the  preservation  of  Metz  as  a  defence  against  French 
invasion  has  ceased  to  have  any  serious  importance. 
I  do  not  venture  to  express  an  opinion  on  the  subject 
beyond  remarking  that,  whether  it  is  so  or  not,  and 
whether  intentionally  or  not,  and  whether  merely  owing 
to  shortage  of  the  necessary  artillery  or  not,  French 
armies  let  Metz  alone. 

The  strategical  question  may,  as  alleged,  have  lost 
importance.  After  1870,  however,  Lorraine  acquired 
for  Germany  an  economic  importance  which  quite  over- 
shadows the  alleged  original  considerations.  I  say 
"alleged"  because  it  seems  incredible  that  Bismarck 
should  not  have  known  that  geologists  did  not  confine 
their  calculations  of  the  extent  of  the  iron-ore  strata  to 


150  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

the  area  then  in  course  of  being  worked  in  Lorraine.  He 
was  a  poUtician  and  not  an  economist  and  possibly  did 
not  expect  Germany  to  become  the  second  greatest 
metallurgist  in  the  world.  Otherwise  he  might  have 
annexed  the  whole  iron  field  —  the  Bassin  de  Briey  — 
for  France  was  at  his  mercy. 

Of  the  total  iron-ore  resources  of  Germany  in  sight, 
namely,  2,840,000,000  tons,  2,130,000,000  tons  are  credibly 
estimated  to  be  the  proportion  supplied  by  the  Lorraine- 
Luxemburg  district.  Of  the  probable  further  resources  of 
1,067,700,000  tons  the  proportion  credited  to  Lorraine- 
Luxemburg  is  500,000,000  tons. 

This  Lorraine-Luxemburg  district  is  one  of  the  largest 
known  iron -fields  in  the  world.  It  is  about  evenly  divided 
—  between  Luxemburg  and  German  Lorraine  on  the 
one  hand  and  French  Lorraine  on  the  other. 

M.  Tribot  Laspiere  in  the  Genie  Civil  (April  7,  1917) 
places  the  contributive  proportion  of  Luxemburg  of 
270,000,000  tons  at  between  one  ninth  to  one  tenth  of 
that  of  German  Lorraine. 

It  is  seen  that  German  Lorraine  has  played  a  very 
important  part  in  German  metallurgy  —  no  less  than 
eighty  per  cent,  in  her  iron  supply. 

In  an  instructive  little  treatise  by  M.  Francis  Laur  — 
La  France,  reine  du  fer  —  the  author  demonstrates  the 
enormous  superiority  in  ore  production  of  France  over 
both  Great  Britain  and  Germany  and  establishes  the 
proportion  of  fifteen  for  France  against  one  half  for 
England  and  one  for  Germany.  France,  in  fact,  has 
twenty-nine  times  more  iron  ore  in  sight  than  Great 
Britain  and  fourteen  times  more  than  Germany,  without 
of  course  counting  the  German  Lorraine  which  if  rean- 
nexed  to  France  would  raise  'pro  tanto  the  proportion  in 


CONQUEST  AND  ANNEXATION  151 

favour  of  France  and  against  Germany.  M.  Laur  esti- 
mates, however,  that  German  Lorraine  alone  smelts 
as  much  ore  as  the  whole  of  France. 

The  iron-fields  of  the  whole  Lorraine  district  are  esti- 
mated at  the  present  rate  of  extraction  of  20,000,000 
tons  per  annum  to  have  a  life  of  about  eighty  years 
still  to  run. 

If  France  is  the  Reine  du  fer  in  Europe,  she  is  far  from 
the  Reine  du  charbon  —  at  least  in  production.  Geologists, 
nevertheless,  assert  that  she  is  one  of  the  most  favoured 
countries  in  Europe  in  possession  of  coal  seams  capable 
of  development.  Anyhow,  France  meanwhile  suffers 
from  a  coal  shortage  while  Germany  has  more  than  she 
can  employ  within  her  own  boundaries. 

M.  L.  de  Launay  in  La  Nature  (May  4,  1918)  estimates 
that  the  restoration  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France  would 
be  tantamount  to  an  addition  of  fifty  per  cent,  to  the 
coal  production  of  France,  but  he  assumes  that  the  whole 
of  the  Saar  coal-field,  which  before  1815  was  under  French 
rule,  will  be  comprised  in  the  reannexation. 

As  regards  the  Bassin  de  Briey  in  French  Lorraine  it 
produces  more  ore  than  French  metallurgy  requires. 
Nearly  half  of  it,  M.  Tribot  Laspiere  calculates,  before 
the  War  was  exported  to  foreign  countries,  twenty -four 
per  cent,  to  Belgium,  six  per  cent,  to  Luxemburg,  ten 
per  cent,  to  Germany  and  one  per  cent,  to  Great  Britain. 

The  whole  Bassin  de  Briey  was  under  German  occupa- 
tion and  probably  at  its  maximum  exploitation  from  the 
beginning  of  the  War. 

By  way  of  postscript  I  may  add  as  regards  Alsace  in 
reference  to  the  famous  potassic  deposits  at  Mulhouse, 
that  the  whole  production,  owing  to  other  large  deposits 
in  Germany,  is  available  for  export. 


152  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

If  the  question  of  raw  materials  is  destined  to  play 
an  important  part  among  the  sanctions  proposed  for  the 
preservation  of  peace  in  the  future,  international  inter- 
dependence in  relation  to  them  is  necessarily  a  condition 
of  their  efficacy. 

Note  on  "  Readjustment  of  the  Frontiers  of 

Italy  " 

President  Wilson  in  his  ninth  proposition  says  that 
"readjustment  of  the  frontiers  of  Italy  should  be  effectu- 
ated along  clearly  recognisable  lines  of  nationality." 

"Nationality"! 

What  is  nationality?  Does  the  President  mean,  like 
the  author  of  the  famous  German  patriotic  song:  "Wo 
ist  des  Deutschen  Vaterland"  which  kindled  the  German 
claim  to  Alsace,  with  the  refrain:  "Wo  die  deutsche 
Sprache  klingt",  that  the  Italian  Fatherland  is  wherever 
the  Italian  language  is  spoken?  If  this  is  the  meaning 
and  speaking  the  same  language  is  to  be  a  principle, 
condition  or  motive  in  the  readjustment  of  Europe,  there 
is  an  obvious  conclusion  as  regards  Alsace.  But  in  prac- 
tice language  is  no  test  within  the  area  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean or  in  that  which  extends  south  of  the  great  line 
of  mountain  ranges  which  separates  southern  from  north- 
ern Europe.  Any  attempt  to  apply  it  would  result  in 
a  hopeless  tangle  of  racial  riddles  and  political  uncer- 
tainties, as  anybody  who  knows  Hungary,  the  Balkans 
and  the  Mediterranean  will  testify.  It  would  affect 
almost  every  habitable  square  mile  of  the  whole  area 
and  imply  a  readjustment  in  accordance  with  the  there 
prevailing  linguistic  chaos. 

As  regards  the  Italian  language  in  particular  it  has  re- 
mained in  one  form  or  another,  since  the  time  of  the 
maritime  supremacy  of  the  Italian  republics,  a  common 


CONQUEST  AND  ANNEXATION  153 

vehicle  of  speech  along  the  whole  of  the  Eastern  Medi- 
terranean seaboard,  from  Tunis  to  Nice,  even  in  the 
Levant  where  the  Byzantine  Greek  influence  resisted  and 
maintained  its  supremacy. 

If  nationality  cannot  for  any  practical  purpose  be 
regarded  as  a  test,  what  is  the  alternative  ? 

Race? 

Who  is  capable  of  speaking  at  the  present  day  with 
any  certainty  of  race  apart  from  language? 

Historically  speaking,  nationality  is  a  political  fact 
based  on  the  existing  circumstances  of  modern  State 
development  in  which  geographical  and  economic  con- 
siderations, commercial  outlets,  the  course  of  navigable 
rivers,  mountain  ranges,  mineral  resources  and  all  the 
material  requirements  of  existing  communities  working 
out  their  own  salvation  amid  the  contending  rivalries  of 
their  neighbours  are  creating  common  interests,  a  common 
polity  and  a  common  language  out  of  sheer  necessity. 

It  must  be,  I  think,  in  this  sense  that  a  historian  like 
President  Wilson  speaks  of  "nationality"  and  of  its 
"clearly  recognisable  lines."  In  other  words,  if  they  are 
not  clearly  recognizable;  if  they  do  not  tally  with  geo- 
graphical and  economic  situations,  the  lines  would  not  be 
clearly  recognisable. 

The  following  observations  of  a  belligerent  statesman, 
if  not  complimentary  to  all  Italian  statecraft,  are,  at 
any  rate,  interesting.  I  leave  them  to  speak  for  them- 
selves : 

"Italy  is  in  a  totally  different  position  in  the  present 
war  from  France  or  England.  France  was  deliberately 
attacked.  England  came  to  her  assistance  under  treaty 
obligations  in  defence  of  Belgium  and,  by  extension,  of 
France.     In  neither  case  was  there  an  option.     Both  are 


154  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

in  the  war  for  self-preservation  —  Italy  entered  the 
war  frankly  for  conquest  and  honestly  and  straightfor- 
wardly she  made  no  attempt  to  disguise  her  purpose. 
The  story  of  how  she  came  into  it  has  been  undisguisedly 
told  in  the  Italian  'green  book.' 

"  I  do  not  think  the  most  passionate  lover  of  any  country 
or  its  people  is  bound  to  respect  any  government  which 
may  happen  to  be  in  office  any  more  than  true  patriotism 
binds  him  to  respect  that  of  his  own.  This  platitude 
applies  to  more  than  one  country  engaged  or  disengaged 
in  the  present  war.  I  must  confess  that  after  reading 
every  word  of  the  Italian  'green  book'  from  start  to 
finish  I  can  find  no  palliative  for  Italian  motives  in  regard 
to  the  war  and,  if  it  was  popular  in  Italy,  this  must  be 
ascribed  to  the  same  causes  that  have  made  the  war 
popular  everywhere  —  causes  of  many  kinds  which 
every  department  of  enquiry  will  have  to  sift  out  and 
analyse  before  modern  scepticism  will  begin  to  entertain 
any  sense  of  appeasement. 

"The  Italian  government  began  by  making  a  claim  for 
compensation  under  Article  7  of  the  Austro-Italian  treaty 
of  alliance  (of  which  the  text  is  not  given)  for  possible 
changes  of  equilibrium  in  the  Balkans  which  might  result 
from  the  Austro-Hungarian  invasion  of  Serbia. 

"The  text  of  the  article  in  question  is  as  follows: 

"'Austria-Hungary  and  Italy,  who  aim  exclusively 
at  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  in  the  East,  bind 
themselves  to  employ  their  influence  to  hinder  every 
territorial  change  detrimental  to  one  or  other  of  the 
contracting  Powers.  They  shall  give  each  other  recipro- 
cally all  explanations  requisite  to  the  elucidation  of 
their  respective  intentions  as  well  as  of  those  of  other 
Powers.  If,  however,  in  the  course  of  events  the  main- 
tenance of  the  status  quo  in  the  territory  of  the  Balkans 


CONQUEST  AND  ANNEXATION  155 

and  on  the  Ottoman  coasts  and  islands  of  the  Adriatic 
Sea  and  the  ^Egean  becomes  impossible,  and  if,  either 
in  consequence  of  the  procedure  of  a  third  Power  or  of 
other  causes,  Austria  and  Italy  be  constrained  to  change 
the  status  quo  by  a  temporary  or  lasting  occupation,  this 
occupation  shall  take  place  only  after  previous  agreement 
between  the  two  Powers  on  the  basis  of  the  principle 
of  a  reciprocal  arrangement  for  all  the  advantages, 
territorial  or  other,  which  one  of  them  may  secure  out- 
side the  status  quo  and  in  such  a  manner  as  to  satisfy 
all  the  legitimate  claims  of  both  parties.' 

"A  long  correspondence  lasting  from  December  9, 
1914,  to  May  4,  1915,  ensued  in  which  both  parties  were 
obviously  talking  against  time,  the  one  preparing  for 
war  and  the  other  hoping  the  war  would  come  to  an  end 
before  the  other  was  ready. 

"The  negotiations  were  conducted  with  the  utmost 
secrecy  which  Baron  Sonnino  on  behalf  of  the  Italian 
government  insisted  upon  and  the  secrecy  applied  even 
to  the  Italian  parliament  which  he  states  in  the  'green 
book'  he  had  no  intention  of  taking  into  his  confidence. 

"As  the  correspondence  proceeds  Baron  Sonnino,  who 
seems  to  be  acting  without  any  mandate  whatsoever 
from  even  the  government  of  which  he  is  a  member, 
and  certainly  none  from  the  parliament  to  which  he  is 
responsible,  offers  Austria-Hungary  a  free  hand  in  Serbia 
in  return  for  compensation  which  he  eventually  claims 
in  eleven  articles  covering  all  the  Italian-speaking  fringe 
of  Austria  and  more,  the  Dalmatian  Islands,  demanding 
recognition  of  Italy's  absolute  sovereignty  over  Valona 
and  renunciation  of  Trieste,  to  be  made  a  free  port  along- 
side the  new  Italian  frontier.  In  return  for  immediate 
execution,  i.e.  immediate  possession,  Italy  was  to  under- 
take to   maintain  'perfect  neutrality'  during  the  war. 


156  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

Baron  Burian  declined  to  accept  all  this  programme 
and  especially  to  grant  immediate  possession  and  Italy 
thereupon   declared   war. 

"Throughout  the  correspondence  Baron  Sonnino  con- 
stantly refers  to  the  'national  aspirations'  of  the  Italians, 
the  prevailing  sentiment  favourable  to  the  Western 
Allies  and  the  danger  of  letting  the  public  know  that 
negotiations  were  pending.  One  rises  from  the  perusal 
of  it  with  a  sense  of  the  appropriateness  of  President 
Wilson's  demand  in  the  third  of  his  propositions  as  set 
out  in  the  speech  of  the  fourth  of  July  when  he  asked  for 
'the  consent  of  all  nations  to  be  governed  in  their  con- 
duct towards  each  other  by  the  same  principles  of  honour 
and  respect  for  the  common  law  of  civilised  society  that 
governs  the  individual  citizens  of  all  modern  States.' 

"President  Wilson  in  the  second  of  the  July  fourth 
principles  requires  that  the  settlement  of  every  question 
'whether  of  territory  or  sovereignty,  of  economic  arrange- 
ment or  of  political  relationship'  shall  be  determined  on 
the  'basis  of  the  free  acceptance  of  that  settlement  by 
the  people  immediately  concerned  and  not  upon  the  basis 
of  the  material  interest  or  advantage  of  any  other  nation 
or  people  which  may  desire  a  different  settlement  for 
the  sake  of  its  own  extension,  influence  or  mastery.' 

"The  President  has  not  intimated  whether  he  regards 
this  of  application  just  as  much  to  populations  of  a  few 
thousands  as  to  those  of  millions. 

"If  it  applies  to  a  rectification  of  the  Italian  frontier 
it  will  be  necessary  to  ascertain  the  feeling  of  the  popula- 
tions which  may  be  no  more  desirous,  for  aught  we  know, 
of  being  annexed  to  Italy  than  French  Canada  or  Mauritius 
at  the  present  day  is  of  reannexation  to  France. 

"A  witty  Italian  has  said  of  his  country  that  it  is 
like  a  veal  chop  d  la  Milanaise,  the  more  you  beat  it, 


CONQUEST  AND  ANNEXATION  157 

the  wider  it  grows.  That  Italy  will  'widen'  northwards 
under  the  contingent  promise  of  President  Wilson's 
ninth  proposition  is  more  than  probable.  All  her  Balkan 
claims  will  necessarily  be  subordinated  to  the  general 
settlement  of  the  Balkans  in  which  the  claim  of  Serbia  to 
a  seaboard  as  a  geographical  necessity  has  now  been 
recognised  by  Italy.  Whether  they  will  coincide  with 
Baron  Sonnino's  claim  to  the  annexation  of  the  Dalmatian 
Islands  or  of  Valona  remains  to  be  seen.  In  any  case,  a 
promise  has  been  made  to  all  the  peoples  concerned  in 
such  transfers  from  one  sovereignty  to  another  that  their 
consent  shall  be  obtained  —  and  their  consent  cannot 
be,  at  least  according  to  Anglo-Saxon  ideas,  a  matter  of 
surmise,  whatever  the  degree  of  probability." 


CHAPTER  VIII 


FREEDOM   OF   NAVIGATION 


I  MUST  confess  that  I  feel  some  anxiety  in  ap- 
proacliing  this  subject.  President  Wilson  in  his 
second  proposition  demands  absolute  freedom  of 
navigation  "alike  in  peace  and  in  war." 

Absolute  freedom  of  navigation  is  surely  incom- 
patible with  war !  Freedom  in  war  time  can  never 
extend  beyond  the  limits  laid  down  by  the  tradi- 
tional policy  of  the  United  States,  and  international 
practice  has  not  yet  reached  even  that  stage. 

"A  belligerent  nation,"  wrote  the  Department 
of  State  at  Washington  on  March  30,  1915,  "has 
been  conceded  the  right  of  visit  and  search,  and 
the  right  of  capture  and  condemnation  if  upon 
examination  a  neutral  vessel  is  found  to  be  engaged 
in  unneutral  service  or  to  be  carrying  contraband 
of  war  intended  for  the  enemy's  government  or 
armed  forces.  It  has  been  conceded  the  right 
to  establish  and  maintain  a  blockade.  It  is  even 
conceded  the  right  to  detain  and  take  to  its  own 
ports  for  judicial  examination  all  vessels  which 
it  suspects  for  substantial  reasons  to  be  engaged 
in  unneutral  or  contraband  service  and  to  condemn 
them  if  the  suspicion  is  sustained.     But  such  rights, 


FREEDOM  OF  NAVIGATION  159 

long  clearly  defined  both  in  doctrine  and  practice, 
have  hitherto  been  held  to  be  the  only  permissible 
exceptions  to  the  principle  of  universal  equality 
of  sovereignty  on  the  high  seas  as  between  bellig- 
erents and  nations  not  engaged  in  war."; 

The  United  States  delegates  at  the  Hague  Con- 
ference of  1899  submitted  the  following  resolution 
which  may  be  taken  to  represent  the  United  States' 
extreme  view : 

*'The  private  property  of  all  citizens  or  subjects 
of  the  signatory  Powers,  with  the  exception  of  contra- 
hand  of  war,  shall  be  exempt  from  capture  or  seizure 
on  the  High  Seas  or  elsewhere  by  the  armed  vessels 
or  the  military  forces  of  any  of  the  said  signatory 
Powers.  But  nothing  herein  contained  shall  extend 
exemption  from  seizure  to  vessels  and  their  cargoes 
which  may  attempt  to  enter  a  port  blockaded  by  the 
naval  forces  of  any  of  the  Powers." 

The  same  resolution  was  submitted  at  the  second 
Hague  Conference  in  1907. 

It  is  seen  that  absolute  freedom  does  not  exist 
in  war  time,  but  subject  to  the  restrictions  set  out 
in  the  above  resolution  England  can  only  endorse 
the  President's  claim.  In  fact  the  British  Govern- 
ment in  a  despatch  dated  September  26,  1914, 
upheld  the  same  view  of  the  principle  of  freedom  of 
the  sea. 

"The  freedom  of  the  seas  for  peaceful  trading 
is  an  established  and  universally  accepted  prin- 
ciple ;  this  fact  has  never  been  more  clearly  recog- 
nized than  in  the  words  of  the  report  of  the  third 
committee  of  the  Second  Peace  Conference  which 


160  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

dealt  with  the  question  of  submarine  contact  mines : 
—  Even  apart  from  any  written  stipulation  it 
can  never  fail  to  be  present  in  the  minds  of  all  that 
the  principle  of  the  liberty  of  the  seas,  with  the 
obligations  which  it  implies  on  behalf  of  those  who 
make  use  of  this  way  of  communication  open  to  the 
nations,  is  the  indisputable  prerogative  of  the  human 
race." 

If  this  is  the  principle,  there  can  be  no  absolute 
freedom  of  navigation  so  long  as  the  right  of  search 
for  contraband,  and  even  the  contingent  right  to 
stop  and  in  case  of  need  overhaul  the  cargo  to  ascer- 
tain whether  the  ship's  papers  tell  the  truth  are 
maintained.  Perhaps  President  Wilson  means  some- 
thing new,  but  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  a  change 
implying  even  that  neutral  ships  shall  be  permitted 
to  carry  contraband  to  belligerents  without  "let 
or  hindrance."  ^ 

As  regards  freedom  of  navigation  in  time  of  peace, 
President  Wilson's  thesis  is  also  open  to  an  objec- 
tion, the  objection  that  his  meaning  is  not  clear. 
In  time  of  peace  the  only  restrictions  on  navigation 
since  the  old  and  now  extinct  attempts  to  exert 
dominion  over  the  sea  beyond  the  territorial  waters' 
limit  are  just  those  the  President  refers  to  in  his 
proposition,  viz. :  those  instituted  by  international 
covenants  such  as  "fishery  agreements",  the  "sale-of- 
drink-at-sea  conventions",  "slave-trade-prevention 
arrangements"  in  the  Indian  Ocean.  Otherwise 
absolute  freedom  of  navigation  exists  everywhere. 

1  Mr.  Lansing's  letter  of  November  Sth  (see  p.  30)  merely  releases 
reservations  made  by  the  Allies  without  specification  of  their  nature. 


FREEDOM  OF  NAVIGATION  161 

Does  President  Wilson  refer  to  the  German 
contention  that  there  is  no  real  freedom  of  the  sea 
unless  independent  coaling  stations  are  available 
for  the  navigation  of  every  nation  having  a  consider- 
able merchant  marine?  Does  he  mean  that  the 
power  to  close  the  Mediterranean  or  the  Suez  Canal, 
or  the  Panama  Canal,  or  the  Dardanelles  are  restric- 
tions on  the  freedom  of  navigation  ?  Does  he  mean 
any  or  all  of  these  ? 

I  will  assume  that  he  means  them  all. 

As  regards  coaling  stations,  it  is  not  an  unreason- 
able contention  that  facilities  should  be  granted 
to  enable  the  navigation  of  different  nations  to 
proceed  without  necessity  of  recourse  to  foreign 
aid  or  exposure  to  foreign  interference.  The  diffi- 
culties are  physical  and  material.  Two  antagonistic 
views,  however,  may  both  be  reasonable.  This 
is  all  I  think  it  desirable  to  say  at  present  on  a  sub- 
ject which  does  not  lend  itself  to  controversy  while 
negotiations  are  pending. 

President  Wilson  does  not  refer  in  detail  to  any 
maritime  channel  but  the  Dardanelles,  of  which  he 
says  that  they  "should  be  permanently  opened  as 
a  free  passage  to  the  ships  and  commerce  of  all 
nations  under  international  guarantees." 

The  experience  of  Belgium  shows  how  little 
reliance  can  be  placed  on  the  word  "guarantees" 
if  it  is  merely  used  as  meaning  a  written  pledge. 
Belgium's  neutrality  was  guaranteed.  President 
Wilson  evidently  does  not  suggest  that  the  freedom 


162  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

of  the  Dardanelles,  Sea  of  Marmora  and  Bosporus 
should  depend  on  the  bare  promises  of  a  treaty, 
but  probably  that  it  should  be  guaranteed  effect- 
ively, that  is,  let  us  suppose,  by  an  international 
commission  sitting  permanently  on  the  spot  and 
managing  the  straits,  not  merely  as  regards  legal 
supervision,  but  as  regards  the  physical  aspects 
of  their  navigation,  the  policing  of  their  user, 
the  maintenance  of  existing  and  erection  of  new 
lighthouses,  if  need  be,  and  all  that  is  necessary  to 
insure  free  and  safe  navigation.  This  is  not  only 
feasible  but  highly  desirable,  and  I  venture  to  sug- 
gest that  dangers  to  navigation  should  not  any- 
where be  left  solely  to  the  devices  of  the  adjacent 
States  but  that  the  expense  of  providing  against 
such  dangers  should,  as  a  common  interest  and  in 
common  justice,  be  proportionately  shared  by  those 
who  share  in  the  benefit. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  all  channels  communi- 
cating between  open  seas  should  be  internationalised, 
that  the  Suez  and  Panama  canals  should  never 
be  liable  to  closure,  but  should  be  as  free  for  traffic 
as  the  high  sea  itself.  Already  they  are  supposed 
to  be  open  to  all  the  world  on  equal  terms.  The 
suggestion  is  that  the  traffic  through  them  should 
be  placed  under  the  direction  of  International 
Boards,  that  the  expenses  of  keeping  them  open 
and  in  good  condition  should  be  borne  by  propor- 
tional contributions  on  the  part  of  the  States  using 
them  and,  of  course,  that  the  territory  necessary 
for  the  exercise  of  such  direction  should  be  as  inter- 


FREEDOM  OF  NAVIGATION  163 

national  as  the  canals  themselves  and  in  all  possible 
contingencies  be  inviolate.  There  is  a  great  deal 
to  be  said  in  favor  of  such  a  view. 

There  are  also  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar.  So  long 
as  the  rock  of  Gibraltar  exists  it  will  dominate  the 
straits.  A  Spanish  political  leader  of  the  greatest 
eminence,  while  out  of  office,  during  the  War  and 
not  long  ago,  raised  the  question  of  restoring  it 
to  Spain.  Contiguity  obviously  is  not  a  reason 
for  doing  so.  It  is  practically  an  island  and  has 
been  for  over  two  hundred  years  a  British  possession. 
Its  importance  for  most  nations  is  that  possession 
of  it  should  not  be  abused.  England  has  exercised 
her  possession  in  keeping  the  straits  open.  Can 
any  other  State  be  trusted  to  conduct  itself  better  ? 
The  only  practical  alternative  would  be  suppression 
—  that  is  suppression  of  the  fortress.  This  would 
not  insure  the  freedom  of  the  straits  unless  the 
two  coasts  were  placed  under  some  international 
regime  guaranteeing  the  maintenance  of  the  sup- 
pression. Otherwise,  it  would  be  upon  the  good 
faith  of  the  government  of  some  other  State  or 
States  that  the  due  observance  of  engagements 
entered  into  would  depend.  If  so,  then  why  pro- 
pose any  change  —  England  has  not  shown  any 
greater  indifference  to  international  engagements 
than  other  States.  She  has  the  power  to  keep 
the  straits  open,  a  power  which  Spain  does  not 
possess.  She  can  maintain  her  possession  while 
Spain  might  not  be  strong  enough  to  resist  capture 
by  a  more  powerful  surrounding  enemy.     I  offer 


164  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

these  arguments  for  consideration  by  those  who 
suggest  that  British  possession  of  Gibraltar  is  not 
in  the  general  interest.  There  are  many  situations 
that  are  anomalous  and  open  to  criticism,  but  it 
is  always  easier  to  criticise  than  to  do  better. 

That  the  President  includes  in  this  second  point 
what  is  called  "England's  mastery  of  the  sea"  is 
not  likely.  That  mastery  has  never  been  used  in 
peace  time  for  any  purpose  inimical  to  the  interests 
of  any  self-respecting  States  and  since  the  adoption 
of  the  Hague  Convention  of  1907  making  the  Drago 
theory  a  part  of  International  Law,  she  cannot  even 
use  her  maritime  power  against  those  who  fail 
in  their  civil  engagements. 

The  President  can  hardly  have  in  view  the  reversal 
of  a  geographical  fact.  England's  supremacy  at 
sea  has  no  reference  to  objects  of  conquest  or  coer- 
cion, but  is  a  necessary  consequence  of  her  island 
position  and  the  insufficiency  of  her  possible  food 
supply  to  meet  the  requirements  of  a  population 
growing  at  a  rate  far  exceeding  any  prospective 
increase  of  such  food  supply  from  domestic  sources. 
It  is  not  an  "offensive"  element  in  her  policy,  but 
a  purely  "defensive"  one.  It  means  securing  the 
connection  between  an  island  State  and  the  outer 
world  and  especially  with  the  colonies  and  depend- 
encies which  are  the  chief  source  of  her  different 
supplies  of  all  kinds,  for  just  as  the  stomach  of  a 
people  needs  food,  the  stomach  of  their  mills  and 
factories  needs  materials. 


FREEDOM  OF  NA^^GATION  165 

All  the  old  ideas  of  exercising  dominion  over  any 
area  of  the  sea  are  dead  and  international  associa- 
tion for  the  perservation  of  equality  for  all  is  likely 
to  be  one  of  the  fundamental  axioms  of  future 
statesmanship  beyond  the  scope  of  political  con- 
troversy. 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  VIII 

Note  on  Immunity  from  Capture  of  Private 
Property  in  Naval  War 

This  subject  for  the  time  being  seems  to  have  altogether 
collapsed.  No  question  of  International  Law  had  given 
rise  to  more  ardent  controversy  and  no  subject  when 
the  emergency  for  decision  arose  excited  so  little.  The 
votaries  of  renunciation  of  the  right  of  capture  were 
mainly  actuated  by  the  fear  that  the  food  supply  of  the 
British  Islands  might  be  cut  off  by  a  victorious  maritime 
Power  or,  if  not,  be  seriously  jeopardised  by  enemy 
cruisers. 

Events  have  shown  the  wisdom  of  not  having  yielded 
to  the  advocates  of  abolition,  though  possibly  it  would 
not  have  much  mattered  what  theoretical  decision  had 
been  taken  before  the  War. 

It  must  not  however  be  supposed  that  the  subject  is 
extinct.  Far  from  being  so,  it  will  probably  be  among 
those  considered  by  at  any  rate  one  of  the  conmiittees 
of  the  Congress  of  Peace. 

It  is  therefore  desirable  to  place  before  the  reader 

^  At  the  Interparliamentary  Conference  at  Brussels  in  1910  at  which 
the  subject  was  brought  up  by  the  advocates  of  abolition,  I  suggested 
that  if  Great  Britain  were  seriously  to  consider  the  proposal  as  feasible 
as  an  island  State  she  would  be  throwing  away  her  chief  weapon  without 
possibility  of  finding  any  corresponding  equivalent  to  readjust  the  balance, 
but  my  voice  was  the  exception  to  an  otherwise  unanimous  chorus  in 
favour  of  abolition. 


FREEDOM  OF  NAMGATION  167 

not  only  the  historique  of  the  question  but  also  the  excep- 
tional character  of  the  English  position.  The  subject, 
in  fact,  will  no  doubt  be  discussed  without  reference  to 
a  war  which,  by  its  practical  suspension  of  law  in  general, 
has  done  nothing  effectively  to  alter  the  relative  attitudes 
of  nations  towards  permanent  questions. 

The  subject  is  one  of  very  old  standing  as  between 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain. 

As  long  ago  as  1783,  Benjamin  Franklin,  in  the  course 
of  treaty  negotiations  with  Great  Britain,  expressed  him- 
self as  follows : 

"It  is  for  the  interest  of  humanity  in  general  that 
the  occasions  of  war  and  the  inducements  to  it  should 
be  diminished.  If  rapine  is  abolished,  one  of  the  en- 
couragements to  war  is  taken  away,  and  peace  therefore 
more  likely  to  continue  and  be  lasting.  The  practice 
of  robbing  merchants  on  the  high  seas,  a  remnant  of  the 
ancient  piracy,  though  it  may  be  accidentally  beneficial 
to  particular  persons,  is  far  from  being  profitable  to  all 
engaged  in  it,  or  to  the  nation  that  authorises  it." 

He  suggested  the  following  article  for  the  treaty  then 
under  discussion : 

"That  if  war  shall  arise  between  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States,  which  God  forbid  ...  all  merchants 
or  traders  with  their  unarmed  vessels  employed  in  com- 
merce, exchanging  the  products  of  different  places,  and 
thereby  rendering  the  necessaries,  conveniences,  and 
comforts  of  life  more  easy  to  obtain,  and  more  general, 
shall  be  allowed  to  pass  freely  unmolested;  and  that 
neither  of  the  Powers  shall  grant  or  issue  any  commission 
to  any  private  armed  vessel,  empowering  them  to  take 
or  destroy  such  trading  ships  or  interrupt  such  com- 
merce." 

This  provision  was  not  adopted. 


168  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

In  his  message  of  December,  1854,  President  Pierce 
referred  to  then  pending  suggestions  on  the  subject  in 
the  following  terms : 

"The  proposal  to  surrender  the  right  to  employ  pri- 
vateers is  professedly  founded  upon  the  principle  that 
private  property  of  unoffending  noncombatants,  though 
enemies,  should  be  exempt  from  the  ravages  of  war; 
but  the  proposed  surrender  goes  but  little  way  in  carrying 
out  that  principle,  which  equally  requires  that  such 
private  property  should  not  be  seized  or  molested  by 
national  ships  of  war.  Should  the  leading  Powers  of 
Europe  concur  in  proposing,  as  a  rule  of  international 
law,  to  exempt  private  property  upon  the  ocean  from 
seizure  by  public  armed  cruisers  as  well  as  by  privateers, 
the  United  States  will  readily  meet  them  upon  that 
broad  ground." 

The  refusal  of  the  United  States  Government  to  sign 
the  Declaration  of  Paris,  it  is  well  known,  was  a  con- 
sequence of  the  refusal  of  the  Powers  to  agree  to  this 
proposal. 

Secretary  Fish  concluded,  on  February  26,  1871, 
a  treaty  with  Italy,  Article  XII.  of  which  provides  that 
in  the  event  of  war  — 

"The  private  property  of  the  citizens  and  subjects 
(of  the  contracting  States),  with  the  exception  of  con- 
traband of  war,  shall  be  exempt  from  capture  or  seizure, 
on  the  high  seas  or  elsewhere,  by  the  armed  vessels  or 
by  the  military  forces  of  either  party;  it  being  under- 
stood that  this  exemption  shall  not  extend  to  vessels 
and  their  cargoes  which  may  attempt  to  enter  a  port 
blockaded  by  the  naval  forces  of  either  party." 

In  his  message  of  December,  1898,  President  McKinley 
again  asserted  the  American  doctrine  on  the  subject  in 
the  following  passage : 


FREEDOM  OF  NAVIGATION  169 

"The  experiences  of  the  last  year  bring  forcibly  home 
to  us  a  sense  of  the  burdens  and  the  waste  of  war.  We 
desire,  in  common  with  most  civilised  nations,  to  re- 
duce to  the  lowest  possible  point  the  damage  sustained 
in  time  of  war  by  peaceful  trade  and  commerce.  It  is 
true,  we  may  suffer  in  such  cases  less  than  other  com- 
munities, but  all  nations  are  damaged  more  or  less  by 
the  state  of  uneasiness  and  apprehension  into  which  an 
outbreak  of  hostilities  throws  the  entire  commercial 
world. 

"It  should  be  our  object,  therefore,  to  minimise,  so 
far  as  practicable,  this  inevitable  loss  and  disturbance. 
This  purpose  can  probably  best  be  accomplished  by  an 
international  agreement  to  regard  all  private  property 
at  sea  as  exempt  from  capture  or  destruction  by  the 
forces  of  belligerent  Powers.  The  United  States  Govern- 
ment has  for  many  years  advocated  this  humane  and 
beneficent  principle,  and  is  now  in  a  position  to  recom- 
mend it  to  other  Powers  without  the  imputation  of  selfish 
motives.  I  therefore  suggest  for  your  consideration  that 
the  Executive  be  authorised  to  correspond  with  the 
Governments  of  the  principal  maritime  Powers,  with  a 
view  of  incorporating  into  the  permanent  law  of  civilised 
nations  the  principle  of  the  exemption  of  all  private  prop- 
erty at  sea,  not  contraband  of  war,  from  capture  or  de- 
struction by  belligerent  Powers." 

Resolutions  were  introduced  in  both  Houses  of  Con- 
gress endorsing  this  recommendation.  The  shortness 
of  the  session,  however,  prevented  final  action  on  the 
resolutions,  "but  the  sentiment  which  was  developed  was 
overwhelming  in  favour  of  adopting  the  rule  of  exemption, 
under  proper  restrictions  as  to  contraband  and  blockade. 
Congress  at  the  same  session  passed  the  Naval  Personnel 
Bill,  which  abolished  prize  money,  thus  removing  one 


170  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

of  the  strongest  incentives  for  capture  of  private  property, 
and  eliminating  all  questions  as  to  the  rights  of  seamen 
and  officers." 

The  subject,  it  is  seen,  has  been  consistently  kept 
in  the  foreground  by  successive  Presidents,  and  it  has 
repeatedly  been  brought  to  the  notice  of  foreign  govern- 
ments ;  but  owing  chiefly  to  the  unwillingness  of  Great 
Britain  to  countenance  change  in  the  existing  practice, 
acquiescence  on  the  part  of  other  governments  has 
remained  until  now  without  effect.^ 

This  brings  us  down  to  the  following  proposition 
made  in  1899  by  the  American  delegates  at  the  Hague 
Conference : 

"The  private  property  of  all  citizens  or  subjects  of 
the  signatory  Powers,  with  the  exception  of  contraband 
of  war,  shall  be  exempt  from  capture  or  seizure  on  the 
high  seas  or  elsewhere  by  the  armed  vessels  of  the  mili- 
tary forces  of  any  of  the  said  signatory  Powers.  But 
nothing  herein  contained  shall  extend  exemption  from 
seizure  to  vessels  and  their  cargoes  which  may  attempt 
to  enter  a  port  blockaded  by  the  naval  forces  of  any  of 
the  said  Powers." 

This  proposition  is  not  clear.  The  words  "or  seizure" 
in  the  phrase  "exempt  from  capture  or  seizure",  which, 
by  the  way,  are  borrowed  from  the  Italo-American  Treaty 
of  1871,  do  not  tally  with  the  reservation  as  to  contra- 
band. Seizure  may  be  indispensable  to  ascertain  whether 
the  arrested  vessel  has  contraband  on  board  or  not. 

The  Conference  ruled  that  the  subject  was  beyond  the 

^  In  1870,  on  the  outbreak  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  Count  Bis- 
marck telegraphed  to  the  Prussian  Minister  at  Washington  :  "For  your 
guidance,  private  property  on  high  seas  will  be  exempted  from  seizure 
by  His  Majesty's  ships  without  regard  to  reciprocity."  The  exemption, 
however,  was  not  maintained  by  Prussia. 


FREEDOM  OF  NAVIGATION  171 

scope  of  its  deliberations.  The  same  proposition  was  re- 
newed at  the  Conference  of  1907  but  it  has  not  yet  been 
subjected  to  any  searching  official  examination. 

The  discussions  on  the  subject  of  immunity  have 
generally  down  to  now  been  based  on  the  assumption 
that  the  object  of  reform  should  be  to  assimilate  property 
at  sea  to  property  on  land,  that  the  natures  of  war  at 
sea  and  war  on  land  are  identical,  and  that  immunity 
of  private  property  on  land  is  already  admitted  as  a 
principle  of  International  Law. 

I  shall  endeavour  in  this  note  to  clear  away  some 
of  the  obscurity  which  has  resulted  from  a  too  desultory 
treatment  of  the  subject,  to  examine  it  in  its  connection 
with  the  recognised  laws  of  war  generally,  to  discuss 
whether  indeed,  in  itself,  immunity  is  desirable  and 
whether  it  is  possible  for  a  great  maritime  country  like 
England  to  agree  to  the  gratuitous  alienation  of  a  right 
which  is  necessarily  of  supreme  importance  to  it. 

The  object  of  war  is  to  force  the  antagonist  to  sue 
for  peace.  It  is  the  ultima  ratio  in  all  international 
differences.  Originally  the  belligerent  exercised  the 
right  of  life  and  death  over  the  whole  armed  and  unarmed 
population  against  which  he  was  warring,  and  he  claimed 
the  same  absolute  power  of  disposition  over  all  their 
property.  It  is  an  armed  conflict  between  communities 
or  nations.  These  communities  or  nations  may  be 
represented  by  constituted  authorities  and  armies  — 
but  it  is  not  a  duel  confined  to  these  authorities  and 
armies.  Armies  are  recruited  from  the  communities 
and  nations  behind  them,  and  it  is  on  the  vitality  and 
material  resources  of  these  communities  or  nations  that 
the  continuance  of  the  war  depends. 

Attenuation  of  the  cruelty  of  war  followed  the  rise 
of  standing  and  regular  armies  and  the  consequent  more 


172  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

marked  distinction  between  soldier  and  civilian.  They 
took  the  form  of  compounding  for  plunder,  of  systematic 
requisitions  and  contributions,  the  confining  of  the  right 
of  levying  these  to  generals  and  commanders-in-chief, 
the  institution  of  quittances  or  bills  drawn  by  the  bellig- 
erent invader  on  the  invaded  power  and  handed  in  pay- 
ment to  the  private  persons  whose  movable  belongings 
are  appropriated  or  used,  and  of  war  indemnities.  These 
were  methods  of  lessening  the  hardships  of  war  as  regards 
private  property  on  land  of  the  subjects  of  belligerent 
States. 

Their  object,  however,  was  not  to  arrive  at  immunity, 
but  to  develop  an  organised  system  by  which  damage 
and  losses  to  individuals,  whom  the  fortune  of  war  had 
brought  into  immediate  contact  with  the  enemy,  can  be 
spread  over  the  whole  community.  Those,  therefore, 
who  speak  of  the  immunity  of  private  property  in  warfare 
on  land  do  not  accurately  describe  the  existing  state  of 
things. 

To  substitute  systematic  for  chaotic  seizure  and  plunder 
on  land  was  obviously  in  the  interest  both  of  invader 
and  invaded,  and  humanity  in  this  as  in  many  other 
cases  has  only  been  another  term  for  the  common  interest 
of  mankind. 

Grotius  described  war  as  the  letting  loose  of  "some 
fury  with  a  general  licence  for  all  manner  of  wickedness", 
and  now  we  know,  and  let  us  hope  will  remember  for  some 
years  to  come,  the  terrors  of  an  invasion  which  has  meant 
the  seizure  of  the  food  on  which  the  inhabitants  of  the 
invaded  country  were  dependent  for  existence,  the  carry- 
ing away  of  bedding,  implements  and  horses,  the  slaughter 
of  livestock,  the  appropriation  of  the  stored  seed  grain, 
not  to  speak  of  gratuitous  barbarities,  the  most  reasonable 
explanation  of  which  was  a  terrorisation  which  missed 


FREEDOM  OF  NAVIGATION  173 

its  purpose,  even  when  all  those  cruelties  were  practised 
systematically. 

The  considerations  which  have  led  mankind  to  regulate 
the  practice  of  war  in  regard  to  private  property  on  land 
do  not  arise  in  the  same  form  in  connection  with  private 
property  at  sea.  Here  there  is  no  question  of  seizing 
the  livestock  or  the  bedding,  or  the  food  or  the  utensils 
of  the  private  citizen.  Only  mercantile  ventures  are 
concerned.  If  ship  and  cargo  are  captured  it  may  be 
hard  upon  the  merchant  but  such  captures  do  not  directly 
deprive  him  of  the  necessaries  of  life.  Yet,  as  in  the 
case  of  war  on  land,  its  hardships  have  been  attenuated, 
and  progress  has  been  made  by  developing  a  more  sys- 
tematic procedure  of  capture  of  private  property  at 
sea.  Thus  exemption  from  capture  is  now  allowed  by 
belligerents  to  enemy  merchant  ships  which,  at  the 
outbreak  of  war,  are  on  the  way  to  one  of  their  ports, 
and  they  also  allow  enemy  merchantmen  in  their  ports,  at 
its  outbreak,  a  certain  time  to  leave  them.  A  somewhat 
similar  practice  exists  as  regards  pursuit  of  merchant 
ships  which  happen  to  be  in  a  neutral  port  at  the  same 
time  with  an  enemy  cruiser.  Privateering  was  abandoned 
by  the  Powers  which  signed  the  Declaration  of  Paris 
of  1856,  and  so  strong  is  public  opinion  in  Europe  against 
it  that  the  United  States  and  Spain  in  their  war,  though 
not  signatories  of  the  Declaration,  both  spontaneously 
waived  the  right  to  resort  to  it. 

Yet  the  only  difference  the  abolition  of  privateering 
makes  is  the  substitution  for  amateur  or  irregular  war- 
ships of  vessels  officered  and  enrolled  as  a  part  of  the 
official  navy. 

Lastly  grew  up,  on  grounds  similar  to  those  which 
have  led  to  the  indulgence  shown  to  private  property 
on  land,  a  now  generally  recognised  immunity  from  cap- 


174  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

ture  of  small  vessels  engaged  in  the  coastal  fisheries  or 
petty  local  navigation  and  their  appliances,  rigging,  fittings 
and  cargoes,  provided  they  are  in  nowise  made  to  serve 
the  purposes  of  war,  an  exemption  which  has  been  con- 
firmed by  the  Hague  Convention  of  1907  numbered  XI. ^ 
This  has  all  been  done  with  the  object  of  making  the 
operations  of  war  systematic,  and  enabling  the  private 
citizen  to  estimate  his  risks  and  take  the  necessary  pre- 
cautions to  avoid  capture,  and  of  restricting  the  acts  of 
war  to  the  purpose  of  bringing  it  to  a  speedy  conclusion. 

We  have  seen  that  there  is  no  immunity  for  private 
property  yet  known  to  the  laws  of  war.  War,  by  its 
very  nature,  prevents  the  growth  of  any  such  immunity. 
The  tendency  in  war  on  land  has  been  to  spread  its 
effects  over  the  whole  community,  to  keep  a  record  on 
both  sides  of  all  confiscations,  appropriations  and  ser- 
vices enforced  against  private  citizens,  but  beyond  this 
no  protection  has  thus  far  been  given  to  private  property 
on  land. 

The  object  of  each  belligerent  is  to  break  the  enemy's 
power  and  force  him  to  sue  for  peace.  To  break  his 
power  it  is  not  enough  to  defeat  him  in  the  open  field; 
he  must  be  prevented  from  repairing  his  loss  both  in 
men  and  in  the  munitions  of  war  and  this  implies  crippling 
his  material  resources,  trade  and  manufactures. 

To  capture  at  sea  raw  materials  used  in  the  manu- 
facturing industry  of  a  belligerent  State,  or  products 
on  the  sale  of  which  its  prosperity,  and  therefore  its 
taxable  values  depend,  is  necessarily  one  of  the  objects, 
and  one  of  the  least  cruel,  which  the  belligerents  pursue. 

To  capture  the  merchant  vessels  which  carry  these 

'See  Barclay,  "International  Law  and  Practice  ",  p.  173.  London 
and  Boston,  1917. 


FREEDOM  OF  NAVIGATION  175 

goods,  and  even  to  keep  the  seamen  navigating  them 
prisoners,  is  to  prevent  the  employment  of  the  ships  by 
the  enemy  as  transports  or  cruisers  and  the  repairing 
from  among  the  seamen  of  the  mercantile  marine  of 
losses  of  men  in  the  official  navy. 

It  is  questionable  whether  war  should  be  made  less 
a  calamity  than  it  is  —  that  is,  beyond  the  elementary 
principle  that  individuals  should  be  made,  as  little  as 
possible,  to  suffer  for  the  acts  of  the  community. 

The  assimilation  of  private  property  at  sea  to  private 
property  on  land  would  mean  that  the  State  to  which 
the  captured  vessels  belonged  should  indemnify  the 
ship  and  cargo  owners  for  their  loss.  Such  indemnifi- 
cation has  become  a  principle  in  war  upon  land,  and  it 
may  become  a  question  of  the  future  how,  by  domestic 
regulation,  to  deal  with  captures  by  the  enemy  of  property 
at  sea.^     The  cases,  however,  are  not  exactly  the  same. 

After  the  outbreak  of  war  shipowners  and  shippers 
belonging  to  a  belligerent  State  know  the  risk  they  incur 
in  sending  ships  or  goods  across  sea.  They  have  the 
option  of  keeping  their  ship  or  cargo  in  port,  or  of  paying 
war  rates  of  insurance,  or  again,  the  shipper  has  the 
option  of  sending  his  goods  under  the  protection  of  a 
neutral  flag.  If  they  expose  their  ship  or  cargo  to  the 
risks  of  capture,  it  is  because  they  have  calculated  the 
chances  of  escape,  and  have  chosen  to  run  the  risks.  To 
indemnify  them  for  losses  incurred  might  be  to  relieve 
the  shipowner  and  shipper  from  the  consequences  of 
their  want  of  foresight  and  caution. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  if  a  proper  valuation  of  outgoing 
ship  and  cargo  were  recorded,  the  State  whose  flag  the 

1  See  Barclay,  "Problems  of  International  Practice  and  Diplo- 
macy ",  p.  200.  London  and  Boston,  1907.  A  discussion  of  the  ques- 
tion of  national  indemnification  for  captures  in  time  of  war. 


176  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

ship  carried  might  indemnify  the  o^Tier,  and  thus  a 
loss  suffered  by  the  individual  citizen  be  spread  over 
the  community.  Means  may  some  day  be  devised  of  so 
indemnifying  for  capture  where  combined  with  a  licence 
to  put  to  sea.  No  experiments  in  this  sense  seem  yet 
to  have  been  made. 

States,  from  motives  of  expediency,  may  agree  not 
to  capture  the  property  of  private  citizens  during  a 
particular  war  with  each  other,  as  in  the  case  of  Italy 
and  Austria  in  1866,  or  they  may  by  treaty  provide  for 
similar  immunity  of  their  respective  private  citizens 
in  the  event  of  a  future  war  between  them.^ 

The  United  States  have  made  it  an  article  of  their 
policy  to  insist  upon  the  adoption  of  immunity  of  private 
property  from  capture  as  a  primary  principle  in  the  reform 
of  the  law  of  maritime  warfare,  England  has  as  reso- 
lutely upheld  the  contrary  principle.  Both  have  been 
actuated  by  their  own  interest.  Napoleon  Bonaparte 
considered  that  the  greatest  blow  which  could  be  dealt 
to  England  would  be  to  compel  her  to  give  up  her  mari- 
time rights.^  And  Nelson  was  of  the  same  opinion, 
holding  that  nothing  could  be  more  injurious  to  the 
English  interests  than  the  adoption  of  "free  ships,  free 
goods",  which  is  now,  nevertheless,  the  rule  binding 
upon  England  under  the  Declaration  of  Paris. 

Whether  it  is  expedient  for  England  at  the  present 
day  to  agree  to  the  immunity  of  private  property  at  sea 

*  See  Barclay,  "  Problems  of  International  Practice  and  Diplo- 
macy",  p.  70,  London  and  Boston,  1907;  technical  diflficulties  involved 
in  the  question  of  immunity  and  at  pp.  172  et  seq.,  176  et  seq.  draft 
forms  of  treaty  dealing  with  assimilation  of  enemy  private  property 
a,t  sea  to  neutral  private  property  at  sea  and  with  assimilation  of  enemy 
private  property  at  sea  to  enemy  private  property  on  land  respectively. 

2  Halleck,  Vol.  IL,  p.  17. 


FREEDOM  OF  NAVIGATION  177 

from  capture,  must  be  dictated  by  the  circumstances 
of  the  particular  war  in  which  she  engages.  It  is  quite 
conceivable  that  different  considerations  would  weigh 
with  her  in  a  war  with  the  United  States  from  those 
which  have  arisen  in  war  with  Germany,  In  the  case 
of  the  United  States  it  might  be  in  the  interest  of  both 
parties  to  localise  the  operations  of  war,  and  to  interfere 
as  little  as  possible,  perhaps  for  the  joint  exclusion  of 
neutral  vessels,  with  the  traffic  across  the  Atlantic. 
In  the  war  with  Germany,  England  has  been  forced  into 
closing  the  high  sea  to  all  traffic  by  the  merchantmen  of 
the  enemy  not  only  in  her  own  but  in  the  general  interest 
of  her  allies. 

Apart  from  expediency,  however,  necessity  of  war, 
that  is  the  necessity  in  which,  by  the  nature  of  things, 
a  belligerent  party  is  placed  of  preserving  its  own  forces 
against  destruction,  and  of  defeating  the  forces  of  the 
enemy,  must  always  stand  in  the  way  of  any  abandon- 
ment of  the  belligerent  right  to  seize  all  the  enemy's 
property,  whether  private  or  public,  which  can  serve 
to  prolong  his  resistance.  Any  attenuations  as  regards 
private  property  have  never  extended  beyond  the  pre- 
vention of  wanton  destruction  and  plunder,  and  the 
equalisation  of  the  burden  of  the  losses,  and  it  is  difficult 
to  see  what  further  can  be  done  in  the  common  interest 
so  long  as  mankind  continues  to  seek  solutions  in  destruc- 
tion and  bloodshed. 


CHAPTER  IX 


ARMAMENTS 


President  Wilson  in  his  fourth  proposition 
demands  "adequate  guarantees"  for  the  reduction 
of  armaments. 

What  meaning  does  he  attach  to  guarantees  and 
what  to  adequate  ? 

Napoleon  obtained  guarantees  from  Prussia  and 
imposed  a  reduction  of  her  armed  forces  to  a  maxi- 
mum limit.  She  observed  the  form;  nevertheless, 
at  the  battle  of  Leipzig  she  brought  six  or  seven 
times  that  maximum  into  the  field  and  the  military 
power  of  Prussia  dated  from  guarantees  which 
Napoleon  must  have  considered  adequate,  seeing 
that  at  the  time  he  imposed  them  he  was  absolute 
master  to  prescribe  any  conditions  he  thought  fit, 

A  century  later  the  problem  of  "preparedness 
for  war"  occupied  the  minds  of  all  European  states- 
men. One  set  of  them  thought  to  conjure  the 
danger  of  war  by  preparing  for  it  and  this  led  to  a 
competition  in  armaments  which  was  a  source  of 
much  profit  to  a  few,  even  many,  and  of  high  wages 
to  an  increasing  mass  of  labour.  Preparedness  for 
war  was  alleged  to  be  guarantee  of  peace.     Another 


ARMAMENTS  179 

set  thought  that  just  as  increase  responded  to 
increase  diminution  might  respond  to  diminution, 
which  as  a  logical  proposition  is  unanswerable. 

"...  The  constant  danger  involved  in  the 
accumulation  of  war  material  renders  the  armed 
peace  of  to-day  a  crushing  burden  more  and  more 
difficult  for  nations  to  bear.  It  consequently 
seems  evident  that  if  this  situation  be  prolonged 
it  will  inevitably  result  in  the  very  disaster  it  is 
sought  to  avoid,  and  the  thought  of  the  horrors  of 
which  makes  every  humane  mind  shudder.  It  is 
the  supreme  duty,  therefore,  of  all  States  to  place 
some  limit  on  these  increasing  armaments  and  find 
some  means  of  averting  the  calamities  which  threaten 
the  whole  world." 

The  author  of  these  words,  from  the  Russian 
note  of  1898  proposing  that  an  international  con- 
ference be  held  to  deal  with  the  question  of  exces- 
sive armaments,  seems  to  have  had  a  prophetic 
vision  of  the  World's  War. 

The  answers  of  the  Powers  to  the  Russian  proposal 
were  unanimously  favourable  and,  as  the  reader 
will  remember,  the  first  Hague  Conference  of  1899 
was  the  outcome  of  the  Russian  suggestion. 

At  the  Conference  the  Russian  Government 
submitted  the  following  propositions  : 

*'l.  Establishment  of  an  international  under- 
standing for  a  term  of  five  years  stipulating  non- 
increase  of  the  present  figures  of  the  peace  effectives 
of  troops  kept  up  for  home  use. 

*'  2.   Fixation,  in  case  of  this  understanding  being 


180  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

arrived  at  and,  if  possible,  of  the  figures  of  the 
peace  effective  of  all  the  Powers,  excepting  colonial 
troops. 

"3.  Maintenance  for  a  like  term  of  five  years 
of  the  amount  of  the  military  budgets  at  present 
in  force." 

When  the  subject  came  on  for  discussion  in  the 
Commission  appointed  to  deal  with  it  in  1899  the 
German  military  delegate  stated  his  view  that 
the  question  of  effectives  could  not  be  discussed 
by  itself,  as  there  were  many  others  to  which  it 
was  in  some  measure  subordinated,  such,  for  in- 
stance, as  the  length  of  service,  the  number  of 
cadres,  whether  existing  in  peace  or  made  ready  for 
war,  the  amount  of  training  received  by  reserves, 
the  situation  of  the  country  itself,  its  railway  sys- 
tem, and  the  number  and  position  of  its  fortresses. 
In  a  modern  army  all  these  questions  went  together, 
and  national  defence  included  them  all. 

This  did  not  seem  an  unreasonable  objection  and, 
in  any  case,  this  statement  of  the  diflBculty  was  not 
refuted. 

In  June,  1906,  the  Italian  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  (then  M.  Tittoni)  made  a  statement  which 
was  characteristic  of  the  then  condescending  "non 
possumus"  continental  attitude  towards  the  sub- 
ject.    It  was  as  follows  : 

"I,  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Italy,  now 
publicly  express  the  adhesion  of  the  Government 
to  the  humanitarian  ideas  which  have  met  with 


ARMAMENTS  181 

such  enthusiasm  in  the  historic  House  of  Parlia- 
ment at  Westminster.  I  have  always  believed 
that,  as  far  as  we  are  concerned,  it  would  be  a 
national  crime  to  weaken  our  armaments  while 
we  are  surrounded  by  strongly  armed  European 
nations  who  look  upon  the  improvement  of  arma- 
ments as  a  guarantee  of  peace.  Nevertheless  I 
should  consider  it  a  crime  against  humanity  not 
to  cooperate  sincerely  in  an  initiative  having  for 
object  a  simultaneous  reduction  of  armaments 
of  the  great  Powers.  Italian  practice  has  always 
aimed  at  the  maintenance  of  peace.  Therefore, 
I  am  happy  to  be  able  to  say  that  our  delegates 
at  the  coming  Hague  Conference  will  be  instructed 
to  further  the  English  initiative." 

Between  the  two  Hague  Conferences  at  which 
attempts  were  made  to  deal  with  the  subject  an 
actual  trial  of  reduction  was  effected  in  the  Ameri- 
can continent  in  a  Disarmament  Agreement  (May 
28,  1902)  between  the  Chilean  and  Argentine 
republics.  This  agreement,  which  was  due  to  the 
initiative  and  good  offices  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment, provided  that  "in  order  to  remove  all  cause 
of  fear  and  distrust  between  the  two  countries," 
the  governments  in  question  "agree  not  to  take 
possession  of  the  warships  which  they  are  having 
built,  and  also  for  the  present  not  to  make  any 
other  acquisitions."  The  two  governments  further- 
more agreed  to  "reduce  their  respective  fleets, 
according  to  an  arrangement  establishing  a  reason- 
able proportion  between  the  two  fleets." 


182  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

The  two  governments  also  respectively  promised 
not  to  increase  their  maritime  armaments  during 
five  years  unless  the  one  who  wished  to  increase 
them  gave  the  other  eighteen  months'  notice  in 
advance. 

Are  these  the  kind  of  guarantees  the  President 
proposes  ? 

Or  does  he  mean  that  there  should  be  an  Inter- 
national Commission  which  would  have  the  power 
to  examine  into  our  respective  national  concerns 
and  tell  us  what  reductions  we  have  to  make  to 
comply  with  the  contractual  scheme  of  reduction 
agreed  to?  If  so,  my  imagination  does  not  rise 
to  realisation  of  the  amount  of  obedience  such  a 
Commission  is  likely  to  receive. 

In  short  I  am  afraid  "adequate  guarantees"  are 
in  the  nature  of  a  pious  wish  and  yet  the  President's 
inclusion  of  the  reduction  of  armaments  among 
the  main  issues  which  arise  out  of  the  war  is  un- 
questionably right. 

There  are  forces  which  make  for  war  which  seem 
beyond  the  control  of  the  more  intelligent  part  of 
the  population  of  even  the  most  progressive  and 
experienced  parliamentarily  governed  countries. 
Thus  twenty  years  ago  war  between  England  and 
France  hung  in  the  balance.  Ardent  patriots 
among  the  French  clamoured  for  the  blood  of  the 
Englishman  to  wipe  out  the  humiliation  of  Fashoda, 
and  proposed  a  crusade  to  free  South  Africa  and 
the  Irish  people  from  the  tyrant's  yoke.  Ardent 
English  patriots  on  their  side  professed  their  indif- 


ARMAMENTS  183 

ference  for  the  feelings  of  a  degenerate  people  who 
did  not  rise  against  military  oppression  and  release 
the  innocent  Dreyfus. 

Against  such  dangerous  manifestations  of  aggres- 
sive patriotism  which,  whether  sincere  or  not, 
caused  great  unrest  and  forced  governments  into 
otherwise  unjustifiable  increases  of  expenditure 
on  armaments,  statesmen  strove  to  react  in  vain, 
and  if  a  reaction  did  come  eventually  it  was  not 
due  to  governments  but  rather  in  defiance  of  them 
and  achieved  under  a  running  fire  of  discouragement 
and  ridicule  from  the  minority  of  ardent  patriots 
on  whom  governments  too  often  seem  to  lean  for 
support. 

Shortly  before  the  outbreak  of  the  recent  War 
revelations  were  made  which  showed  how  powerful, 
cooperative  and  centralised  were  the  interests  of 
the  great  private  arsenals  and  manufacturers  of 
material  of  war  of  all  kinds  and  how  closely  inter- 
woven and  international  they  were. 

Where  powerful  and  wealthy  interests  are  con- 
cerned, it  is  not  a  far  cry  to  say  public  opinion  is 
exposed  to  being  influenced  by  them  without  con- 
scious knowledge  of  the  methods  employed. 

Is  not  the  immense  power  which  these  huge  inter- 
ests can  wield  in  the  promotion  of  orders  for  arma- 
ments in  itself  a  possible  danger  to  peace  ? 

If  this  is  so,  statification  of  all  armament  indus- 
tries is  perhaps  the  one  effective  method  of  restrict- 
ing armaments,  that  is,  by  keeping  them  under  con- 
trol.    The    present    situation    lends    itself    to    the 


184  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

realisation  of  sucli  a  reform  both  nationally  and 
internationally. 

Perhaps  it  is  just  an  agreement  to  take  some  such 
steps  that  the  President  means  when  he  speaks  of 
"  adequate  guarantees . ' ' 

But  above  all  these  factitious  aids  to  evolution 
is  the  process  of  evolution  itself.  The  World's 
War  may  have  killed  for  the  time  being  the  disease 
of  militarism  from  which  the  world  was  suffering 
before  it  reached  its  climax  in  the  criminal  act  of 
August,  1914.  The  world  has  now  seen  what  the 
thrill  of  war  means  as  compared  with  the  dullest 
time  of  peace.  For  years  hence  the  peoples  of  the 
earth  will  be  paying  the  price  of  armaments  and  the 
most  powerful  interests  will  have  diflSculties  in  rous- 
ing peoples  for  a  long  time  to  see  in  "preparedness 
for  war  "  a  method  of  peace  or  a  way  out  of  the  annual 
financial  difficulties  our  governments  will  all  have 
to  face  till  peoples  have  again  forgotten  what  war 
means. 


NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  IX 

Suggested  Clauses  Respecting  Nationalisation  of 
Production  of  Material  of  War 

Whereas  it  is  obvious  that  the  existence  of  large  war 
industries  dependent  for  their  prosperity  and  even  exist- 
ence on  the  obtaining  of  orders  for  the  supply  of  war  ships, 
artillery,  small  arms,  ammunition,  that  is  to  say,  of 
articles  which  can  be  used  for  no  other  purpose  than  the 
prosecution  of  war,  implies  an  interest  which  profits  by 
the  apprehension  of  war  and  loses  by  international  ar- 
rangements which  would  entail  any  slackening  of  the 
demand  for  such  material  of  war ;   and 

Whereas  these  interests,  like  all  great  industrial  inter- 
ests naturally  and  in  self-protection  gravitate  to  under- 
standings which  are  in  direct  opposition  to  movements 
for  the  preservation  and  assurance  of  peace ; 

It  is  in  the  joint  interest  of  national  finance  and  inter- 
national peace  that  henceforward  all  production  of  articles 
of  no  use  except  for  purposes  of  war  shall  be  State  monop- 
olies, a  fair  indemnity  to  be  paid  to  present  owners 
in  which  any  exceptional  rate  of  profit  made  during  the 
present  war  or  in  preparation  for  it  shall  be  debited  in 
reduction  of  the  gross  amount  payable. 


CHAPTER  X 


THE   LAW   OF   NATIONS 


The  protective  law  of  war,  the  law  which  secures 
as  far  as  possible  the  rights  of  neutral  countries 
and  subjects  from  the  consequences  of  warfare 
and  which  by  sympathetic  extension  asserts  the 
rights  of  innocent  noncombatants  against  its  bar- 
barities, is  the  creation  of  neutrals.  The  contradic- 
tion between  the  contentions  of  belligerents  and 
neutrals  is  only  one  of  standpoints  and  the  indigna- 
tion of  the  latter  is  an  emanation  of  their  interest, 
as  such,  to  be  unaffected  by  hostilities  to  which  they 
are  not  a  party. 

Where  there  is  no  neutral  powerful  enough  to 
insist  on  the  neutral  standpoint,  it  remains  merely 
doctrinal  and  this  is  what  happened  in  the  recent 
War. 

Thus,  for  instance,  so  far  from  the  facts  of  the 
War  having  shown  that  the  doctrine  of  immunity 
of  private  property  from  capture  in  maritime  war 
needed  adoption,  they  seem  to  have  shown  the 
contrary;  it  has  been  made  clear  that  war  in  cer- 
tain cases  can  only  be  brought  to  an  end  by  economic 
isolation.  Four  years  of  military  operations  only 
brought  out  their  futility;    it  was  the  silent  block- 


THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS  187 

ade  which  stifled  the  enemy's  trade  and  industry 
and  starved  him  to  the  brink  of  death  that  turned 
the  scale. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  was  the  submarine  warfare 
that  brought  the  Allies  nearest  to  defeat.  While 
the  navy  by  its  constant  and  unfailing  vigilance 
never  allowed  an  enemy  ship  to  cross  the  open  sea, 
the  enemy  submarines  with  corresponding  persist- 
ency kept  up  the  same  strain  of  impending  hun- 
ger and  anxiety  lest  food  and  other  supplies  to  the 
Allies  should  become  reduced  beyond  the  rate  of 
repair. 

On  both  sides  the  determining  factors  in  the  ulti- 
mate result  have  been  economic  and  the  fate  of  the 
War  on  land  has  been  dependent  on  the  power  of 
the  belligerents'  respective  naval  forces  to  capture 
or  destroy  private  property  and  their  respective 
domestic  ability  to  repair  loss.  The  War  has  shown 
that,  in  such  a  war,  warfare  obeys  no  rules  but 
those  of  expediency.  It  has  been,  as  events  have 
proved,  truly  a  death  struggle.  All  arms  were 
resorted  to  and  all  the  barbarities  of  past  ages  have 
been  revived  because  it  has  been  a  death  struggle 
similar  to  the  racial  death  struggles  of  earlier  ages. 
There  has  been  no  moderating  neutral  influence 
to  watch  over  the  interests  of  non-parties  or  of 
humanity. 

The  exceptional  character  of  the  War  warrants 
the  conclusion  that  though  the  doctrines  of  the 
international  law  of  war  have  been  more  or  less 
ignored  during  the  recent  War,  this  is  only  because 
practically  the  whole  world  was  in  a  state  of  bel- 


188  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

ligerency.  When  the  neutral  influence  is  able  once 
more  to  make  itself  felt  the  more  familiar  condi- 
tions will  be  revived,  and  just  as  there  is  no  reason 
to  suppose  the  Congress  of  Peace  will  be  able  to  do 
more  than  its  predecessors  in  the  settlement  of  the 
world  to  the  satisfaction  of  all  the  High  Contract- 
ing Parties,  some  of  such  parties  may  profit  by 
the  experience  of  recent  events  and  seek  to  avoid 
entangling  alliances  capable  of  dragging  them  out 
of  their  comparatively  safe  and  potentially  strong 
position  as  neutrals. 

Organisation  and  disintegration  in  the  history 
of  mankind  follow  each  other  with  the  fatality  of 
a  law  of  nature.  The  stages  from  the  conquest  of 
liberty  to  dictatorship  as  a  rescue  from  licence  are 
among  the  recurring  facts  of  historical  evolution. 
The  wisdom  of  the  leader  is  soon  swamped  in  the 
struggle  for  leadership  as  we  have  seen  whenever 
democracy  produces  a  political  class  among  a  free 
people. 

Law  is  the  one  stable  element  in  the  life  of  com- 
munities. Even  bad  law  is  better  than  disrespect 
for  it,  because  the  alternative  for  bad  law  is  not 
necessarily  good  law  and  the  stability  of  law  is  the 
common  basis  of  all  social  and  commercial  inter- 
course. To  labour  anything  so  obvious  is  super- 
erogation and  I  need  only  add  that  what  is  true  of 
the  domestic  intercourse  of  nations  can  only  be  true 
of  intercourse  between  nations.  To  say  that  Inter- 
national Law  is  dead  is,  therefore,  about  as  true 
as  to  say  that  an  inundation  or  an  earthquake  puts 


THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS  189 

an  end  to  engineering  and  architecture.  Far  from 
it,  the  need  of  a  law  binding  on  nations  and  which 
nations  will  respect  and  may  even  be  forced  to 
respect  is  inherent  to  the  idea  of  that  Society  of 
Nations  to  which  the  peoples  of  the  world  are  look- 
ing forward  as  a  safeguard  against  lawless  ambitions, 
whether  of  potentates,  statesmen,  bureaucracies, 
oligarchies  or  democracies. 

The  work  of  the  Hague  Peace  Conference  will 
necessarily  form  part  of  the  special  work  which  the 
creation  of  a  Society  of  Nations  will  entail. 

After  two  great  wars  in  the  last  century  there 
was  active  and  effective  agitation  in  favour  of  further 
development  of  the  Law  of  Nations.  The  Italian 
war  of  liberation  led  to  the  Geneva  Convention 
and  the  Red  Cross  movement,  that  of  1870  to  the 
foundation  of  the  Institute  of  International  Law 
and  the  Society  for  the  Reform  and  Codification  of 
the  Law  of  Nations  (now  called  the  International 
Law  Association),  and  eventually  to  the  Hague 
conferences.  The  reaction  in  the  case  of  the  recent 
War  is  towards  sanctions  for  the  enforcement  of  the 
Law  of  Nations  and  hence  to  the  conception  of  a 
Society  of  Nations  capable  of  enforcing  respect  for 
it. 

Fiat  juris  regnum  in  terris. 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  X 

Note  on  Preambles  to  Different  International 
Conventions  relating  to  War  and  Peace 

The  following  preambles  to  international  conventions 
may  be  considered  as  having  definitely  determined  cer- 
tain principles  to  be  beyond  the  scope  of  controversy. 
It  is  important  to  group  them  as  declarations  of  moral 
law  and  conduct  agreed  to  by  the  different  States  which 
ratified  the  conventions  in  question. 

War 

1.  Geneva  Convention  of  1864 :  the  Powers  were 
animated  by  "the  desire  within  the  measure  of  their 
ability  of  mitigating  the  evils  inseparable  from  war, 
of  suppressing  its  useless  hardships  and  of  ameliorating 
the  condition  of  wounded  soldiers  on  the  field  of  battle." 

In  the  new  Geneva  Convention  of  1906,  the  Powers 
repeat  that  they  are  "equally  animated  by  the  desire 
of  mitigating,  as  far  as  possible,  the  evils  inseparable 
from  war  "  and  desire,  with  this  end  in  view,  to  improve 
and  to  complete  the  arrangement  agreed  upon  at  Geneva 
on  August  22,  1864,  for  the  amelioration  of  the  condition 
of  wounded  or  sick  soldiers  in  armies  in  the  field. 

The  first  provision  of  the  Convention  carrying  out  the 
object  of  the  above  preamble  states  that  "oflBcers  and 
soldiers  and  other  persons  officially  attached  to  armies" 


THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS  191 

shall  be  taken  care  of  as  prisoners  of  war  "without  dis- 
tinction of  nationality."  After  each  engagement  the 
commander  in  possession  of  the  field  is  to  take  measures 
to  search  for  the  wounded  and  prevent  any  maltreatment 
or  pillage. 

2.  The  Convention  of  1899-1907,  for  the  Adaption  to 
Maritime  Warfare  of  the  Principles  of  the  Geneva  Con- 
vention relates  that  the  Powers  are  "alike  animated  by 
the  desire  to  diminish,  as  far  as  depends  on  them,  the 
evils  inseparable  from  warfare",  and  that  they  wish  "with 
this  object  to  adapt  to  maritime  warfare,  the  principles 
of  the  Geneva  Convention." 

3.  The  Declaration  of  St.  Petersburg  (1868)  sets  out 
that  an  International  Military  Commission  "assembled 
at  St.  Petersburg  in  order  to  examine  into  the  expediency 
of  forbidding  the  use  of  certain  projectiles  in  times  of 
war  between  civilized  nations"  and  by  common  agree- 
ment "fixed  the  technical  limits  at  which  the  necessities 
of  war  ought  to  yield  to  the  requirements  of  humanity", 
that  the  governments  represented  considered  "that  the 
progress  of  civilisation  should  have  the  effect  of  alleviat- 
ing as  much  as  possible  the  calamities  of  war"  ; 

That  the  only  legitimate  object  which  States  should 
endeavour  to  accomplish  during  war  is  to  weaken  the 
military  forces  of  the  enemy ; 

"That  for  this  purpose  it  is  sufficient  to  disable  the 
greatest  possible  number  of  men ; 

"That  this  object  would  be  exceeded  by  the  employ- 
ment of  arms  which  uselessly  aggravate  the  sufferings 
of  disabled  men,  or  render  their  death  inevitable ;   and 

"That  the  employment  of  such  arms  would,  therefore, 
be  contrary  to  the  laws  of  humanity." 

4.  All  the  declarations  of  1899  in  their  preambles 
are  stated  to  be  inspired  by  the  sentiments  which  found 


192  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

expression  in  the  Declaration  of  St.  Petersburg  of  1868 
forbidding  the  employment  of  explosive  projectiles  of 
a  weight  inferior  to  400  grammes. 

The  Powers  represented  at  these  different  conferences 
have,  therefore,  declared  that  on  a  level  with  the  use  of 
explosive  bullets  are  the  use  of  bullets  which  expand  or 
flatten  easily  in  the  human  body,  such  as  bullets  with  a 
hard  envelope  which  does  not  entirely  cover  the  core  or 
is  pierced  with  incisions ;  of  projectiles  which  diffuse 
asphyxiating  or  deleterious  gases;  and  the  discharging 
of  projectiles  and  explosives  from  balloons  or  by  other 
new  methods  of  a  similar  nature. 

5.  The  Powers,  say  the  Convention  with  Respect  to  the 
Laws  and  Usage  of  War  on  Land,  in  drawing  it  up  were 
"animated  by  the  desire  to  serve  the  interests  of  humanity 
and  the  ever-increasing  requirements  of  civilisation"; 
they  thought  it  important  "with  this  object  to  revise 
the  laws  and  general  customs  of  war,  either  with  the  view 
of  defining  them  more  precisely,  or  of  laying  down  cer- 
tain limits  for  the  purpose  of  modifying  their  severity 
as  far  as  possible." 

"The  provisions,"  it  says,  "have  been  inspired  by 
the  desire  to  diminish  the  evils  of  war  so  far  as  military 
necessities  permit"  and  are  destined  to  serve  as  general 
rules  of  conduct  for  belligerents  in  their  relations  with 
each  other  and  with  populations. 

Though  it  had  not  been  possible  to  agree  forthwith  on 
provisions  embracing  all  the  circumstances  which  occurred 
in  practice,  it  was  "  not  intended  by  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  that  the  cases  not  provided  for  should,  for  want 
of  a  written  provision  be  left  to  the  arbitrary  judgment 
of  the  military  Commanders";  "and  until  a  more  com- 
plete Code  of  the  laws  of  the  war  was  issued,  the  High 
Contracting  Parties  thought  it  right"  to  declare  that 


THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS  193 

in  cases  not  included  in  the  regulations  adopted  by  them,- 
populations  and  belligerents  remain  under  the  protection 
and  empire  of  the  principles  of  international  laws  as 
they  result  from  the  usages  established  between  civilised 
nations,  from  the  laws  of  humanity,  and  the  require- 
ments of  the  public  conscience. 

And  Article  3  of  the  Convention  by  way  of  further 
emphasis  states  that  "the  belligerent  Party  who  violates 
the  provisions  of  the  said  Regulations  shall  be  bound,  if 
the  case  arises,  to  pay  an  indemnity",  and  that  "it  is 
responsible  for  all  acts  done  by  persons  forming  part  of 
its  armed  force." 

6.  In  the  same  way  the  Convention  relating  to  Bom- 
bardment by  Naval  Forces  in  time  of  War  states  that 
the  Powers  considered  that  it  was  of  "importance  to 
subject  bombardment  by  naval  forces  to  general  pro- 
visions guaranteeing  the  rights  of  inhabitants  and  insur- 
ing the  preservation  of  the  principal  buildings,  by  ex- 
tending to  this  operation  of  war,  as  far  as  possible,  the 
principles  of  the  regulations  of  1899  with  respect  to  the 
laws  and  customs  of  war  on  land"  and  that  they  were  "in- 
spired by  the  desire  to  serve  the  interests  of  humanity 
and  to  lessen  the  rigours  and  disasters  of  war." 

7.  Lastly  as  regards  the  Employment  of  Submarine 
Mines  acting  automatically  by  Contact,  the  Convention 
on  the  subject  upholds  "the  principle  of  the  freedom  of 
sea  routes  open  to  all  nations"  and  declares  that  "if, 
in  the  present  state  of  things,  the  use  of  submarine  mines 
with  automatic  contact  cannot  be  forbidden,  it  is  im- 
portant to  limit  and  regulate  their  use,  in  order  to  restrict 
the  rigours  of  war  and  to  give,  as  far  as  possible,  to  peaceful 
navigation  the  security  it  has  the  right  to  claim,  in  spite 
of  the  existence  of  a  war." 


194  COLLAPSE  AND  KECONSl RUCTION 

Peace 

Hague  Convention  for  the  Pacific  Settlement  of  Inter- 
national Disputes 

(The  passages  in  italics  are  additions  and  alterations 
made  by  the  Convention  of  1907.) 

"Animated  by  a  strong  desire  to  concert  for  the  main- 
tenance of  general  peace ; 

"Resolved  to  second  by  their  best  efforts  the  friendly 
settlement  of  international  disputes ; 

"Recognising  the  solidarity  which  unites  the  members 
of  the  society  of  civilised  nations ; 

"Desirous  of  extending  the  empire  of  law,  and  of 
strengthening  the  appreciation  of  international  justice ; 

"Convinced  that  the  permanent  institution  of  a  Court 
of  Arbitration,  accessible  to  all,  in  the  midst  of  the  inde- 
pendent Powers,  will  contribute  effectively  to  this  result ; 

"Having  regard  to  the  advantages  attending  the  general 
and  regular  organisation  of  arbitral  procedure; 

"Sharing  the  opinion  of  the  august  Initiator  of  the 
International  Peace  Conference  that  it  is  expedient  to 
record  in  an  International  agreement  the  principles  of 
equity  and  right  on  which  are  based  the  security  of  States 
and  the  welfare  of  peoples ; 

"  Desirous  for  this  purpose  of  better  assuring  the  practical 
working  of  Commissions  of  Inquiry  and  Courts  of  Arbitration 
and  to  facilitate  recourse  to  arbitration  when  matters  in 
variance  are  concerned  which  can  be  dealt  with  by  a  summary 
procedure; 

"  Have  thought  it  necessary  to  revise  on  certain  points  and  to 
complete  the  work  of  the  first  Peace  Conference  for  the  pacific 
settlement  of  international  disputes.'* 


THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS  195 

Neutral  Rights 

Convention  Relative  to  the  Establishment  of  an  Inter- 
national Prize  Court  (1907) 

"Animated  by  the  desire  to  settle  in  an  equitable 
manner  differences  which  arise  from  time  to  time  in 
maritime  warfare,  in  connection  with  decisions  of  national 
Prize  Courts ; 

"Holding,  that  if  such  Courts  are  to  continue  to  give 
decisions  in  accordance  with  the  forms  prescribed  by 
their  legislation,  it  is  important  that,  in  certain  cases, 
recourse  be  provided  under  conditions  harmonising,  as 
far  as  possible,  with  the  public  and  private  interests 
involved  in  all  Prize  cases ; 

"Considering,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  formation 
of  an  international  Court  with  a  carefully  regulated 
competence  and  procedure  seems  the  best  means  of 
attaining  this  object ; 

"Being,  moreover,  convinced  that  in  this  manner  the 
rigorous  consequences  of  a  maritime  war  may  be  atten- 
uated :  that,  in  particular,  good  relations  between  bellig- 
erents and  neutrals  are  more  likely  to  be  maintained, 
and,  in  consequence,  the  preservation  of  peace  better 
assured".  .  .  . 

Memorandum  of  a  Scheme  for  the  Promotion  of 
Law  and  Justice  among  Nations  by  Education 

The  weakness  of  all  the  schemes  which  have  hitherto 
been  propounded  for  the  promotion  of  the  spirit  of  law 
and  justice  among  civilized  mankind  generally  has  been 
that  they  assumed  mankind  generally  to  be  ready  to 
receive  enlightenment.  That  this  is  not  the  case  is 
shown  by  the  almost  universal  adoption  of  compulsion 


196  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

for  the  spread  of  education  and  by  the  practical  failure 
of  all  propagandas  which  are  not  founded  on  the  very 
simplest  of  issues. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  a  matter  of  almost  universal 
experience  that  ideas  absorbed  in  youth  while  the  mind 
is  still  fresh  and  therefore  receptive  are  far  more  tenacious 
than  impressions  obtained  in  later  years  when  the  brain 
tissue,  like  the  rest  of  the  physical  being,  has  begun  to 
harden. 

Ideas  acquired  in  youth  partake  in  fact  of  the  character 
of  faith.  They  remain  throughout  life,  like  faith.  The 
deeper  furrows  of  mental  tendency  and  the  thinner  after- 
impressions  due  to  reason  have  little  chance  of  obliter- 
ating these  stronger  lines  which  become  the  convictions 
of  almost  every  life. 

If,  in  particular.  Peace  advocacy  per  se  has  made  but 
little  progress,  it  is  mainly  due  to  its  having  been  addressed 
to  men's  maturer  reason  which  unfortunately  is  just  as 
unstable  as  faith  imbibed  at  an  early  age  is  firm. 

Just  as  the  Churches  seek  to  implant  conviction  in 
the  young  and  creeds  are  taught  to  children  long  before 
they  have  reached  the  age  of  understanding,  with  the 
result  that  even  the  greatest  minds  seldom  succeed 
completely  in  their  efforts  at  self-emancipation,  so  may 
we  not  hope  that  if  a  basis  of  international  amity  and 
mutual  respect  and  consideration  could  be  implanted  in 
the  minds  of  the  rising  generations  of  those  who  are 
destined  to  voice  the  political  and  international  life  of 
peoples,  it  would  have  a  similar  effect.?  Might  it  not 
forward  the  growth  of  that  faith  in  upright,  humane  and 
considerate  conduct  among  nations,  the  absence  of  which 
is  now  being  shown  to  be  the  chief  cause  of  the  deplorable 
break-up  with  which  civilisation  is  at  present  threatened  ? 

That  the  best  laid  schemes  may  fail  through  the  inter- 


THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS  197 

vention  of  the  unforeseen,  that  faults  of  character,  a  bad 
choice  of  instruments,  external  jealousies  and  rivalries 
and  many  other  disturbing  elements  due  to  our  faulty- 
human  nature  may  interfere  with  their  successful  realisa- 
tion, is  a  consideration  inherent  to  all  human  effort.  This, 
however,  may  be  said  of  the  scheme  I  have  outlined  in 
the  following  suggestions,  that  whether  its  effect  should 
be  wholly  as  beneficial  as  I  believe  it  would  be  or  not, 
it  could  not  be  without  any  effect  at  all  in  determining 
a  current  of  international  understanding.  Even  if  the 
effect  were  only  small,  the  effort  would  not  be  entirely 
lost.  It  might,  moreover,  be  the  starting-point  of  other 
efforts  in  the  same  sense.  My  own  conviction  is  that 
the  emancipation  of  mankind  from  the  present  tendency 
to  regard  as  justifiable  in  international  relations  most  of 
the  misconduct  we  strive  to  banish  from  our  citizen 
life  can  only  be  achieved  by  creation  of  a  new  faith  among 
mankind  and  all  analogies  point  to  this  being  achievable 
by  influence  exercised  over  young  minds  at  their  impres- 
sionable age. 

I.  The  purpose  to  be  fulfilled 

The  purpose  to  be  fulfilled  is  the  education  of  public 
opinion  in : 

(a)  The  utility  of  law  and  order  in  international 
relations ; 

(b)  The  futility  as  a  solution  of  international  problems 
of  war  which  at  the  best  only  substitutes  new  for  older 
problems ; 

(c)  The  advantages  to  the  masses  of  mankind  of  a 
progressive  international  morality ; 

(d)  The  sanctity  of  international  engagements  as  a 
basis  of  such  morality ; 


198  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

(e)  The  desirability  of  employing  peaceful  methods 
of  diplomacy,  mediation,  arbitration  and  the  Hague 
Court  and  appreciation  of  their  respective  potentialities. 

2.    Points  for  consideration  in  the  attainment  thereof 

(a)  The  most  effective  channel  for  influencing  public 
opinion  is  the  teaching  of  those  whose  minds  are  still  in 
a  receptive  condition ; 

(h)  To  give  direction  to  the  forces  which  form  public 
opinion,  it  is  necessary  to  operate  on  the  intellectual, 
professional,  commercial  and  industrial  classes  simul- 
taneously. 

(c)  The  intellectual,  professional  and  so-called  upper 
classes  have  always  been  influenced  by  the  training  of 
the  higher  schools. 

(d)  The  commercial  and  industrial  or  so-called  middle 
and  lower  classes  are  entitled  to  obtain  knowledge  and 
intellectual  training  (as  in  Scotland  and  America)  un- 
affected by  questions  of  leisure  and  means. 

3.   To  effect  the  above  purpose 

(e)  Eight  Chairs  of  International  Law  might  be  created 
in  connection  with  the  Universities  of  London,  Paris, 
Berlin,  Vienna,  Rome,  Petrograd,  New  York  and  Tokio. 

(/)  Tenants  of  these  Chairs  to  be  chosen  for  qualifica- 
tion from  among  members  of  the  Institute  of  Interna- 
tional Law,  and 

(g)  Such  tenants  to  undertake  before  appointment  to 
regard  their  mission  as  purely  international,  cosmopolitan 
and  independent.  Acceptance  of  any  public  appoint- 
ment during  tenure  of  the  Chair  or  of  any  office  which 
might  curtail  the  freedom  of  their  opinions  to  be  equiva- 
lent to  resignation. 


THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS  199 

(h)  Tenants  of  the  Chairs  to  meet  at  regular  intervals 
as  an  academic  committee  to  discuss  matters  of  interest 
in  the  prosecution  of  the  purpose  for  which  the  Chairs 
have  been  created. 

(i)  The  Chairs  to  be  placed  under  the  High  Patronage 
of  (say)  the  Pope,  the  President  of  the  United  States  and 
the  President  of  the  Swiss  Confederation. 

(j)  A  meeting  to  be  held  (say)  once  every  year  under 
the  presidency  of  one  of  the  above  patrons  alternately 
at  which  the  tenants  of  the  Chairs  should  render  an 
account  of  their  stewardship  and  to  which  such  persons 
should  be  invited  as  the  patron  in  question  may  deter- 
mine. 

(k)  The  first  tenants  of  the  Chairs  to  be  appointed  by 
(say)  the  Committee  of  the  "Carnegie  Endowment 
for  International  Peace"  or  other  constituent  authority 
or  authorities.  Thereafter  appointments  to  be  made  by 
the  said  Carnegie  Endowment  and  (or)  authorities  on 
presentation  by  the  governing  bodies  of  the  universities 
in  question. 

Tenure  of  the  Professorships  to  be  for  ten  years ;  holders 
to  be  re-eligible. 

(l)  The  foundation  in  each  case  to  be  more  or  less 
in  proportion  to  the  needs  of  the  respective  cities;  for 
London,  Paris,  Berlin  and  New  York,  to  be  (say)  $500, 
000  each  and  in  the  case  of  Vienna,  Rome,  Petrograd 
and  Tokio  (say)  $400,000  each,  making  a  total  of  (say) 
three  and  a  half  million  dollars. 

4.   To  effect  the  purpose  of  the  Chairs,  the  Professors  to 
bear  in  mind  that  they  must  seek 

To  promote  the  study  of  International  Law  and  Usage 
as  a  branch  of  knowledge  in  statecraft  among : 
(a)   Those  who  contemplate  entering  public  life ; 


200  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

(6)  Those  who  are  qualifying  for  entry  into  the  diplo- 
matic or  consular  services ; 

(c)  Publicists  and  journalists ; 

(d)  Students  of  law ; 

(e)  Students  of  the  subject  for  its  own  sake. 

5.    Mode  of  work.     Nonacademic  lectures 

The  tenants  of  the  Chairs  to  deliver  a  series  of  (say) 
six  public  lectures  a  year  open  to  all  persons  free  of  charge 
who  apply  for  a  ticket ;  these  lectures  to  be  of  a  popular 
character  explaining  the  methods  of  operation  of  inter- 
course among  nations,  the  working  of  diplomatic  and 
consular  relations,  the  conclusion  and  effect  of  treaties, 
the  origin  and  advantage  of  law  and  order  among  the 
community  of  States,  the  growth  and  grouping  of  States ; 
the  part  played  by  racial  and  linguistic  homogeneity 
in  state  development  and  the  capabilities  of  statecraft  and 
its  organs  in  the  promotion  of  good  understanding  among 
peoples  generally. 

Academic  work 

The  tenants  of  the  Chairs  to  take  charge  of  three  simul- 
taneous classes  in  which  the  work  would  be  graduated. 

First  year's  class.  The  students  should  be  conducted 
through  the  elements  of  International  Law  in  such  a 
way  as  the  tenant  of  the  chair  may  deem  best  adapted 
to  the  enlargement  of  their  understanding  of  the  subject. 
In  this  class,  an  adequate  portion  of  the  time  should  be 
devoted  to  the  origin  and  history  of  International  Law. 

The  object  of  this  class  would  be  purely  the  acquisition 
of  knowledge. 

Second  year's  class.  This  should  be  devoted  to  the 
examination  of  the  problems  of  International  Law  and 


THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS  201 

Usage,  students  in  turn  under  the  chairmanship  of  the 
Professor  to  deal  with  matters  selected  by  the  Professor, 
other  students  to  take  part  in  the  discussion ;  the  matters 
to  be  selected  in  advance  by  the  Professor  to  enable  the 
members  of  the  class  as  far  as  possible  to  mature  their 
views  on  the  subject. 

The  object  of  this  class  would  be  to  deal  with  the  practi- 
cal application  of  law  and  usage  among  nations. 

Third  year's  class.  This  should  be  devoted  to  the 
language  of  diplomacy,  the  drafting  of  memoranda  on 
current  events,  condensing  reports,  the  art  of  statement 
in  memoranda,  verbal  notes,  etc.,  the  preparation  of 
treaties  and  other  diplomatic  engagements  and  under- 
takings and  their  interpretation,  the  art  and  methods  of 
diplomacy  and  negotiation,  the  study  of  the  official 
books  of  the  different  States,  the  utilisation  of  books  of 
reference,  the  methods  of  government  and  foreign  policies 
of  different  States,  commercial  politics,  treaties  of  com- 
merce, tariff  systems,  colonial  doctrines,  exterritoriality, 
comparative  and  historical  geography  and  cartography. 

Professors'  assistants.  As  the  above  scheme  of  work 
implies  more  than  any  man  could  manage,  the  Professor 
to  be  entitled  to  employ  assistants  as  lecturers  and  teachers 
to  aid  him  in  such  parts  of  his  work  as  he  may  in  his 
discretion  appoint. 


CHAPTER  XI 


NEUTRALISATION 


Before  dealing  with  neutralisation,  we  must 
be  clear  about  the  meaning  and  varieties  of  meaning 
of  the  word  "neutrality",  from  which,  owing  to 
imperfection  of  terminology,  the  sense  of  the  term 
has  not  been  sufficiently  distinguished. 

Mr.  Kleen,  an  eminent  Swedish  writer,  member  of 
the  Institute  of  International  Law,  whose  book  in 
two  volumes  on  neutrality  is  the  most  complete 
work  on  the  subject  ever  written,  finds  in  practice 
a  number  of  distinctions.  First  of  all  there  is 
neutrality  purely  and  simply  which  he  defines  as 
"celle  qui  appartient  et  s'impose  en  vertu  du  droit 
international  a  tout  Etat  qui  pendant  une  guerre, 
veut  rester  en  dehors  des  hostilites."  ^  He  then 
finds  a  conventional  neutrality  which  he  defines 
as  "celle  qui,  par  suite  d'une  situation  particuliere 
ou  exceptionnelle,  accommode  la  neutralite  simple 
et  ordinaire  a  certains  cas  ou  aux  circonstances, 
en  la  soumettant  a  des  conditions  ou  bien  en  aug- 
mentant  ou  en  diminuant  sa  portee."  ^  This  con- 
ventional neutrality  again  may  be  perfect,  that  is 

1  Ifleen,  "Lois  et  usages  de  la  neutralite,"  I,  p.  81. 

2  Ibid.,  I,  p.  83. 


NEUTRALISATION  203 

to  say  in  the  legal  sense,  strict,  when  it  is  "appliquee 
entierement  comme  le  present  le  droit  international 
quant  aux  droits  et  devoirs  reciproques",^  or  it 
may  also  be  free  if  "elle  depend  de  la  volonte  et 
du  jugement  de  I'Etat  neutre  lui-meme,  et  si  elle 
pent  etre  abandonnee  par  lui  quand  bon  lui  semble, 
lorsqu'il  trouve  que  son  droit  et  son  interet  I'obli- 
gent  a  prendre  les  armes."  ^  On  the  other  hand, 
conventional  neutrality  may  be  obligatory  in  the 
case  where  "un  Etat  s 'engage  par  convention  avec 
un  ou  plusieurs  autres  Etats  a  I'observer  ou  a 
la  maintenir,  soit  en  general  et  pour  tons  les  cas 
de  guerre  soit  pour  un  cas  special  ou  en  vue  d'une 
certaine  ou  de  certaines  guerres."  ^  Neutrality 
in  the  special  case  mentioned  in  the  latter  part  of 
this  quotation  is  termed  by  Mr.  Kleen  "neutralite 
accidentelle."  He  gives  its  definition  as  follows : 
"La  neutralite  accidentelle  est  celle  par  laquelle 
un  Etat  s 'engage  par  convention  en  vers  un  ou 
plusieurs  autres  Etats  a  rester  neutre  pendant  une 
ou  plusieurs  guerres  determinees.  L'acte  conven- 
tionnel  pent  etre  conclu,  ou  d'avance,  dans  la 
supposition  de  telle  eventualite  de  guerre,  ou  lors 
de  celle-ci."  ^  The  conventional  neutrality  which 
is  imperfect  or  limited,  "la  pretendue  neutralite 
dite  imparfaite  ou  limitee  et  qui  comporterait  une 
somme  moins  grande  de  devoirs  a  remplir,  soit  pour 
les  neutres,  soit  pour  les  belligerents",  he  declares 
"nulle."  ^     Mr.  Kleen,  however,  finds  still  another 

1  Kleen,  "Lois  et  usages  de  la  neutralite",  I,  p.  109. 

2  Ihid..  I,  p.  84.  3  iii^^^  i^  p,  84.  *  Ibid.,  I,  p.  102. 
6  Ibid.,  I,  p.  109. 


204  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

conventional  neutrality  which  is  partial,  viz. :  "lors- 
qu'elle  n'embrasse  qu'une  ou  plusieurs  parties  du 
territoire  de  I'Etat."  ^  With  this  he  contrasts 
"general  conventional  neutrality",  i.e.  "celle  qui 
embrasse  tout  le  territoire  de  I'Etat."  ^  And  this 
brings  us  back  to  the  definition  of  neutrality  itself 
as  to  which  he  says :  "La  neutralite  est  la  situation 
juridique  dans  laquelle  un  Etat  pacifique  est,  autant 
que  possible,  laisse  en  dehors  des  hostilites  qui  ont 
lieu  entre  des  Etats  belligerents,  et  s'abstient  lui- 
meme  de  toute  participation  ou  ingerence  dans  leur 
differend,  en  observant  vis-a-vis  d'eux  une  stricte 
impartialite."  ^ 

Distinct  from  all  these  forms  of  neutrality,  quali- 
fied and  absolute,  is  conventional  permanent  or  per- 
petual neutrality  which  he  defines  as  follows :  "celle 
par  laquelle  un  Etat  —  ordinairement  contre  des 
garanties  d'inviolabilite  pour  sa  neutralite  —  s'oblige 
une  fois  pour  toutes  envers  d'autres  Etats  a  rester 
neutre  en  general  et  pendant  toutes  les  guerres."  ^ 

This  is  the  neutrality  which  results  from  the 
status    of    "neutralisation." 

A  neutral  nation  in  time  of  war  is  merely  one 
which  does  not  take  part  in  it.  Its  nonbelligerent 
position  entails  certain  rights  and  obligations  which 
are  known  as  the  law  relating  to  neutrals.  Holland, 
for  instance,  which  is  not  neutralized  like  Belgium, 
was  nevertheless  neutral  and  the  Hague  conven- 
tions apply  without  distinction  to  both.     The  oper- 

1  Kleen,  "Lois  et  usages  de  la  neutralite",  I,  p.  103. 

^  Ibid.,  I,  p.  103.  3  7^-^,^  i^  p,  73^  4  jj^^.^  j^  p.  85. 


NEUTRALISATION  205 

ation  of  neutralisation  is  not  confined  to  time  of  war. 
It  places  the  neutralised  State  or  area,  as  it  were,  in 
trust.  It  implies  a  relationship  among  the  grantors 
or  guarantors  which,  within  the  scope  of  the  orig- 
inating agreement,  is  a  curtailment  of  the  freedom 
of  action  of  its  governing  authority. 

Of  neutralisation  in  contemporary  practice  we 
have  six  examples,  viz. :  those  of  Belgium,  Switzer- 
land, Luxemburg,  the  Congo  Territories,  an  area 
of  French  Savoy  and  the  Ionian  Islands. 

As  regards  Belgium,  her  neutrality  was  first 
assured  by  a  treaty  dated  November  15,  1831, 
and  reaflirmed  in  another  dated  August  30,  1839. 
The  signatories  were  Great  Britain,  France,  Austria, 
Prussia,  Russia  and  Holland.  Article  7  of  this 
treaty  provided :  "Belgium  shall  form  an  independ- 
ent and  perpetually  neutral  State.  It  shall  be 
bound  to  observe  such  neutrality  towards  all  other 
States." 

That  of  Luxemburg  resulted  from  a  treaty  con- 
cluded on  May  11,  1867,  between  Great  Britain, 
France,  Austria,  Belgium,  Italy,  the  Netherlands, 
Prussia  and  Russia,  which  declared  the  Grand 
Duchy  of  Luxemburg  a  "perpetually  neutral  State," 
the  High  Contracting  Parties  undertaking  to  respect 
its  neutrality  and,  with  the  exception  of  Belgium 
(itself  a  neutral  State),  placing  it  under  their  "col- 
lective guarantee." 

Switzerland  owed  her  neutrality  to  a  Declaration 
dated  March  20,  1815,  signed  by  eight  Powers, 
viz. :  Great  Britain,  France,  Russia,  Prussia,  Austria, 
Spain,  Portugal,  and   Sweden  and  Norway,  which 


206  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

guaranteed  her  perpetual  neutralisation.  By  a 
decision  of  the  Swiss  Confederation,  dated  May  27, 
1815,  this  neutralisation  was  accepted,  and  on 
November  20,  1815,  it  was  reaffirmed  by  a  fresh 
declaration  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain,  France, 
Russia,  Prussia  and  Austria. 

There  is  a  difference  in  form  between  the  neu- 
tralisation of  Belgium  and  that  of  Luxemburg 
and  Switzerland.  In  the  case  of  Belgium,  there  is 
no  specific  guarantee  of  neutralisation  by  the 
Powers,  as  there  is  in  the  treaties  insuring  it  for 
the  two  other  States,  but  as  the  articles  agreed  to, 
including  the  one  quoted  above,  were  "placed  under 
the  guarantee"  of  the  said  Powers,  the  effect  is 
the  same  in  so  far  as  the  rights  and  obligation  of 
perpetual  neutrality  are  concerned. 

The  legal  position  of  the  neutralised  area  of 
the  Congo  Basin  is  quite  different.  This  basin  com- 
prises all  the  regions  watered  by  the  Congo  and  its 
affluents,  including  Lake  Tanganyika  and  its  eastern 
tributaries.  It  is  a  vast  region  of  Central  Africa 
affecting  French,  Portuguese,  British  and  German 
dominions  as  well  as  the  whole  Congo  State,  now 
a  Belgian  dependency.  By  the  General  Act  of 
Berlin  of  1885,  the  High  Contracting  Parties  bind 
themselves  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  the  terri- 
tories or  portions  of  territory  belonging  to  the 
States  concerned  so  long  as  the  Powers  exercising 
the  rights  of  sovereignty  or  protectorate  over  these 
territories  shall  fulfil  the  duties  which  neutrality  re- 
quires. But  in  a  letter  from  Sir  E.  Malet  to  Earl 
Granville,  respecting  the  nature  of  this  condition. 


NEUTRALISATION  207 

it  was  stated  that  though  the  British  Government 
had  been  "anxious  to  extend  the  benefit  of  neu- 
trality as  widely  as  should  be  found  practicable", 
it  had  been  absolutely  necessary  to  insist  on  such 
provisions  as  would  secure  that  "if  parts  of  the 
territory  of  a  belligerent  were  to  be  respected  as 
enjoying  immunity  from  hostilities,  they  should 
in  no  sense  and  in  no  degree  be  capable  of  serving 
as  a  base  of  operations  for  the  forces  of  such  bellig- 
erent." As  France  and  Portugal  considered  this 
to  be  inconsistent  with  their  sovereign  rights,  it 
was  agreed  that  the  signatory  Powers  should  use 
their  good  oflBces  in  case  of  a  war  in  which  one  or 
more  of  the  belligerents  should  hold  territory  in 
the  free  basin,  to  obtain  the  neutralisation  of  such 
territory  during  the  war  by  special  agreement.  As 
regarded  the  newly  formed  free  State  of  the  Congo, 
added  Sir  E.  Malet,  "the  engagement  to  respect 
its  territory  does  not  involve  a  guarantee  but  it 
only  entails  a  moral  obligation." 

It  is  seen  that  neutralisation,  like  neutrality, 
involves  distinctions.  In  the  case  of  the  Congo 
Basin,  to  take  the  least  definite  form,  there  is  merely 
an  obligation  arising  from  the  power  to  claim  it. 

In  the  case  of  Luxemburg,  the  neutralisation 
is  not  only  absolute  but  its  preservation  is  dependent 
entirely  and  unrestrictedly  on  the  good  faith  of 
the  Powers  creating  it,  the  Treaty  of  1867  providing 
that,  being  neutralised,  "the  maintenance  or  estab- 
lishment of  fortifications  on  its  territory  becomes 
without    aim    or    object."      This    treaty    further 


208  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

provided  that  the  town  of  Luxemburg  should  cease 
to  be  a  fortified  place  and  that  any  troops  provided 
by  the  sovereign  should  be  restricted  to  requirements 
for  the  preservation  of  order.  As  regards  Switzer- 
land and  Belgium,  no  such  stipulation  was  imposed 
and,  alongside  the  guarantee,  in  the  one  case  of 
the  neutralisation  and,  in  the  other,  of  the  stipu- 
lations contained  in  the  treaty  creating  the  neutrali- 
sation they  were  left  to  provide  such  fortifications 
and  defences  as  in  their  discretion  they  might  deem 
desirable.^ 

DifiFering  from  neutralisation  but  having  a  pur- 
pose of  more  or  less  the  same  character  are  buffer 
zones,  that  is  to  say,  strips  of  territory  on  either 
side  of  a  frontier  which  the  respective  States  agree 
to  regard  as  in  a  sense  neutralised.  On  the  zone 
the  parties  may  undertake  to  erect  no  fortifications 
and  to  maintain  no  armed  forces  but  those  necessary 
to  enforce  obedience  to  the  law.  Such  zones,  it 
is  seen,  are  not  neutralised  in  the  sense  of  being 

'  The  case  of  Savoy  is  anomalous  and  does  not  fall  within  the  scope 
of  the  present  volume. 

The  case  of  the  Ionian  Islands  has  given  rise  to  no  examination  of  the 
character  of  the  neutrality  conferred  on  them  by  the  treaties  of  1863 
and  1864.  That  of  July  12,  1863,  did  not  go  beyond  laying  down  the 
principle  that  the  Ionian  Islands  should  be  attached  to  Greece.  The 
Contracting  Powers  a  few  months  later  first  placed  all  the  islands  under 
the  regime  of  neutrality  and  then  confined  the  neutrality  to  the  islands 
of  Corfu  and  Paxo  only.  By  the  Treaty  of  March  29,  1864,  France, 
Great  Britain  and  Russia,  in  their  capacity  of  Guaranteeing  Powers, 
declared  with  the  assent  of  Austria  and  Prussia  that  the  islands  of  Corfu 
and  Paxo  with  their  dependencies,  after  being  united  with  the  Hellenic 
Kingdom,  should  enjoy  perpetual  neutrality,  the  King  of  the  Hellenes 
undertaking  to  preserve  such  neutrality. 


NEUTRALISATION  209 

recognised  as  such  by  any  third  Power  and  in  the 
event  of  war  between  the  States  concerned,  the 
arrangement  between  the  parties  would  cease  to 
be  operative.  There  have  been  many  instances 
of  buffer  zones  ^  in  the  course  of  history.  The  most 
recent  of  them,  estabhshed  by  agreement  between 
Sweden  and  Norway  in  1905,  is  a  zone  of  fifteen 
kilometres  on  either  side  of  their  frontier  within 
which  all  existing  fortresses  were  to  be  dismantled 
and  no  new  ones  to  be  erected  and  no  armed  troops 
to  be  maintained. 

The  principle  of  neutralisation  is  still  one  of  the 
most  promising  of  modern  political  developments 
for  restriction  of  geographical  areas  exposed  to 
the  calamities  of  war.  If  one  aggressive  State 
broke  its  promise,  other  States  respected  theirs, 
at  any  rate  as  regards  Belgium  and,  on  the  whole, 
the  de  facto  situation  is  favourable  to  reliance  on 
good  faith  being  observed  where  the  terms  of  a 
treaty  leave  no  room  for  equivocation.  With 
the  interdiction  of  secret  treaties  and  the  control 
of  foreign  policy  by  the  respective  parliaments 
of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  to  the  coming 
settlement,  international  affairs  may  be  brought 
into  line  with  the  ordinary  straightforward  rules 
of  conduct  by  which  honest  private  citizens  con- 
sider themselves  bound,  and  neutralisation  by 
treaty  or  proclamation  may  become  one  of  the  dif- 
ferent processes  of  law  by  which  war  may  eventually 
become  as  obsolete  as  duelling. 

^  See  special  note  on  Buffer  Zones,  pp.  222-224. 


NOTES  TO   CHAPTER  XI 

Suggested  Form  of  Agreement  as  to  Proclama- 
tions OF  Neutralisation^ 

Considering  that  Article  10  of  the  General  Act  of 
Berlin  of  February  26,  1885,  provides  that : 

"In  order  to  give  a  new  guarantee  of  security  to  trade 
and  industry,  and  to  encourage  by  the  maintenance  of 
peace  the  development  of  civilisation  in  the  countries 
mentioned  in  Article  I.,^  and  placed  under  the  free-trade 
system,  the  High  Signatory  Parties  to  the  present  Act, 
and  those  who  shall  hereafter  adopt  it,  bind  themselves 
to  respect  the  neutrality  of  the  territories  or  portions 
of  territories,  belonging  to  the  said  countries,  comprising 

'  From  Sir  T.  Barclay's  "  Problems  of  International  Practice  and 
Diplomacy."  London  and  Boston,  1907.  See  also  by  same  author, 
"International  Law  and  Practice  for  Comparison  of  Conventions  of 
1899  with  Those  of  1907." 

2  This  Article  extends  the  application  of  the  free-trade  declaration 
to  all  the  territories  forming  the  basin  of  the  Congo  and  its  tributaries. 
It  adds  a  zone  eastwards  of  the  Congo  Basin  to  the  Indian  Ocean,  and 
concludes  as  follows :  "  It  is  agreed  that,  in  extending  the  principle 
of  free  trade  to  this  eastern  zone,  the  Powers  represented  at  the  Confer- 
ence only  enter  into  an  undertaking  for  themselves,  and  that  this  prin- 
ciple does  not  apply  to  territory  belonging  at  present  to  any  independent 
and  sovereign  State  without  its  consent.  The  Powers  undertake  to  em- 
ploy their  good  oflBces  with  the  Governments  established  on  the  African 
shore  of  the  Indian  Ocean  with  a  view  to  obtaining  their  consent  thereto, 
and,  in  any  case,  to  assure  the  most  favourable  conditions  of  transit 
for  all  nations." 


NEUTRALISATION  2 1 1 

therein  the  territorial  waters,  so  long  as  the  Powers  which 
exercise  or  shall  exercise  the  rights  of  Sovereignty  or  Pro- 
tectorate over  those  territories,  using  their  option  of  pro- 
claiming themselves  neutral,  shall  fulfil  the  duties  which 
neutrality  requires," 

But  that  no  provision  has  been  made  for  the  mode  in 
which  notice  of  such  a  proclamation  of  neutralisation 
shall  be  given ;  ^ 

And  whereas  the  said  General  Act  provides  that  diffi- 
cirlties  arising  in  connection  with  the  territories  dealt 
with  under  it  shall,  before  any  appeal  to  arms,  be  sub- 
mitted to  mediation  or  arbitration ;  ^ 

And  considering  that  Article  11  provides  that  — 

"In  case  a  Power  exercising  rights  of  Sovereignty  or 
Protectorate  in  the  countries  mentioned  in  Article  I., 
and  placed  under  the  free-trade  system,  should  be  involved 
in  a  war,  then  the  High  Signatory  Parties  to  the  present 
Act,  and  those  who  shall  hereafter  adopt  it,  bind  them- 
selves to  lend  their  good  offices  in  order  that  the  terri- 
tories belonging  to  this  Power  and  comprised  in  the 
conventional  free-trade  zone  shall,  by  the  common  con- 
sent of  this  Power  and  of  the  other  belligerent  or  bellig- 
erents, be  placed  during  the  war  under  the  rule  of  neu- 
trality, and  considered  as  belonging  to  a  nonbelligerent 
State,  the  belligerents  thenceforth  abstaining  from  extend- 
ing hostilities  to  the  territories  thus  neutralised,  and  from 
using  them  as  a  basis  for  warlike  operations," 

^  The  provision  made  for  notice  in  case  of  occupation  is  as  follows : 
"Any  Power  which  shall  henceforth  take  possession  of  any  territory 
on  the  shores  of  the  African  Continent,  situate  outside  its  present  pos- 
sessions, or  which,  until  now,  having  none,  shall  come  to  acquire  any 
such  possessions,  and  any  Power  which  shall  assume  a  protectorate, 
shall  accompany  the  document  relating  thereto  by  a  notification  ad- 
dressed to  the  other  Powers,  signatories  to  the  present  Act,  in  order 
to  enable  them,  if  need  be,  to  make  good  any  claims"  (Article  34). 

*  Article  12. 


212  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

And  whereas  there  is  no  reason  why,  subject  to  the 
same  principles  and  conditions,  such  neutraUsation  should 
not  be  made  applicable  to  other  non-European  (Euro- 
pean ?)  regions ; 

It  is  hereby  agreed,  etc.,  as  follows : 

1.  Upon  notice  being  given  to  the  International  Bureau  ^ 
at  The  Hague  that  any  High  Contracting  Party  has 
placed  any  territory  under  the  regime  of  strict  permanent 
neutrality,  the  said  Bureau  shall  notify  all  the  other  High 
Contracting  Parties  accordingly.  If  within  three  months 
after  receipt  of  such  notification,  no  objection  should  be 
raised  by  any  H.  C.  P.,  such  permanent  neutrality  shall 
be  considered  as  proclaimed. 

2.  The  conditions  upon  which  permanent  neutrality 
shall  be  enjoyed  are  as  follows  : 

(a)  That  on  the  neutral  territory  there  shall,  at  no 
time,  be  raised  any  fortifications,  and  that  there  shall 
be  kept  up  in  connection  with  it  no  armed  ships  or  forces 
beyond  such  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  preservation  of 
public  order ; 

(6)  That  the  rules  of  neutrality  as  set  out  in  draft 
No.  9  shall  be  strictly  observed; 

(c)  That  all  international  difficulties,  without  any 
exception  whatsoever,  shall  be  deemed  ipso  facto  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  The  Hague  Court,  the  Umpire,  in 
case  of  disagreement  as  to  his  selection,  to  be  appointed 
by  the  President  of  the  Swiss  Confederation,  and  in  case 
Switzerland  should  be  a  party,  or  the  President  should 
refuse  to  act,  by  the  King  of  the  Belgians. 

3.  The  High  Contracting  Parties  solemnly  undertake  to 
respect  any  neutralisation  thus  proclaimed  and  observed. 
Any  breach  thereof  shall  be  submitted  to  The  Hague  Court 
in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  §  (c)  of  Article  2  hereof. 

^  See  Article  22  of  "  The  Hague  Peace  Convention." 


NEUTRALISATION  213 

Note  on  Some  German  Theories  Respecting  Neu- 
tralisation AND  Its  Guarantees 

A  theory  was  propounded  by  German  writers  in  the 
course  of  the  late  War  that  a  guarantee  of  neutralisation 
is  the  same  as  a  guarantee  of  integrity  and  that  Belgium 
was  not  bound  to  resist  the  invasion  of  German  troops 
under  the  treaty  imposing  neutralisation,  that  Germany 
in  undertaking  to  respect  her  integrity  and  defray  all 
the  expenses  and  loss  incurred  by  crossing  her  territory 
would  still  have  been  observing  the  conditions  of  her 
guarantee.  This,  however,  is  not  the  view  of  her  best 
known  and  most  influential  writer  on  International  Law, 
Professor  Von  Liszt,  of  the  University  of  Berlin,  who  has 
treated  the  whole  subject  in  a  totally  different  sense  in 
his  book:  "Das  Volkerrecht"  (9th  edition)  published  in 
1913.  I  translate  the  chief  passages  of  his  pronounce- 
ment on  the  subject : 

"Permanent  neutrality,"  he  says,  "in  the  first  place, 
is  binding  on  the  neutralised  State,  inasmuch  as  it  is 
not  only  forbidden  to  carry  on  any  war,  except  one  in 
defence  of  its  territory,  but  also,  not,  in  peace  time,  to 
conclude  any  Treaty  which  may  bind  it  to  carry  on  war. 
.  .  .  Permanent  neutralisation,  moreover,  is  binding 
upon  other  States  not  only  those  which  have  stipulated 
the  neutralisation  but  also  those  which  either  expressly  or 
even  only  tacitly  have  given  their  consent  to  it.  Viola- 
tion of  such  neutralisation  by  belligerents,  therefore, 
constitutes  an  international  delict  and  entitles  the  Powers 
to  take  steps  against  the  offender.  But  more  particularly 
does  the  neutralisation  bind  the  guaranteeing  Powers, 
that  is  to  say  those  States  which  have  bound  themselves 
to  uphold  the  integrity  of  the  territory  of  the  neutralised 
State,  to  defend  it,  if  need  be,  with  armed  forces.     If  the 


214  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

guarantee  is  a  collective  one,  it  binds  the  Powers,  how- 
ever, only  to  collective  intervention,  though  each  of  them 
is  entitled  to  unilateral  intervention. 

"Neutralisation  by  Treaty  creates  a  juridical  situa- 
tion which  can  only  be  altered  or  determined  by  consent 
of  the  contracting  States.  Hence  the  neutralised  State 
cannot  terminate  its  neutralisation  by  its  own  declara- 
tion nor  can  any  of  the  States  which  have  stipulated 
the  neutralisation  retire  voluntarily  from  its  undertaking. 
Any  accretions  of  territory,  which  include  colonial  acquisi- 
tions, on  the  part  of  the  neutralised  State,  however,  re- 
quire the  approval  of  other  States  and  especially  of  the 
guaranteeing  Powers.  This  follows  from  the  principle 
of  unity  of  State  territory  which  excludes  any  distinction 
between  neutralised  and  non-neutralised  parts."  ^ 

Professor  Von  Liszt,  I  may  mention,  was  nevertheless 
one  of  the  signatories  of  the  manifesto  of  the  "intel- 
lectuals" which  stated  that  it  was  not  true  that  Germany 
had  criminally  violated  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  be- 
cause she  had  unquestionable  proof  that  France  and 
England  had  already  made  preparations  to  violate  Bel- 
gian territory  and  that,  on  the  part  of  the  Fatherland, 
not  to  have  been  the  first  to  do  so  would  have  been  suicide. 
As  no  evidence  whatsoever  has  been  advanced  in  sup- 
port of  this  statement  except  two  reports  found  in  the 
archives  of  the  Foreign  OflSce  at  Brussels  after  the  inva- 
sion of  Belgium,  which  do  not  bear  out  the  allegation,  the 
signatories  must  have  been  entirely  misled  by  some  false 
allegations  submitted  to  them.  I  cannot  suppose  that 
an  accomplished  lawyer  like  Professor  Von  Liszt,  that 
first-class  business  men  like  Herr  Von  Gwinner  and  Doctor 
Kaempf,  that  men  trained  in  the  exact  sciences  like  Pro- 
fessors Ehrlich,  Ostwald  and  Haeckel,  that  a  mathema- 

*  Pages  60  et  seq. 


NEUTRALISATION  215 

tician  like  Professor  Foerster,  that  a  historian  like  Pro- 
fessor Lamprecht,  that  a  critical  theologian  like  Professor 
Von  Harnack,  that  men,  in  short,  with  great  European 
reputations  at  stake  should  have  subscribed  such  a 
statement  without  evidence  sufficiently  cogent  to  warrant 
their  doing  so.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  we  shall  some  day 
know  by  what  ignoble  methods  men  of  such  scientific 
eminence  can  have  been  induced  to  make  a  statement  of 
such  precision.  Professor  Schiemann,  to  whose  sagacity 
I  have  had  occasion  more  than  once  elsewhere  to  refer,^ 
was  not  misled.  As  he  seems  to  have  said  ^  the  manifesto 
proved  nothing  and,  therefore,  could  not  possibly  con- 
vince people  who  took  a  diametrically  opposite  view. 
If  they  were  not  misled  by  false  allegations,  it  only  shows 
that  in  time  of  war  even  the  wisest  of  men  revert  to 
unreasoning  combative  instincts.  I  need  not  quote 
from  less  exhaustive  examinations  of  the  subject  by 
other  German  publicists,  but  I  may  say  that  the  views 
expressed  by  Professors  Von  Ullmann  and  Gareis  in 
their  treatises  on  International  Law  are  practically  the 
same. 

Nor  did  official  Germany  contest  the  view  that  the 
neutralisation  of  Belgium  forbade  entry  upon  its  terri- 
tory. The  German  Chancellor,  apart  from  the  notorious 
incident  of  the  "scrap  of  paper",  stated  in  the  Reichs- 
tag: 

"We  are  in  a  state  of  legitimate  defence,  and  necessity 
knows  no  law.  Our  troops  have  occupied  Luxemburg 
and  have  perhaps  already  entered  Belgium.  This  is 
contrary  to  the  dictates  of  International  Law.     France 

^  See  Barclay's  "Thirty  Years  Anglo-French  Reminiscences."  Lon- 
don.    Constable  &  Co.,  1914. 

2  See  "Enqiiete"  of  Mr.  Ibanez  de  Ibero,  Echo  de  Paris,  March  29, 
1915.  Mr.  De  Ibero's  articles  have  since  been  republished  in  book 
form. 


216  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

has,  it  is  true,  declared  at  Brussels  that  she  was  prepared 
to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  so  long  as  it  was 
respected  by  her  adversary.  But  we  knew  that  France 
was  ready  to  invade  Belgium,  France  could  wait;  we 
could  not.  A  French  attack  upon  our  flank  in  the  region 
of  the  Lower  Rhine  might  have  been  fatal.  We  were, 
therefore,  compelled  to  ride  roughshod  over  the  legitimate 
protests  of  the  Governments  of  Luxemburg  and  Belgium. 
For  the  wrong  which  we  are  thus  doing,  we  will  make 
reparation  as  soon  as  our  military  object  is  attained." 

To  this  admission  that  the  invasion  was  a  violation 
of  Germany's  contractual  obligations  towards  Belgium 
and  her  co-guarantors,  the  contention  of  later  writers 
must  yield.  Moreover,  it  is  in  accordance,  as  we  have 
seen,  with  the  views  of  Germany's  leading  authorities 
on  International  Law. 

Far,  however,  from  facilitating  an  issue  from  the 
difficulties  we  have  to  face  in  determining  the  nature  of 
neutralisation,  the  admission  of  deliberate  illegality 
adds  very  seriously  to  the  complication. 

Neutralisation  is  solely  dependent  on  honourable 
observance  of  the  treaty  obligations  creating  it.  Even 
Treitschke,  the  apologist  of  all  that  is  ruthless,  selfish 
and  uncompromising  in  international  relations,  has 
warned  his  countrymen,  that,  "a  State  must  have  a 
very  highly-developed  sense  of  honour,  if  it  is  not  to  be 
disloyal  to  its  own  nature.  The  State  is  not  a  violet 
blooming  in  the  shade.  ...  It  must  strain  every  nerve 
to  preserve  for  itself  that  respect  which  it  enjoys  in  the 
State-system."  ^  We  shall  see  below  that  elsewhere  he 
qualifies  this  high-minded  recommendation  to  the  states- 
men of  the  Fatherland. 

i"The  Political  Thought  of  Heinrich  von  Treitschke",  by  H.  W. 
C.  Davis,  p.  177.    London,  1914. 


NEUTRALISATION  217 

There  is  no  ground  upon  which  a  nation  which  breaks 
its  bond  is  less  unworthy  than  an  individual  who  com- 
mits a  breach  of  trust.  International  good  faith  is  a 
primal  interest  for  the  whole  community  of  nations. 
That  engagements  shall  be  respected  is  the  groundwork 
of  civilised  intercourse.  It  is  no  mere  theoretical  or 
moral  proposition  to  say  that  on  the  sanctity  of  treaties 
rests  the  whole  fabric  of  international  stability.  On  the 
strength  of  the  confidence  that  States  will  respect  their 
engagements,  nations  enter  into  contracts  with  each  other 
without  taking  the  precautions  necessary  where  bad  faith 
may  be  apprehended.  The  interchange  of  merchandise 
between  the  citizens  of  different  States,  the  admission 
of  ships  to  each  other's  ports  and  harbours,  all  the  free- 
dom of  business  between  nations  is  guaranteed  by  trea- 
ties. Patents,  trade-marks,  designs,  copyright  are  all  the 
subject  of  treaties.  Cables,  telegraphs,  telephones,  postal 
services  all  interconnect  the  different  countries  of  the 
world  in  virtue  of  treaties.  In  short,  the  whole  intercourse, 
trade  and  navigation  of  the  two  hemispheres  is  subject 
to  the  fidelity  with  which  States  may  be  counted  upon 
to  respect  their  engagements.  Cases  there  have  been 
of  States  repudiating  engagements,  but  until  now  these 
have  never  been  among  the  great  States  and  the  result 
has  been  without  exception  disastrous  for  the  delinquents. 

In  the  case  of  Germany's  repudiation  of  her  engagements 
to  Belgium,  she  appeals  to  the  authority  of  her  chief 
political  historian,  Treitschke,  who,  in  spite  of  his  own 
theory  of  national  honour,  qualifies  the  binding  character 
of  treaty  engagements  to  such  an  extent  that  little  of  it 
remains : 

"The  relative  importance  of  various  obligations," 
he  says,  "must  be  quite  different  in  the  case  of  the  State 
from  what  it  is  in  the  case  of  private  individuals.    A  great 


218  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

number  of  the  duties  incumbent  upon  private  individuals 
could  not  possibly  be  held  to  be  incumbent  upon  the 
State.  The  highest  duty  of  the  State  is  self-preservation. 
Self-preservation  is  for  the  State  an  absolute  moral 
obligation.  And,  therefore,  it  must  be  made  clear  that  of 
all  political  sins,  that  of  weakness  is  the  most  heinous  and 
despicable.  ...  In  private  life  there  may  be  excuses 
for  moral  weakness.  In  the  State  there  can  be  no  ques- 
tion of  any  excuse.  The  State  is  Power,  and  if  it  is  false 
to  its  own  nature,  no  punishment  can  be  too  severe  for 
it."  1 

"Every  State,"  he  wrote  elsewhere,  "will  for  its  own 
sake  limit  its  sovereignty  to  a  certain  extent  by  means 
of  treaties.  When  States  conclude  agreements  with 
one  another,  they  do  to  some  extent  restrict  their  powers. 
But  this  does  not  really  alter  the  case,  for  every  treaty 
is  a  voluntary  self-limitation  of  an  individual  power, 
and  all  international  treaties  contain  the  tacit  proviso : 
rebus  sic  stantibus.  One  State  cannot  hamper  the  exer- 
cise of  its  free  will  in  the  future  by  an  obligation  to  another 
State.  The  State  has  no  supreme  judge  placed  above 
itself,  and,  therefore,  it  concludes  all  its  treaties  with 
that  mental  reservation.  This  is  confirmed  by  the  fact 
that  .  .  .  the  moment  war  is  declared  all  treaties  between 
the  belligerent  nations  are  cancelled.  Now  every  sover- 
eign State  has  the  unquestionable  right  to  declare  war 
when  it  so  desires  and,  therefore,  it  is  possible  for  every 
State  to  cancel  its  treaties."  ^ 

This  is  not  a  lawyer's  view  and  in  justice  to  German 
authorities  of  a  more  accurate  and  less  polemical  charac- 
ter, I  translate  the  following  passage  on  the  same  sub- 

1  "The  Political  Thought  of  Heinrich  von  Treitschke",  by  H.  W. 
C.  Davis,  p.  167.     London,  1914. 
*  Ibid.,  pp.  162  et  teq. 


NEUTRALISATION  219 

ject  from  the  already  quoted  work  on  International  Law 
of  Professor  Von  Liszt : 

"The  statement  that  all  international  treaties  are 
subject  to  the  tacit  clause  rebus  sic  stantibus,  that  on  alter- 
ation of  circumstances  they  may  be  denounced,  is  un- 
questionably as  a  general  proposition  inaccurate;  other- 
wise the  very  principles  of  international  law  would  be 
negatived.  The  course  of  historical  events  Involves  a 
continual  variation  of  circumstances  and  contractual 
fidelity,  without  which  no  international  law  can  subsist, 
would  be  within  the  discretion  of  the  contracting  States  . . . 

"...  Even  treaties  of  indefinite  duration  .  .  .  can- 
not be  offhand  cancelled  by  unilateral  denunciation.  .  ,  . 

"An  exception  is  admissible  only  in  so  far  as  a  treaty 
involves  specific  conditions,  expressed  or  tacit,  and  in  so 
far  as,  through  the  alteration  of  these  conditions,  the 
obligations  undertaken  have  become  essentially  heavier. 
If  a  State  has  guaranteed  the  integrity  of  another  State, 
the  treaty  of  guarantee  may  be  denounced  if,  through 
expansion  of  its  territory,  as  for  instance  through  the 
acquisition  of  an  extended  colonial  area,  the  obligations 
of  the  guaranteeing  State  are  sensibly  increased.  This 
would  apply  to  tariff  arrangements,  if  by  the  territorial 
expansion  the  new  economic  conditions  altered  essential 
conditions  of  the  arrangements.  Also  constitutional 
changes  as  from  a  monarchical  to  a  republican  form  of 
government,  or  vice  versa,  would  warrant  denunciation, 
if  the  treaty  had  been  entered  into  in  view  of  the  con- 
tinuance of  some  form  of  government. 

"Apart  from  such  exceptions,  the  principle  pacta 
sunt  servanda,  which  is  the  basis  of  all  law,  must  be  up- 
held." 1 

International  Law  has  only  the  binding  character 
1  "  Vdlkerrecht",  pp.  170  et  »eq. 


220  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

which  States  choose  to  accord  it.  Observance  of  its 
rules  depends  entirely  on  the  voluntary  respect  with 
which  the  Great  Powers  treat  them.  A  single  State 
so  powerful  that  it  is  beyond  reach  of  the  pressure  of 
other  States  can  set  them  at  naught.  Thus  for  genera- 
tions attempts  to  modify  international  maritime  law 
have  been  dependent  on  the  cooperation  of  England  as 
chief  maritime  State,  without  whose  assent  these  attempts 
were  necessarily  abortive.  So  it  is  as  regards  International 
Law  governing  matters  on  land.  Thus  without  the  co- 
operation of  Germany  as  the  then  greatest  military 
Power,  proposals  for  reduction  of  armaments,  in  spite 
of  their  having  the  support  of  practically  all  the  other 
great  Powers,  were  destined  to  failure  and  failed.  The 
same  consensus  is  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  exist- 
ing rules  and  practice.  A  great  Power  which  refuses  to 
recognise  the  binding  character  of  neutralisation  nega- 
tives its  purpose.  If  the  moral  restraints  of  neutralisa- 
tion by  treaty  can  no  longer  be  relied  upon,  the  independ- 
ence and  integrity  of  smaller  States  generally  will  depend 
upon  the  overwhelming  physical  cooperation  of  guar- 
anteeing States.  The  method  originally  planned  for 
the  protection  of  Holland  and  Belgium  was  the  creation 
of  a  line  of  fortifications  erected  at  the  expense  of  the 
guaranteeing  States.  Neutralisation  was  a  later  substi- 
tute for  this  method.  The  recent  War  has  shown  that 
fortresses  are  powerless  against  sufficiently  powerful 
artillery  and  we  are  thrown  back  on  trenches  and  water 
as  a  means  of  self-defence  and,  as  in  antiquity,  European 
frontiers,  liable  at  any  moment  to  violation,  may  have 
to  be  guarded  in  peace  as  in  war  time !  Without  going 
to  any  tragic  length  we  shall  now  have  to  consider  the 
feasibility  at  any  rate  of  bufiFer  zones  —  zones  on  either 
side  of  frontiers  within  which,  as  in  the  case  of  Sweden 


NEUTRALISATION  221 

and  Norway,  no  fortijQcations,  defences  of  any  kind,  or 
the  presence  of  troops  would  be  permissible.  The  neu- 
tralisation of  such  zones  would  at  least  prevent  the 
creation  of  such  a  threatening  anomaly  as  the  great 
German  camp  at  Elsenborn  on  the  very  edge  of  the  Bel- 
gian frontier. 

The  violation  of  Belgium's  neutrality  dwarfs  every 
other  violation  of  right  and  law  of  the  War.  Atrocities 
may  be  explained  to  the  satisfaction  of  those  in  whose 
name  they  were  committed,  ruses  of  war  may  be  argued 
to  cover  abuses  charged  against  each  other,  reprisals 
may  be  alleged  to  warrant  the  sinking  of  passenger  ships 
and  drowning  of  innocent  civilians,  damage  to  private 
property  and  harmless  persons  by  bombardment  may  be 
excused  on  the  ground  that  it  was  involuntary.  But  no 
excuse  can  be  given  for  the  imposition  of  war  upon  a 
neutralised  State  in  defiance  of  a  binding  treaty  by  a 
guarantor  of  that  neutralisation. 

By  straining  every  muscle  in  vindication  of  her  guar- 
antee England  has  earned  the  respect  of  posterity.  No 
other  European  State  engaged  in  this  frightful  conflict 
can  claim  to  have  entered  the  struggle  solely  as  she  did 
as  a  matter  of  national  honour  and  good  faith.  She  was 
ready  in  1911  to  go  to  war  at  the  side  of  France  in  fulfil- 
ment of  her  obligations  under  the  agreement  of  1904. 
She  was  only  partly  bound  to  assist  France  in  1914,  but 
as  she  was  bound  to  assist  France  to  resist  invasion  in 
1911  so  she  was  bound  to  resist  the  invasion  of  Belgium 
in  1914.  But  for  that  invasion  she  might  have  confined 
herself  to  carrying  out  her  obligations  to  France  in  respect 
of  the  navigation  of  the  British  Channel  and  the  Atlantic 
ports.  Whether  this  would  have  led  to  war  or  not  would 
have  depended  on  the  development  of  events.  England 
by  intervening  for  the  assertion  of  the  sanctity  due  to 


222  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

treaty  obligations  has  established  a  priceless  precedent 
for  the  protection  of  mankind  against  repetition  of  the 
crime  of  which  Germany  stands  convicted  at  the  bar  of 
history.^ 

Note  on  Buffer  Zones  2 

"Buffer"  zones  are  of  quite  recent  origin  as  a  political 
creation ;  i.e.  where  their  object  is  to  establish  upon  the 
territory  of  two  contiguous  States  a  strip  or  zone  on 
either  side  of  the  frontier  which  the  respective  States 
agree  to  regard  as  neutral,  on  which  the  parties  undertake 
to  erect  no  fortifications,  and  to  maintain  no  armed 
forces  but  those  necessary  to  enforce  the  ordinary  rights 
of  government.  The  word  "neutral"  does  not  correctly 
describe  the  character  of  the  zone.  It  is  not  neutral  in 
the  sense  of  being  recognised  as  such  by  any  third  State, 
and  it  necessarily  ceases  to  be  neutral  in  case  of  war 
between  the  States  concerned.  The  word  "buffer" 
comes  nearest  to  the  object,  but  even  this  term  implies 
more  than  is  meant. 

The  "buffer"  zones  between  European  and  native 
possessions  outside  Europe  differ  according  to  their  dif- 

^  A  German  newspaper  in  America  has  quoted  from  my  article  on 
Neutrality  in  the  last  edition  of  the  Encyclopaedia  Britannica  a  "prec- 
edent" in  the  Boer  War  when  Great  Britain  asked  and  obtained  from 
Portugal  permission  to  take  troops  across  Portuguese  colonial  territory. 
There  was  no  question  in  connection  with  this  incident  of  a  guarantee 
by  Great  Britain  of  the  neutrality  of  Portuguese  territory.  Nor  had 
any  such  neutrality  been  imposed  upon  Portugal  by  neighbouring  States. 
Portugal,  in  short,  was  free  to  allow  British  troops  and  ammunition 
to  cross  her  territory  in  the  same  way  as  Holland  would  be  free  to  allow 
British  or  German  troops  or  munitions  of  war  to  cross  her  territory.  It 
would  be  for  the  other  belligerent  to  regard  such  a  departure  from  the 
duties  of  neutrality  as  tantamount  to  joining  the  enemy. 

*  From  Sir  T.  Barclay's  "Problems  of  International  Practice  and 
Diplomacy."     London  and  Boston,  1907. 


NEUTRALISATION  223 

ferent  purposes.  Thus  eight  kilometres  on  either  side  of 
the  frontier  were  estabhshed  by  an  agreement  of  April  12, 
1882,  between  the  King  of  Cambodge  (under  French 
protectorate)  and  the  Governor  of  Cochin-China  for 
the  purpose  of  repressing  a  number  of  iniquities.  Under 
this  treaty  the  police  authorities  of  both  parties  were 
allowed  free  access  to  exercise  their  jurisdiction  through- 
out the  zone.  Between  Spain  and  Morocco  a  treaty 
of  March  5,  1894,  established  between  the  camp  of 
Melilla  and  Moroccan  territory  a  zone  within  which  no 
new  roads  were  to  be  made,  no  herds  to  be  allowed  to 
graze,  no  land  to  be  cultivated,  no  troops  of  either  party 
or  even  private  persons  carrying  arms  to  set  foot,  no 
inhabitants  to  dwell,  and  all  habitations  to  be  razed. 
The  zone  between  Burmah  and  Siam,  established  by  an 
agreement  between  Great  Britain  and  France,  dated 
January  15,  1896,  declared  "the  portion  of  Siam  w^hich 
is  comprised  within  the  drainage  basin  of  the  Menam, 
and  of  the  coast  streams  of  a  corresponding  longitude" 
neutral  as  between  them.  Within  this  area  the  two 
Powers  undertook  not  to  "operate  by  their  military  or 
naval  forces,  except  in  so  far  as  they  might  do  so  in  concert 
for  any  purpose  requisite  for  maintaining  the  independence 
of  Siam."  They  also  undertook  not  to  acquire  within 
that  area  any  privileges  or  commercial  facilities  not  ex- 
tended to  both  of  them. 

"Buffer"  zones  might  fulfil  a  useful  purpose  even  in 
Europe.  They  would  obviously  react  against  the  well- 
known  feeling  known  as  "esprit  de  frontiere" ,  and  diminish 
the  danger  of  incidents  arising  out  of  this  feeling,  and 
might  attenuate  the  rivalry  of  neighbouring  counter- 
armaments. 

These  considerations  no  doubt  led  the  Swedish  and 
Norwegian  governments  in  their  settlement  of  September, 


224  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

1905,  to  establish  a  "buffer"  zone  of  fifteen  kilometres  on 
either  side  of  the  frontier  between  the  two  States  in 
question.  Within  these  thirty  kilometres  all  existing  for- 
tresses are  dismantled,^  no  new  ones  are  to  be  erected, 
and  no  armed  troops  to  be  maintained;  any  question 
between  the  two  States  relative  to  the  provisions  respect- 
ing the  "buffer"  zone  to  be  decided  by  arbitration. 
There  are  other  provisions  in  the  Swedo-Norwegian 
Treaty  the  object  of  which  is  to  render  armaments  as 
between  them  unnecessary. 

*  It  was  stipulated  that  the  dismantling  should  be  controlled  by  a 
technical  Commission  of  three  officers  of  foreign  nationality,  to  be 
chosen,  one  by  each  of  the  contracting  powers,  and  the  third  by  the  two 
officers  thus  appointed,  or,  in  default  of  an  agreement  on  their  part,  by 
the  President  of  the  Swiss  Confederation.  The  dismantling  of  the  forts 
in  question  has  now  been  carried  out.  The  Commission  was  composed 
on  the  part  of  Sweden  of  an  engineer  on  the  staff  of  the  Austrian  army, 
and  on  the  part  of  Norway  of  a  Colonel  in  the  German  army,  and,  by 
agreement  of  these,  of  a  Colonel  in  the  Dutch  army. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE   HAGUE   COURT   AND   ITS   POTENTIALITIES 

To  sneer  at  the  Hague  Court,  at  arbitration, 
at  peace  methods  generally  because  the  most  terrible 
war  the  world  ever  saw  broke  out  in  spite  of  them, 
is  just  about  as  reasonable,  as  I  have  said  of  Inter- 
national Law,  as  to  sneer  at  engineering,  archi- 
tecture and  the  science  of  building  generally,  because 
an  earthquake  has  destroyed  some  of  man's  finest 
work.  There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  trea- 
ties relating  to  Arbitration  and  the  Hague  Court 
and  to  International  Law,  as  established  by  the 
Hague  conventions  and  by  treaties  between  and 
with  our  Allies  and  with  neutrals,  just  as  they 
stood  before  the  War  in  spite  of  violations  on  all 
hands  by  belligerents  of  almost  every  rule  which 
had  been  laid  down  by  statesmen  and  jurists  for 
the  humanising,  so  far  as  it  can  be  made  human, 
of  so  insensate  a  survival  of  barbarism  as  war,  have 
lost  their  cogency  and  effect.  And  a  stroke  of  the 
pen  can  revive  their  cogency  and  effect  as  regards 
our  late  enemies.  It  is  certain  that  the  Congress 
of  Peace  will  see  in  an  extension  of  its  scope  and 
effect,  without  expecting  from  it  realisation  of  any 
of  the  dreams  of  a  millennium  in  which  some  of  its 
more  ardent  apologists  have  indulged,  a  part  of  the 


226  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

work  to  be  done  for  the  promotion  of  law  and  order 
throughout  the  world. 

The  Hague  Court  owes  its  origin  to  the  Peace 
Conference  of  1899,  but  to  understand  its  true 
nature  and  objects  we  must  go  back  to  an  earlier 
period  in  the  history  of  International  Arbitration. 
International  Arbitration  means  simply  the  refer- 
ence of  disputes  between  independent  States  to 
arbitrators  chosen  by  the  parties  themselves.  It 
is  this  voluntary  and  agreed  selection  of  the  judges 
that  distinguishes  arbitration  from  adjudication 
in  disputes  in  ordinary  Courts  of  Justice.  Arbi- 
tration is  no  new  thing  in  the  settlement  of  disputes 
between  nations.  All  cases,  however,  down  to 
the  great  one  about  which  I  shall  speak  presently, 
had  been  decided  by  an  arbitrator  or  arbitrators 
without  regard  to  any  particular  procedure  and 
without  any  attempt  to  assimilate  the  forms  of 
any  national  judicature.  There  was  no  question 
of  deciding  international  differences  as  differences 
between  individuals  are  decided  in  Law  Courts. 
It  was  due  to  the  statesmen  of  the  two  great  Anglo- 
Saxon  communities  that  the  first  attempt  was 
made  to  deal  with  grave  international  differences 
in  accordance  with  the  forms  of  national  justice. 
In  spite  of  the  violent  opposition  of  excited  patriots 
the  two  governments  signed  a  treaty  at  Washington 
in  1871  referring  the  Alabama  and  several  smaller 
analogous    cases    to    the    decision    of    arbitrators.^ 

1  The  Alabama  was  a  vessel  built  in  British  waters  for  use  as  a  war 
vessel  in  the  service  of  the  Southern  Confederates  during  the  great 


HAGUE  COURT  AND  ITS  POTENTIALITIES     227 

For  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  arbitration  a 
system  which  has  now  become  almost  common 
practice  was  adopted.  The  Court  was  constituted 
of  three  foreign  arbitrators,  viz. :  Count  Sclopis, 
an  ItaHan,  M.  Stoempfli,  a  Swiss,  and  Baron  DTta- 
juta,  a  Brazihan.  Lord  Chief  Justice  Cockburn 
sat  on  the  Court  on  behalf  of  Great  Britain  and 
Charles  Francis  Adams  on  behalf  of  the  United 
States.  Count  Sclopis  presided.  This  Tribunal 
met  at  Geneva  in  1871,  and  after  sitting  for  nine 
months  delivered  an  award  condemning  the  British 
Government  to  pay  a  sum  of,  in  round  figures, 
three  and  a  quarter  million  pounds,  as  an  indemnity 
for  the  damage  done  in  particular  by  the  Alabama 
in  the  capture  of  Northern  or  Federal  ships  for  the 
benefit  of  their  ultimately  defeated  adversaries, 
the  Southern  or  Confederate  States.  The  result 
eventually  came  to  be  regarded  as  highly  satis- 
factory, and  excited  patriots  were  obliged  to  admit 
that  high  as  the  indemnity  was,  it  was  an  infinitely 
better  solution  than  submitting  the  question  to 
the  arbitrament  of  brute  force ;  and  we  cannot 
at  the  present  day  but  rejoice  that  the  Government 
had  the  foresight  to  resist  the  combative  instincts 
of  those  who  regarded  acceptance  of  a  peaceable 
settlement  as  the  abdication  of  England's  proud 
independence  and  an  acceptance  of  foreign  dicta- 
tion in  a  matter  governed  by  no  then  existing  rules 

American  Civil  War.  That  the  vessel  was  being  built  for  this  purpose 
was  notorious,  and  the  attention  of  the  British  Government  was  called 
to  this  fact  by  the  United  States  Minister  in  London.  The  vessel  was, 
nevertheless,  allowed  to  sail,  and  at  the  Azores  she  was  equipped  for 
active  service  in  the  then  pending  war. 


228  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

of  international  practice.  So  true  is  it  that  there 
were  at  that  time  no  such  rules  that  the  Treaty 
of  Washington  had  to  lay  down  certain  principles 
of  law  which  were  stated  in  the  treaty  not  to  be  of 
general  acceptance  but  only  to  have  been  adopted 
for  the  purpose  of  the  case  in  question.  These 
principles,  however,  in  spite  of  the  British  reserva- 
tion, have  become  the  law  of  civilised  nations, 
and  are  now  incorporated  as  such  in  one  of  the 
Hague  conventions.  The  precedent  of  the  Geneva 
Court,  however,  remained  a  solitary  exception 
among  the  numerous  arbitrations  which  followed  it 
for  thirty  years. 

Meanwhile,  in  both  England  and  the  United 
States,  the  idea  that  arbitration  might  some  day 
become  a  standing  international  institution  never 
ceased  to  occupy  the  minds  of  pacific  reformers. 
It  became  almost  a  commonplace  to  advocate  the 
principle  of  arbitration  in  every  case  of  international 
difficulty,  and  in  1895  Lord  Alverstone,  at  a  meet- 
ing of  the  International  Law  Association  at  Brussels, 
stated  that  "arbitration  was  now  regarded  as  so 
fully  recognised  by  all  civilised  nations  that  it 
had  become  unnecessary  to  argue  in  its  support." 
Schemes  of  procedure  were  drawn  up  by  different 
international  bodies,  and  towards  the  close  of  the 
last  century  men  began  to  talk  seriously  about 
general  and  standing  treaties  of  arbitration  and 
the  possibility  of  a  permanent  Court  for  its  applica- 
tion without  that  ironical  undercurrent  which  until 
then  had  marked  the  expression  of  the  practical 
man's    feelings    towards    arbitration.     It    had,    in 


HAGUE  COURT  AND  ITS  POTENTIALITIES     229 

fact,  been  made  slightly  ridiculous  by  the  exagger- 
ated hopes  expressed  by  some  of  its  more  injudicious 
advocates.  At  length  the  idea  of  a  standing  treaty 
of  arbitration  struck  the  highly  practical  mind 
of  the  late  Lord  Salisbury  as  feasible,  at  any  rate, 
between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain, 
and  in  1896  he  was  personally  directing  negotiations 
for  this  purpose  with  the  Department  of  State  at 
Washington.  The  negotiations  resulted,  in  1897, 
in  the  signing  of  such  a  treaty  for  five  years.  I 
cannot  help  thinking  that  the  principles  of  that 
treaty  were  full  of  wisdom.  It  did  not  attempt  to 
do  the  impossible  but  only  to  meet  different  con- 
tingencies which  could  arise  between  two  nations 
in  the  way  best  adapted  to  avoid  national  suscepti- 
bilities. 

There  were  to  be  three  classes  of  arbitration  tri- 
bunals. For  questions  of  indemnity  up  to  £100,000, 
three  arbitrators  were  to  be  necessary.  When 
more  than  that  sum  was  in  dispute,  five  arbitrators 
were  to  be  called  in.  For  territorial  or  national 
questions  of  supreme  importance  the  number  of 
arbitrators  was  increased  to  six.  In  case  of  the 
arbitrators  finding  it  impossible  to  form  the  re- 
quired majorities,  a  friendly  Power  was  to  be  called 
in.  to  mediate.* 

*  The  chief  clauses  in  the  Treaty  were  Article  VI  and  Article  VII. 
Article  VI  was  as  follows : 

"Any  controversy  which  shall  involve  the  determination  of  terri- 
torial claims  shall  be  submitted  to  a  tribunal  composed  of  six  members, 
three  of  whom  shall  be  Judges  of  the  British  Supreme  Court  of  Judica- 
ture, or  members  of  the  Judicial  Committee  of  the  Privy  Council,  to  be 
nominated  by  Her  Britannic  Majesty,  and  the  other  three  of  whom  shall 


230  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

The  essential  point  in  this  project  was  that  for 
these  questions  of  supreme  national  importance 
the  arbitrators  were  to  belong  exclusively  to  the 
two  contracting  States.  The  idea  which  had  pre- 
vailed until  then  in  the  constituting  of  Courts 
of  Arbitration  was  that  the  arbitrator  or  umpire, 
if  more  than  one,  was  necessarily  a  person  who, 
by  his  independence  and  entire  detachment  from 
the  interests  involved,  had  the  requisite  impartiality 
for  the  pure  and  simple  application  of  principles 
of  justice.  It  was  thought  that  nations  could  only 
apply  as  between  themselves  the  same  principles 
as  regulate  litigation  between  citizens.  And  indeed 
the  assimilation  is  reasonable  and  perfectly  practi- 
cable for  questions  of  indemnity,  which  constitute 
the  majority  of  international  differences. 

The  use  of  the  word  "arbitration"  in  connection 
with  this  proposed  mode  of  dealing  with  such  vital 
issues  is  therefore  to  some  extent  misleading.     The 

be  Judges  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  or  Justices  of  the 
Circuit  Courts,  to  be  nominated  by  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
whose  award  by  a  majority  of  not  less  than  five  to  one  shall  be  final. 
In  case  of  an  award  made  by  less  than  the  prescribed  majority,  the 
award  shall  also  be  final,  imless  either  Power  shall,  within  three  months 
after  the  award  has  been  reported,  protest  that  the  same  is  erroneous,  in 
which  case  the  award  shall  be  of  no  validity.  In  the  event  of  an  award 
made  by  less  than  the  prescribed  majority  and  protested  as  above  pro- 
vided, or  if  the  members  of  the  Arbitral  Tribunal  shall  be  equally  divided, 
there  shall  be  no  recourse  to  hostile  measures  of  any  description  until 
the  mediation  of  one  or  more  friendly  Powers  has  been  invited  by  one 
or  both  of  the  high  contracting  parties." 

Article  VII  provided  for  decision  by  a  tribunal  similarly  composed 
of  all  questions  "of  principle  of  grave  general  importance  affecting  the 
national  rights"  of  either  State,  "as  distinguished  from  the  private 
rights  whereof  it  is  merely  the  international  representative." 


HAGUE  COURT  AND  ITS  POTENTIALITIES     231 

Court  provided  for  that  treaty  was  called  an  "Arbitral 
Tribunal."  In  reality  it  was  a  "Joint  Commission." 
This  Joint  Commission,  then,  was  instituted  to  meet 
the  difficulty  of  bringing  grave  national  issues  within 
the  operation  of  the  Arbitration  Treaty  in  question. 
The  draftsmen  of  the  Treaty  of  1897  knew  that  no 
Great  Powers  would  dare  to  leave  the  decision  of 
any  vital  issues  between  them  to  the  hazard  of 
any  independent  judgment,  however  great  and 
unquestioned  the  impartiality  of  the  judge.  It 
has  always  been  felt  that  such  issues  could  never 
be  committed  to  the  decision  of  foreign  arbitrators, 
or  of  a  foreign  umpire,  an  umpire  being,  for  obvious 
reasons,  necessarily  a  foreigner.  The  negotiators, 
therefore,  provided  that  there  should  be  neither 
outside  arbitrators  nor  any  umpire  at  all.  Further- 
more, to  allay  fears  that  any  great  national  interest 
might  be  exposed  to  quixotic  or  unpractical  views 
taken  by  any  single  judge,  it  was  provided  that, 
to  be  binding,  the  decision  should  require  the  con- 
currence against  it  of  two  out  of  three  of  the  judges 
appointed  by  either  party.  This  precluded,  by 
a  simple  and  practical  method,  for  both  countries, 
any  danger  of  decisions  which  might  excite  national 
distrust.  The  object  of  the  two  governments  was, 
manifestly,  not  so  much  to  create  a  substitute  for 
war,  as  to  provide  a  further  stage  of  negotiation, 
and  enable  Governments  to  issue  from  any  dead- 
lock into  which  they  might  have  been  drawn  in  the 
heat  of  controversy  or  by  pressure  of  public  opinion. 
They  consequently  limited  their  efforts  to  the 
creation,    without   the   introduction    of    any    third 


232  COLL^VPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

or  independent  element,  of  an  automatic  system, 
calculated  to  remove  questions  between  the  two 
States  from  irritating  discussion  by  irresponsible 
politicians  who  can  seldom  be  sufficiently  conversant 
with  the  facts  to  deal  efficiently  with  them.  They 
hoped  thereby  to  arrest  the  development  of  those 
vague  hatreds,  created  by  prejudice  and  ignorance, 
which  grow  no  one  knows  how,  and  soon  break 
away  from  their  initial  cause.  Unfortunately  this 
Anglo-American  Treaty  was  not  adopted  by  the 
United  States  Senate,  although  there  was  a  majority 
of  sixteen  in  its  favour,  owing  to  the  fact  that  the 
United  States  Constitution  requires  a  two  thirds 
majority  for  the  adoption  of  a  treaty.  There  were 
42  votes  for  and  26  against  it.  A  transfer  of  four 
votes  from  the  negative  to  the  affirmative  would 
have  sufficed  to  ratify  it. 

At  length  came  the  Czar's  famous  rescript  of 
1898.  Count  Muravieff,  his  Foreign  Minister,  in- 
cluded among  the  subjects  for  discussion  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  uniform  practice  in  reference  to  good 
offices,  mediation  and  facultative  arbitration,  but 
the  proposal  of  a  Court  of  Arbitration  once  more 
came  from  the  representatives  of  the  two  Anglo- 
Saxon  communities.  It  was  more  particularly,  in 
fact.  Lord  Pauncefote,  the  British  Delegate,  who 
had  signed  the  Anglo-American  Treaty  when  British 
Ambassador  at  Washington  two  years  before,  to 
whom  the  proposal  of  the  Permanent  Court  was  due. 

There  is  something  colossal  in  the  very  idea  of 
a  permanent  Court  of  Justice  for  the  decision  of 


HAGUE  COURT  AND  ITS  POTENTIALITIES     233 

differences  between  States.  One  thinks  of  the 
graduation  of  our  national  Courts,  of  how  our  judi- 
cial organisation  provides  an  ever  higher  rank  and 
greater  function,  as  it  ascends  from  rung  to  rung 
in  the  hierarchy,  and  yet  the  highest  rung  only 
deals  with  very  small  matters  compared  with  the 
immense  interests  involved  in  the  decision  of  an 
international  issue.  Our  sense  of  proportion  asks 
where  we  should  find  the  judges  great  enough  to 
inspire  awe  and  confidence  in  the  mighty  litigants 
who  are  to  humbly  submit  their  differences  to  this 
highest  jurisdiction  of  mankind. 

States  shrank  from  making  recourse  to  the  new 
Court  compulsory.  In  fact  they  repudiated  the 
idea  of  compulsion  in  every  provision  of  the  Con- 
vention of  1899,  and  much  to  the  disappointment 
of  many  of  the  more  ardent  votaries  of  arbitration, 
it  contains  specific  warnings  of  its  purely  optional 
character.  Thus  the  signatory  Powers  undertake, 
in  case  of  grave  disagreement  or  conflict,  before 
appealing  to  arms,  **as  far  as  circumstances  allow", 
to  have  recourse  to  the  good  offices  or  mediation 
of  one  or  more  friendly  Powers,  and,  "as  far  as 
circumstances  allow",  the  Powers  may  tender  their 
good  offices,  and  the  exercise  of  this  right  can  never 
be  considered  as  an  unfriendly  act.  Provision  is 
made  "as  far  as  circumstances  allow",  and  where 
involving  "neither  national  honour  nor  vital  inter- 
ests", for  international  commissions  of  inquiry 
which  are  to  have  no  binding  character  for  the 
parties. 

The  Convention  on  the  subject  states  that  the 


234  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

object  of  the  Permanent  Court  was  to  facilitate 
immediate  recourse  to  arbitration  for  international 
differences  which  it  had  not  been  possible  to  settle 
by  diplomacy.  It  was  to  be  at  all  times  accessible 
and  to  operate,  unless  otherwise  stipulated  by  the 
parties,  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  procedure 
inserted  in  the  Convention.  The  Conference,  it 
is  seen,  left  it  to  the  Powers  themselves  to  organise 
the  Permanent  Court,  but  it  made  a  suggestion  of 
what  might  be  the  composition  of  the  Court  failing 
direct  agreement  of  the  parties,  viz. :  that  each 
party  should  appoint  two  arbitrators  and  that  these 
together  should  choose  an  umpire. 

It  was  also  agreed  that  each  signatory  Power 
should  select  four  persons  of  known  competency 
in  questions  of  international  law  and  of  the  highest 
moral  reputation  to  form  a  panel  of  members  of 
the  Court  from  which  the  Arbitrators  could  be 
selected.  The  panel  was  duly  created,  but  for 
some  time  it  seemed  as  if  the  Court  was  destined 
to  remain  a  mere  pious  wish,  if  not  an  ironical 
demonstration  of  the  absurdity  of  "pacifism", 
a  term  which  had  been  invented  by  the  adversaries 
of  pacific  methods  generally.  For  three  years 
no  recourse  was  had  to  the  new  institution.  To 
the  English  judicial  mind  in  particular  it  merely 
appeared  as  a  sort  of  concession  of  the  practical 
man  to  popular  sentiment,  even  perhaps  to  popular 
ignorance  which  it  would  be  safe  to  ignore.  At 
length  the  United  States  and  Mexico,  less  suscep- 
tible to  the  ridicule  of  the  ignorant,  gave  it  its  first 
case,  and  "gave  a  lesson  to  the  Old  World." 


HAGUE  COURT  AND  ITS  POTENTIALITIES     235 

The  lesson  had  its  effect.  It  was  le  premier  pas 
qui  coute,  and  since  then  the  Hague  Court  has  had 
many  cases.  I  do  not  say  that  they  have  all 
been  cases  which  would  not  have  been  settled  by 
arbitration  without  the  existence  of  the  Hague 
Court,  but  I  do  say  that  the  existence  of  this  Court 
has  facilitated  recourse  to  arbitration,  that  irritating 
discussion  preliminary  to  the  adoption  of  its  pro- 
cedure has  been  avoided,  and  that  it  has  had  a 
suggestive  influence  generally  which  has  relieved 
States  from  any  need  of  public  justification  of 
recourse  to  its  peaceful  agency.  Its  utilisation, 
moreover,  may  be  the  means  of  proceeding  further 
in  the  development  of  arbitration  by  the  broaden- 
ing of  the  area  of  its  jurisdiction,  so  to  speak,  and 
by  the  adaptation  of  its  methods  to  the  varying 
requirements  of  international  controversies.^ 

International  Law  is  not  backed  up  with  a  police 
force  to  carry  out  its  fiats.  It  depends  for  its 
observance  upon  the  reasonableness  of  its  rules. 
Diplomacy,  the  chief  agency  by  which,  in  time  of 
peace.  International  Law  is  applied,  on  the  other 
hand,  like  the  procedure  of  our  domestic  courts 
of  justice,  is  largely  a  congeries  of  devices  which 
have  grown  up  to  provide  for  requirements  shown 
to  exist,  owing  to  the  inherent  intellectual  short- 
comings of  the  men  who  resort  to  law  or  even  of 
those    who   have   to    apply    it.     In    our    domestic 

'  See  a  full  analysis  of  the  cases  which  have  been  dealt  with  by  the 
Hague  Court :  Barclay,  "New  Methods  of  Adjusting  International  Dis- 
putes and  the  Future",  chap.  VII.     London,  1917. 


236  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

courts  we  distrust  leaving  irrevocable  decisions  to 
the  judgment  of  one  man  or  prescribing  finality 
either  to  arguments  or  to  evidence.  And,  to  a 
great  extent,  circumstances  have  also  led  in  diplo- 
macy to  the  employment  of  many  different  forms 
to  enable  governments  in  a  similar  way  to  avoid 
the  calamity  of  deadlocks.  Yet  deadlocks  do 
occur,  and  we  had,  before  the  diplomatic  break- 
down of  1914,  recently  been  more  than  once  brought 
to  the  verge  of  war  with  powerful  neighbours  by 
practical  deadlocks.  Our  diplomatic  machinery, 
in  spite  of  its  arsenal  of  forms,  failed  for  want  of  a 
further  jurisdiction,  which,  by  operation  of  law, 
without  further  discussion,  should  become  neces- 
sarily possessed  of  the  question  at  issue.  We  can- 
not disregard  the  natural  weaknesses  of  mankind 
in  the  relations  of  nations  with  one  another.  Pa- 
triotism, ignorance,  "bluff",  improvidence,  thought- 
lessness, courage,  love  of  excitement,  conceit,  con- 
viction (right  or  wrong) ,  misunderstanding,  exagger- 
ation, all  affect  the  course  of  international  questions, 
when  public  opinion  is  appealed  to  or  allowed  to 
take  any  part  in  their  decision.  This  is  the  danger, 
and  successful  as  our  diplomacy  usually  is,  we  can 
no  longer  rely,  in  the  circumstances  of  the  present 
age  —  with  a  vigilant  and  enterprising  press  ruth- 
lessly day  by  day  dissecting  every  international 
incident,  and  a  nervous,  overstrained  democracy 
which,  especially  in  overcrowded  cities,  claims  its 
say  in  all  public  matters  —  on  the  quiet  settlement 
of  diflBculties,  which  the  accredited  diplomatists 
have  not  solved,  without  the  aid  of  some  further 


HAGUE  COUET  AND  ITS  POTENTIALITIES     237 

dilatory  amicable  procedure  by  which  governments 
can  at  least  gain  time. 

Whatever  difference  of  opinion  may  exist  as  to 
the  mode  in  which  arbitration  can  be  best  adapted 
to  cover  such  and  all  cases  of  international  difficulty, 
we  have  the  great,  if  only,  precedent  of  a  general 
arbitration  treaty  between  great  Powers,  the  unrati- 
fied Anglo-American  Treaty  of  1897.  It  cannot  be 
denied  that  that  treaty  is  based  on  a  reasonable 
view  of  the  difficulties  which  beset  arbitration, 
where  national  questions  of  vital  importance  are 
involved.  It  embodies,  at  any  rate,  as  President 
Cleveland  said  of  it,  a  "practical  working  plan" 
for  bringing  these  delicate  matters  within  a  general 
treaty.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Hague  Conven- 
tion has  dealt  with  all  matters  but  this  very  class, 
which  was  excluded  from  the  purview  of  the  Con- 
ference, and  as  regards  all  others  but  this  class, 
reference  to  the  Hague  Court  is  fast  being  made 
compulsory.  Then  what  is  wanted,  to  complete 
the  work  done  at  the  Hague,  is  to  graft  upon  it 
some  such  provisions  as  those  contained  in  the  Anglo- 
American  Treaty,  confining  the  choice  of  the  arbi- 
trators, where  the  question  is  of  vital  importance, 
to  persons  exclusively  of  the  nationality  of  the 
States  concerned. 

There  are  three  great  landmarks  in  the  history 
of  systematic  arbitration,  that  is,  arbitration  as  a 
judicial  method  of  adjusting  international  differ- 
ences. The  first  was  the  Anglo-American  Alabama 
arbitration  at  Geneva  in  which  the  forms  and  pro- 


238  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

cedure  of  law  courts  were  followed.  The  second 
was  the  constitution  of  a  permanent  court  of  arbi- 
tration at  the  Hague  modelled  more  or  less  upon  the 
principles  of  the  Geneva  arbitration  court.  The 
third  was  the  first  standing  treaty  of  arbitration, 
imder  which  two  great  Powers  determined  to  submit 
all  differences  of  a  judicial  character  to  the  decision 
of  this  court.  That  treaty  was  signed  by  Lord 
Lansdowne,  the  British  Secretary  for  Foreign  Ajffairs, 
and  M.  Cambon,  the  French  Ambassador,  on  Octo- 
ber 14,  1903,  a  treaty  for  ever  memorable  because 
it  was  the  first  of  the  series  of  agreements  which 
consolidated  the  Entente  between  England  and 
France.  It  provided  that  differences  "of  a  judicial 
order,  or  relating  to  the  interpretation  of  existing 
Treaties  between  the  two  Contracting  Parties, 
which  may  arise,  and  which  it  may  not  have  been 
possible  to  settle  by  diplomacy,  shall  be  submitted 
to  the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration,  established 
by  the  Convention  of  July  29,  1899,  at  the  Hague, 
on  condition,  however,  that  neither  the  vital  interests, 
nor  the  independence  or  honour  of  the  two  Con- 
tracting States,  nor  the  interests  of  any  State  other 
than  the  two  contracting  States,  are  involved." 

The  terms  of  agreement  as  adopted  by  Great 
Britain  and  France  became  a  sort  of  common  form, 
and  in  the  course  of  a  few  years  there  were  but  a 
few  States  in  the  world  which  had  not  concluded 
with  each  other  similar  treaties.  The  Hague  Court, 
in  fact,  was  now  universally  recognised  as  an  inter- 
national institution  with  a  definite  function. 

A  fact   which  has   probably   been   forgotten   by 


HAGUE  COURT  AND  ITS  POTENTIALITIES     239 

most  people  by  this  time  is  that  the  Russian  original 
project  of  a  general  treaty  of  arbitration  provided 
that  it  should  be  obligatory.  The  then  famous 
Article  10  of  that  project  provided  as  follows : 

"From  the  ratification  of  the  present  Act  by  all 
the  signatory  powers,  arbitration  is  obligatory  in 
the  following  cases,  in  so  far  as  they  do  not  affect 
either  vital  interests  or  the  national  honour  of 
the  contracting  States  : 

"1.  In  cases  of  difficulty  or  contention  relating 
to  pecuniary  damage  suffered  by  a  State  or  its 
citizens,  in  consequence  of  illegal  acts  or  negligence 
of  another  State  or  its  citizens. 

"2.  In  cases  of  difference  relating  to  the  inter- 
pretation or  application  of  the  treaties  or  conven- 
tions herein  mentioned. 

"(a)  Treaties  and  conventions  relating  to  posts 
and  telegraphs,  railways,  protection  of  submarine 
cables;  prevention  of  collisions  on  the  high  seas; 
navigation  of  international  rivers  and  inter-oceanic 
canals. 

"(6)  Conventions  relating  to  copyright  and  indus- 
trial property  (patents,  trade-marks,  etc.) ;  to 
money  and  weights  and  measures ;  to  sanitary 
and  veterinary  matters  and  the  phylloxera. 

"(c)  Conventions  relating  to  successions,  cartel 
and  mutual  judicial  assistance. 

"(d)  Conventions  relating  to  boundaries,  in  so 
far  as  of  a  purely  technical  and  nonpolitical  char- 
acter." 

To  the  first  class  in  this  enumeration  some  excep- 
tion was  taken,  but  the  conference  was  practically 


240  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

agreed  on  the  general  principle  of  the  article, 
viz. :  that  the  signatories  should  oblige  themselves 
to  refer  to  arbitration  all  matters  not  involving 
a  vital  interest  or  the  national  honour.  After 
recasting  the  Russian  project  to  meet  different 
objections  of  detail,  the  idea  of  making  reference 
to  arbitration  obligatory,  even  on  these  minor 
matters,  had  to  be  abandoned.  One  Power  alone, 
but  a  very  great  Power,  refused  to  agree  to  obliga- 
tory arbitration  in  any  case  whatsoever.  That 
Power  was  Germany,  who  "did  not  consider  that 
she  could  enter  into  any  treaty  binding  herself 
beforehand  to  submit  new  cases  to  arbitration." 
But  for  Germany's  persistent  obstruction,  arbi- 
tration might  by  now  have  reached  a  point  at 
which  even  "national  honour  and  vital  interests" 
could  be  included  in  its  jurisdiction. 

At  the  time  it  seemed  as  if  this  opposition  on  the 
part  of  a  leading  State  on  an  essential  point  would 
made  the  whole  work  of  the  conference  in  reference 
to  arbitration  a  mockery,  and  there  was  general 
disappointment,  not  confined  to  those  who  had 
hoped  that,  though  the  Russian  Emperor's  original 
idea  of  disarmament  had  not  found  favour  with 
any  of  the  chief  participants  in  the  conference, 
at  any  rate  some  sort  of  obligatory  arbitration  would 
be  adopted  which  would  largely  compensate  for 
its  rejection.  Obligatory  arbitration,  in  fact,  had 
become  for  many  the  chief  object  of  the  conference, 
and  it  seemed  to  them  as  if  without  it  no  headway 
in  the  cause  of  peace  would  have  been  made  at  all. 
When  the  conference  came  to  an  end  the  stormy 


HAGUE  COURT  AND  ITS  POTENTIALITIES    241 

petrels  of  the  press  and  magazines  were  jubilant 
at  this  apparent  failure  of  the  conference  to  do 
anything  but  put  in  the  form  of  an  agreement  the 
rules  already  practised.  There  could  be  little 
doubt,  however,  that  thenceforward  the  statesmen 
of  the  Western  nations  intended  to  treat  the  Hague 
Court  seriously  and,  with  a  recognised  Court  to 
apply  it,  there  was  no  longer  anything  Utopian 
in  the  idea  of  a  code  of  international  law.  For  all 
cases  of  a  judicial  character  the  Hague  Court  had 
become  as  much  the  appropriate  jurisdiction  as 
any  national  court  for  similar  cases.  We  heard 
no  more  about  the  futility  of  a  Court  which  had 
no  means  of  enforcing  its  decisions.  Universal 
public  opinion  afforded  the  necessary  sanction. 
Although  as  many  as  thirteen  cases  have  now  been 
decided  by  the  Court,  and  two  at  the  outbreak  of 
the  War  were  still  pending,  and  the  Powers  which 
have  submitted  differences  to  it  number  seventeen,^ 
including  some  States  which  have  even  been  regarded 
as  unruly,  not  a  single  instance  has  occurred  of  a 
State  showing  even  the  slightest  disrespect  for 
the  decision  given. 

We  must,  however,  remember  a  point  which  is 
often  overlooked,  that  the  parallel  in  national  justice 
to  an  international  court  of  arbitration  is  a  civil 
not  a  criminal  court  with  powers  of  punishment. 
It  is  a  jurisdiction  which  is  essentially  a  court  for 

^  The  States  which  have  agreed  to  references  are  as  follows :  Great 
Britain,  France,  Russia,  Germany,  the  United  States  of  America,  Japan, 
Mexico,  Spain,  Italy,  Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  Sweden,  Norway, 
Portugal,  Turkey,  Peru,  Venezuela. 


242  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

the  decision  of  points  of  law  and  the  assessment 
of  damage.  Whether  we  are  likely  ever  to  reach 
a  stage  in  which  such  a  court  can  deal  with  any  but 
questions  of  judicial  right  is  a  different  point. 

The  Anglo-French  treaty  contained  the  proviso 
that  it  should  not  apply  to  questions  involving 
vital  interests,  the  independence  or  the  honour  of 
either  State.  This  was  the  class  of  questions  which 
in  the  Anglo-American  treaty  of  1897  corresponded 
to  questions  of  "grave  general  importance  affecting 
the  national  rights  "  reserved  for  a  joint  commission 
as  distinguished  from  a  court  of  arbitration.  This 
exclusion  of  the  very  matters  which  seem  the  only 
kind  capable  of  inflaming  public  opinion  to  a  dan- 
gerous point  shows  the  limit  to  which  in  both 
America  and  Europe  statesmen  are  prepared  to  go 
so  far  as  arbitration  is  concerned. 

"Vital,"  seems  to  mean  some  difficulty  which  can 
only  be  solved  by  reversion  to  the  status  quo  ante 
or  the  reversal  pure  and  simple  of  the  act  committed. 
If,  for  instance,  the  English  port  authorities  had 
declined  in  time  of  peace  to  allow  a  French  man- 
of-war  to  leave  Gibraltar  until  a  case  arising  out  of 
a  collision  were  tried,  France  would  probably  have 
refused  to  submit  the  question  of  the  detention  to 
arbitration,  but  might  have  agreed  to  the  deter- 
mination by  arbitration  of  the  liability  of  the  vessel 
and  assessment  of  the  damages.  The  freedom  of 
movement  of  her  vessels  of  war  she  would  have 
considered  as  a  vital  interest,  the  other  as  a  differ- 
ence of  a  judicial  order. 


HAGUE  COURT  AND  ITS  POTENTIALITIES     243 

The  determination  of  what  is  a  question  involv- 
ing "national  honour"  is  less  easy.  An  insult 
to  an  ambassador  or  to  the  national  flag  may  be 
regarded  as  exat*  Dies.  Though  an  indemnity  may  be 
paid  by  way  of  damages,  it  is  obvious  that  no  State 
would  willingly  agree  to  an  arbitration  in  which 
it  might  be  competent  to  the  tribunal  to  declare 
that  no  damages  were  payable  or  would  allow  a 
third  party  alone  to  assess  the  payment  which 
would  repair  an  insult.  It  is  only  where  there 
may  be  a  doubt  whether  a  certain  act  is  an  insult 
or  not  that  conceivably  arbitration  would  be  ac- 
cepted by  a  State  which  felt  some  doubt  itself. 
On  the  other  hand  the  overheated  discussion  of 
any  question  or  the  difficulty  of  receding  from  an 
erroneous  or  one-sided  view  of  a  question  may  be 
regarded  as  involving  a  national  honour  conspicu- 
ously absent  in  most  such  cases  from  the  contro- 
versy. 

It  has  been  proposed  by  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment that  the  Court  should  be  assimilated  even 
in  its  composition  to  a  national  court,  that  judges, 
as  in  the  case  of  national  judicatures,  be  appointed 
and  sit  in  rotation,  and  that  a  special  selection  of 
arbitrators  ad  hoc  should  become  unnecessary.  An 
exhaustive  scheme  was  submitted  by  the  American 
delegates  at  the  conference  of  1907  for  the  purpose 
of  creating  this  "Court  of  Arbitral  Justice."  Out 
of  the  panel  forming  the  court  three  judges  were 
to  be  selected  to  form  a  special  delegation,  and 
three   more   to   replace   them   if   the   former   were 


244  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

unable  to  act.  They  were  to  meet  in  session  once 
a  year  on  the  third  Wednesday  in  June,  the  session 
to  last  until  all  the  business  on  the  agenda  had 
been  transacted.  The  difficulty  of  an  annual 
selection  by  all  the  powers  involved  might,  no  doubt, 
be  overcome  and  probably  the  scheme  of  the  United 
States  with  some  minor  modifications  will  before 
long  bring  the  court  into  a  closer  harmony  with 
existing  judicial  systems.^ 

What,  then,  are  the  potentialities  of  the  Hague 
Court  .f^  Since  it  came  into  existence  in  1899  there 
have  been  six  wars  —  the  South  African,  the  Russo- 
Japanese,  the  Turco-Italian,  the  Turco-Balkan, 
the  Inter-Balkan,  and  the  recent  gigantic  conflict. 
In  none  of  these  cases  has  there  been  matter  for 
arbitration.  They  have  all  been  wars  of  conquest, 
deliberately  undertaken  with  a  view  to  conquest. 
In  the  Turco-Italian  and  the  recent  War  no  time 
was  left  after  the  declaration  of  war  for  any  media- 
tion which  might  have  led  to  arbitration,  if  there 
had  been,  in  either,  any  arbitrable  matter.  In  the 
Inter-Balkan  War  the  hostilities  broke  out  without 
even  a  declaration  of  war.  In  the  Turco-Balkan 
War  even  the  disguise  of  a  grievance  was  dispensed 
with,  and  in  the  South  African  War,  in  which  griev- 
ances were  alleged  and  there  was  time  for  arbitra- 
tion, it  was  firmly  declined. 

It  is  obvious  that  where  one  of  the  parties  is 
decidedly  in  the  wrong,  he  will  not  agree  to  arbi- 
tration.    We  may  therefore  eliminate  from  among 

^  See  Barclay's  "International  Law  and  Practice",  chap.  VIII. 
London  and  Boston,  1917. 


HAGUE  COURT  AND  ITS  POTENTIALITIES     245 

the  potentialities  of  the  Hague  Court  recourse  to 
it  where  one  of  the  parties  to  the  difference  has  an 
unavowed  object  or  an  avowed  object  which  accord- 
ing to  the  principles  of  justice  would  have  to  be 
condemned.  It  is  a  court  for  the  determination 
of  cases  in  which  there  are  disputed  questions  of 
right  and  damages,  questions  in  which  rules  of  law 
and  justice  are  applicable,  and  in  which  the  parties 
seek  in  good  faith  an  honest  solution. 

And  yet  there  are  powers  which  might  be  given  to 
it,  even  in  cases  like  the  recent  terrible  War.  It 
might  sit  as  a  sort  of  court  for  grievances  before 
which  all  alleged  violations  of  international  treaties 
or  usages  might  be  laid ;  by  which  all  cases  of  futile 
cruelty  might  be  judicially  examined.  It  might 
not  only  condemn  such  violations  of  law  and  human- 
ity but  it  might  offer  recommendations  and  help 
to  prevent  the  growth  of  illegality. 

It  may  be  a  dream  but  one  wonders  whether  out 
of  the  Hague  Court  and  its  further  developments, 
some  institution  may  not  be  evolved  in  which  men 
of  different  nations  may  be  elected  by  civilised 
mankind  to  possess  in  common  the  citizenship  of 
all  nations  and  relinquish  patriotism  or  political 
attachment  to  any  one  of  them,  an  institution  en- 
titled to  express  its  opinions  and  give  its  advice 
with  all  the  sanctity  of  the  oracles  of  antiquity. 
Or  perhaps,  a  special  State  may  some  day  be  created 
like  the  District  of  Columbia,  created  to  fulfil  the 
purpose  of  securing  independence  among  the  States 
of  the  World,  or  it  might  be  a  special  college  of 
jurists  having  an  existence  as  independent  as  the 


246  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

Vatican.  In  any  case,  some  such  body  of  "super- 
men" who  have  nothing  to  gain  and  nothing  to  lose 
might  come  to  wield  a  power  over  the  minds  of  man- 
kind not  unlike  that  at  present  wielded  by  the  Holy 
Father  at  Rome  or  by  the  Caliph  over  Moham- 
medans. President  Wilson's  proposal  of  a  Society 
of  Nations  may  lead  to  the  realisation  of  some  such 
greater  moral  force  than  the  world  at  present  pos- 
sesses to  protect  men  against  their  own  cruel  and 
rapacious  instincts  and  to  set  a  higher  tone  of  human 
sympathy  and  fraternity  among  mankind  generally. 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  XII 

Draft  Suggestions  of  a  Convention  for  Improved 
Organisation  of  Hague  Conferences  * 

The  plenipotentiaries  of  the  following  H.  C.  P.  .  .  . 
who  signed  at  the  Hague  .  .  ,  1907,  the  Conventions 
and  Declarations  established  by  the  second  Hague  Peace 
Conference, 

Considering  that  it  is  desirable  to  try  to  profit  by  ex- 
perience acquired  and  facilitate,  as  far  as  possible,  the 
convocation,  preparation,  and  preliminary  work  of 
future  Conferences ; 

Whereas  it  is  necessary  to  make  a  distinction,  and  in 
fact  a  distinction  has  been  made,  between  questions  of  a 
general  character  in  which  all  the  States  are  interested 
and  those  which  are  fundamental  only  to  the  greater 
Powers ; 

Whereas  Article  XXII  of  the  Convention  for  the 
Peaceful  Settlement  of  International  Differences  of  1899 
(Article  XLIII  of  the  revised  Convention  of  1907) 
created  an  International  Bureau  at  The  Hague  which 
serves  as  Registrar  and  Record  Office  for  The  Hague 
International  Arbitration  Court,  and  Article  XXVIII 
of  the  said  Convention  (Article  XLIX  of  the  re- 
vised Convention  of  1907)  has  constituted  a  Permanent 

*  From  Sir  T.  Barclay's  "International  Law  and  Practice."  London 
and  Boston,  1917. 


248  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

Administrative  Council,  composed  of  the  diplomatic  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Signatory  Powers  accredited  to  The 
Hague  and  presided  over  by  the  Dutch  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs ; 

WTiereas  these  two  bodies  are  in  existence  and  have 
fulfilled  their  office  to  the  satisfaction  of  their  respective 
principals,  and  whereas  it  is  desirable  to  centralise  the 
work  of  The  Hague  as  far  as  possible ; 

Whereas  it  is  expedient  to  constitute  further  a  body  of 
international  jurisconsults  to  whom  the  Powers  can  have 
recourse  upon  all  judicial  matters  as  well  as  to  assist  the 
International  Bureau  and  the  Administrative  Council 
as  legal  experts,  and  to  act  as  a  Consultative  Committee 
able  to  take  charge,  inter  alia,  of  the  preparation  of  the 
work  of  future  Hague  Conferences,  and  within  the  scope 
of  its  capacities  deal  with  such  matters  as  the  said  Inter- 
national Bureau  shall  be  instructed  by  the  Consultative 
Council  to  require  of  it ; 

With  a  view  to  dealing  with  above  objects,  the  pur- 
poses and  duties  of  the  several  bodies  above  referred  to 
shall  be  as  follows  : 

1.  The  International  Bureau  shall  discharge  the  follow- 
ing duties  outside  its  ordinary  functions  as  registrar 
of  the  International  Arbitration  Court : 

(a)  To  preserve  and  classify  all  the  documents  relat- 
ing to  the  Conferences; 

(fc)  To  keep  the  H.  C.  P.  informed  of  all  questions 
concerning  the  work  of  the  Conferences; 

(c)  To  constitute,  improve,  and  catalogue  a  library 
of  International  Law  and  accessory  knowledge; 

{d)  To  draw  up  an  annual  report  of  its  work  for  sub- 
mission to  the  Administrative  Council; 

{e)  To  serve  as  intermediary  for  all  communications 
between  or  among  the  Signatory  Powers; 


HAGUE  COURT  AND  ITS  POTENTIALITIES    249 

(/)  To  transmit  immediately  all  communications  re- 
ceived to  the  Administrative  Council;   and 

(g)  To  be,  in  general  terms,  under  the  direction  of  the 
Bureau  of  the  Administrative  Council,  and  to  perform  all 
secretarial  and  executive  duties  committed  to  it  by  such 
Bureau. 

2.  The  Administrative  Council  remains  composed  of 
the  diplomatic  representatives  of  Contracting  Powers 
at  The  Hague,  who  shall  every  year  elect  two  Vice- 
presidents,  not  eligible  for  more  than  two  successive 
years  of  office.  The  President  and  the  two  Vice-presi- 
dents shall  form  the  Bureau  of  the  Administrative  Council. 

Outside  its  functions  in  connection  with  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  International  Arbitration  Court,  it  shall 
discharge  the  following  duties :  Assemble  on  convoca- 
tion by  its  Bureau  to  discuss  the  matters  submitted  in  the 
agenda  drawn  up  by  the  said  Bureau,  or  such  matters 
suggested  by  any  member  of  the  Council  of  which  due 
notice  shall  have  been  given ;  to  take  note  of  all  communi- 
cations received  from  the  International  Bureau;  give  the 
necessary  instructions  to  the  said  International  Bureau 
and  receive  the  annual  report  of  that  Bureau.  Minutes 
of  the  meeting  of  the  Council  shall  be  kept,  but  they  shall 
only  be  binding  upon  the  Signatories  thereto.  Two 
copies  shall  be  given  to  each  member. 

3.  Apart  from  the  Administrative  Council  and  Inter- 
national Bureau,  a  Consultative  Committee  shall  be 
created  and  composed  as  follows : 

(a)  Four  members  selected  by  the  Institute  of  Inter- 
national Law ; 

(b)  Four  members  selected  by  the  Administrative 
Council;  and 

(c)  Four  members  selected  by  the  Committee  as  thus 
far  constituted. 


250  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

One  of  each  category  shall  retire  on  expiry  of  every 
two  years,  and  not  be  re-eligible  for  two  years  after  five 
years'  tenure  of  office. 

The  Consultative  Committee  shall  be  entrusted  with  the 
preparation  of  the  work  of  future  Conferences  and  with 
the  examination  of  all  questions  which  have  been  sub- 
mitted but  not  solved  at  previous  Conferences.  It 
shall  also  examine  all  matters  submitted  to  it  by  the 
Administrative  Council  or  by  any  member  of  the  said 
Council  individually. 

The  International  Bureau  shall  be  entrusted  with  the 
secretaryship  of  the  Committee. 

The  Bureau  of  the  Administrative  Council  may,  if  the 
Committee  so  desires,  invite  specialists  in  military,  mari- 
time, or  other  matters  to  give  the  Committee  the  benefit 
of  their  expert  advice. 

It  shall  fix  the  remuneration  of  the  members  of  the 
Committee  and  of  the  said  occasional  specialists. 

4.  The  Bureau  of  the  Administrative  Council  may  call 
a  general  meeting  of  the  Consultative  Committee  to  discuss 
any  questions  it  may  deem  desirable  to  submit  to  it, 
or  recommend  States  to  send  representatives  to  any 
Conference  to  be  held  at  The  Hague  or  elsewhere  to 
deliberate  upon  any  matters  it  may  deem  of  sufficient 
importance. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

BALANCE  OF  POWER  AND  FEDERATION 

One  of  the  profoundest  fallacies  of  contemporary 
statecraft,  as  past  events  have  consistently  proved 
and  as  has  once  more  been  demonstrated  by  the 
present  complete  breakdown  of  the  theory,  is  that 
the  balance  of  power  makes  for  peace  or  is  a  means 
of  preserving  it.  Events,  on  the  contrary,  have 
shown  that  the  balance  of  power  merely  makes 
the  issue  of  an  armed  struggle  doubtful.  What 
really  makes  for  peace  is  such  an  overwhelming 
combination  interested  in  its  preservation  that 
any  one  State  would  be  naturally  discouraged 
from  any  attempts  to  break  the  peace. 

The  overwhelming  power  of  the  Roman  Empire 
was  able  to  keep  peace  in  the  then  world  for  several 
centuries,  as  Great  Britain  has  been  and  is  able  to 
do  in  India.  But  empires  are  not  emanations  of 
political  freedom.  While  they  impose  the  sway  of 
a  directing  executive,  free  countries  exercise  their 
executive  power  by  delegation.  The  one  is  oper- 
ated from  above,  the  other  from  below.  The  one 
has  an  independent  interest  of  self-preservation 
apart  from  that  of  the  people  governed,  the  other 


252  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

draws  its  breath  from  its  constituents  and  it  is 
they  who  have  the  interest  of  self-preservation. 

Free  countries  are  necessarily  unwieldy  for  pur- 
poses of  aggression  and  therefore  less  able  to  bring 
the  moral  effect  of  "preparedness"  to  bear  on  the 
promotion  of  political  purposes  in  foreign  relations 
than  empires,  that  is  to  say  strongly  centralised 
States.  To  resist  the  tendency  of  such  States, 
they  have  to  resort  to  combination  or  federation. 
Hence  federation  is  the  reverse  of  empire,  the  one 
receiving  its  powers  from  its  constituents,  the  other 
delegating  powers  to  its  dependents. 

The  break-up  of  the  three  greatest  instances  of 
empire  may  result  in  eventual  federation  of  all 
three  as  a  League  of  Nations  for  defence  against 
the  reaction  which  may  be  in  course  of  evolution 
in  countries  which  have  hitherto  been  the  home 
of  political  freedom,  for  seldom  if  ever  in  history 
has  victory  been  of  advantage  to  popular  liberties. 
This  union  for  self-preservation  against  external 
neo-aggressive  tendencies  may  present  material 
features  of  great  importance  for  the  future  of  democ- 
racy throughout  the  world. 


NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  XIII 

Note  on  the  Problem  of  Austria-Hungary 

It  was  a  diplomatic  platitude  to  speak  of  Austria- 
Hungary  as  a  geographical  necessity.  The  Empire- 
Kingdom  had  survived  the  break-up  of  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire  as  wreckage  and  out  of  the  wreckage  came  a 
composite  structure  due  to  requirements  of  self-preserva- 
tion and  because  this  was  a  necessity  it  survived.  Well- 
informed  persons  thought  it  would  not  outlive  the  reign 
of  the  late  Emperor-King.  It  did  not  long  survive  him, 
but  its  break-up  was  followed  by  consequences  which 
seemed  destined  to  show  that  remedy  by  break-up  for  the 
grievances  of  her  peoples  may  be  worse  than  the  complaint. 
The  weakness  of  Austria-Hungary  lay  in  the  attempt 
to  rule  by  a  dual  system  instead  of  through  a  general 
federation.  The  salvation  of  small  communities  and 
nations  is  not  isolation,  as  they  generally  begin  by  think- 
ing, but  cooperation  or  federation  which  enables  them 
to  preserve  their  respective  liberties  at  home  while  ob- 
taining the  security  and  strength  union  gives  to  those 
too  weak  to  assert  their  rights  against  external  dangers 
singly. 

Federation,  moreover,  while  assuring  strength  for 
defence,  creates  none  of  those  aggressive  tendencies 
which  seem  inseparable  from  the  centralisation  of  power. 
Nothing  has  proved  more  conclusively  the  strength  of 
even  a  tie  of  unorganised  federation,  when  a  conscious 


254  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

common  interest  is  at  stake,  than  the  support  England 
has  had  from  her  self-governing  colonies  not  only  in 
spite  of  the  weakness  of  the  bond  of  union  between  the 
component  parts  of  the  empire,  but  in  spite  of  domestic 
government  in  each  of  them  being  as  little  centralised 
as  is  compatible  with  government  of  any  kind. 

President  Wilson  saw  the  importance  of  preserving 
Austria-Hungary,  and,  wiser  than  those  who  demanded 
its  destruction,  he  asked  that  its  place  among  nations 
should  be  safeguarded  and  assured.  The  peoples  com- 
posing it  should  be  given,  he  said,  the  first  opportunity 
of  autonomous  development.  It  is  not  clear  why  he 
weakened  his  recommendation  by  qualifying  it  in  the 
words  "first  opportunity."  The  present  opportunity 
was  the  first  and  the  Allies  have  in  fact  recognised  the 
courageous  "elan"  of  the  Czechs  as  a  ground  for  giving 
Bohemia  that  domestic  autonomy  for  which  she  has  agi- 
tated and  sacrificed  life  and  liberty  so  amply. 

None  knows  better  than  the  President,  however,  how 
often  in  the  course  of  history  the  achievement  of  freedom 
has  meant  freedom  for  those  who  fought  for  it  and  has 
degenerated  into  freedom  to  oppress  others.  Guaran- 
tees will  assuredly  be  asked  of  the  peoples  concerned  that 
all  the  benefits  and  franchises  of  autonomous  govern- 
ment shall  be  enjoyed  by  the  inhabitants  of  the  territory 
placed  under  autonomous  government  without  distinc- 
tion of  race,  origin  or  religion  of  any  kind  whatsoever. 

The  President's  utterances  and  the  whole  tenor  of 
Anglo-Saxon  civilisation  of  the  principles  of  the  French 
Declaration  of  the  Rights  of  Man  require  this  affirmation 
of  racial  and  religious  tolerance. 

The  difficulties  of  Austria-Hungary  were  largely  due 
to  the  rival  influences  of  Germany  and  Russia,  especially 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  AND  FEDERATION  ^55 

to  that  of  the  latter,  which,  true  to  the  tradition  of  autoc- 
racies, kept  Slav  grievances  in  a  smouldering  condition 
ready  to  be  fanned  into  flame  whenever  domestic  diflS- 
culties  grew  out  of  hand  and  exposed  the  existing  regime 
or  dynasty  to  serious  trouble.  The  overthrow  of  the 
Russian  dynasty  delivered  Austria-Hungary  from  its 
chief  tormentor.  It  is  doubtful  if  the  Russian  interest 
in  the  Slav  communities  had  any  protective  effect  against 
persecution  in  Hungary,  where  it  seemed  merely  to  excite 
hostility  against  Slav  population  and  communities. 

The  Emperor  Karl,  a  pupil  of  the  late  Count  Aehren- 
thal.  Count  Burian  and  Professor  Lammasch,  had  been 
inoculated  with  the  federative  ideas  of  these  enlightened 
men.  It  was  Aerenthal  who  sent  him  at  a  time  when 
he  never  dreamt  that  he  would  succeed  so  shortly,  if 
ever,  to  the  throne,  to  Prague,  as  a  handsome,  genial 
and  open-minded  young  Prince,  whom  he  wished  to 
understand  the  Czechs  and  eventually  perhaps  to  become 
the  champion  of  their  aspirations.  I  met  him  there  in 
1908,  doing  his  best  without  funds  to  make  himself  popu- 
lar and  successful  in  doing  so  to  a  certain  extent. 

Count  Burian  is  a  believer  in  federation.  A  Hun- 
garian endowed  with  all  the  political  genius  of  a  gifted 
people,  a  keen  observer  of  the  conditions  and  potentialities 
of  all  the  races  and  provinces  of  the  Empire-Monarchy, 
he  was  joint  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  of  Finance  and 
Administrator  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina  when  the  crisis 
connected  with  the  annexation  of  that  province  took 
place.  Europe  was  utterly  misled  over  this  crisis,  owing 
to  the  prevalent  ignorance  in  Western  Europe  of  Balkan 
and  Austro-Hungarian  conditions,  by  an  astute  but 
unscrupulous  Russian  diplomacy.  I  was  at  the  time 
close  to  events  and  was  privileged  to  play  a  part  in  the 
settlement  which  Baron  Burian,  as  he  then  was,  with 


'25Q  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

consummate  ability  and  energy  brought  to  a  peaceful 
issue. 

Thus  in  the  new  sovereign  and  in  Count  Burian,  his 
most  trusted  adviser,  President  Wilson  would  have  had 
a  congenial  soil  for  the  planting,  acceptance  and  applica- 
tion of  those  federative  and  democratic  principles  for 
the  vindication  of  which  America  entered  the  war  on  the 
side  of  the  Allies. 

A  federation  in  which  there  would  have  been  but  one 
central  government  instead  of  two,  constitutional  equality 
for  each  of  the  provinces,  and  a  general  parliament  repre- 
senting them  all  granting  its  powers  of  government  to 
ministers  of  its  own  choice  is  the  sort  of  settlement  I  pre- 
sume Count  Burian  contemplated.  The  geographical 
position  and  economic  requirements  of  South  Central 
Europe  which  led  to  grouping  of  States  into  an  empire 
are  permanent  factors  which  will  operate  whatever 
the  form  or  forms  of  government  chosen  by  the  peoples 
concerned.  We  may,  therefore,  expect  that  the  compo- 
nent elements  of  the  late  Austro-Hungarian  Empire,  as 
soon  as  their  domestic  conditions  of  autonomy  are  assured, 
will  readjust  their  mutual  relations  in  the  sense  of  a  feder- 
ation to  which  a  powerful  neighbour  may  not  be  favour- 
able. Any  active  opposition  on  her  part,  however,  may 
force  the  speed  of  the  process  of  a  reunion  which  is  a 
necessity  of  self-preservation  and  involves  economic 
interests  of  supreme  importance. 

Note  on  the  Ottoman  Empire 

There  is  nothing  more  pathetic  in  history  than  the 
failure  of  the  "Young  Turks"  to  rescue  their  country 
from  the  barbarous  yoke  of  the  Serail.  It  is  orthodox 
to  attribute  the  failure  to  the  Young  Turks  themselves 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  AND  FEDERATION     257 

and  to  abuse  them  as  a  pack  of  adventurers  who,  on  get- 
ting possession  of  power,  used  it  in  the  same  way  as  the 
Hamidian  regime  they  had  superseded. 

This  is  not  the  opinion  of  all  disinterested  observers, 
certainly  not  of  some  of  those  who  were  in  close  contact, 
like  myself,  in  the  winter  of  1908-1909,  with  the  moving 
spirits  of  the  Young  Turk  movement. 

The  leaders  were  all  comparatively  young  men,  most 
of  them  intellectuals,  Arabs,  Armenians,  Jews,  Greeks, 
a  galaxy  of  all  the  kinds  of  men  Macedonia  and  Asia 
Minor  produce  —  a  microcosm  of  the  Ottoman  Empire 
just  as  little  Turkish  as  Turkey  itself,  for  in  reality 
there  are  few,  if  any,  genuine  Turks  in  the  world  at  all. 
Where  there  is  a  difference  it  is  between  Mohammedan, 
Christian,  and  Jew.  And  when  those  who  are  familiar 
with  the  Near  East  speak  of  the  superiority  of  the  Turks 
as  the  "only  true  gentlemen"  among  the  near  Eastern 
peoples,  they  mean  the  genuine  Mohammedans  whose 
integrity,  independence,  dignity  and  generosity  in  thought 
and  in  deed  is  just  as  marked  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
where  the  whole  population  is  Serbian,  as  at  Constanti- 
nople and  in  the  Levant. 

When,  therefore.  President  Wilson  stipulates  that  the 
Turkish  portions  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  should  be  assured 
a  secure  sovereignty  it  is  not  easy  to  determine  to  which 
part  of  the  Turkish  population  he  refers. 

Religion,  not  race,  determines  the  different  tendencies, 
ideals  and  polity  of  the  different  sections  of  the  population 
of  Turkey. 

The  Young  Turkish  movement  was  as  genuinely 
Turkish  as  any  action  on  the  part  of  Turkey  can  be.  If 
it  failed,  it  was  not  from  anything  intrinsically  wrong 
in  its  composition  but  because,  as  most  revolutions  neces- 
sarily are,  it  was  under  the  leadership  of  men  who  had 


258  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

had  no  experience  of  government  and  because  as  upstarts 
and  adventurers,  which  as  revolutionaries  they  necessa- 
rily were,  they  were  not  encouraged,  in  fact  were  more  or 
less  discouraged,  by  those  who  ought  to  have  been  their 
friends. 

In  spite  of  the  almost  open  hostility  of  Western  diplo- 
macy, the  Young  Turks  endeavoured  to  bring  about  bene- 
ficial reforms,  but  these  implied  taxation,  and  under  the 
old  regime,  taxes  mainly  took  the  form  of  exactions  from 
those  whom  it  was  worth  while  to  coerce.  The  poor, 
incapable  of  yielding  either  tribute  or  baksheesh,  bore 
little  or  none  of  the  burden  of  taxation,  and  when  the 
Young  Turks  began  to  introduce  Western  methods  into 
the  raising  of  revenue,  it  was  easy  for  their  enemies  to 
arouse  hostility  on  the  part  of  those  for  whose  emanci- 
pation they  were  working  by  representing  them  as  oppres- 
sors —  only  showing  that  the  Eastern  feeling  towards 
the  "publicans"  had  changed  little  in  the  course  of  two 
thousand  years. 

Deserted  by  those  who  ought  to  have  been  their  friends 
the  Young  Turkish  movement  was  exposed  to  all  the 
vicissitudes  of  political  and  social  upheavals.  As  soon 
as  the  empire  seemed  to  be  settling  into  a  stable  condi- 
tion, the  first  blow  at  its  integrity  was  struck  and  Italy 
began  the  series  of  wars  which  have  followed  one  another 
in  such  close  sequence  and  interconnection  that  the 
historian  would  be  justified  in  lumping  them  together 
as  one  war  and  calling  it  in  accordance  with  its  duration 
which  may  still  be  long,  in  so  far  as  the  coming  settle- 
ment is  not  based  on  the  geographical  and  economic 
requirements  of  the  peoples  concerned. 

The  only  diplomacy  which  showed  any  sympathy 
with  the  Young  Turkish  movement  was  the  German. 
The  still  young  and  inexperienced  men  who  were  at  the 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  AND  FEDERATION     259 

helm,  when  the  crisis  of  1914  came,  preferred  the  German 
to  the  Russian  lead  as  the  lesser  evil,  especially  as  the 
German  clutch  was  upon  their  shoulders  and  it  was 
easier  to  let  it  remain  than  to  shake  it  off. 

The  question  of  Turkey's  preservation,  it  is  seen,  is 
not  one  of  race  and  it  cannot  be  one  of  religion,  for  except 
among  the  Arabs,  far  from  the  real  seat  of  interest  for 
Europe,  the  religions  are  as  scattered  as  the  races.  Ex- 
pediency alone  can  dictate  a  settlement  in  which  the 
Allies  have  interests  almost  as  scattered.  In  fact,  a 
self-denying  protocol  will  almost  necessarily  have  to 
precede  any  discussion  to  eliminate  non-interests  and 
reduce  the  question  to  specific  areas  and  points.  The 
device  of  determining  "spheres  of  interest"  which  has 
averted  conflict  in  two  or  three  parts  of  the  world  already 
will  probably  be  resorted  to  once  more.  Temporary, 
unsatisfying  and  undemocratic  as  such  a  method  of 
picketing  and  impounding  an  independent  country  and 
its  people  may  be,  the  predatory  traditions  of  Western 
Europe  are  still  so  persistent  and  the  ''interests"  of 
the  European  Allies  in  the  Near  East  and  the  Levant 
have  become  so  interlocked  that  the  greatest  delicacy 
will  be  required  to  prevent  conflict  over  the  spoil.  Reli- 
gion, geographical  necessity  and  political  exigencies 
will  leave  little  room  for  the  assertion  of  those  democratic 
principles  which  in  Western  Europe  it  is  to  be  hoped 
will  be  an  immediate  and  inalienable  result  of  the  War. 

There  is  a  proverb  that  warns  men  against  discussing 
trouble  before  it  arises.  In  any  case  the  time  has  not 
yet  come  to  argue  in  public  questions  on  which  the  Allies 
themselves  may  be  exposed  to  serious  disagreement. 
Perhaps  to  prevent  its  taking  an  acute  form  consideration 
will  be  shown  for  the  requirements,  feelings  and  intelli- 
gence of  the  inhabitants  of  the  countries  concerned. 


260  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

Allies'  Agreement  Relating  to  Constantinople  and 
THE  Straits  and  for  Partition  of  Asia  Minor 

The  following  statement  is  taken  from  the  Pravada, 
a  Maximalist  organ  from  which  it  had  been  translated 
into  French,  from  which  in  turn  it  is  now  translated  into 
English :  ^ 

"On  the  19th  February /4th  March,  1915,  the  Tsar's 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  transmitted  to  the  Ambassa- 
dors of  France  and  Great  Britain  a  memorandum  wherein 
the  wish  was  expressed  that,  as  a  result  of  this  war,  the 
following  territories  should  be  united  with  Russia : 

"The  city  of  Constantinople,  the  western  shore  of 
the  Bosphorus,  the  Sea  of  Marmora,  the  Dardanelles, 
Southern  Thrace  as  far  as  the  Enos-Midia  line,  the  shores 
of  Asia  Minor  between  the  Bosphorus  and  the  river 
Sakaria  and  certain  points  in  the  Ishmid  Gulf,  the  islands 
in  the  Sea  of  Marmora  and  the  Imbros  and  Tenedos 
Islands.  The  special  rights  of  France  and  England  in 
the  said  territories  to  remain  safeguarded. 

"The  French  and  English  Governments  gave  their 
consent  to  our  requests  provided  the  war  should  be  finished 
rapidly  and  successfully  and  that  satisfaction  should  be 
granted  to  a  whole  series  of  claims  by  France  and  England 
in  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  elsewhere. 

"These  claims  as  far  as  they  concern  Russia  result 
as  follows : 

"The  recognition  of  Constantinople  as  a  free  port 
for  the  transit  of  goods  not  coming  from  or  going  into 
Russia  and  the  free  passage  of  the  Straits  for  merchant 
vessels. 

"The  recognition  in  Asiatic  Turkey  of  the  rights  of 
Great  Britain  and  France  which  require  to  be  exactly 
determined  by  a  special  agreement  between  France, 
Great  Britain  and  Russia. 

"The  preservation  under  independent  Mussulman  sover- 
eignty of  Arabia  and  the  Mussulman  Holy  Places. 

"The  inclusion,  in  conformity  with  the  Anglo-Russian 

1  Translated  from  the  French  by  Mr.  A.  Wright. 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  AND  FEDERATION     261 

Convention  of  1907/  of  the  neutral  zone  of  Persia  within 
the  British  sphere  of  influence. 

"Acknowledgement  that  these  claims  shall  be  granted. 

"The  Russian  Government  however  made  some  reser- 
vations : 

"In  view  of  our  wishes  concerning  the  Mussulman 
Holy  Places,  it  is  necessary  immediately  to  decide  whether 
these  places  shall  remain  under  Turkish  sovereignty, 
the  Sultan  keeping  the  title  of  Caliph,  or  is  it  proposed 
to  create  a  new  independent  State?  In  our  judgment 
it  is  desirable  that  the  Caliphate  be  separated  from  Turkey. 
In  any  case,  freedom  of  pilgrimage  must  be  assured. 

"While  agreeing  that  the  neutral  zone  in  Persia  should 
be  subject  to  British  influence,  the  Russian  Government 
nevertheless  considers  it  just  to  ask  that  the  towns  of 
Ispahan  and  Yezd  be  left  to  Russia  and  also  that  the 
part  of  the  neutral  zone  which  forms  the  corner  between 
the  frontiers  of  Russia  and  Afghanistan  and  abuts  on 
the  frontier  of  Russia  at  Zoulfagar  be  included  in  the 
sphere  of  Russian  influence. 

"At  the  same  time  the  Russian  Government  considers 
it  desirable  to  settle  the  question  of  the  contiguity  of 
Afghanistan  and  Russia  in  accordance  with  the  wishes 
expressed  in  the  pourparlers  of  1914. 

"On  the  entry  of  Italy  in  the  war,  our  claims  were 
communicated  to  the  Italian  Government  and  the  latter 
gave  their  consent  thereto,  subject  to  a  victorious  con- 
clusion of  the  war  giving  satisfaction  to  the  wishes  of 
Italy  in  general  and  in  the  East  particularly,  and  granting 
her  the  same  rights  as  granted  to  France  and  Great 
Britain  in  the  territories  ceded  to  us." 


Note  on  the  Question  of  Asia  Minor 

"As  a  result  of  the  pourparlers  which  took  place  in 
the  spring  of  1916  in  London  and  Petrograd,  the  allied 

1  This  is  probably  a  mistranslation  from  the  Russian  text.  It  reads 
in  the  original  probably:  "The  inclusion  within  the  British  sphere  of 
influence  of  the  neutral  zone  aa  determined  in  the  Anglo-Russian  agree- 
ment of  1907." 


262  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

governments  of  Great  Britain  and  France  and  Russia 
came  to  an  agreement  relating  to  the  future  division  of 
zones  of  influence  and  territorial  acquisitions  in  Asiatic 
Turkey  and  in  reference  to  the  formation  within  the 
limits  of  Arabia  of  an  independent  Arabian  State  or  of 
a  confederation  of  Arabian  States. 

"In  its  principal  heads  the  agreement  may  be  summed 
up  as  follows : 

"Russia  acquires  the  provinces  of  Erzeroum,  Trebi- 
zond.  Van  and  Bitlis,  as  well  as  the  Southern  Kurdistan 
territories  as  per  the  line  Moucha-Sert-Ihn-Omar- 
Amalia,  Persian  frontier.  The  terminus  of  the  Russian 
territorial  acquisitions  on  the  shores  of  the  Black  Sea 
would  be  a  point  to  be  ultimately  settled  west  of  Trebi- 
zond. 

"France  receives  the  strip  of  the  shore  of  Syria,  the 
vilayet  of  Adana  and  territory  bounded  on  the  south  by 
the  line  Aintab-Kharput  up  to  the  Russian  frontier  and 
in  the  north  by  the  line  Ata-Dagh-Kessaria-Ak-Ladge- 
VildizDagh-Zara-Orguine-Kharpout.^ 

"Great  Britain  acquires  the  southern  portion  of  Meso- 
potamia with  Bagdad  and  reserves  to  herself  in  Syria 
the  ports  of  Haifa  and  Acre. 

"According  to  a  convention  between  France  and  Eng- 
land, the  zone  between  the  French  and  English  regions 
will  constitute  the  confederation  of  the  Arabian  States 
or  one  independent  Arabian  State  whose  zones  of  influ- 
ence shall  be  then  determined. 

"Alexandretta  is  declared  a  free  port. 

"For  the  purpose  of  guaranteeing  the  religious  inter- 
ests of  the  Allied  Powers,  Palestine  and  the  Holy  Places 
are  excluded  from  Turkish  territory  and  shall  be  governed 
under  a  special  regime  to  be  settled  by  a  convention 
between  Russia,  France  and  England. 

"As  a  general  rule  the  Contracting  Parties  agree  to 
recognize  the  concessions  and  prerogatives  which  existed 
before  the  war  in  the  districts  acquired  by  them. 

"They  accept  a  part  of  the  Ottoman  debt  in  propor- 
tion to  the  territories  acquired. 

*  Probably  Ata  Dagh,  Kaisarieh  (Caesarea  Mazaca),  Ak  Dagh,  Yildiz 
Dagh,  Zara,  Arabgir,  Kharput. 


BALANCE  OF  POW^R  AND  FEDERATION     263 


<<i 


N.B.  As  for  the  zone  of  influence  almost  exclu- 
sively inhabited  by  Mussulmans,  in  accordance  with  the 
Franco-English  agreement,  it  was  to  be  divided  between 
the  Arab  Sultanates  which,  in  the  districts  of  Damascus, 
Aleppo  and  Mossul  were  to  seek  from  France  the  political, 
technical  and  financial  assistance  which  they  would 
need  from  abroad,  whereas  in  the  Mesopotamia  districts 
they  were  to  seek  such  assistance  from  England.  The 
King  of  Mecca,  Master  of  the  Holy  Places  of  Islam 
which  interest  a  large  number  of  the  ressortissants  of  the 
three  Powers,  was  to  be  independent." 


Note  on  Imperial  Federation  and  India 

The  following  preambles  to  the  Acts  of  Parliaments 
providing  for  federation  of  the  three  great  British  self- 
governing  Colonies  restrict  their  development  as  polit- 
ical units  to  their  respective  geographical  areas : 

An  Act  for  the  Union  of  Canada,  Nova  Scotia,  and  New 
Brunswick  and  the  Government  thereof ;  and  for  Purposes 
connected  therewith  (March  29,  1867). 

"Whereas  the  Provinces  of  Canada,  Nova  Scotia, 
and  New  Brunswick  have  expressed  their  Desire  to  be 
Federally  united  into  One  Dominion  under  the  Crown 
of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland, 
with  a  Constitution  similar  in  Principle  to  the  United 
Kingdom : 

"And  whereas  such  a  Union  would  conduce  to  the 
Welfare  of  the  Provinces  and  promote  the  Interests  of 
the  British  Empire : 

"And  whereas  on  the  Establishment  of  the  Union  by 
Authority  of  Parliament  it  is  expedient,  not  only  that  the 
Constitution  of  the  Legislative  Authority  in  the  Dominion 
be  provided  for,  but  also  that  the  Nature  of  the  Executive 
Government  be  therein  declared  : 

"And  whereas  it  is  expedient  that  Provision  be  made 
for  the  eventual  Admission  into  the  Union  of  other  Parts 
of  British  North  America," 


264  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

An  Act  to  Constitute  the  Commonwealth  of  Australia  (July 

9,  1900). 

"Whereas  the  people  of  New  South  Wales,  Victoria, 
South  Australia,  Queensland,  and  Tasmania,  humbly 
relying  on  the  blessing  of  Almighty  God,  have  agreed 
to  unite  in  one  indissoluble  Federal  Commonwealth  under 
the  Crown  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and 
Ireland,  and  under  the  Constitution  hereby  established: 

"And  whereas  it  is  expedient  to  provide  for  the  admis- 
sion into  the  Commonwealth  of  other  Australasian  Colo- 
nies and  possessions  of  the  Queen." 

An  Act  to  Constitute  the  Union  of  South  Africa  (September 

20,  1909). 

"Whereas  it  is  desirable  for  the  welfare  and  future 
progress  of  South  Africa  that  the  several  British  Colonies 
therein  should  be  united  under  one  Government  in  a 
legislative  union  under  the  Crown  of  Great  Britain  and 
Ireland : 

"And  whereas  it  is  expedient  to  make  provision  for  the 
union  of  the  Colonies  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  Natal, 
the  Transvaal,  and  the  Orange  River  Colony  on  terms  and 
conditions  to  which  they  have  agreed  by  resolution  of 
their  respective  Parliaments  :  and  to  define  the  executive, 
legislative,  and  judicial  powers  to  be  exercised  in  the 
government  of  the  Union : 

"And  whereas  it  is  expedient  to  make  provision  for 
the  establishment  of  provinces  with  powers  of  legisla- 
tion and  administration  in  local  matters  and  in  such  other 
matters  as  may  be  specially  reserved  for  provincial  legis- 
lation and  administration : 

"  And  whereas  it  is  expedient  to  provide  for  the  even- 
tual admission  into  the  Union  or  transfer  to  the  Union  of 
such  parts  of  South  Africa  as  are  not  originally  included 
therein." 

It  may  be  doubted  whether  federation  is  a  feasible 
method  of  government  except  where  the  geographical 
situation  and  economic  interests  of  the  constituent  parties 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  AND  FEDERATION     265 

are  such  as  to  make  union  for  self-defence  or  the  promo- 
tion of  common  commercial  interests  desirable.  Patriot- 
ism and  the  link  of  common  origin  no  doubt  have  their 
eflFect  where  the  interests  are  not  divergent. 

"The  case  of  India,"  says  the  Earl  of  Cromer,  "differs 
very  materially  from  that  of  the  self-governing  Domin- 
ions. .  .  .  That  some  reforms  will  have  to  be  made 
after  the  war  in  the  methods  under  which  India  is  at 
present  governed,"  he  adds,  "is  both  possible  and  prob- 
able." 

The  general  direction  which  reform  may  take  was  in- 
dicated in  the  dispatch  of  the  Government  of  India  dated 
December,  1911,  which  contains  the  following  passage: 

"The  only  possible  solution  of  the  difficulty  would 
appear  to  be  gradually  to  give  the  Provinces  a  larger 
measure  of  self-government,  until  at  last  India  would 
consist  of  a  number  of  administrations,  autonomous  in 
all  provincial  affairs,  with  the  Government  of  India 
above  them  all  and  possessing  power  to  interfere  in  case 
of  misgovernment,  but  ordinarily  restricting  their  func- 
tions to  matters  of  Imperial  concern." 

"I  am  very  clearly  of  opinion,"  again  says  Lord  Cro- 
mer, "that  India  is  not  yet  ripe  for  complete  self-govern- 
ment in  the  sense  in  which  that  term  is  used  in  the  Domin- 
ions. The  same  may  be  said  of  Egypt  and  the  Soudan. 
It  would  at  present  be  altogether  premature  to  discuss 
the  desirability  of  bringing  either  of  these  two  countries 
within  the  full  scope  of  a  general  scheme  for  the  Federa- 
tion of  the  Empire." 

In  the  luminous  article  from  which  I  have  quoted 
above  ^  Lord  Cromer  asks : 

*  See  "After- War  Problems",  edited  by  W.  H.  Dawson.  London, 
Allen  and  Unwin  Ltd.     1917. 


^66  COLLAPSE  AND   RECONSTRUCTION 

"How  is  Nationalism,  which  is  based  on  the  right 
to  autonomy,  to  be  reconciled  with  Imperialism,  which 
is  often  dictated  by  economic  interests  or  geographical 
considerations  and  which  need  not  necessarily  but  may 
often  be  irreconcilable  with  the  assertion  of  autonomous 
rights?  Democratic  political  thinkers  answer,  almost 
with  one  voice,  'By  the  adoption  of  the  system  of  Feder- 
ation'." 

In  Lord  Cromer's  opinion  they  are  unquestionably 
right  in  principle. 

It  would,  he  thinks,  be  a  mistake  to  be  unduly  daunted 
by  the  obvious  difficulties  which  will  have  to  be  en- 
countered in  devising  a  plan  of  federation. 

Looking  at  the  extreme  complexity  of  the  subject 
and  the  great  importance  of  avoiding  a  false  step,  it 
would  be  wise  for  all  concerned,  he  observes,  to  proceed 
tentatively,  to  be  satisfied  for  the  time  being  with  deal- 
ing with  the  comparatively  easy  subject  of  a  somewhat 
closer  association  in  executive  matters,  and  then  to  see 
how  the  revised  system  works  before  proceeding  to  re- 
forms of  a  more  drastic  and  far-reaching  description. 

In  any  case  it  seems  desirable,  even  if  more  important 
changes  be  made,  to  arrange  that  the  Imperial  Confer- 
ence should,  for  the  future,  meet  every  two  years  instead 
of,  at  present,  at  intervals  of  four  years.  "Thus,  the 
statesmen  both  of  the  United  Kingdom  and  of  the  Domin- 
ions would  more  frequently  be  brought  in  close  contact 
with  each  other.  They  would  be  able  mutually  to 
exchange  views." 

However,  remarks  Lord  Cromer  in  the  same  article, 
broadly  speaking,  there  are  two  methods  by  which 
consultations  with  the  Dominions  can  be  secured.  One  is 
to  associate  them  to  a  greater  extent  than  at  present 
with  the  executive  action  of  the  British  Government.     The 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  AND  FEDERATION     267 

other  is  to  go  farther  afield,  to  change  the  whole  consti- 
tution of  the  British  Empire,  and  by  some  kind  of  legis- 
lative amalgamation  to  enable  the  people  of  each  sepa- 
rate imperial  unit  to  make  their  voices  heard  by  adopting 
the  normal  and  habitual  proceedings  common  under  all 
democratic  forms  of  government. 

"Obviously,  the  former  of  these  two  alternatives 
possesses  the  advantage  that  it  involves,  relatively 
speaking,  a  far  less  degree  of  radical  change  and  that  it  is 
much  less  difficult  to  carry  into  execution  than  the  latter." 

Colonials  are  fully  aware,  says  Lord  Cromer,  that 
no  sane  British  stateman  would  for  one  moment  propose 
that  coercion  should  be  exercised  in  order  to  oblige  them 
to  maintain  a  connection  which  had  become  irksome  or 
distasteful  to  them.  But  they  are  far  from  desiring  sev- 
erance. They  hold  that  both  self-interest  and  sentiment 
point  to  the  conclusion  that,  if  any  change  is  to  take 
place,  it  should  be  in  the  direction,  not  of  separation, 
but  of  closer  union,  which  must  never,  however,  in  any 
degree  impair  local  autonomy. 

Recent  events,  adds  Lord  Cromer,  have  enormously 
tended  to  strengthen  the  force  of  these  considerations. 
"Never  did  the  short-sighted  and  defective  states- 
manship of  Berlin  err  more  conspicuously  than  when  it 
thought  that  national  peril  would  exercise  a  dissolving 
effect  on  the  component  parts  of  the  British  Empire. 
The  very  opposite  has  taken  place.  The  event  which 
it  was  thought  would  sunder  the  colonial  connection  has 
tended  to  solder  it  together  to  the  extent  of  imparting 
to  it  a  strength  and  rigidity  which  has  astonished  the 
world.  To  the  amazement  of  all  absolutists  and  coer- 
cionists  the  link  was  found  to  be  so  tough  because  it 
was  so  slender.  Never  have  democratic  principles 
achieved  a  greater  triumph." 


268  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

These  judicious  remarks  of  a  man  combining,  as  Lord 
Cromer  did,  the  experience  of  a  man  of  action  and  of  a 
well-read  and  thoughtful  observer  apply  not  only  to 
federation  within  the  British  Empire  but  to  the  principle 
of  federation  generally. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

A   SOCIETY    (or   league)    OF  NATIONS 

The  pre-Congress  of  Paris  has  placed  before  the 
world  its  draft  of  a  constitution  of  a  "League  of 
Nations."  There  is  matter  in  it  to  keep  the  public 
opinions  of  all  the  races,  nations  and  governments 
of  mankind  occupied  for  some  time  to  come. 

The  French  edition  of  the  draft  uses  the  term 
"Societe"  — the    English,     "League." 

The  basis  of  the  draft  is  President  Wilson's 
fourteenth  proposition  which  is  as  follows : 

"A  general  association  of  Nations  must  be  formed 
under  specific  covenants  for  the  purpose  of  affording 
mutual  guarantees  of  political  independence  and 
territorial  integrity  to  great  and  small  states  alike." 

In  his  July  Fourth  speech  the  President  enlarged 
on  this  proposition.  The  fourth  proposition  of 
that  speech  set  out  that  "the  establishment  of  an 
organization  of  peace  which  shall  make  it  certain  that 
the  combined  power  of  free  nations  will  check  every 
invasion  of  right,  and  serve  to  make  peace  and  jus- 
tice the  more  secure  by  affording  a  definite  tribunal 
of  opinion  to  which  all  must  submit  and  by  which 
every  international  readjustment  that  cannot  be 
amicably  agreed  upon  by  the  peoples  directly  con- 
cerned shall  be  sanctioned." 


270  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

In  his  letter  to  the  German  Government  of  No- 
vember 5,  191 S,  Mr.  Lansing  wrote : 

"The  AlHed  Governments  .  .  .  declare  their  will- 
ingness to  make  peace  with  the  Government  of 
Germany  on  the  terms  of  peace  laid  down  in  the 
President's  address  to  Congress  of  January  8, 
1918,  and  the  principles  enunciated  in  his  subse- 
quent addresses.'* 

In  the  same  letter  Mr.  Lansing  on  behalf  of  the 
Allies  added : 

"Further,  in  the  conditions  of  peace  laid  down  in 
his  address  to  Congress  of  January  8,  1918,  the 
President  declared  that  invaded  territories  must 
be  restored  as  well  as  evacuated  and  freed.  The 
Allied  Governments  feel  that  no  doubt  ought  to 
be  allowed  to  exist  as  to  what  this  provision  implies. 
By  it,  they  understand  that  compensations  wiU 
be  made  by  Germany  for  all  damages  done  to  the 
civilian  population  of  the  Allies  and  their  property 
by  the  aggression  of  Germany  by  land,  by  sea  and 
from  the  air." 

This  agreement  between  the  belligerents  is  the 
foundation  to  which  the  Societj'  of  Nations  will 
owe  its  existence. 

It  has  been  seen  that  the  French  rendering  of 
"Society"  is  correct.  The  agreement  is  to  create 
a  society  not  a  league  of  nations  and  it  will  be  for 
the  Peace  Congress  when  it  meets  to  decide  whether 
it  shall  be  the  one  or  the  other. 

The  terms  of  peace  offered  by  the  Allies  on  which 
hostilities   were  brought   to  a  termination  are  the 


A  SOCIETY   (OR  LEAGUE)   OF  NATIONS      271 

basis.  We  now  have  a  draft  elaborated  by  the 
Alhes  as  a  formulation  of  the  details  of  these  terms 
in  so  far  as  the  Society  of  Nations  is  concerned. 
But  we  must  not  treat  it  as  a  final  statement  or 
forget  that  the  real  basis  is  still  the  enunciation  of 
principles  forming  the  terms  of  peace  agreed  to  by 
the  belligerents  and  to  which  all  the  Allies'  drafts, 
whether  relating  to  the  proposed  Society  of  Nations 
or  to  other  matters,  are  subordinate  until  the  con- 
tracting parties   determine  otherwise. 

Meanwhile  it  is  a  draft  submitted  for  public 
criticism  and  as  such  is  only  different  from  other 
drafts  in  having  been  drawn  up,  as  President  Wil- 
son intimated,  by  the  oflBcial  representatives  of  the 
different  governments  represented.^ 

It  leaves  intact  President  Wilson's  propositions 
which  critics  may  interpret  differently,  but  which 
even  he  has  no  power  to  alter  without  the  consent 
of  all  the  Parties  to  the  agreement  they  constitute. 

The  President's  fourteenth  proposition  precip- 
itated quite  a  deluge  of  interesting  suggestions 
from  both  sides  of  the  belligerent  frontier.  Not 
onlv  were  societies  of  an  incidental  character  formed 
for  study  of  the  details  it  implied  but  Parliamentary 
and  Extra-Parliamentarv  Committees  were  entrusted 
with  the  consideration  of  its  form  and  potentialities. 
In  fact  it  was  one  of  those  generous,  though  rather 
vague  ideas  which  appeal  to  men  and   women  of 

^  The  President  in  his  address  on  the  draft  said :  "Inasmuch  as  I  am 
stating  it  in  presence  of  official  representatives  of  the  various  govern- 
ments here  present,  including  myself,  I  may  say  that  there  is  a  universal 
feeling  that  the  world  cannot  rest  satisfied  with  merely  official  guidance." 


272  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

ideals  and  lend  themselves  to  a  great  deal  of  com- 
ment without  need  to  alight  on  the  terra  firvia  of 
fact  or  to  descend  into  the  subsoil  of  traditional  and 
historical  political  development. 

The  President  himself  rather  tentatively  used 
the  expression  "must  be  formed."  "A  general 
association  of  Nations,"  he  said,  "must  be  formed 
under  specific  covenants."  Did  he  mean  by  "gen- 
eral" open  to  all  nations  in  opposition  to  any  idea 
of  exclusiveness,  that  is,  in  opposition  to  a  League 
of  Nations  which  historically  would  rather  have  the 
nature  of  a  "combine"  operating  to  some  extent 
aggressively?  Why  "specific"?  Does  this  add 
any  qualification  to  the  sense  of  "covenant "  ?  These 
"specific"  covenants,  he  adds,  are  to  "give  mutual 
guarantees  of  political  independence  and  territorial 
integrity  to  great  and  small  states  alike." 

It  seems  as  if  the  President  had  dealt  with  two 
different  suggestions  in  one  proposition,  the  one 
being  a  general  association  of  nations  to  be  formed 
after  foundations  had  been  laid  by  special  agree- 
ments among  the  different  High  Contracting  Parties 
in  the  several  treaties  between  them  which  will 
determine  their  respective  peace  relations  for  the 
future. 

In  what  sense  does  the  President  use  the  term 
"mutual  guarantees"?  I  presume  that  he  uses 
it  in  its  diplomatic  sense  of  a  deliberate  written 
undertaking  in  treaty  form. 

In  his  July  Fourth  statement  of  the  "ends  for 
which  the  associated  peoples  of  the  world  are  fight- 
ing" President  Wilson  seems  to  explain  his  meaning. 


A  SOCIETY  (OR  LEAGUE)   OF  NATIONS      273 

In  the  fourth  proposition  of  that  statement  he 
speaks  of  "the  estabHshment  of  an  organization 
of  peace  which  shall  make  it  certain  that  the  com- 
bined power  of  free  nations  will  check  every  invasion 
of  right." 

If  only  "free  nations"  will  be  admitted  to  the 
organisation,  the  term  "free"  requires  definition 
and  the  "Society  of  Nations"  is  no  longer  a  gen- 
eral one. 

What  is  the  criterion  of  freedom  ? 

Mr.  H.  G.  Wells,  to  make  the  matter  fro  tanto 
clearer,  dropped  the  term  Society  and  adopted  the 
term  League.  "  The  Western  Allies  know  to-day, " 
says  this  distinguished  writer,  "what  is  involved 
in  making  bargains  with  governments  that  do  not 
stand  for  their  people."  In  further  explanation 
he  adds,  it  must  be  clearly  in  the  President's  mind 
that  "no  mere  *  scrap  of  paper'  with  just  a  Kaiser's 
or  a  Chancellor's  endorsement  is  a  good  enough 
earnest  of  fellowship  in  the  League.  It  cannot  be 
a  diplomatists'  league.  The  League  of  Nations, 
if  it  is  to  have  any  such  effect  as  people  seem  to 
expect  of  it,  must  be  '  understanded  of  the  people ' ; 
that  is  to  say,  it  must  be  supported  and  sustained 
by  deliberate  explanation  and  teaching  by  School 
and  Church  and  Press  of  the  whole  mass  of  all  the 
peoples  concerned." 

This  explanation  of  Mr.  Wells'  did  not  lighten 
the  burden  of  seeking  to  work  out  details  for  giv- 
ing practical  effect  to  the  President's  suggestion  ! 

Lord  Grey  of  Falloden  followed  the  example  of 
Mr.  Wells  in  speaking  at  all  times  of  a  League  of 


274  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

Nations.  The  latter,  as  we  see,  takes  a  rather 
ideahstic  view  of  the  possibilities  of  united  moral 
and  intellectual  effort.  Lord  Grey  belongs  by 
recent  experience  to  diplomacy.  It  does  not  follow, 
he  observes  in  his  pamphlet  on  the  subject,  that  a 
"League  of  Nations  to  secure  the  peace  of  the 
world"  will  remain  impossible  because  "it  has  not 
been  possible  hitherto." 

The  term  "League  of  Nations  to  secure  the  peace 
of  the  world"  does  not  necessarily  imply  "free" 
nations.  It  is  obvious  that  if  an  autocrat  like  the 
late  Russian  Emperor,  France  and  the  British  Em- 
pire formed  a  league  to  preserve  the  peace  of  the 
world,  they  were  a  League  of  Nations.  It  was  as 
such  that  they  gave  effect  to  their  bond.  Practi- 
cally all  the  nations  of  the  world  joined  their  League, 
and  in  actual  practice  we  have  at  this  moment  what 
is  contemplated  by  a  league.  Moreover  this  League 
is  in  action  for  the  punishment  of  defaulters ;  it 
surrounded  the  brigand  who  attacked  his  neighbour, 
pursued  him  by  hue  and  cry  till  he  could  escape  no 
longer  and  surrendered  to  justice. 

The  tragically  self-revealing  German  apology 
for  the  invasion  of  Belgium,  —  that  Germany's 
strength  lay  in  the  superior  speed  with  which  she 
could  bring  her  forces  against  her  enemies  and 
defeat  them  before  they  were  ready,  —  her  admission 
that  any  attempt  to  settle  a  difficulty  by  negotia- 
tion deprived  her  of  that  superiority,  in  other  words 
that  she  made  war  to  prevent  her  adversary  from 
becoming  better  able  to  defend  himself,  shows  where 


A  SOCIETY  (OR  LEAGUE)  OF  NATIONS     275 

the  danger  is.  When  President  Wilson  speaks  of 
"the  combined  power  of  free  nations"  does  he  not 
contemplate  the  power  to  do  the  very  thing  the 
Allies  have  just  been  doing  ? 

A  League  of  Nations,  then,  will  necessarily  restrict 
national  independence  to  the  extent  requisite  for 
mutual  assurance  against  the  renewal  of  the  condi- 
tion of  things  which  culminated  in  a  world  war. 
It  will  place  a  limitation  on  the  free  action  of  the 
participating  nations. 

It  is  in  this  sense  that  Lord  Grey  of  Falloden 
regarded  it,  as  explained  in  the  pamphlet  from  which 
I  have  already  quoted. 

The  obligation  implied  In  joining  in  the  League, 
he  says,  "is  that  if  any  nation  will  not  observe 
this  limitation  upon  its  national  action ;  if  it  breaks 
the  agreement  which  is  the  basis  of  the  League, 
rejects  all  peaceful  methods  of  settlement  and  resorts 
to  force,  the  other  nations  must  one  and  all  use  their 
combined  force  against  it.  The  economic  pressure 
that  such  a  League  could  use  would  in  itself  be 
very  powerful,  and  the  action  of  some  of  the  smaller 
States  composing  the  League  could  perhaps  not 
go  beyond  economic  pressure,  but  those  States 
that  have  power  must  be  ready  to  use  all  the  force, 
economic,  military  or  naval,  that  they  possess. 
It  must  be  clearly  understood  and  accepted  that 
defection  from  or  violation  of  the  agreement  by 
one  or  more  States  does  not  absolve  all  or  any  of 
the  others  from  the  obligation  to  enforce  the  agree- 
ment." 

It  seems  also  to  be  the  view  of  Mr.  A.  J.  Balfour, 


276  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

the  present  British  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
who,  when  forwarding  the  British  war  aims  in 
answer  to  President  Wilson's  request,  stated  on 
behalf  of  his  Government  that  "behind  all  treaty 
arrangements  for  preventing  or  limiting  hostilities, 
some  form  of  international  sanction  should  be 
devised  which  would  have  a  deterrent  effect  on 
aggressive  purposes." 

Just  what  is  set  out  in  the  passage  from  Lord 
Grey's  pamphlet  we  have  been  doing  during  the 
last  four  and  a  half  years. 

We  have  used  all  the  combined  force,  —  economic, 
military  and  naval,  —  of  some  fifteen  States,  includ- 
ing five  out  of  the  seven  great  Powers,  against 
practically  one  delinquent. 

I  do  not  suppose  that  President  Wilson  or  Lord 
Grey  or  Mr.  Balfour  contemplates  the  possibility 
of  having  to  begin  such  a  war  over  again  to  insure 
observance  of  the  agreement  entered  into  by  the 
associated  nations  as  "the  basis  of  this  League." 
Has  this  occurred  to  President  Wilson  and  is  it 
this  which  accounts  for  his  having  added  to  his 
fourth  July  Fourth  proposition  an  apparent  quali- 
fication? In  that  proposition  speaking  of  the 
"establishment  of  an  organization  of  peace"  he 
adds,  "which  shall  .  .  .  serve  to  make  peace  and 
justice  the  more  secure  by  affording  a  definite 
tribunal  of  opinion  to  which  all  must  submit." 

What  is  a  definite  tribunal  of  opinion  ?  Does  the 
President  mean  a  permanent  Hague  Court  such  as 
the   United    States   plenipotentiaries    proposed   at 


A  SOCIETY  (OR  LEAGUE)  OF  NATIONS     277 

the  Conference  of  1907,  with  salaried  judges  sitting 
as  in  national  courts  ? 

Then  the  President  concludes  his  July  Fourth 
proposition  by  giving  the  tribunal  jurisdiction  over 
every  "international  readjustment  that  cannot  be 
amicably  agreed  upon  by  the  people  directly  con- 
cerned." I  presume  that  by  "readjustment"  the 
President  meant  that  he  proposed  to  turn  over  to 
the  new  "tribunal  of  opinion"  all  questions  unsettled 
by  the  Treaty  of  Peace. 

By  this  tribunal,  he  says,  such  readjustment  shall 
be  "sanctioned."  This  seems  from  the  context 
to  be  merely  a  loose  employment  of  the  word.  I 
take  it  that  he  merely  meant  sanctioned  by  a 
decision. 

The  use  of  the  word  "readjustment",  if  the 
above  interpretation  of  the  President's  meaning  is 
not  correct,  may  imply  that  he  has  perceived  the 
difficulty  of  bringing  claims  not  based  on  purely 
juridical  grounds  within  the  scope  of  an  Inter- 
national Court  of  Law,  claims  for  instance  against 
the  closing  of  thinly  populated  areas  to  immigration, 
against  discriminating  tariffs,  protective  port  and 
canal  dues,  etc.,  disproportionate  colonial  dis- 
tribution, the  right  to  coaling  stations  commen- 
surate with  maritime  expansion,  in  fact  those 
readjustments  which  the  varying  and  respective 
developments  of  different  nations  require  to  pre- 
vent hardship,  grievances,  and  eventually  those 
shocks  which  lead  to  the  display  of  force  and  even 
war. 


278  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

Analysed  and  reduced  to  its  constituent  parts 
the  President's  July  Fourth  proposition  seems  to 
include  the  four  following  elements : 

1.  Establishment  of  an  international  organisa- 
tion for  the  preservation  of  international  peace; 

2.  That  organisation  to  impose  such  sanctions 
as  it  may  devise  for  preventing  any  invasion  of  the 
rights  of  members  thereof ; 

3.  A  tribunal  to  be  established  by  the  organisation 
for  the  trial  of  any  such  invasion  of  right,  but  at  the 
same  time, 

4.  Power  to  be  given  to  the  tribunal  to  deal  with 
claims  having  the  nature  of  a  readjustment,  that 
is,  claims  not  based  solely  on  juridical  right. 

If  this  was  the  President's  meaning,  he  has  placed 
his  finger  on  what  has  hitherto  been  the  weak  point 
in  all  treaties  of  arbitration,  nay,  in  the  very  system 
of  arbitration,  as  at  present  conceived,  as  a  method 
for  the  solution  of  any  really  dangerous  international 
disputes,  viz. :  those  involving  material  interest, 
traditional  policy  or  national  pride. 

I  can  say  this  with  some  reason  having,  as  Con- 
vener of  the  Arbitration  Committee  of  the  Institute 
of  International  Law,  endeavoured  in  my  different 
reports  and  draft  provisions  to  meet  the  difficulty. 
The  reader  will,  I  hope,  pardon  me  the  vanity  of 
quoting  the  following  passage  from  my  report  of 
1912,  as  it  preceded  the  War  and  which,  perhaps 
better  than  any  suggestions  I  might  make  in  exist- 
ing contingencies  when  a  certain  amount  of  reticence 
is  necessary,  serves  to  illustrate  what  I  take  to  have 
inspired  President  Wilson's  meaning: 


A  SOCIETY   (OR  LEAGUE)  OF  NATIONS      279 

The  difficulty  for  States  to  include  in  an  arbitra- 
tion treaty  all  differences  without  exception  arises 
from  the  fact  that  there  exist  no  rules,  except  the 
ordinary  juridical  rules,  which  arbitrators  can 
apply. 

Thus  how  would  it  be  possible  to  frame  rules 
enabling  States  to  have  recourse  to  arbitration  in 
cases  of  preponderating  interest  without  any  real 
juridical  basis  :  for  instance  when  it  is  a  question 
of  the  disrupted  and  disordered  condition  of  a 
neighbouring  country  and  the  actual  or  alleged 
danger  resulting  from  this  condition  for  the  State's 
own  territory  (the  case  between  France  and  Tunisia, 
between  France  and  Morocco,  Russia  and  Persia) 
or  where  the  claim  is  for  colonial  territories  in  pro- 
portion to  the  needs  of  an  emigrating  population 
(the  case  alleged  between  Germany  and  France 
and  between  Germany  and  Portugal  —  a  possible 
case  between  Russia  and  Japan  for  Eastern  Siberia, 
between  Germany  and  Australia,  between  Japan 
and  the  United  States  for  the  Philippines),  or,  again, 
in  questions  of  rectification  of  frontiers  to  bring 
them  into  line  with  a  reasonable  geographical  situa- 
tion on  racial  grounds  (the  case  alleged  between 
Italy  and  Austria-Hungary  for  the  cession  to  Italy 
of  the  Italian  portions  of  the  Empire,  the  case 
alleged  between  Greece  and  Turkey  for  the  cession 
to  Greece  of  islands  having  Greek  populations,  the 
cases  between  Serbia  and  Austria-Hungary  as 
regards  Bosnia-Herzegovina  and  between  Bulgaria 
and  Greece  and  Turkey  as  regards  districts  in 
Macedonia),  or  treatment  on  racial  grounds  (a 
possible  case  for  Japan  and  China  respecting  their 
subjects  in  the  United  States,  Canada  and  Aus- 
tralia) . 

There  is  no  juridical  rule  capable  of  application 
to  any  of  the  problems  in  this  list,  among  which 
there  is  sufficient  material  for  a  dozen  possible  wars. 


280  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

One  alone  might  be  the  signal  for  all  to  break  out  at 
once.  .  .  . 

To  enable  arbitration  to  settle  such  questions 
it  would  be  necessary  to  allow  the  judges  to  take 
their  stand  alongside  the  god  of  battle,  to  appraise 
the  fortune  of  war,  and  calculate  the  issue  of  armed 
conflicts.  They  would  have  to  take  into  account, 
as  I  have  said,  preponderating  interests,  the  balance 
of  power,  strength  so  overwhelming  that  the  issue 
of  a  war  could  leave  no  possible  doubt.  In  vain 
one  searches  in  the  arsenal  of  law  for  rules  for  arbi- 
tration which  could  provide  solutions  in  cases 
where  justice  plays  little  or  no  part  at  all.  For 
such  cases,  there  is  only  mediation  which  in  cer- 
tain contingencies  might  take  the  form  of  a  threat 
of  intervention.  Generally  speaking,  all  that  can 
apparently  be  done  at  present  is  to  stimulate  public 
reprobation  of  interested  acts  of  violence,  of  all 
violations  of  treaty  engagements,  of  all  the  inter- 
national immorality  which  still  pollutes  the  age 
in  which  we  live. 


President  Wilson  had,  no  doubt,  as  a  historian, 
perceived  the  gravity  of  the  problem  of  applying 
principles  of  law  or  justice  in  most  of  the  troubles 
which  have  eventuated  in  war.  Choice  of  the 
lesser  among  evils,  expediency,  and  a  genuine  desire 
for  the  preservation  of  peace,  even  the  attitude 
which  a  common  French  saying  adopts  as  regards 
recourse  to  law,  that  "a  poor  compromise  is  better 
than  a  good  judgment",  may  be  of  help  within  the 
Society  of  Nations  proposed  by  the  President. 

I  have  pointed  out  some  of  the  difficulties  and 
suggested  others  in  creating  a  Society  of  Nations. 


A  SOCIETY   (OR  LEAGUE)  OF  NATIONS      281 

The  greatest  of  all  is  the  creation  of  the  new  political 
entity  itself  and  the  curtailment  of  the  individual 
legislative  independence  of  the  federating  States 
which  it  implies,  not  because  peoples  may  be  unwill- 
ing to  curtail  power  of  their  own  governments  to 
plunge  them  into  international  ventures  without 
their  consent,  but  because  any  power  of  coercion 
possessed  by  the  executive  authority  of  the  federated 
States  would  entail  extension  of  the  very  power 
in  question  in  each  individual  State  which  it  is 
sought  to  restrict  and  release  from  that  legislative 
control  which  is  now  universally  acknowledged  to 
be  inherent  to  the  possession  of  political  freedom. 

Still  as  President  Wilson  said  in  his  speech  lay- 
ing the  draft  on  the  table  of  the  pre-Congress  "a 
living  thing  is  born."  "It  is  not  in  contemplation", 
he  added,  that  it  should  be  "merely  a  league  to 
secure  the  peace  of  the  world.  It  is  a  league  which 
can  be  used  for  co-operation  in  any  international 
matter."  These  were  very  significant  words,  the 
full  meaning  of  which  is  apparent  when  we  bear 
in  mind  that  the  greatest  cares  of  modern  statecraft 
are  economic  and  that  the  greatest  problems  which 
face  modern  parliaments  are  financial  —  that  the 
so-called  labour  question  includes  both  and  that  it 
is  essentially  international,  because  on  the  efficiency 
of  labour  and  practically  labour  alone  depends  the 
prosperity  of  the  masses  of  mankind  and  they 
cannot  live  on  domestic  exchanges  in  countries 
which  do  not  supply  the  raw  materials  of  life  and 
industry  within  their  own  boundaries. 


282  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

The  preamble,  therefore,  starts  off  with  the 
statement  that  the  covenant  is  entered  into  "in 
order  to  promote  international  co-operation"  and 
only  secondly  "international  peace  and  security", 
which  may  or  may  not  be  a  consequence  of  any 
effort  to  interfere  with  the  independence  of  adhering 
or  non-adhering  States. 

The  text  of  the  draft  "covenant",  as  laid  before 
the  world  for  consideration  at  the  sitting  on  February 
14  of  the  pre-Congress,  gives  rise  to  different  observa- 
tions, a  few  of  which  are  appended  to  the  text  set 
out  below : 

Covenant 

(1)  Preamble  —  In  order  to  promote  international  co- 
operation and  to  secure  international  peace  and  security 
by  the  acceptance  of  obligations  not  to  resort  to  war,  by 
the  prescription  of  open,  just,  and  honorable  relations 
between  nations,  by  the  firm  establishment  of  the  under- 
standings of  international  law  as  the  actual  rule  of  con- 
duct among  Governments,  and  by  the  maintenance  of 
justice  and  a  scrupulous  respect  for  all  treaty  obligations 
in  the  dealings  of  organized  peoples  with  one  another, 
the  Powers  signatory  to  this  covenant  adopt  this  Consti- 
tution of  the  League  of  Nations  : 

Article  1.  The  action  of  the  high  contracting  parties 
under  the  terms  of  this  covenant  shall  be  effected  through 
the  instrumentality  of  a  meeting  of  a  body  of  delegates 
representing  the  high  contracting  parties,  of  meetings 
at  more  frequent  intervals  of  an  Executive  Council 
and  of  a  permanent  international  secretariat  to  be  es- 
tablished at  the  seat  of  the  League. 


A  SOCIETY  (OR  LEAGUE)  OF  NATIONS      283 

(1)  President  Wilson,  in  presenting  the  plan  of 
the  League  of  Nations  at  the  full  sitting  of  the 
Peace  Conference  at  the  French  Foreign  Office  said : 

"I  have  the  honour,  and,  as  I  esteem  it,  the  very 
great  privilege  of  reporting  in  the  name  of  the  Com- 
mission constituted  by  this  Conference  on  the 
formulation  of  a  plan  for  the  League  of  Nations. 
I  am  happy  to  say  that  it  is  a  unanimous  report, 
a  unanimous  report  from  the  representatives  of 
fourteen  nations  —  the  United  States,  Great  Britain, 
France,  Italy,  Japan,  Belgium,  Brazil,  China, 
Czecho-Slovak,  Greece,  Poland,  Portugal,  Rumania 
and  Serbia." 

Article  2.  Meetings  of  the  body  of  delegates  shall 
be  held  at  stated  (1)  intervals  and  from  time  to  time,  as 
occasion  may  require,  for  the  purpose  of  dealing  with 
matters  within  the  sphere  of  action  of  the  League.  Meet- 
ings of  the  body  of  delegates  shall  be  held  at  the  seat  of 
the  League,  or  at  such  other  places  as  may  be  found  con- 
venient, and  shall  consist  of  representatives  of  the  high 
contracting  parties.  Each  of  the  high  contracting  parties 
shall  have  one  vote,  but  may  have  not  more  than  three 
representatives. 

(1)  The  word  "stated"  is  too  vague  to  afford 
any  security  for  the  adhering  Parties.  The  words 
"from  time  to  time"  and  "as  occasion  may  require" 
suggest  that  the  word  "stated"  does  not  mean 
regular.     Then  what  does  it  mean  ? 

Who,  moreover,  is  to  determine  when  the  occasion 
for  meeting  has  occurred  or  where  the  meeting  shall 
be  held?     The  wording  of  the  clause  excludes  the 


284  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

interpretation  that  the  Body  of  Delegates  decides 
when  or  where  it  shall  meet. 

Article  3.  The  Executive  Council  shall  consist  of 
representatives  of  the  United  States  of  America,  the  British 
Empire,  France,  Italy,  and  Japan,  together  with  repre- 
sentatives of  four  other  States,  members  of  the  League.  (1) 
The  selection  of  these  four  States  shall  be  made  by  the 
body  of  delegates  on  such  principles  and  in  such  manner 
as  they  think  fit.  Pending  the  appointment  of  these 
representatives  of  the  other  States,  representatives  of 
shall  be  members  of  the  Executive  Council. 

Meetings  of  the  Council  shall  be  held  from  time  to 
time  as  occasion  may  require,  and  at  least  once  a  year, 
at  whatever  place  may  be  decided  on,  or,  failing  any  such 
decision,  at  the  seat  of  the  League,  and  any  matter  within 
the  sphere  of  action  of  the  League  or  affecting  the  peace 
of  the  world  may  be  dealt  with  at  such  meetings. 

Invitations  shall  be  sent  to  any  Power  to  attend  a 
meeting  of  the  council  at  which  such  matters  directly 
affecting  its  interests  are  to  be  discussed,  and  no  decision 
taken  at  any  meeting  will  be  binding  on  such  Powers 
unless  so  invited. 

(1)  The  majority  is  to  consist  at  all  times  of  the 
five  States  named.  The  four  appointments  to  be 
made  by  the  body  of  delegates  are  of  States,  not 
persons.  This  means  that  if,  let  us  say,  Belgium, 
Switzerland,  China  and  Argentine  were  appointed, 
these  four  Powers  would  represent  on  the  Executive 
Council  the  interests  and  control  over  Holland, 
Portugal,  Sweden,  Norway,  etc.,  in  Europe  and 
over  Brazil,  Mexico,  etc.,  on  the  American  Con- 
tinent. 


A  SOCIETY  (OR  LEAGUE)  OF  NATIONS     285 

"i^ais  is  not  likely  to  be  agreed  to  in  view  of  the 
enormous  powers  given  in  the  draft  to  the  Executive 
Council,  and  the  article  will  probably  have  to  be 
recast  on  quite  different  lines. 

The  provision  that  this  Council  of  nine  may  cite 
before  it  any  State  with  whose  interests  it  may  intend 
to  deal  and  that  unless  it  is  so  cited  decisions  are 
not  binding  on  it  does  not  attenuate  the  interference 
with  national  autonomy. 

Article  4.  All  matters  of  procedure  at  meetings  of  the 
body  of  delegates  or  the  Executive  Council,  including 
the  appointment  of  committees  to  investigate  particular 
matters,  shall  be  regulated  by  the  body  of  delegates  or 
the  Executive  Council,  and  may  be  decided  by  a  majority 
of  the  States  represented  at  the  meeting. 

The  first  meeting  of  the  body  of  delegates  and  of  the 
Executive  Council  shall  be  summoned  by  the  President 
of  the  United  States  of  America. 

Article   5.     The  permanent  secretariat  of  the  League 

shall  be  established  at  ,  which  shall  constitute  the 

seat  of  the  League.  The  secretariat  shall  comprise  such 
secretaries  and  staff  as  may  be  required,  under  the  general 
direction  and  control  of  a  Secretary  General  of  the  League, 
who  shall  be  chosen  by  the  Executive  Council.  The 
secretariat  shall  be  appointed  by  the  Secretary  General 
subject  to  confirmation  by  the  Executive  Council. 

The  Secretary  General  shall  act  in  that  capacity  at 
all  meetings  of  the  body  of  delegates  or  of  the  Executive 
Council. 

The  expenses  of  the  secretariat  shall  be  borne  by  the 
States  members  of  the  League,  in  accordance  with  the 
apportionment  of  the  expenses  of  the  International 
Bureau  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union. 


286  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

Article  6.  Representatives  of  the  high  contracting 
parties  and  officials  of  the  League,  when  engaged  in  the 
business  of  the  League,  shall  enjoy  diplomatic  privi- 
leges and  immunities,  and  the  buildings  occupied  by  the 
League  or  its  officials,  or  by  representatives  attending 
its  meetings,  shall  enjoy  the  benefits  of  extraterritori- 
ality. 

Article  7.  Admission  to  the  League  of  States,  not 
signatories  to  the  covenant  and  not  named  in  the  protocol 
hereto  as  States  to  be  invited  to  adhere  to  the  covenant, 
requires  the  assent  of  not  less  than  two  thirds  of  the 
States  represented  in  the  body  of  delegates,  and  shall  be 
limited  to  fully  self-governing  countries  (1),  including  do- 
minions and  colonies. 

No  State  shall  be  admitted  to  the  League  unless  it  is 
able  to  give  effective  guarantees  of  its  sincere  intention 
to  observe  its  international  obligations  and  unless  it 
shall  conform  to  such  principles  as  may  be  prescribed 
by  the  League  in  regard  to  its  naval  and  military  forces 
and  armaments  (2). 

(1)  What  is  a  fully  self-governing  country? 

Is  a  country  in  which  women  are  excluded  from 
representation  and  government  fully  self-governing  ? 

Is  a  country  in  which  a  government  has  powers 
in  conjunction  with  a  hereditary  sovereign  to  plunge 
it  into  war  without  the  consent  of  parliament  a  fully 
self-governing  country  ? 

Is  a  dominion  or  colony  in  which  a  governor 
not  appointed  by  it  has  a  right  of  veto  a  self-govern- 
ing country  ? 

(2)  What  is  meant  by  effective  guarantees  of 
sincerity  or  intention?  An  example  of  such  a 
guarantee  and  a  definition  of  sincerity  are  necessary 


A  SOCIETY   (OR  LEAGUE)  OF  NATIONS      287 

as  telsquels;  the   words  have  the  appearance  of  a 
contradiction  of  terms. 

Article  8.  The  high  contracting  parties  recognize 
the  principle  that  the  maintenance  of  peace  will  require 
the  reduction  of  national  armaments  to  the  lowest  point 
consistent  with  national  safety,  and  the  enforcement 
by  common  action  of  international  obligations,  having 
special  regard  to  the  geographical  situation  and  circum- 
stances of  each  State,  and  the  Executive  Council  shall 
formulate  plans  for  effecting  such  reduction.  The  Execu- 
tive Council  shall  also  determine  for  the  consideration 
and  action  of  the  several  Governments  what  military 
equipment  and  armament  is  fair  and  reasonable  in  pro- 
portion to  the  scale  of  forces  laid  down  in  the  program 
of  disarmament;  and  these  limits,  when  adopted,  shall 
not  be  exceeded  without  the  permission  of  the  Executive 
Council  (1). 

The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that  the  manu- 
facture by  private  enterprise  of  munitions  and  imple- 
ments of  war  lends  itself  to  grave  objections,  and  direct 
the  Executive  Council  to  advise  how  the  evil  effects 
attendant  upon  such  manufacture  can  be  prevented, 
due  regard  being  had  to  the  necessities  of  those  countries 
which  are  not  able  to  manufacture  for  themselves  the  muni- 
tions and  implements  of  war  necessary  for  their  safety. 

The  high  contracting  parties  undertake  in  no  way  to 
conceal  from  each  other  the  condition  of  such  of  their 
industries  as  are  capable  of  being  adapted  to  warlike 
purposes  or  the  scale  of  their  armaments,  and  agree  that 
there  shall  be  full  and  frank  interchange  of  information 
as  to  their  military  and  naval  programs  (2). 

(1)  The  first  paragraph  of  the  article  taken  in 
conjunction  with  Article  3  implies  that  each  Power 


288  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

will  be  summoned  before  the  Executive  of  Nine 
and  be  heard  on  the  subject  of  its  disarmament. 
The  Executive  only  determines  for  the  considera- 
tion of  the  respective  Powers  what  is  fair  and 
reasonable.  With  whom  rests  the  final  decision 
in  case  of  disagreement  between  the  Executive 
and  such  Powers  ? 

(2)  The  second  and  third  paragraphs  seem  to 
favour  the  munition  industries  of  the  Executive 
Powers.  As  this  subject  of  private  arsenals  will 
probably  be  one  of  the  chief  questions  for  the  decision 
of  the  Peace  Congress  the  weakness  of  the  wording 
of  the  paragraph  does  not  necessarily  imply  tender- 
ness for  these  powerful  enterprises. 

Article  9.  A  permanent  commission  shall  be  con- 
stituted to  advise  the  League  on  the  execution  of  the 
provisions  of  Article  8  and  on  military  and  naval  ques- 
tions generally  (1). 

(1)  Will  the  Permanent  Commission  be  appointed 
by  the  Executive  Powers  ?  It  is  supererogation 
to  criticise  the  article  which  ought  really  to  form 
part  of  Article  8  till  this  is  made  clear. 

Article  10.  The  high  contracting  parties  shall  under- 
take to  respect  and  preserve  as  against  external  aggression 
the  territorial  integrity  and  existing  political  independence 
of  all  States  members  of  the  League.  In  case  of  any  such 
aggression  or  in  case  of  any  threat  or  danger  of  such 
aggression  the  Executive  Council  shall  advise  upon  the 
means  by  which  the  obligation  shall  be  fulfilled. 

Article  11.  Any  war  or  threat  of  war,  whether  immedi- 
ately affecting  any  of  the  high  contracting  parties  or  not. 


A  SOCIETY   (OR  LEAGUE)   OF  NATIONS      289 

is  hereby  declared  a  matter  of  concern  to  the  League, 
and  the  high  contracting  parties  reserve  the  right  to  take 
any  action  that  may  be  deemed  wise  and  effectual  to 
safeguard  the  peace  of  nations. 

It  is  hereby  also  declared  and  agi-eed  to  be  the  friendly 
right  of  each  of  the  high  contracting  parties  to  draw  the 
attention  of  the  body  of  delegates  or  of  the  Executive 
Council  to  any  circumstance  affecting  international 
intercourse  which  threatens  to  disturb  international 
peace  or  the  good  understanding  between  nations  upon 
which  peace  depends. 

Article  12.  The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that 
should  disputes  arise  between  them  which  cannot  be 
adjusted  by  the  ordinary  processes  of  diplomacy  they 
will  in  no  case  resort  to  war  without  previously  sub- 
mitting the  questions  and  matters  involved  either  to 
arbitration  or  to  inquiry  by  the  Executive  Council, 
and  until  three  months  after  the  award  by  the  arbitrators 
or  a  recommendation  by  the  Executive  Council,  and 
that  they  will  not  even  then  resort  to  war  as  against  a 
member  of  the  League  which  complies  with  the  award 
of  the  arbitrators  or  the  recommendation  of  the  Executive 
Council. 

In  any  case  under  this  article  the  award  of  the  arbitra- 
tors shall  be  made  within  a  reasonable  time,  and  the  recom- 
mendation of  the  Executive  Council  shall  be  made  within 
six  months  after  the  submission  of  the  dispute. 

Article  13.  The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that 
whenever  any  dispute  or  difficulty  shall  arise  between 
them,  which  they  recognize  to  be  suitable  for  submission 
to  arbitration  and  which  cannot  be  satisfactorily  settled 
by  diplomacy,  they  will  submit  the  whole  matter  to 
arbitration.  For  this  purpose  the  court  of  arbitration 
to  which  the  case  is  referred  shall  be  the  court  agreed  on 


290  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

by  the  parties  or  stipulated  in  any  convention  existing 
between  them.  The  high  contracting  parties  agree 
that  they  will  carry  out  in  full  good  faith  any  award 
that  may  be  rendered.  In  the  event  of  any  failure  to 
carry  out  the  award  the  Executive  Council  shall  propose 
what  steps  can  best  be  taken  to  give  effect  thereto. 

Article  14.  The  Executive  Council  shall  formulate 
plans  for  the  establishment  of  a  permanent  court  of 
international  justice,  and  this  court  shall,  when  established, 
be  competent  to  hear  and  determine  any  matter  which 
the  parties  recognize  as  suitable  for  submission  to  it  for 
arbitration  under  the  foregoing  article. 

Article  15.  If  there  should  arise  between  States, 
members  of  the  League,  any  dispute  likely  to  lead  to 
rupture,  which  is  not  submitted  to  arbitration  as  above, 
the  high  contracting  parties  agree  that  they  will  refer 
the  matter  to  the  Executive  Council;  either  party  to 
the  dispute  may  give  notice  of  the  existence  of  the  dis- 
pute to  the  Secretary  General,  who  will  make  all  necessary 
arrangements  for  a  full  investigation  and  consideration 
thereof.  For  this  purpose  the  parties  agree  to  communi- 
cate to  the  Secretary  General  as  promptly  as  possible 
statements  of  their  case,  all  the  relevant  facts  and  papers, 
and  the  Executive  Council  may  forthwith  direct  the 
publication  thereof. 

Where  the  efforts  of  the  council  lead  to  the  settlement 
of  the  dispute,  a  statement  shall  be  published,  indicating 
the  nature  of  the  dispute  and  the  terms  of  settlement, 
together  with  such  explanations  as  may  be  appropriate. 
If  the  dispute  has  not  been  settled,  a  report  by  the  council 
shall  be  published,  setting  forth  with  all  necessary  facts 
and  explanations  the  recommendation  which  the  council 
think  just  and  proper  for  the  settlement  of  the  dispute. 
If  the  report  is  unanimously  agreed  to  by  the  members  of 


A  SOCIETY   (OR  LEAGUE)    OF  NATIONS         291 

the  council,  other  than  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  the  high 
contracting  parties  agree  that  they  will  not  go  to  war 
with  any  party  which  complies  with  the  recommendations, 
and  that  if  any  party  shall  refuse  so  to  comply  the  council 
shall  propose  measures  necessary  to  give  effect  to  the 
recommendations.  If  no  such  unanimous  report  can 
be  made  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  majority  and  the 
privilege  of  the  minority  to  issue  statements,  indicating 
what  they  believe  to  be  the  facts,  and  containing  the 
reasons  which  they  consider  to  be  just  and  proper. 

The  Executive  Council  may  in  any  case  under  this 
article  refer  the  dispute  to  the  body  of  delegates.  The 
dispute  shall  be  so  referred  at  the  request  of  either  party 
to  the  dispute,  provided  that  such  request  must  be  made 
within  fourteen  days  after  the  submission  of  the  dispute. 
In  a  case  referred  to  the  body  of  delegates,  all  the  pro- 
visions of  this  article,  and  of  Article  12,  relating  to  the 
action  and  powers  of  the  Executive  Council,  shall  apply 
to  the  action  and  powers  of  the  body  of  delegates.^ 

^  After  reading  the  second  paragraph  of  Article  15  the  President 
said:  "I  pause  to  point  out  that  a  misconception  might  arise  in  con- 
nection with  one  of  the  sentences  I  have  just  read :  *If  any  party  shall 
refuse  so  to  comply,  the  Council  shall  propose  the  measures  necessary 
to  give  effect  to  the  recommendation.' 

"  A  case  in  point,  a  purely  hypothetical  case,  is  this :  Suppose  that 
there  is  in  the  possession  of  a  particular  Power  a  piece  of  territory  or 
some  other  substantial  thing  in  dispute  to  which  it  is  claimed  that  it 
is  not  entitled.  Suppose  that  the  matter  is  submitted  to  the  Executive 
Council  for  a  recommendation  as  to  the  settlement  of  the  dispute,  diplo- 
macy having  failed,  and  suppose  that  the  decision  is  in  favour  of  the 
party  which  claims  the  subject  matter  of  dispute  as  against  the  party 
which  has  the  subject  matter  in  dispute. 

"  Then  if  the  party  in  possession  of  the  subject  matter  in  dispute  merely 
sits  still  and  does  nothing,  it  has  accepted  the  decision  of  the  Council 
in  the  sense  that  it  makes  no  resistance;  but  something  must  be  done 
to  see  that  it  sxurenders  the  subject  matter  in  dispute.  In  such  a 
case,  the  only  case  contemplated,  it  is  provided  that  the  Executive 


292  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

Article  16,  Should  any  of  the  high  contracting 
parties  break  or  disregard  its  covenants  under  Article 
12  it  shall  thereby  ipso  facto  be  deemed  to  have  com- 
mitted an  act  of  war  against  all  the  other  members  of  the 
League,  which  hereby  undertakes  immediately  to  subject 
it  to  the  severance  of  all  trade  or  financial  relations,  the 
prohibition  of  all  intercourse  between  their  nationals 
and  the  nationals  of  the  covenant-breaking  State  and  the 
prevention  of  all  financial,  commercial,  or  personal 
intercourse  between  the  nationals  of  the  covenant- 
breaking  State  and  the  nationals  of  any  other  State, 
whether  a  member  of  the  League  or  not  (1). 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Executive  Council  in  such 
case  to  recommend  what  effective  military  or  naval 
force  the  members  of  the  League  shall  severally  contrib- 
ute to  the  armed  forces  to  be  used  to  protect  the  cove- 
nants of  the  League. 

The  high  contracting  parties  agree,  further,  that  they 
will  mutually  support  one  another  in  the  financial  and 
economic  measures  which  may  be  taken  under  this  article 
in  order  to  minimize  the  loss  and  inconvenience  resulting 
from  the  above  measures,  and  that  they  will  mutually 
support  one  another  in  resisting  any  special  measures 
aimed  at  one  of  their  number  by  the  covenant-breaking 
State  and  that  they  will  afford  passage  through  their  terri- 
tory to  the  forces  of  any  of  the  high  contracting  parties  who 
are  co-operating  to  protect  the  covenants  of  the  League. 

(1)  This  would  be  difficult  to  apply,  if  the  de- 
faulter were  a  country  on  which  others  were  depend- 
ent for  food  or  raw  materials.  The  draftsman  tries 
to  meet  the  difficulty  in  the  third  paragraph,  but 

Council  may  then  consider  what  steps  may  be  necessary  to  oblige  the 
party  against  whom  judgment  has  gone  to  comply  with  the  decisions 
of  the  Council." 


A  SOCIETY  (OR  LEAGUE)   OF  NATIONS     293 

the  one  clause  is  positive  and  the  other  merely 
potential. 

Article  17.  In  the  event  of  dispute  between  one 
State  member  of  the  League  and  another  State  which  is 
not  a  member  of  the  League,  or  between  States  not 
members  of  the  League,  the  high  contracting  parties 
agree  that  the  State  or  States,  not  members  of  the  League, 
shall  be  invited  to  accept  the  obligations  of  membership 
in  the  League  for  the  purposes  of  such  dispute,  upon 
such  conditions  as  the  Executive  Council  may  deem 
just,  and  upon  acceptance  of  any  such  invitation,  the 
above  provisions  shall  be  applied  with  such  modifications 
as  may  be  deemed  necessary  by  the  League. 

Upon  such  invitation  being  given  the  Executive  Council 
shall  immediately  institute  an  inquiry  into  the  circumstances 
and  merits  of  the  dispute  and  recommend  such  action  as 
may  seem  best  and  most  eflfectual  in  the  circumstances. 

In  the  event  of  a  power  so  invited  refusing  to  accept 
the  obligations  of  membership  in  the  League  for  the 
purposes  of  the  League,  which  in  the  case  of  a  State 
member  of  the  League  would  constitute  a  breach  of 
Article  12,  the  provisions  of  Article  16  shall  be  ap- 
plicable as  against  the  State  taking  such  action. 

If  both  parties  to  the  dispute,  when  so  invited,  refuse 
to  accept  the  obligations  of  membership  in  the  League 
for  the  purpose  of  such  dispute,  the  Executive  Council 
may  take  such  action  and  make  such  recommendations 
as  will  prevent  hostilities  and  will  result  in  the  settle- 
ment of  the  dispute. 

Article  18.  The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that 
the  League  shall  be  intrusted  with  general  supervision 
of  the  trade  in  arms  and  ammunition  with  the  countries 
in  which  the  control  of  this  traffic  is  necessary  in  the 
common  interest  (1). 


294  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

(1)  This  article  seems  to  regard  Article  8  as  of 
no  effect  and  in  any  case  Articles  18  and  8  belong 
together. 

Article  19.^  To  those  colonies  and  territories  which, 
as  a  consequence  of  the  late  war,  have  ceased  to  be  under 
the  sovereignty  of  the  States  which  formerly  governed 
them  and  which  are  inhabited  by  peoples  not  yet  able 
to  stand  by  themselves  under  the  strenuous  conditions 
of  the  modern  world,  there  should  be  applied  the  prin- 
ciple that  the  well-being  and  development  of  such  peoples 
form  a  sacred  trust  of  civilization  and  that  securities 
for  the  performance  of  this  trust  should  be  embodied  in 
the  constitution  of  the  League. 

The  best  method  of  giving  practical  effect  to  this 
principle  is  that  the  tutelage  of  such  peoples  should  be 
intrusted  to  advanced  nations,  who  by  reason  of  their 
resources,  their  experience,  or  their  geographical  position, 
can  best  undertake  this  responsibility,  and  that  this 
tutelage  should  be  exercised  by  them  as  mandatories 
on  behaK  of  the  League. 

The  character  of  the  mandate  must  differ  according 
to  the  stage  of  the  development  of  the  people,  the  geo- 
graphical situation  of  the  territory,  its  economic  conditions 
and  other  similar  circumstances. 

Certain  communities,  formerly  belonging  to  the  Turkish 
Empire,  have  reached  a  stage  of  development  where 
their  existence  as  independent  nations  can  be  provisionally 
recognized,  subject  to  the  rendering  of  administrative 
advice  and  assistance  by  a  mandatory  power  until  such 

^  Before  reading  Article  19,  the  President  said:  "Let  me  say  before 
reading  Article  19,  that  before  being  embodied  in  this  document  it  was 
the  subject  matter  of  a  very  careful  discussion  by  representatives  of 
the  five  greater  Parties,  and  that  their  imanimous  conclusion  in  the 
matter  is  embodied  in  this  Article." 


A  SOCIETY  (OR  LEAGUE)  OF  NATIONS     295 

time  as  they  are  able  to  stand  alone.  The  wishes  of 
these  communities  must  be  a  principal  consideration  in 
the  selection  of  the  mandatory  power. 

Other  peoples,  especially  those  of  Central  Africa,  are 
at  such  a  stage  that  the  mandatory  must  be  responsible 
for  the  administration  of  the  territory,  subject  to  condi- 
tions which  will  guarantee  freedom  of  conscience  or 
religion,  subject  only  to  the  maintenance  of  public  order 
and  morals,  the  prohibition  of  abuses  such  as  the  slave 
trade,  the  arms  traffic,  and  the  liquor  traffic,  and  the  pre- 
vention of  the  establishment  of  fortifications  or  military 
and  naval  bases  and  of  military  training  of  the  natives 
for  other  than  police  purposes  and  the  defense  of  territory, 
and  will  also  secure  equal  opportunities  for  the  trade 
and  commerce  of  other  members  of  the  League. 

There  are  territories,  such  as  Southwest  Africa  and 
certain  of  the  South  Pacific  Isles,  which,  owing  to  the 
sparseness  of  the  population,  or  their  small  size,  or  their 
remoteness  from  the  centres  of  civilization,  or  their  geo- 
graphical contiguity  to  the  mandatory  State  and  other 
circumstances,  can  be  best  administered  under  the  laws 
of  the  mandatory  States  as  integral  portions  thereof, 
subject  to  the  safeguards  above  mentioned  in  the  inter- 
ests of  the  indigenous  population. 

In  every  case  of  mandate,  the  mandatory  State  shall 
render  to  the  League  an  annual  report  in  reference  to 
the  territory  committed  to  its  charge  (1). 

The  degree  of  authority,  control,  or  administration, 
to  be  exercised  by  the  mandatory  State,  shall,  if  not 
previously  agreed  upon  by  the  high  contracting  parties 
in  each  case,  be  explicitly  defined  by  the  Executive  Coun- 
cil in  a  special  act  or  charter. 

The  high  contracting  parties  further  agree  to  establish 
at  the  seat  of  the  League  a  mandatory  commission  to 


296  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

receive  and  examine  the  annual  reports  of  the  mandatory 
powers,  and  to  assist  the  League  in  insuring  the  observ- 
ance of  the  terms  of  all  mandates  (2). 

(1)  Tliis  provision  might  be  generalised  with 
advantage,  publicity  being  obviously  a  safeguard 
against  combinazione  of  all  kinds. 

(2)  Does  this  mean  that  the  Mandatory  Com- 
mission will  be  composed  of  members  of  the  Execu- 
tive Council  or  of  the  delegates,  or  of  both  or  of 
neither?  What  is  the  effect  of  the  words  "at 
the  seat  of  the  League?"  Do  they  mean  that  the 
Commission  is  to  be  a  mere  Bureau?  Are  the 
reports  of  the  Commission  or  the  mandatories' 
reports  to  be  made  public?  Will  it  be  a  sort  of 
Ministry  with  a  chief  responsible  to  the  Executive 
Council  —  perhaps  a  member  of  it  ? 

Article  20.  The  high  contracting  parties  will  endeavor 
to  secure  and  maintain  fair  and  humane  conditions  of 
labor  for  men,  women,  and  children,  both  in  their  own 
countries  and  in  all  countries  to  which  their  commercial 
and  industrial  relations  extend;  and  to  that  end  agree 
to  establish  as  part  of  the  organization  of  the  League 
a  permanent  bureau  of  labor  (1). 

(1)  The  same  observations  in  general  apply  to 
this  article  as  to  the  final  clause  of  the  previous 
one. 

Article  21.  The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that 
provision  shall  be  made  through  the  instrumentality 
of  the  League  to  secure  and  maintain  freedom  of  transit 
and  equitable  treatment  for  the  commerce  of  all  States 
members  of  the  League,  having  in  mind,  among  other 


A  SOCIETY   (OR  LEAGUE)   OF   NATIONS     297 

things,  special  arrangements  with  regard  to  the  necessities 
of  the  regions  devastated  during  the  war  of  1914-1918  (1). 

(1)  This  article  is  obscure,  seeming  to  apply  to 
some  difference  of  opinion  of  the  drafting  Powers 
which  is  not  obvious. 

Article  22.  The  high  contracting  parties  agree  to 
place  under  the  control  of  the  League  all  international 
bureaus  already  established  by  general  treaties,  if  the 
parties  to  such  treaties  consent.  Furthermore,  they 
agree  that  all  such  international  bureaus  to  be  constituted 
in  futiu'e  shall  be  placed  under  control  of  the  League  (1). 

(1)  Does  the  control  of  the  League  mean  of  the 
Executive  Council?  Will  the  control  be  exercised 
by  an  official  reporting  to  it  and  (or)  the  delegates  ? 
Will  there  be  a  "Ministry  of  International  Conven- 
tions" with  a  chief  responsible  to  the  Executive 
Council  and  (or)  delegates  ? 

Article  23.  The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that 
every  treaty  or  international  engagement  (1)  entered  into 
hereafter  by  any  State  member  of  the  League  shall  be 
forthwith  registered  with  the  Secretary  General  and  as 
soon  as  possible  published  by  him,  and  that  no  such 
treaty  or  international  engagement  shall  be  binding  until 
so  registered. 

(1)  Should  this  not  read  "every  international 
treaty  or  engagement.''"  Is  not  the  word  "engage- 
ment" vague?  Is  not  "obligation"  or  "under- 
taking" meant?  The  sense  of  the  word  "conven- 
tion" in  diplomacy  has  come  to  mean  a  treaty 
among  a  number  of  Powers,  though  it  is  also  used 


298  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

for  agreements  relating  to  commercial  and  indus- 
trial as  distinguished  from  political  matters. 

Article  24,  It  shall  be  the  right  of  the  body  of  dele- 
gates from  time  to  time  to  advise  the  reconsideration 
by  States  members  of  the  League  of  treaties  which  have 
become  inapplicable  and  of  international  conditions  of 
which  the  continuance  may  endanger  the  peace  of  the 
world  (1). 

(1)  This  seems  to  be  an  inversion  of  procedure. 
Did  not  the  draftsman  mean:  "It  shall  be  the 
right  of  any  State  member  of  the  League  to  submit 
for  consideration  by  the  delegates  any  treaty  which 
has  become  inapplicable  and  demand  release  from 
its  terms?"  The  article  is  obscure.  An  instance 
of  what  is  meant  is  desirable. 

Article  25.  The  high  contracting  parties  severally 
agree  that  the  present  covenant  is  accepted  as  abrogating 
all  obligations  inter  se  which  are  inconsistent  with  the 
terms  thereof,  and  solemnly  engage  that  they  will  not 
hereafter  enter  into  any  engagements  inconsistent  with 
the  terms  thereof.  In  case  any  of  the  Powers  signatory 
hereto  or  subsequently  admitted  to  the  League  shall, 
before  becoming  a  party  to  this  covenant,  have  under- 
taken any  obligations  which  are  inconsistent  with  the 
terms  of  this  covenant,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  such  Power 
to  take  immediate  steps  to  procure  its  release  from  such 
obligations. 

Article  26.  Amendments  to  this  covenant  will  take 
effect  when  ratified  by  the  States  whose  representatives 
compose  the  Executive  Council  and  by  three  fourths  of 
the  States  whose  representatives  compose  the  body  of 
delegates. 


A  SOCIETY  (OR  LEAGUE)   OF  NATIONS      299 

Without  wishing  in  any  way  to  depreciate  the 
draft  thus  submitted  for  consideration,  I  venture 
to  remark  that  it  shows  the  defects  inherent  to 
hasty  drafting  and  to  the  compromising  of  different 
views  there  may  not  have  been  time  to  thresh  out. 
Moreover,  it  seems  influenced  by  the  desire  to 
assure  the  domination  of  the  Great  Powers  while 
introducing  a  minimum  of  parHamentary  restric- 
tion upon  their  supremacy  through  a  Body  of 
Delegates  who  are  only  vaguely  brought  into  action 
if  at  all.  Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  its  defects,  it  is 
a  very  fair  basis  for  discussion  and  as  such,  having 
the  unanimous  approval  of  the  representatives  of 
the  Allies,  it  must  be  treated  with  respect. 

I  venture  to  suggest,  however,  that  the  greatest 
deterrent  from  war  would  be  public  and  unfettered 
discussion  of  any  difficulties  capable  of  leading  to 
it  in  a  "parliament  of  mankind"  and  that  voting 
after  such  discussions  would  have  the  effect  of  divid- 
ing it  into  parties  which  would  necessarily  lead  to 
strife  as  in  domestic  parliaments  and  accentuate 
the  evil  it  is  sought  to  avert. 

With  this  principle  in  view  I  have  drawn  up  the 
following  preamble  of  suggestions  which  may  be 
useful  for  the  further  consideration  of  the  Congress : 

Suggested  Preamble  to  Constitution  of  a 
Society  of  Nations 

Whereas  the  idea  of  a  Society  of  Nations  has  long 
been  among  the  nobler  aspirations  of  men,  and  the  federa- 
tion of  communities  for  specific  purposes  has  been  suc- 
cessfully essayed ; 


300  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

Whereas  such  a  Societj'^  as  proposed  at  the  present  time 
has  for  object  the  prevention  of  war ; 

Whereas  the  prevention  of  war  seems  attainable,  if 
at  all,  by  making  its  consequences  so  unlikely  to  insure 
success  as  to  deter  engaging  in  it,  or  by  making  clear 
to  all  mankind  that  solutions  are  less  costly  by  pacific 
than  by  violent  methods; 

Whereas  an  overwhelming  combination  of  Powers 
for  its  prevention  seems  capable  of  serving  as  a  deterrent, 
but  neither  history  nor  the  practice  of  men  in  civil  com- 
binations affords  any  instances  of  such  combinations  hav- 
ing endured  beyond  an  immediate  common  interest ; 

Whereas,  on  the  other  hand,  the  better  understanding 
of  each  other's  objects,  necessities,  ideals  may  in  itself 
be  a  preservative  against  the  employment  of  violence 
as  a  means  of  obtaining  satisfaction  to  just  demands ; 

Whereas,  this  better  understanding  depends  upon 
statesmen  meeting  each  other  and  being  able  to  con- 
verse with  each  other ; 

Whereas,  resolutions  dependent  on  the  decisions  of 
a  majority  would  necessarily  tend  to  division  instead  of 
harmony ; 

Whereas  to  make  such  meetings  effective  and  inde- 
pendent of  passing  events  and  currents  of  public  feel- 
ing, it  is  desirable  that  they  should  be  periodical  and 
automatic ; 

Whereas  for  the  purpose  of  such  meetings  a  country 
should  be  chosen  which  is  permanently  neutralised  and 
where  permanent  officials  and  government  authorities 
are  likely  to  be  less  subject  to  international  bias  than 
countries  not  so  detached  from  international  controver- 
sies ; 

Whereas  of  the  three  countries  which  enjoy  permanent 
neutrality,  viz. :    Switzerland,  Belgium  and  Luxemburg, 


A  SOCIETY   (OR  LEAGUE)   OF  NATIONS      301 

Luxemburg  alone  is  completely  neutralised  and  her 
territory,  in  this  respect  recalling  to  some  extent  the 
position  of  the  "District  of  Columbia"  in  the  United 
States,  is  marked  out  as  the  headquarters  of  official  efforts 
for  the  avoidance  of  warfare ; 

Whereas  official  must  be  distinguished  from  unofficial 
agencies  for  the  avoidance  of  war,  and  it  is  desirable 
not  to  let  them  be  confused  in  the  public  mind ; 

Whereas  it  is  desirable  that  a  parliamentary  union  for 
all  purposes  should  be  created  and  that  there  should  be 
no  restriction  placed  upon  the  free  discussion  of  all  mat- 
ters, and  that  a  full  report  of  the  proceedings  should  be 
published;  and 

Whereas  it  is  undesirable  that  such  a  union  should 
have  power  to  adopt  resolutions  outside  matters  of  its 
by-laws ; 

Whereas  it  is  desirable  to  discourage  any  spirit  which 
can  interfere  with  the  free  play  of  argument  or  with  the 
revelation  of  facts  and  situations,  the  object  of  discus- 
sion being  the  enlightenment  of  public  opinion  and  not 
coercion  of  a  minority  by  a  majority; 

Whereas  the  periodical  meetings  of  representatives 
of  governments,  though  corresponding  to  meetings  of 
a  Senate,  shall  not  be  public  and  shall  even  be  so  secret 
that  only  matters  may  be  divulged  by  specific  authorisa- 
tion of  the  Parties  affected ; 

Whereas  it  is  desirable  that  both  Houses  possess  the 
greatest  possible  independence  in  so  far  as  being  governed 
by  their  own  by-laws,  electing  their  own  Presidents, 
Vice-presidents,  and  other  officers  and  having  their  own 
officials,  their  own  independent  buildings  with  all  facili- 
ties for  general  assemblies,  committee  meetings,  libraries, 
writing  rooms,  etc.,  on  the  scale  of  a  parliament  of  a 
first-class  State; 


302  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

Whereas  it  is  desirable  that  meetings  shall  not  be 
pressed  for  time  and  that  every  year  the  Session  should 
open  at  a  fixed  date  which  it  is  proposed  should  be  the  first 
of  June,  the  sitting  to  continue  until  the  work  is  completed ; 

Whereas  there  is  no  reason  why  committees  should 
not  make  suggestions  or  adopt  conclusions  in  reports 
submitted  for  discussion  at  plenary  sittings ; 

Whereas  it  is  desirable  that  the  equality  of  States 
should  be  observed  as  far  as  possible,  but  that  in  the 
discussions  it  would  be  falsifying  the  object  of  free  and 
untrammeled  discussion  to  disregard  the  universal  char- 
acter of  this  parliament  of  mankind,  and  populations  of 
the  world  should,  as  far  as  possible,  be  represented  in 
such  meetings  and  not  the  States  to  which  they  belong ; 

Whereas,  nevertheless,  it  is  practically  impossible 
as  well  as  of  no  particular  advantage  to  have  a  direct 
election  for  members  and  the  election  of  parliaments 
can  serve  as  the  first  stage  of  selection ;   and 

Whereas,  it  is  indispensable  for  their  independence 
that  the  members  should  be  freely  chosen  by  the 
respective  parliaments  themselves  and  not  by  govern- 
ments or  executives ; 

And,  whereas,  by  way  of  limiting  to  a  workable  pro- 
portion the  number  represented,  there  should  be  two 
members  for  everj''  independent  State; 

Whereas,  also,  it  is  desirable  that  all  opinions  should 
have  a  hearing,  that  all  printed  matter  from  whatever 
source  and  of  whatever  character  should  be  admitted  to 
the  Library,  classed  and  at  the  disposal  of  the  public 
in  the  public  Reading  Room,  which  should  be  open  to  all 
persons  of  over  twenty-one  years  of  age ;  and 

No  distinction  should  be  made  between  the  sexes  in 
connection  with  these  presents ; 

It  is  hereby  agreed,  etc. 


A  SOCIETY   (OR  LEAGUE)   OF  NATIONS      303 

I  have  also  drawn  up  the  following  further  pre- 
amble to  a  suggested  protocol  dealing  with  matters 
apart  from  the  constitution  of  the  Society  of  Na- 
tions itself  but  closely  correlated  to  its  objects  and 
scope : 

Suggested  Preamble  to  a  Protocol  to  be  Annexed 

TO  THE  Above 

Furthermore,  having  in  view  the  universal  interest 
attaching  to  all  efforts  to  promote  reduction  of  the  burden 
of  armaments,  the  peaceable  adjustment  of  conflicts 
involving  vital  interests  or  national  honour,  and  the 
amicable  settlement  of  all  questions  dangerous  for  inter- 
national peace,  and  the  hope  that  the  ultimate  futility 
of  armed  peace  be  rendered  possible ; 

And  whereas  by  special  agreements  the  Powers  in 
1899  and  1907  dealt  with  methods  for  the  peaceable 
adjustment  of  all  international  conflicts ; 

But  whereas  conflicts  arise  chiefly  out  of  matters  of 
rivalry  connected  with  territorial  aggrandisement  and 
expansion,  or  out  of  the  possible  exclusion,  for  the  benefit 
of  particular  States,  of  the  trade  and  enterprise  of  other 
States,  from  existing  or  possible  markets ; 

And  whereas  in  China,  Central  Africa,  and  Morocco 
the  principle  of  equality  of  treatment,  without  distinction 
of  nationality,  has  been  permanently  adopted  as  a  funda- 
mental condition  in  connection  with  economic  expansion 
in  these  regions,  and  whereas  most  of  the  Powers  have  al- 
ready expressed  their  attachment  to  this  principle  of 
equality ; 

And  whereas  the  High  Contracting  Parties  have  agreed 
that  when  any  such  High  Contracting  Parties  shall 
acquire  dominion  or  any  dominant  influence  over  terri- 
tory outside  Eiuope,  by  way  of  annexation,  protectorate, 


304  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

lease,  sphere  of  influence,  or  otherwise,  such  acquisition 
shall  be  subject  to  the  condition  that  absolute  equality 
of  treatment,  whether  by  way  of  import  or  export  duties, 
concessions,  privileges,  and  economic  matters  of  all  kinds, 
shall  be  granted,  maintained,  or  recognised,  as  the  case 
may  be,  in  regard  to  the  subjects  and  citizens  of  all  States 
without  distinction ; 

And  whereas  it  is  desirable  to  generalise  the  application 
of  the  principle  of  "buffer"  zones  at  present  in  actual 
practice  as  between  Burmah  and  Siam,  and  as  between 
Sweden  and  Norway  and  thus  lessen  the  suspicious  rivalry 
which  leads  nations  to  compete  against  each  other  in 
accentuation  of  their  frontier  defences. 

And  whereas  the  High  Contracting  Parties  have  agreed 
to  regard  a  zone  on  either  side  of  their  frontier  as  neu- 
tralized within  which  no  fortification  shall  be  erected 
or  armed  forces  maintained,  contiguous  Powers  to  arrange 
the  width  of  such  neutralised  zone  between  them  in 
accordance  with  existing  circumstances  and  the  configura- 
tion of  the  soil ; 

It  is  hereby  agreed,  etc. 


CHAPTER  XV 


America's  mission 


President  Wilson's  peace  propositions  cannot, 
it  has  been  seen,  be  regarded  as  a  cut-and-dried, 
take-or-leave-it  offer  of  peace.  And  even  they  do 
not  lift  the  war  out  of  a  certain  egotistic  blindness, 
which  posterity  may  lay  to  the  charge  of  our  gener- 
ation. Vaguely  many  feel  there  is  throughout 
mankind  an  inner  Drang,  an  impulsion  to  which 
statesmen  are  not  philosophic  enough  to  give  expres- 
sion. We  would  like  to  link  it  up,  in  the  sequence 
of  historic  causation,  with  something  more  worthy 
of  its  bloodshed,  and  suffering,  and  irreparable 
destruction  of  the  patrimony  of  generations  to 
come,  than  a  number  of  matters  which  could  and 
can,  be  much  better  settled  by  leisurely  negotia- 
tion than  by  violence,  and  some  of  which  it  may  be 
difficult  to  settle  at  all  while  men's  nerves  are  still 
trembling  with  anger  and  their  hands  still  bear  the 
blood  stains  of  battle. 

We  search  in  vain  for  its  justification,  and  we  have 
to  fall  back  on  excuses  which  will  take  it  beyond 
the  volition  of  statesmen. 

Changes  are  taking  place  which  were  never  at 
the  outset  dreamt  of.     The  conversion  of  Germany 


306  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

by  defeat  from  a  powerful  autocracy  into  perhaps 
a  still  more  powerful  republican  commonwealth, 
a  federation  through  defeat  of  Southern  Europe 
into  a  geographical  entity  capable  of  giving  scope 
to  inner  autonomy  while  outwardly  uniting  its 
different  races  for  their  common  weal  seem  to  be 
among  its  concrete  impending  results.  On  the 
other  hand,  victory  possibly  evolving  into  reaction 
for  self-defence,  with  three  of  the  great  allied  na- 
tions forming  "pockets",  as  it  were,  on  the  map  of 
Europe,  seems  to  be  another. 

The  uncritical  optimists,  the  Candides  of  our  own 
time,  turn  their  self-confident  faces  from  the  warn- 
ings of  history.  They  condemn  as  impractical 
any  distinction  between  causes  and  occasions.  Like 
superficial  administrators,  they  single  out  the  occa- 
sion, the  crime,  the  individual  volition,  and  think 
that  in  surrounding  and  capturing  the  criminal 
they  have  quenched  the  source  of  the  crime. 

Yet  those  who  have  watched  the  evolution  of  our 
own  time  see  its  effects  without  being  able  to  dis- 
cern any  stages  in  the  process  of  its  development. 
And  when  we  cast  our  vision  along  the  stream  of 
ages,  we  seem  to  discern  impulses,  racial  tendencies 
of  mankind,  which  lie  beyond  the  range  of  individ- 
ual volition,  blind  impulses  that  lead  whole  peoples 
to  their  doom,  inner  forces  of  destruction  which  con- 
sume some,  outer  forces  of  destruction  which  move 
masses  of  men  against  each  other,  as  if  they  were  as 
dependent  on  cosmic  phenomena  as  inundations  and 
earthquakes.     Babylon,  Athens,   Carthage,   Egypt, 


AMERICA'S  MISSION  307 

Rome,  in  turn  bear  witness  to  the  one,  as  the 
mysterious  westward  push  of  Celt,  Saxon,  Slav, 
Hun  attest  the  other.  Does  not  the  present  War 
present  features  not  unlike  a  Volkerwanderung, 
such  as  historians,  sociologists  and  psychologists 
ascribe  to  over-population  on  the  one  hand,  and 
to  insufficient  accessible  food  to  feed  it  on  the  other. 
An  island  State  possessing  ships  enough  armed  and 
unarmed  to  insure  its  ability  to  protect  its  overseas 
settlements  has  a  safety  valve  through  which  its 
overflow  can  escape  automatically,  while  the  bal- 
ance of  food  necessary  to  feed  its  home  population 
automatically  flows  in  as  required.  A  State  which 
has  not  these  advantages  and  which  by  sea  and  by 
land  can  be  forced  by  its  neighbour  to  rely  on  its 
own  resources  solely  to  feed  its  population  and  its 
industries,  may  be  exposed,  when  its  population 
and  its  industries  reach  a  certain  point,  to  the  burst- 
ing of  its  valveless  boilers,  and  once  more  we  may 
have  been  witnessing  the  phenomenon  of  invading 
hordes  moving  westward  as  if  in  search  of  food,  of 
populations  as  if  grown  out  of  proportion  to  their 
available  resources,  breaking  through  the  frontiers 
which  contained  them. 

The  aim  of  civilised  man  is,  or  at  any  rate  ought 
to  be,  to  emancipate  his  existence  from  such 
cataclysms,  to  make  himself  independent  as  far 
as  possible  of  physical  phenomena.  He  clothes 
and  houses  himself  against  the  rigours  of  climate 
and  season.  He  is  no  longer  dependent  on  the 
domestic  harvest  for  his  food.  He  is  constantly 
overcoming  obstacles  of  distance.     He  is  eradicating 


308      ,    COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

disease,  crime  and  other  dangers  to  life.  And 
during  the  last  half-century  efforts  had  been  made 
to  bring  about  a  similar  betterment  in  the  inter- 
national relations  of  mankind. 

Posterity  will  certainly  wish  for  the  enlighten- 
ment future  historians  may  be  able  to  give  it  with 
more  detachment  than  can  be  expected  from  those 
who  have  lived  through  the  great  tragedy. 

Yet  those  who  have  been  close  to  events  can 
perhaps  see  later  some  of  the  seams  and  defects 
on  the  canvas  of  the  panorama  which  may  wear 
off  under  the  erosion  of  time,  and  anyhow,  one  of 
the  facts  for  posterity  will  be  the  way  this  genera- 
tion views  and  judges  the  War. 

This  War  has  been  described  by  one,  if  not  more 
than  one  writer,  as  "a  war  to  end  war",  and  this 
idea  seems  to  some  extent  to  underlie  President 
Wilson's  idea  of  what  the  War  means.  A  war  to 
end  war  implies  a  peace  from  which  the  causes  and 
dangers  of  future  war  will  be  eliminated.  Cannot 
this  devout  wish  of  all  mankind  be  expressed  with 
more  psychological  precision  by  saying  that  electors 
should  choose  as  their  representatives  men  who  are 
responsible  and  that  the  object  for  which  they  are 
chosen  should  be  to  build  up  a  more  logical,  more 
reasonable  condition  of  things  than  that  which  failed 
to  prevent  the  present  War  ? 

There  is  a  current  optimism  about  the  "ending" 
of  war  which  assumes  that  peace,  not  war,  is  natural 
to  man.  There  is  nothing  in  nature  or  in  history 
to  bear  out  such  an  assumption.     Moreover,  just 


AMERICA'S  MISSION  309 

as  a  spark  can  start  a  conflagration,  so  any  petty 
monarch  or  community  can  fire  the  first  shot  that 
sets  the  world  ablaze.  The  monarch  of  Montenegro 
has  played  the  part  of  the  spark  in  at  least  two  wars  ! 

Still,  if  the  spark  does  not  alight  on  inflammable 
material,  it  does  or  may  do  no  harm. 

Inflammable  material  unfortunately  is  scattered 
everywhere,  and  is  largely  beyond  the  scope  of 
international  arrangement. 

International  ill-feeling  begotten  of  heated  contro- 
versy and  fanned  in  the  press  is  one  form  of  it. 
Munitions  factories  dependent  for  dividends  on 
the  fear  of  unpreparedness  for  war  are  another. 
Protective  tariffs  directed  against  particular  coun- 
tries are  a  third.  Politicians  in  quest  of  sensa- 
tional publicity  are  a  fourth.     And  so  on. 

An  optimist  delusion  is  that  war  is  the  handi- 
work of  statesmen  and  that,  as  it  is  the  poor  who 
with  their  lives  pay  the  price  of  it,  it  is  necessarily 
unpopular.  Evidence  tends  quite  the  other  way. 
There  seems  at  all  times  to  be  a  sufficient  latent 
leaven  of  hatred  at  the  core  of  every  nation  to 
insure  popularity  to  any  war  a  responsible  govern- 
ment is  likely  to  wage. 

President  Wilson  is  evidently  quite  alive  to 
the  danger  of  the  inflammable  material,  seeing 
that  he  asks  States  to  reform  themselves  and  exacts 
as  a  primary  condition  of  peace  the  suppression  of 
"militarism  ",  which  means  nothing  if  not  an  aggres- 
sive policy,  a  policy  of  threatening  or  hinting  at 
war  as  an  alternative  for  argument  and  reason. 


310  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

Some  forms  of  inflammable  material  can  be  dealt 
with  by  legislation.  Others  are  dependent  on 
enlightenment,  on  the  growth  and  promotion  of 
reciprocal  knowledge  of  the  geographical  conditions, 
economic  requirements  and  social  ideals  of  different 
nations.  Closer  international  contact  than  hereto- 
fore between  statesmen,  by  personal  meetings 
for  the  joint  discussion  of  the  problems  arising  out 
of  conflicting  interests  which  are  as  unavoidable 
in  the  life  of  nations  as  in  that  of  individuals,  may 
become  one  of  the  most  effective  methods  by  which 
danger  of  war  can  be  averted.  If  the  proposed 
Society  or  League  of  Nations  went  no  further  than 
to  bring  about  the  organisation  of  periodical  meet- 
ings of  such  a  kind,  the  boon  to  the  world  would 
largely  contribute  to  redeem  the  War  from  the 
charge  at  any  rate  of  futility. 

President  Wilson's  statement  of  the  principles 
which  should  govern  a  liberated  Europe  for  the 
future  is  an  afterthought  which  has  arisen  during 
the  War  and  has  no  connection  with  its  causes. 
It  is  so  big  with  potentialities  that,  living  in  the 
detail  of  our  daily  controversies,  we  hardly  realise 
its  immensity.  Yet  it  is  but  the  contemporary 
expression  of  the  same  impulse  which  animated  the 
champions  of  Freedom  who  shook  off  the  Roman 
yoke,  who  met  at  Runnymede,  who  flocked  to  the 
banner  of  Cromwell,  who  signed  the  Declaration 
of  Independence,  who  proclaimed  les  droits  de 
Vhomme,  who  fought  Napoleon  and  who  are  now 
fighting  Napoleon's  imitators,  an  impulse  of  reac- 


AMERICA'S  MISSION  311 

tion  which  will  always  resist  those  who  endeavour 
to  assert  a  mastery.  In  this  expansion  of  the  im- 
pulse to  a  wider  area  of  mankind  the  spokesman  of 
the  greatest  free  community  in  the  world  is  only 
delivering  a  time-honoured  message  of  freedom 
to  fellow-men  still  under  the  yoke  of  unchosen 
masters.  His  message  has  been  like  the  battle 
cry  of  the  Crusaders,  who  crossed  the  then  ocean 
to  liberate  Palestine  and  deliver  Christendom  from 
the  yoke  of  Islam.  But  if  it  is  to  remain  a  crusade, 
the  President  must  remain  true  to  the  principles 
he  has  enunciated  and  apply  them  with  the  justice 
and  universality  of  a  Gospel.  God  grant  that  he 
avoid  the  temptation  to  descend  into  the  arena  of 
revenge  or  conquest,  and  that  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  conscious  of  their  gigantic  mis- 
sion and  injfluenced  by  the  lofty  and  eternal  prin- 
ciples of  Washington,  will  back  their  leader  in  the 
stern  determination  with  which  they  entered  the 
War  to  put  an  end  not  only  to  it,  but,  as  far  as 
possible,  to  causes  and  possible  causes  of  war  in  the 
future,  for  the  benefit  of  Mankind  generally.  The 
principles  inscribed  on  behalf  of  the  United  States 
have  been  adopted  by  all  the  Allied  governments 
as  a  promise  to  the  Peoples  whom  they  have 
the  good  fortune  to  rule  —  good  fortune  of  wealth, 
good  fortune  of  birth  or  even  good  fortune  of  in- 
tellect. They  are  a  gospel  of  perpetual  application 
and  woe  betide  the  classes,  oligarchies  or  kings  who 
on  selfish,  patriotic  or  revengeful  grounds  defraud 
them  of  the  right  for  which  they  have  been  told  they 
shed  their  blood  and  impoverished  the  future. 


NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  XV 

Some  Extracts  from  President  Wilson's  Messages 
(January  to  April,  1917) 

Why  We  Are  At  War 

January  22,  1917.  I  only  take  it  for  granted  that 
mere  terms  of  peace  between  the  belhgerents  will  not 
satisfy  even  the  belligerents  themselves. 

Mere  agreements  may  not  make  peace  secure.  It 
will  be  absolutely  necessary  that  a  force  be  created  as  a 
guarantor  of  the  permanency  of  the  settlement  so  much 
greater  than  the  force  of  any  nation  now  engaged  in  any 
alliance  hitherto  formed  or  projected  that  no  nation, 
no  probable  combination  of  nations,  could  face  or  with- 
stand it. 

If  the  peace  presently  to  be  made  is  to  endure  it  must 
be  a  peace  made  secure  by  the  organized  major  force 
of  mankind. 

Only  a  tranquil  Europe  can  be  a  stable  Europe.  There 
must  be  not  only  a  balance  of  power,  but  a  community 
of  powers  not  organized  rivalries,  but  an  organized  com- 
mon peace. 

It  would  be  accepted  in  humiliation,  under  duress, 
at  an  intolerable  sacrifice,  and  would  leave  a  sting,  a 
resentment,  a  bitter  memory,  upon  which  terms  of  peace 
would  rest,  not  permanently  but  only  as  upon  quick- 
sand. 


AMERICA'S  MISSION  313 

February  6,  1917.  I  do  not  desire  any  hostile  conflict 
with  the  Imperial  German  Government.  We  are  the 
sincere  friends  of  the  German  people  and  earnestly 
desire  to  remain  at  peace  with  them.  We  shall  not 
believe  that  they  are  hostile  to  us  until  we  are  obliged 
to  believe  it;  and  we  purpose  nothing  more  than  the 
reasonable  defence  of  the  undoubted  rights  of  our  people. 
We  wish  to  reserve  no  selfish  ends.  We  seek  merely  to 
stand  true  alike  in  thought  and  in  action  to  the  immemorial 
principles  of  our  people  which  I  sought  to  express  in  my 
address  to  the  Senate  only  two  weeks  ago.  We  seek 
merely  to  vindicate  our  right  to  liberty  and  justice  and 
an  unmolested  life.  There  are  the  bases  of  peace  not 
war. 

February  26,  1917.  It  is  not  of  material  interest 
merely  that  we  are  thinking.  It  is  rather  of  fundamental 
human  rights,  chief  of  all,  of  the  right  to  life  itself.  I 
am  thinking  not  only  of  the  rights  of  Americans  to  go 
and  come  about  their  proper  business  by  way  of  the  sea, 
but  also  of  something  much  deeper,  much  more  funda- 
mental than  that.  I  am  thinking  of  those  rights  of 
humanitj'^  without  which  there  is  no  civilization.  My 
theme  is  of  those  great  principles  of  compassion  and  of 
protection  which  mankind  has  sought  to  throw  about 
human  lives,  the  lives  of  noncombatants,  the  lives  of 
men  who  are  peacefully  at  work,  keeping  the  industrial 
processes  of  the  world  quick  and  vital,  the  lives  of  women 
and  children,  and  of  those  who  supply  the  labor  which 
ministers  to  their  sustenance. 

I  cannot  imagine  any  man  with  American  principles 
at  his  heart  hesitating  to  defend  these  things. 

April  2,  1917.  Our  object  now  as  then  is  to  vindicate 
the  principle  of  peace  and  justice  in  the  life  of  the  world 


314  COLLAPSE  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 

as  against  selfish  and  autocratic  power  and  to  set  up 
amongst  the  really  free  and  self-governed  peoples  of  the 
world  such  a  concert  of  purpose  and  of  action  as  will 
henceforth  insure  the  observance  of  these  principles. 

We  are  at  the  beginning  of  an  age  in  which  it  will 
be  insisted  that  the  same  standards  of  conduct  and  of 
responsibility  for  wrong  done  shall  be  observed  among 
nations  and  their  governments  that  are  observed  among 
the  individual  citizens  of  civilized  States. 

We  have  no  quarrel  with  the  German  people.  We 
have  no  feeling  toward  them  but  one  of  sympathy  and 
friendship.  It  was  not  upon  their  impulse  that  their 
government  acted  in  entering  upon  this  war.  It  was  not 
with  their  previous  knowledge  or  approval. 

We  are  glad,  now  that  we  see  the  facts  with  no  veil 
of  false  pretence  about  them,  to  fight  thus  for  the  ultimate 
peace  of  the  world  and  for  the  liberation  of  its  peoples, 
the  German  people  included ;  for  the  rights  of  nations 
great  and  small  and  the  privilege  of  men  everywhere  to 
choose  their  way  of  life  and  of  obedience.  The  world 
must  be  made  safe  for  democracy.  Its  peace  must  be 
planted  upon  the  trusted  foundations  of  political  liberty. 

We  have  no  selfish  ends  to  serve.  We  desire  no  con- 
quest, no  dominion.  We  seek  no  indemnities  for  om*- 
selves,  no  material  compensation  for  the  sacrifices  we 
shall  freely  make.  We  are  but  one  of  the  champions 
of  the  rights  of  mankind.  We  shall  be  satisfied  when 
those  rights  have  been  made  as  secure  as  the  faith  and 
freedom  of  the  nation  can  make  them. 

Just  because  we  fight  without  rancor  and  without 
selfish  objects,  seeking  nothing  for  ourselves  but  what  we 
shall  wish  to  share  with  all  free  peoples,  we  shall,  I  feel 
confident,  conduct  our  operations  as  belligerents  with- 
out passion  and  ourselves  observe  with  proud  punctilio 


AMERICA'S  MISSION  315 

the  principles  of  right  and  of  fair  play  we  profess  to  be 
fighting  for. 

We  are,  let  me  say  again,  the  sincere  friends  of  the 
German  people,  and  shall  desire  nothing  so  much  as  the 
early  reestablishment  of  intimate  relations  of  mutual 
advantage  between  us  —  however  hard  it  may  be  for 
them,  for  the  time  being,  to  believe  that  this  is  spoken 
from  our  hearts. 

But  the  right  is  more  precious  than  peace  and  we  shall 
fight  for  the  things  which  we  have  always  carried  nearest 
om*  hearts  —  for  democracy,  for  the  right  of  those  who 
submit  to  authority  to  have  a  voice  in  their  own  govern- 
ments, for  the  rights  and  liberties  of  small  nations,  for  a 
universal  dominion  of  right  by  such  a  concert  of  free 
peoples  as  shall  bring  peace  and  safety  to  all  nations  and 
make  the  world  itself  at  last  free. 

To  such  a  task  we  can  dedicate  our  lives  and  our  for- 
tunes, everything  that  we  are  and  everything  that  we 
have,  with  the  pride  of  those  who  know  that  the  day  has 
come  when  America  is  privileged  to  spend  her  blood  and 
her  might  for  the  principles  that  gave  her  birth  and  happi- 
ness and  the  peace  which  she  has  treasured.  God  help- 
ing her,  she  can  do  no  other. 


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